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ABSTRACT
The Swazi kingdom grew out of the pressures associated with 
competition for trade and for the rich resources of Shiselweni. 
While centred on this area it acquired some of its characteristic 
features - notably a regimental system, and the dominance of a 
Dlamini aristocracy. Around 1815 the Swazi came under pressure 
from the South, and were forced to colonise the land lying 
north of the Lusutfu. Here they remained for some years a 
nation under arms, as they plundered local peoples, and were 
themselves swept about by the currents of the Mfecane.
In time a more settled administration emerged, as the aristocracy 
spread out from the royal centres at Ezulwini, and this process 
accelerated under Mswati as he subdued recalcitrant chiefdoms, 
and restructured the regiments. Consequantly, by the time 
Mswati died in 1865, Dlamini power was sufficiently entrenched 
for there to be no serious disturbance, and for a regency to 
function smoothly for the following decade.
Externally the dominant influence was the Zulu, who continually 
threatened the kingdom’s stability. The Swazi were forced by 
these attacks to look for allies in the Boers, and to make 
several territorial cessions from 1846. Nevertheless, the 
relations they established were not markedly.unequal, since 
the Republic were dependent on the Swazi in various ways. 
Consequently, the Swazi were able to take charge of the lowveld 
in the north, and by the 1860s reached the pinnacle of their 
power.
The consolidation of the South African Republic following the 
British annexation, and the discovery of gold, meant that this 
freedom was gradually lost, and in the 1880s pressure mounted 
on Swaziland itself. The clearest index of this lies in the 
country's conquest by concessions, which eventually so eroded 
the social fabric of the country that a pretext was given for 
the Republic and Britain to intervene.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost my thanks are due to my supervisor, Dr. Shula 
Marks, who introduced me to southern African studies, and without 
whose encouragement and forebearance this thesis would not have 
been written. A debt of gratitude is also owing to all those 
who gave their assistance and encouragement to my researches 
in Swaziland - in particular to Prince Makhungu Dlamini, who 
opened doors which would have otherwise remained closed; to 
Arthur Dlamini for giving me the benefit of his wide knowledge 
of Swazi history and oral historians, and for his unstinting 
help in a variety of other ways; to Mr. T. Simelane and 
Mr. F. Buckham for their excellent translations of interviews; 
to Mr. J. Masson and to Mike and Fiona Armitage for smoothing 
my way after my arrival in Swaziland; and to a host of officials 
from the Department of Local Administration and Community 
Development who helped with my interviewing in their individual 
districts.
The staff of a large number of libraries and archives assisted 
in the course of my research, who are too numerous to acknowledge 
individually. In addition to a general word of thanks, however,
I should like to single out for special acknowledgement the 
archivists and librarians at the Society for the Propogation 
of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, and the Killie Campbell Africana 
Library, Miss M. Farmer of the Gubbins Library, University of 
the Witwatersrand and Mrs. B.E. Rothgeisser of the same
institution for her translations of German mission sources.
A Hayter scholarship from the Department of Education and 
Science, and an equipment grant from the University of London, 
Central Research Fund, provided the funds which made this 
thesis financially possible, and their assistance is gratefully 
acknowledged.
Lastly, I should like to thank David Hedges for access to his 
notes from the Arquivo Historico de Mocambique, Maputo, and his 
translations of these; Helen Malcomess who painstakingly typed 
the manuscript of this thesis over a none too enjoyable 
Christmas; and most of all my wife, Christine, who prodded and 
proof read, and whose support and encouragement during the 
course of my research cannot be adequately expressed.
C O N T E N T S
Title page i
Abstract ii-iii
Acknowledgements iv-v
List of Maps and Figures vii
Abbreviations viii-ix
Map x
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER II THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SWAZI STATE 27
CHAPTER III THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SWAZI STATE -
ADMINISTRATIVE RE-ORGANISATION AND 
ZULU ATTACKS, 1839 - 1852 76
CHAPTER IV SWAZI-BOER RELATIONS, 1852 - 1865 117
CHAPTER V DEEPENING AND WIDENING OF DLAMINI
POWER, 1852 - 1865 164
CHAPTER VI INTERREGNUM: 1865 - 1874 212
CHAPTER VII MBANDZENI: 1875 - 1881 268
CHAPTER VIII REPUBLICAN PRESSURE AND THE BEGINNINGS
OF CONCESSIONS, 1881 - 1886 336
CHAPTER IX THE CONQUEST BY CONCESSIONS,
1886 - 1889 385
CONCLUSION 426
APPENDIX 429
BIBLIOGRAPHY 434
vii
LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES
MAPS
1. Modern Swaziland x
2. Swaziland - Vegetation Types 12
3. Swaziland - Relief 15
4. Swaziland - % Better Arable Land by
Subcatchments 17.
5. Swaziland - Drought Hazard 19
6. Chiefdoms c. 1820 39
7. Transvaal 95
8. Mozambique Chiefdoms c. 1860 203
9. Transvaal Districts - 1873 236
10. Disputed Border Area - 1880 330
11. Mineral Concessions Granted in 1880s 365
FIGURES
1. Marriage to a woman of one’s father’s brother’s
clan 51
2. Marriage to classificatory mother’s brother’s
daughter 51
viii
ABBREVIATIONS
A.B.B. Albasini Brieweboek.
A.H.M. Arquivo Historico de Mozambique.
A.Y.B. Archives Year Book of South African History.
C.L. Cory Library for Historical Research.
C.O. Colonial Office.
Cod. Codices.
E.C.A. Executive Council Archive, Natal.
E.V.R. Eerste Volksraad Notules.
F.C. Forbes Collection.
F.P. Fynn Papers.
G.H.N. Government House Records, Natal.
G.H.Z. Government House Records, Zululand.
G.P. Garden Papers.
H.C. High Commissioner.
K.C.L. Killie Campbell Africana Library.
L. Lydenburg Argief.
L.L. Lydenburg Landdrost Argief.
Mac.P . Macleod Papers.
M.P. Miller Papers.
N. A. Natal Archives.
P.A. Transvaalse Staatsargief, Pretoria.
P.P. Parliamentary Papers.
P.R.O. Public Records Office.
S.A.R. South African Republic.
S.A.A.R. South African Archival Records.
S.C. Soutter Versameling (Collection).
ix
S.N. Superintendent van Naturelle.
S.N.A. Secretary for Native Affairs, Natal.
S.P. James Stuart Papers.
S.P.G. Society for the Propogation of the Gospel.
5.5. Argief Staatsekretaris.
S.St. Secretary of State.
5.5.A. The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th 
and 20th Centuries.
Sw.A. Swaziland Government Archives.
T.S.C. Sir Theophilus Shepstone Collection.
U.A. Utrecht Landdrost Argief.
U.R. Argief Uitvoerende Raad.
U.W.A. University of the Witwatersrand Archives.
Wa.A. Wakkerstroom Landdrost Argief.
W.M.M.S. Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society.
MAP 1 x
MODERN SWAZILAND
Mozambique
Hh<jhl
Transvaal
O F S N atal
•  Piggs Peak
C ape Province •Tshaneni
Lomahasl
HHOHHO
•  Mbabane
Ezulwini
LobaAiba
•  Siteki
•  Manzini
•Malkerns
• Bunya
LUBOMBO
Lusutfi MANZINI
•  Mankayane •Siphofaneni
Big Bi
•  Hlathikhulu
•Maloma
SHISELWENI
.Mahamba —,
iwavum; I__
Dwaleni
•  Mlosheni
 District boundaries
Lavumisa
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The historiography of pre-colonial Swaziland is not especially 
strong. There are a number of studies which touch on the subject, 
but in one way or another these are all limited in scope. Until 
recently, for example, there has been a mainly albocentric bias, 
and comparatively little has been written on the Swazi themselves; 
Symington and Van Rooyen concentrate on the relations of the Boer 
republics with the Swazi (1), Watson and Boyce focus on con­
cessions (2), Garson confines himself primarily to the diplomatic 
manoeuvering between the South African Republic and Britain over 
the status of Swaziland (3), and Perkins looks at missions (4). 
Only Matsebula gives an account centred firmly on the Swazi them­
selves, and his is more of a survey than a detailed analysis, 
which only partly explores the data available from the archives 
and from oral tradition (5).
Indeed, with the exception of this and two other much narrower
(1) F.C. Symington, ’Swaziland tot 1890’, (M.A, Thesis, University 
of South Africa, 1941); T.S. Van Rooyen, ’Die Verhouding 
tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die Geskiedenis
van die Oos-Transvaal Tot 1882’, A.Y.B., 1951, I, (Cape 
Town, 1951).
(2) E. Watson, ’The History of the Little Free State and 
Swaziland affairs relating thereto’, (M.A. Thesis, University 
of the Witwatersrand, 1941); A.N. Boyce, 'The Swaziland 
Concessions and their Political Consequences 1876-1908’,
(M.A. Thesis, University of South Africa, 1947).
(3) N.G. Garson, 'The Swaziland Question and the Road to the Sea. 
1887-1895', A.Y.B., 1957, II, (Parow, 1957).
(4) F.J. Perkins, ’A History of Christian Missions in Swaziland
to 1910’, (Ph.D Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1974).
(5) J.S.M. Matsebula, A History of Swaziland, (Cape Town, 1972).
2studies by Swazi historians (6), it is usually more rewarding to 
turn to the writings of social anthropologists (7). Hilda Kuper, 
in particular, provides an unrivalled insight into the functioning 
of Swazi politics, which is neither as synchronic or Dlamini 
orientated as one might be led to suppose (8). In addition to 
its introductory chapters it is exceptionally rich in historical 
allusions, as a glance at the following footnotes will readily 
confirm, besides drawing on extensive regional data from the 
south and north-east. Nevertheless, An African Aristocracy does 
not purport to be an historical text. It contains no systematic 
exposition of the evolution of centre-regional relations, still 
less of their interaction with pressures from outside, and tends 
to view them for the most part from the perspective of the ruling 
group. For all these reasons there is room for a more broadly 
based historical contribution, and it is hoped that this study 
will partly meet that need.
(6) A.M. Dlamini, 'Expansion and Survival Policy of the Swazi 
Nation1, (mimeo n.d. Luyengo, Swaziland): A.B. Nxumalo 'Oral 
Tradition concerning Mswati II', Occasional Paper No. I of 
the School of Education, University of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, (Swaziland, April 1976).
(7) H. Beemer, 'Notes on the Diet of the Swazi in the Protectorate', 
African Studies, XIII, (1939); H. Kuper, 'A Ritual of King- 
ship among the Swazi', Africa, XIV, 5, (1944); H. Kuper, An 
African Aristocracy: Rank Among the Swazi, (London, 1947);
H. Kuper, The Swazi, (London, 1952); A.J.B. Hughes, Swazi 
Land Tenure, (Institute for Social Research, University of 
Natal, Durban, 1964); H. Kuper, 'Kinship among the Swazi', 
in A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde (eds.), African Systems 
of Kinship and Marriage, (London, 1950); B.A. Marwick, The 
Swazi, (Cambridge, 1940); A.C. Myburgh, The Tribes of the 
Barberton District, Union of South Africa, Department of 
Native Affairs, Ethnological Publications No. 25, (Pretoria, 
1949); A.C. Myburgh, Die Stamme van die Distrik Carolina,
Unie Van Suid-Afrika, Department van Naturellesake, Etnologiese 
Reeks Nr. 34, (Pretoria, 1956).
(8) Kuper, Aristocracy.
Our current state of knowledge on pre-colonial Swaziland is at 
least partly a reflection of the dearth of published primary 
material. Compared with the Zulu or Southern Sotho, or a number 
of other southern African chiefdoms, Swaziland has little in the 
way of traveller, or settler or missionary accounts (9). 
Similarly, as far as British Blue Books are concerned, or other 
official compilations, Swaziland figures only briefly and inter­
mittently in the published account. Still more significantly, 
Swazi history has had no Bryant or MacGregor to make a systematic 
collection of its oral traditions (10). Both Honey and Miller 
have gathered useful information, as did Stuart more briefly in 
his early Swaziland days, but for the most part these are 
unpublished or not readily accessible, and are not remotely as 
comprehensive as the other studies just named (11).
The main sources for this thesis are therefore archival and oral.
(9) The only significant ones are E.P. Mathers, Golden South 
Africa, or the Gold Fields revisited; being further glimpses 
of the gold fields of South Africa (London, 1888); P. Hope/
Journey from Natal via the South African Republic, and 
across the Lebombo Mountains to Loren^ Marques or Delagoa 
Bay, and thence to the Gold-Fields near Leydenberg’,
Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, XLIV (1874);
G.R. Von Wielligh, Langs Die Lebombo^ (Pretoria, 1928), 
(travellers); D. Forbes, My Life in South Africa, (London,
1938); K.C.L. M.P., MS 1478," A.M. Miller," *A Short History 
of Swazieland' from the Times of Swazieland, V.I, Nos. 1-3,
6-12, Bremersdorp, June 5 - Aug. 21, 1897 pettiers);
T. Wangemann, Maleo en Sekoekoeni, (Cape Town, 1957);
C.C. Watts, Dawn in Swaziland, ^London, 1922), (missionaries). 
Even periodical missionary publications are scanty, com­
prising The Report of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary 
Society; Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Notices, both 1844- 
1847, 1881 ff; and The Net, 1875 ff.
(10) A.T. Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, (London 1929); 
J.C. MacGregor, Basutu Traditions. (Cape Town, 1905).
(11) Sw.A., de S.G.M. Honey, (Mss.), 'A History of Swaziland1; K.C.L.
M.P., and in particular MS 1478, 'Short History'; K.C.L,, 
Stuart Papers.
Archival sources have been used in the main to document Swaziland’s 
external relations; the Natal Archives for Swaziland's relations 
with Natal and the Zulu; the Transvaal Archives for relations with 
the Boers and the North Sotho; the Maputo Archives for relations 
with the Shangane, Tconga and the Portuguese; and the Colonial 
Office and Swaziland Archives for Swaziland’s conquest by con­
cessions. Oral sources on the other hand have been of mainly 
domestic significance, illuminating such areas as the incorporation 
of lesser chiefdoms in the expanding Swazi state,and the subsequent 
development of their relations with the Dlamini ruling group. Two 
points should, however, be made in this regard. First, although 
I have made extensive use of oral sources in this study, I make 
no claim to having adequately tapped Swazi traditions. In the 
absence of any earlier studies of Swazi traditional histories, 
the principle I adopted in conducting my fieldwork was to collect 
the dominant traditions of the principal chiefdoms in Swaziland, 
and more sophisticated analyses are now needed both by region and 
by chiefdom. Second, this modus operandi has tended to yield a 
certain type of information with an emphasis on the chiefdoms at 
times when their status was in flux. In practice what this means 
is an emphasis on the years up to the death of Mswati, after which 
a more dominant royal tradition reflects a more integrated Swazi 
state.
As indicated in the title to this thesis, its main purpose is to 
trace the evolution of the Swazi kingdom from its establishment 
to its subjugation, and to demonstrate the dynamic interaction of 
internal and external forces that is manifest throughout. Within 
that general framework a number of sub-themes are examined; the
5specific variant of the Nguni polity that the Swazi kingdom 
represents (Chapters I, II and III); the interaction of Boer and 
Swazi communities in the frontier zone of the eastern 'Trans-vaal' 
(Chapters III and IV); the continuities of Zulu policy towards 
Swaziland, and its enduring impact on Swazi politics (Chapters II, 
III, V and VI); the implications of Swaziland's collaboration with 
the Transvaal in the late 1860s and 1870s in their relations with 
other black groups (Chapters VI and VII); and the role of concessions 
in the underdevelopment and political enfeeblement of the Swazi 
state (Chapters VIII and IX). The span of time with which the 
thesis is concerned is from 1820 to 1890. 1890 marks the end
of effective Swazi autonomy, 1820, as I shall now argue, the 
effective beginning of the Swazi state.
Ngwane and Dlamini Origins
Swazi history, in one sense, begins in 1820, as it was then that 
the nations's principal elements combined. Eswatini, it is true, 
had existed much earlier, but without ever assuming a lasting 
character or shape (12). From roughly 1770 to 1815 it had com­
prised the modern district of Shiselweni, while before that it 
had shifted gradually south from Delagoa Bay,' and it was only 
with Sobhuza's expansion into the north in the years after 1820 
that modern Swaziland emerged in recognisable form. It is with 
the foundations of the Swazi state in the two decades after 1820 
that the second chapter is primarily concerned, but since much of 
what happened then was conditioned by what went before, a back­
ground to these developments will be given first.
(12) Meaning ’Swaziland', Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 15; S.P., 29392, 
File 91, 'Preliminary notes on the effect of European 
Influence on the natives of Swaziland', 2, 3 Jan. 1899;
Sw.A., R.C.S. 115/14, Encl. 'Historical Notes', by A.M. Marwick.
The history of the Ngwane, or at any rate their royal line the 
Dlamini, stretches back far into the past. According to 
genealogies collected by Stuart at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the Dlamini were able to trace their line of succession 
back some forty generations (13). Calculating on a basis of 
twenty-five years per generation, this would take us back well 
into the tenth century, and even making generous allowance for 
distortion through the inclusion of the names of regents and the 
subsidiary names of kings, we are still projected five or six 
hundred years back into the past; surely the most illustrious 
pedigree boasted by any South African ’group' (14).
Exactly who and where the Dlamini were in this period is less 
easy to say. For Bryant, they emerge briefly into the light of 
history as the Amankomazis and Vambes, recorded in Portuguese 
documents of the sixteenth century, having been led by Dlamini II 
from the upper Komati River to that part of the Lebombo mountains 
nearest Delagoa Bay (15) . In associating the Dlamini with the 
Vambe Bryant is probably correct. Both the Dlamini and a large 
number of other northern Nguni groups trace their origins to this 
Mbo nucleus, and the term Vambe is, as Bryant points out, almost 
unmistakeably the prefix 'Va' and 'Mbo', Bryant may even be 
right in associating the Mbo with the Makomatees (Amakomatis),
(13) S.P., File 74, 126, John Gama, 17 Dec. 1898.
(14) Bryant calculates on eighteen years per generation, but more 
recent scholarship has tended to take twenty-five to thirty 
years as a fairer average. See S. Marks, 'The traditions of 
the Natal 'Nguni': a second look at the work of A.T. Bryant', 
in L. Thompson (ed,), African Societies in southern Africa, 
(California, 1969), 128,
(15) Bryant, Olden Times, 288-90, 313-4.
7Komati, as he notes, is the tekela form of the Ntungwa Komanzi, 
and Mbo traditions point to the Komati River as their earliest 
point of dispersal. Where Bryant probably errs however, is in 
equating the Langa/Dlamini with the Mbo, and in seeing Dlamini 
as the leader of a single Mbo migration to the coast. There 
are indications, as Marks points out, of Mbo occupation of the 
south-eastern coastlands long before Bryant's supposed migrations, 
as well as of substantially earlier differentiation among its 
component groups. Similarly, there is little evidence to support 
the idea of Dlamini leading this movement, besides the recurrance 
of his name in Mbo genealogies and address names (izi Thakazelo) , 
and it is more likely that Dlamini and his namesakes were the 
leaders of various minor movements of various separate groups (16).
Whatever the. sequence and leadership of these migrations, Bryant 
pictures the Mbo as staying in the vicinity of Delagoa Bay for 
some considerable time, where they split into various sub-groupings 
of the Emalangeni, the Mkize, the Natal Dlamini and so on, before 
eventually 'quarrelling' and spreading south into Natal. Bryant 
places this movement between 1680 and 1730, but also accepts 
Mbandzeni's statement that this period of disruption coincided 
with the reign of the Ngwane leader, Dlamini III (17). Since on 
his own reckoning Dlamini III reigned from about 1760, Bryant 
clearly has a problem, and it is likely that what he has done is 
to conflate a number of entirely separate movements, spread over 
a considerable period of time. One part of these took place in 
the seventeenth century or before when groups like the Natal
(16) Marks, 'Traditions', 137-40; Bryant, Olden Times, 315-6.
(17) Ibid, 316-7*
8Dlamini and the Hlubi split off from the Mbo nucleus and moved 
south (18). A further and quite distinct series of secessions 
followed in the reign of Dlamini III, coinciding in this case 
with a sudden upsurge in trade (19). Smith talks of a rapid 
expansion in the volume of trade handled by Delagoa»Bay, taking 
place in the three decades after 1750, and there are various 
indications of simultaneous political dislocations (20). The 
Ngwane were rent by a series of dynastic feuds in these years, 
during which Magudlela and Hlubi were both excluded from power, 
while the Ndwandwe, with whom the Swazi had hitherto been 
associated, seem to have sheared off at roughly the same time (21).
On this last point my interpretation differs materially from 
Bryant’s. Bryant sees the Ngwane and Ndwandwe migrating together 
down the Lebombo before cutting inland to Magudu in the reigns 
of Langa and Ngwane, the Ndwandwe and Ngwane leaders respectively. 
Here they separated, the Ngwane doubling back across the Pongola 
River and the Ndwandwe gradually drifting south to the basins 
of the Mkuze and Black Mfolozi (22). A number of objections can 
be raised to Bryant's account. By 1810, as I have argued else­
where, the Ngwane and Ndwandwe parties had diverged to such an 
extent that it is difficult to see them separating such a short
(18) Marks, ’Traditions’, 140-1.
(19) Ibid, 141.
(20) A. Smith, ’The trade of Delagoa Bay as a factor in Nguni 
politics 1750-1835', in Thompson, African Societies,
173-4, 179-80.
(21) P.L. Bonner, ’Early State Formation among the Nguni: The 
relevance of the Swazi Case’, paper presented to a Conference 
on African History, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, 
September 1975, 8-9.
(22) Bryant, Olden Times, 158-9, 316-7. A partial separation 
had taken place on the Lebombo, with Ngwane and Ndwandwe 
marching down the northern and southern banks of the Pongola 
River respectively.
9while before (23). The early proliferation of Ngwane cadet 
branches and their simultaneous settlement in northern Zululand 
lends further weight to this argument. The Nxumalo, emaNcwangeni 
and iKohlo branches each have genealogies going back three or 
four generations before Zwide, while Gaza, the grandfather of 
Soshangane, was reputedly established at Etshaneni mountain just 
south of the Mkuze River by 1750 (24). Lastly, one may cite the 
lapsing of the marriage connection between the Ngwane and the 
Ndwandwe. Between the reign of Dlamini III and Sobhuza I no 
marriages were contracted between the Ngwane and Ndwandwe royal 
houses, despite their apparently preferred nature, which once 
again suggests the idea of a rupture in the reign of Ludvonga I 
or Dlamini III, which was only healed two or three generations 
later (25).
Once they had separated from the Ngwane the Ndwandwe moved hurriedly 
southwards. Their iKohlo branch established itself at Etshaneni 
mountain around 1750, and their main line probably arrived at 
Magudu at roughly the same time. The Ngwane moved down the 
Lebombo at a more leisurely pace, and only spread out into 
southern Swaziland in the latter part of Dlamini Ill's reign.
(23) Bonner, 'State Formation', 3-6.
(24) Bryant, Olden Times, 276-7, 448, In addition Luzipo Ka 
Nomageje, one of Stuart's few Ndwandwe informants, claimed 
there were a number of former Ndwandwe kings buried at Magudu, 
C. de B. Webb and J.B. Wright (eds), The James Stuart Archive 
of recorded oral evidence relating to the history of the Zulu 
and neighbouring peoples Vol. I,(Durban 1976), Evidence of 
Luzipo ka Nomageje 21 Nov. 1904.
(25) Matsebula, History, 6; interview Maboya Fakudze, 23 May 1970, 
Lobamba, Swaziland; interview Makhathi and Mnkonkolote 
Mkhatshwa and others, 12 April 1970, Elwandle, Swaziland,
10
It is unlikely that this migration took place in any single 
decisive movement in the sense that Bryant seems to suggest.
Tembe desires to dominate trade to the south probably underlay 
the conflict, and it was only after a protracted struggle that 
the Ngwane allowed themselves to be squeezed out to the west. 
Dlamini’s heir Ngwane was hidden at Godlwako in southern Swaziland, 
while Dlamini resisted Tembe pressures, and the latter’s burial 
on the Lebombo suggests a certain measure of success (26).
Indeed even Ngwane retained an interest on the east side of the 
Lebombo in the early part of his reign, as can be seen in the 
phrase "Ngwane wamahlabatshi", which links his name to the sandy 
places on the east side of the Lebombo (27). In time however 
the Ngwane were gradually pushed out. By the end of the 
eighteenth century the Tembe are supposed to have extended their 
control two hundred miles inland from Delagoa Bay and a hundred 
miles along the coast, and it was probably in the boom years 
from 1750 to the 1770s that they tightened their grip over the 
area and expelled dissident elements like the Ngwane (28).
As these pressures grew, the Ngwane threw off outriders into 
the country below the Lebombo. Ngwane’s brother Ndlela seems 
to have moved into the vicinity of modern Mlosheni, and his 
uncle Shabalala (Dlamini's brother) settled a little further
(26) Interview Joseph Dlamini, 8 May 1970, Lucolweni, Swaziland; 
interview Tigodvo and Mbali Hlophe, Jubela Malinga,
Gugwanyane Dludlu, Nkambule, 1 April 1970, Godlwako, 
Swaziland; interview Simahla Msane and various Nxumalo 
informants, 18 March 1970, Esikhotheni, Swaziland; Matsebula, 
History, 5.
(27) Interview Simahla Msane, 18 March 1970.
(28) W. White, Journal of a voyage performed in the Lion extra 
Indiaman, (London, 1800), 41.
11
west (29). An Ngwane presence was spreading, but it was not 
until Ngwane Ill’s reign that the kingdom’s centre of gravity 
shifted decisively west, coinciding in all probability with the 
expulsion from the Lebombo. It was then that the Swazi made 
their first sally across the Pongola River. Having settled in 
depth as far as Mkwakweni hill, they then made an attempt to 
occupy the region between the southern bank of the Pongola and 
the Magudu hills. This, of course, was Ndwandwe territory, and 
it is far from clear in what capacity they made their move. One 
Swazi account talks of the Ngwane finding the area blocked by 
the ’Zulu’, and retreating back across the Pongola River, while 
others imply a more protracted stay. Two possible conclusions 
can be drawn from these accounts. Either the Ndwandwe had 
already centred themselves on the Mfolozi, and now roused them­
selves to expel the Ngwane from an outlying part of their territory, 
or the Ngwane came to them as supplicants under pressure from 
Tembe attacks.,- Whichever was the case the result was much the 
same; either sooner or later the Ngwane evacuated Magudu, and then 
retraced their steps across the Pongola River, to settle as some 
sort of junior partner in the region of modern Shiselweni (30).
Thus we find Tigodvo, the Hlophe chief whom Ngwane incorporated 
at this time, being praised as "he who fought for two kings,
Langa and Zwide", and there must have been others who shared in 
that dual position (31). At the same time, whatever the initial
(29) S.P., Mss., 30096, p.r, John Gama, 18 Dec. 1898,
(30) Interview Nyanda Nhlabatsi and Tomonye Dlamini, 6 July 
1970, Phekamgenkhosi, Swaziland; interview Mandlabovu 
Fakudze and Mgudwa Masonge, 29 June 1970, Macetsheni, 
Swaziland; interview Maboya Fakudze; Bryant, Olden Times, 159.
(31) Interview Tigodvo Hlophe.
HAP 2
12
S W A Z IL A N D -V E G E T A T IO N  TYPES
5
j;
agudu
Zululand Thornveld
Low veld
Lowveld sour Bushveld
m
N Eastern Mountain Sourveld
Northern Tall Grassland
o o 
o o Piet Retief Sourveld
N Eastern Sandy Highveld 
 Modern Boundary
(Adapted from J.P.H. Acocks, 'Veld Types of South Africa1, (Pretoria, 1951).)
13
relationship, it is likely that the Ngwane sought from that 
moment to prise themselves loose of Ndwandwe control, producing 
tensions which in the long run would lead to confrontation and 
war.
The country which the Ngwane now entered was ideally suited to 
their agricultural and pastoral needs. (Map 2) Its heartland 
lay between the royal burial grounds of Mhlokotfwa and Mbilaneni 
in which all the royal capitals were situated. Ngwane built his 
national headquarters (Zombodze) in the vicinity of modern 
Dwaleni, and his own administrative capital (Hhohho) near modern 
Mlosheni, while Ndvungunye and Sobhuza subsequently sited their 
respective capitals a little south of Mlosheni (32), It was
(32) In explanation of the system of twin capitals Matsebula
writes, "The Swazi tradition provides that the King and his 
mother must reign together over their people. Hence it 
will be noted in what follows that there must always be two 
royal headquarters, or residences. The King's residence 
is the administrative headquarters, known in siSwati as 
lilawu. It is here that the King's day-to-day business is 
carried out. ,...The Queen Mother's residence, known as 
umphakatsi, is the national capital and the spiritual and 
ceremonial home of the nation. It is where all important 
national events such as the ceremony of the eating of the 
first fruit (iNcwala) take place. The Queen Mother, or 
iNdlovukazi, normally exercises a restraining influence on 
her son, the King", (History, 5-6). For the sites of these 
capitals see Sw.A., R.C.S, 115/14,Encl. Marwick to Honey,
15 Dec. 1916, encl. W.E. Dawson, Minister S.A. Mission, to 
Marwick, 11 Dec. 1916, reporting a discussion with chief 
'Baimbai' (Mbayimbayi) Dlamini; interview Simahla Msane,
18 March 1970; Matsebula, History, 6-7. Some disagreement 
exists however over the names of the capitals associated 
with individual kings. Matsebula (History, 6-8) writes 
that Shiselweni was the capital of both Ndvungunye and 
Sobhuza, which on the face of it is anomalous. H. Kuper 
(An African Aristocracy: Rank among the Swazi, (London 1947),
12 note 2) says that it was Sobhuza whose capital was 
Shiselweni and that it referred to the huge quantities of 
ash that were seen on the site. Both these sources are 
contradicted by two of Stuart's informants, who claimed 
that Shiselweni was originally called Lobamba, and was 
only renamed when Sobhuza reoccupied after it had been 
burnt by Zwide. Sobhuza's building of another Lobamba for 
his mother when he established himself at Mdimba seems to 
support this idea, S.P., 30091, Giba and Mnkonkoni, 26 Nov, 1898.
this latter region which was particularly suited to the Ngwane 
economic needs. Situated on the water-shed of the Ngwavuma River 
it also lay in the transitional zone between the middleveld and 
the lowveld. (Map 3) The importance of this latter division 
arose from the access it gave to different types of grazing land. 
In the Ngwane economy cattle occupied a central role. Apart from 
the multifarious uses to which their hides and horns could be 
put, or their role in Ngwane society as the principal store of 
wealth, virtually all the protein in the Ngwane diet was derived 
from milk. Of this, under ideal conditions, Ngwane cattle could 
be fairly prolific producers, often giving as much as two to 
three gallons a day (33). Ideal conditions however meant access 
to nutritious and healthy pasturage throughout the year, and 
this neither the middleveld nor the lowveld by themselves could 
provide. During the summer months the grass on the middleveld 
was sweet and nutritious, but in the winter it dried up and 
lost its power to sustain. In the lowveld on the other hand the 
low bush and the grass were nutritious all the year round, but
(33) Union of South Africa, Department of Agriculture ( A g r i ­
cultural Research Institute Series No. 22), Bulletin No. 311 
'Nguni Cattle, Report on Indigeous Zsic7 Cattle in South 
Africa', (Pretoria, 1950), 13; Beemer however estimates 
about one gallon a day in summer, see Beemer 'Diet',
208, 218-20. Barnard cites figures fluctuating from 2-3 
lbs a day to 20 lbs a day depending on the cow and on the 
grazing. W.G. Barnard, The Cattle of the Swazi, Mpisi series 
No. II (Mbabane, 1951), 9; W.G. Barnard, The Cattle of ~the 
Swazi, Mpisi series No. Ill (Mbabane, 1952),30.
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were plagued by nagana and other diseases throughout the summer 
months (34). Mlosheni, therefore, combined the best of both 
worlds and allowed year round grazing to the Ngwane's hardy Nguni 
herds.
The other principal element in the Ngwane diet was millet, 
prepared either as porridge or as beer, and once again the area 
south of Mlosheni was well suited to its needs (35). Murdoch, 
in his analysis of Swazi soils, lists three areas in Swaziland 
with the largest concentrations of good soils, each of which 
became successively the centre of the expanding Swazi state 
(Map 4). Shiselweni was not itself located on the most fertile 
portion of the southern bloc, but on a slightly inferior tract 
a little to the south-east. The superior grazing of this area 
presumably accounts for the drift, which suggests the greater 
importance of cattle in the early economy of the south. Never­
theless even here the soil was of superior worth, and its con­
tinuous cultivation since then has led to its present exhausted 
state (36).
(34) Beemer, 'Diet1, 220, note 2; D.M. Doveton, The Human 
Geography of Swaziland, (London, 1937), 42, 47, 49; Union 
of South Africa, Department of Agriculture Entomology 
Memoirs, Memoir No. I, C. Fuller, Tsetse in the Transvaal 
and surrounding Territories. An Historical R e v i e w ^ (Pretoria 
1923), 26, Appendix F.12, 57; P. Hope, 'Journey from Natal 
via the South African Republic and across ttie Lebombo 
Mountains to Lorenzo Marques or Delagoa Bay, and thence to 
the Gold-Fields near Leydenberg', Journal of the Royal 
Geographical Society, XLIV (1874), 207; S.S. 133, No.475, 129
(35) Beemer 'Diet', 203-7, 217-19; Doveton, Geography, 88.
Maize seems to have made a fairly late appearance, being 
introduced according to John Gama by the Ndzinisa clan 
during Sobhuza's reign S.P. 30096 's', John Gama, 18 Dec. 
1898; see also, M.P., MS 1748, Miller, 'Short History', 13.
(36) G. Murdoch, Soils and Land capability in Swaziland, Swazi­
land Ministry of Agriculture, Bulletin No. 23, (3 Vols, 
Mbabane, 1968), 315, 326, 381, 384, 408.
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A further advantage of Shiselweni was a relatively low incidence 
of drought, with a 40% risk as compared to 60% or 80% further 
east (37). (Map 5) However, even a 40% risk meant a fairly 
precarious existence and gave the rivers of the Ngwavuma water­
shed a central economic role. Their alluvial banks were planted 
during droughts and during winter, and they provided perennial 
water for cattle when lesser streams had dried up (38). As a 
result their distribution was a major influence on the pattern 
of Ngwane settlement. Ngwane villages clustered on river valleys 
stretching north from the Pongola along the middleveld/lowveld 
divide, and had reached as far as the Mkhondvo River and Esincneni 
hills by the beginning of Sobhuza’s reign. Ngwane territory, 
on the other hand was something different again. Bounded by the 
Pongola in the south, it also stretched as far as the Lebombo 
in the east and the fringes of the highveld in the west, giving 
access in the latter case to yet another type of pasture. Barring 
certain strategic limitations, it was a near perfect environment.
In all these-, respects the Ngwane heartland bore a close resem­
blance to the centres of the Ndwandwe and Mthethwa empires at 
Magudu, kwa-Dlovunga and Oyengweni. Like the Ngwane, these were 
situated on or near the highly prized Zululand thornveld. Like 
the Ngwane, they commanded access to the lowveld and at least 
one other veld type; and like the Ngwane they were situated in
(37) Ibid, 33, 325.
(38) W.G. Barnard, Cattle, II, 10; ibid, III, 8. In both of 
these reports Barnard emphasises that losses of cattle 
during drought are mainly due to lack of access to water 
rather than a deterioration of pasturage. Beemer, ’Diet’, 
203-7, 217-19; Doveton, Geography, 88. For a passing 
reference see also interview Loncayi Hlophe, 24 May 1970, 
Lamgabhi, Swaziland.
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areas with rainfall of 700 mm or more, and within ten kilometres 
of a major watershed (39). The similarities between these 
environments have prompted Webb to hypothesise that it was 
competition for these particularly scarce combinations of 
resources which underlay the growth of the great empires among 
the northern Nguni towards the end of the eighteenth century. 
Mounting pressures of population, he suggests, led to increasing 
conflict over these areas, which came to a climax during the 
great droughts and famines at the end of the eighteenth century (40). 
Guy draws similar conclusions, but with.a somewhat different 
emphasis. The high relief of parts of Zululand, he argues, 
creates an environment for cattle unrivalled in southern Africa, 
with pockets of thornveld in close association with both other 
veld types and water supplies. In such uniquely favourable 
conditions, human and cattle population increased rapidly, 
leading to a deterioration of pasture and growing intercommunal 
strife. These reached flashpoint with the late eighteenth 
century famines, producing massive dislocations and an attempt 
to rationalise access to grazing, which gave rise to the growth 
of the great states (41).
(39) J.B.McI. Daniel, 'A Geographical Study of Pre-Shakan Zulu­
land’, The South African Geographical Journal, (July 1973),
55, No. 1, 23-31.
(40) C. de B. Webb, ’Environment and History: the Northern Nguni 
Example’, paper presented to a Conference on the History
of the Transkei and Ciskei, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 
February, 1973; Daniel, ’Pre-Shakan Zululand', 23-31;
C. de B. Webb, 'Of Orthodoxy, Heresy and the Difaqane’, 
paper presented to a Teacher Conference on African History, 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, May 1974, 9-10.
(41) J.J. Guy, ’Cattle-keeping in Zululand', paper presented to 
the Language and History in Africa Seminar, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 8.
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Taken together Webb and Guy’s analyses provide a far more 
satisfactory explanation for the growth of states among the 
northern Nguni, and have recently been supported by dendroclimato- 
logical evidence (42). By their single focus however, and by 
their concentration on similarities between these societies to 
the virtual exclusion of what set them apart, they do still 
present a somewhat distorted picture of their development.
These differences were often substantial and had an important 
bearing on events in Zululand and beyond. As compared with the 
Ndwandwe, for instance, the Ngwane were substantially less 
militarised and less destructive, and so eventually succumbed 
under the weight of Ndwandwe attacks. As against the Mthethwa 
on the other hand, they embarked on their career of expansion 
a good deal earlier, and were more firmly rooted in the areas 
they occupied than the ephemeral Mthethwa empire. Still more 
significantly perhaps, they were appreciably smaller than both, 
and might in some respects be compared more appropriately with 
the quasi confederacies of the Qwabe and Drakensburg Ngwane (43).
These differences obviously have to be explained, and can be 
attributed, in my view, to' the varying significance of trading 
and grazing rivalries in their political development; to the
(42) M. Hall, ’Dendroclimatology, Rainfall and Human Adaptation 
in the later Iron Age of Natal and Zululand1, Annals of the 
Natal Museum, (1976) (forthcoming). Hall’s findings based 
on tree ring evidence show an unprecedented increase in 
rainfall levels, which is likely to have been accompanied 
by an increase in cattle and human population, from about 
1745 to 1790, followed by the worst period of drought for 
the previous 300 years. This culminated in about 1802 - 
i.e. the Madlatule famine referred to by Bryant and Stuart. 
The reliability of Hall’s findings are borne out by his 
ability to plot from the same evidence other known droughts 
in the nineteenth century (i.e. 1822, 1848-9, 1868).
(43) This point is treated more fully in Bonner, ’State 
Formation’, 3-6.
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different points in time at which those rivalries themselves 
felt; and to the distinctive social structures and economic 
formations of the areas they occupied. My argument on these 
points has been elaborated elsewhere (44), and I will confine 
myself here to the question of social structures and economic 
formations, since these were to have a major bearing on later 
Swazi development. Of late, in particular, there has been a 
tendency to forget that northern Nguniland contained not just 
a range of environments but a variety of economies and societies 
as well. The latter,it is true,constantly tend to assimilate 
to the former, but cultural factors nevertheless retain a 
sufficient degree of autonomy to affect the individual patterns 
of political power. The influences operating on the Ndwandwe 
and Ngwane in this regard are strikingly different. Where the 
Ndwandwe were assimilated into a society which was predominantly 
Ntungwa in composition, the Ngwane were as strongly permeated 
by Sotho influences. In each case the extent of this penetration 
is hard to exaggerate. So intense was the acculturation that 
took place between the Ndwandwe and Ntungwa that it is difficult 
to decide who absorbed whom. Bryant for instance was thoroughly 
confused and could only come up with the erroneous conclusion 
that the Ndwandwe were probably Ntungwa in origin (45). The 
Ngwane became equally assimilated into the groups they conquered. 
One of the surprising things about conventional historiography 
is the way that they are so confidently classified among the 
Nguni, when their culture is literally cluttered with Sotho 
borrowings. At a superficial level this can be seen in things
(44) Ibid .
(45) A.T. Bryant, A History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Tribes, 
(Cape Town, 1964), 12.
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like hair styles and patterns of speech, but it has also 
penetrated much deeper than that. It is an anthropological 
commonplace that systems of kinship lie at the heart of African 
societies, and it is precisely here that Sotho influence is 
most marked. Where the Nguni have generally practised a form 
of exogamy, which places all people from the clans of grand­
parents within the prohibited degrees, the Swazi have ignored 
this taboo completely and have adopted the Sotho practice of 
preferential cross cousin marriage (46). As an index of Sotho 
influence this is particularly striking,and was to have a 
profound influence on the second phase of Swazi state formation, 
but still more important for our purposes is Sotho penetration 
of Swazi politics and economy. Here, the greater democratisation 
of Swazi politics as compared with for example the Zulu may owe 
itself directly to Sotho influence. The Swazi libandla, which 
is a national council representing all shades of Swazi opinion, 
finds no close parallel among the Zulu, and may well be an 
adaptation of its Sotho counterpart, the pitso (47). So too 
may be the unique position accorded by the Swazi to the queen 
mother. Kuper characterises the Swazi kingdom as a dual 
monarchy, with the queen mother wielding powers almost equal to 
those of the king, and Ziervogel regards this as an explicitly
(46) Bryant, Olden Times, 147; D. Ziervogel, ’A Swazi Translation 
of 1846’, African Studies, 9 (1950), 183, note 1; Kuper 
Aristocracy, 83, 95-6.
(47) As suggested by J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: A 
Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Bantu Africa, (London, 1966), 
51. A national council of sorts existed among the Zulu but 
does not seem to have played the same part in political
life. A.T. Bryant, The Zulu People as they were before the 
White man came, (Pietermaritzburg, 1949), 464.
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Sotho borrowing (48). His evidence is admittedly tenuous, but 
it is indirectly supported by Swazi tradition. Somnjalose 
Simelane, who was the first queen mother to exercise these 
powers, is supposed to have done so to check the growing 
arbitrariness of Ndvungunye and Sobhuza, and it was in recognition 
of her services that these powers were later institutionalised (49). 
Beneath this rather personalised description however, it is 
possible to glimpse deeper forces at work: on the one hand the 
increasing violence which went with state formation, particularly 
as it affected subject groups; on the other the gradual penetra­
tion of Sotho influence after the first trauma of incorporation, 
as a means of counteracting that trend.
The point of all this is that institutions of Sotho origin seem 
to have acted to check the accumulation and exercise of centralised 
power in a way that did not happen among the Ndwandwe, and a 
parallel argument can be developed for their respective economies. 
Here I speak more cautiously. Economies obviously adapt to 
environment, and it would be dangerous to credit them with too 
much autonomy. Nevertheless, there do seem to be sufficient 
differences between the economies of the societies into which 
the Ngwane and Ndwandwe intruded to affect their respective 
political development. The Ntungwa, with whom the Ndwandwe 
assimilated, were the most highly pastoral Nguni group, and this 
must inevitably have lent an extra edge to competition for grazing 
in the area even before the Ndwandwe entered, besides catching
(48) D. Ziervogel, The Eastern Sotho, (Pretoria, 1954), 5; 
Kuper, Aristocracy, 54-6.
(49) H. Kuper, Aristocracy, 13.
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them up in it once they arrived (50). For many Sotho, cattle 
did not have the same overwhelming significance. They were 
important, but not the linchpin of economic life, and this must 
likewise have confined the scale of conflict in the area, before 
and after Ngwane intrusion, and made their imposition of control 
that much more easy and peaceable (51).
This argument must however be qualified by another. The Sotho 
were by no means the only groups incorporated by the Ngwane, and 
several of the chiefdoms occupying the choicest pasturage in 
southern Swaziland were in fact of Mbo Nguni stock (the Hlophe, 
Mkhabela, Mndzebele, and Kunene, for example) (52). The factors 
just cited would obviously not apply to them, but the ease with 
which they were subordinated can, I feel, be accounted for in 
other terms. The Ngwane, as we have seen, did not arrive in 
the Shiselweni area for a generation after the Ndwandwe, and 
then in all probability as some sort of junior partner, having 
fled initially to Magudu before being allocated the tract north 
of the Pongola. In the meantime the Ndwandwe had broken the 
resistance of at least some of the groups that the Ngwane were 
to incorporate, the Hlophe of Tigodvo being a specific case in 
point (53). From this perspective the conflict that subsequently
(50) S. Marks and A. Atmore, 'The Problem of the Nguni: An 
examination of the ethnic and linguistic situation in South 
Africa before the Mfecane', in D. Dalby (ed.), Language and 
History in Africa: a volume of collected papers presented to 
the London seminar on language and history in Africa (held at 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, 1967-69),
(London, 1970), 127, 129.
(51) B. Sansom, 'Traditional Economic Systems', in W.D. Hammond- 
Tooke (ed), The Bantu-speaking peoples of Southern Africa, 
(London, 1974), 150-3.
(52) See the classification in Bryant, Olden Times, 681-697 and 
H. Kuper, The Swazi, (London, 1952), 61-81.
(53) Above, 11.
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blew up between Sobhuza and Zwide makes much more sense. In 
the years that followed the Ngwane must have gradually detached 
themselves from the Ndwandwe, and may even have come to challenge 
their overall hegemony south of the Pongola. Groups like the 
Hlophe fell more firmly under Ngwane control, while others like 
the Ntungwa Simelane, who fled from Zwide to Ndvungunye, 
further swelled Ngwane power (54). Under Sobhuza the situation 
deteriorated further, until Sobhuza was eventually obliged to 
try and defuse the situation by proposing that a daughter of 
Zwide should become his own chief wife. Zwide grudgingly 
agreed, but warned that, “this would not stop him attacking 
Sobhuza if he wanted to in the future", and on that gloomy note 
his daughter Thandile journeyed north to meet her prospective 
spouse (55). Zwide did not in fact desist for long. A new 
dispute soon blew up over grain fields on the south side of the 
Pongola River, which served to crystallise earlier rivalries, 
and Zwide struck out to destroy Ngwane power once and for all (56).
(54) Ibid; Sw.A., R.C.S. 115/14, Encl. Marwick to Honey, 15 Dec. 
1916, encl. Dawson to Marwick, 11 Dec. 1916; interview 
Simelane Simelane and Jozi Simelane, 6 May 1970,
Kontjingila, Swaziland.
(55) Matsebula, History, 11; interview Maboya Fakudze; one of 
Sobhuza’s sisters named Posile was also married to Zwide,
S.P. 30091, Giba and Mnkonkoni, 26 Nov. 1898, 86.
(56) Kuper, Aristocracy, 13; Sw.A., Honey, ’History', 17;
Bryant, Older Times, 318; M.P., MS 1478, Miller, 'Short 
History’, 7~8. This conflict may well have been brought
to a head by drought. William Beinart shows how the Mpondo 
fell back on a more intensive sort of agriculture when their 
cattle had been plundered by Zulu raiders, (W. Beinart,
.'Economic Change in Pondoland in the Nineteenth Century’, 
paper presented to the University of London, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, Postgraduate Seminar, The Societies 
of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, Nov.
1975, 2), and the ravages of drought are likely to have 
had the same effect. Cattle would have died and people 
would have fallen back on more intensive agricultural 
production in the only places that it was possible i.e. the 
irrigable river banks.
CHAPTER II 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SWAZI STATE 
Zwide's invasions very nearly obliterated the Ngwane state. 
Sobhuza is usually pictured in Swazi historiography as executing 
a tactical withdrawal to a sanctuary in the north, from the 
security of which he quickly reconstructed the Ngwane state (1). 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Rather than resuming a 
barely interrupted career of expansion, he was obliged to 
abandon the bulk of his followers to Zwide, and to lead the life 
of a rootless refugee whom Zwide hounded further and further 
north. The only point at which these wanderings resemble 
traditional historiography is in the first phase of his 
evacuation. According to Matsebula, this was undertaken well 
before the burning of Shiselweni, by which time his new capital 
of Ephungalegazi had been built (2). Other sources put it a 
few hours before Zwide's attack, and have Sobhuza beating a 
hasty retreat towards Hlathikhulu, but either way Sobhuza's 
intentions were presumably the same; Zwide was on the rampage 
and he needed to get out of his reach-(3). Zwide however was 
not so easily put off. No sooner had Sobhuza settled himself 
at his new capital near Hlathikhulu than a fresh Ndwandwe army 
took the field and Sobhuza had to resume his journey north (4).
(1) Kuper, Aristocracy, 13-14; Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 20-22; 
Bryant, Olden Times, 318; Matsebula, History, 8-11;
M.P. Miller, rShort History,' 8-9.
(2.) Matsebula, History, 8-9.
(3) Matsebula gives the location of Ephungalegazi as in the
Sinceni area north of Hlathikhulu (ibid) . Other sources
place it at Mbulungwane hill, a little to the south-west 
of Hlathikhulu, interview Simahla Msane, 23 April, 1970; 
interview Ndambi MkhonHa and four others, 15 May, 1970, 
Ezulwini, Swaziland.
(4) Matsebula, History, 8-9.
Sobhuza*s first stop, in some accounts, was among the Nkambule 
of Buseleni, at a rocky fortress situated just south of the 
Mkhondvo River (5). Even here, on the outer edges of his 
previous domains, he felt insecure, and pressed on again across 
the Lusutfu River to the Nqabaneni fortresses.of the Maseko.
Two considerations probably dictated this choice of refuge.
First, there was the strength of the strongholds themselves, and 
second, the greater sense of kinship the Ngwane seemed to have 
felt for the Maseko as compared with the other Sotho-speaking 
groups of the area. Not only were the Maseko of Ntungwa - 
Ngune origin, belonging to the same stock as Sobhuza1s mother 
Somnjalose Simelane, but they were also somehow connected with 
the Ngwane themselves through an early marriage to the Dlamini. 
The Maseko leader, Mgazi, therefore welcomed Sobhuza, and 
allowed his followers sanctuary (6).
By this stage Sobhuza*s following was reduced to a remnant; a 
tiny band of devoted followers like Sonyezane Dlamini,
Dambuza Lukhele and Sokhukhusa Hlophe, who scouted his way 
forward, or close kinsmen like Malunge Dlamini, who lent moral 
support and much needed advice (7). Forbes, in his manuscript, 
talks of only a few hundred soldiers accompanying Sobhuza on 
this leg of his journey, and it is clear that many chiefdoms
(5) Dlamini, ’Expansion', 3; interview Simahla Msane, 23 April, 
1970; interview Maphoyisa and Ngoti Manana, 24 April, 1970, 
Ka-Manana, Swaziland.
(6) The Gule, Mthimkhulu, Maseko and Simelane apparently do 
not intermarry, Dlamini, 'Expansion' , 3-4; Bryant, History, 
3; Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 18; interview Maloba Maseko,
19 March, 1970, Nqabaneni, Swaziland.
(7) Interview Nyanda Nhlabatsi; interview Lukhele and Ngota 
Nkambule, 21 June 1970, Phunga, Swaziland; interview 
Loncayi Hlophe; Sw.A., R.C.S. 454/40, Encl. P. Seme,
'Petition of the Swazi tribes of the Eastern Transvaal to the 
Union Parliament', 25 March, 1932, 4.
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like the Mamba, the Ngcamphalala and the Khumalo stayed almost 
entirely behind (8). Once Sobhuza's refuge became known a 
steady trickle of supporters began to make their way north, and 
they might ultimately have swelled to more substantial 
proportions had it not been for yet another attack by the 
Ndwandwe. This time it was not only Sobhuza’s Ngwane that 
suffered, but Mgazi's Maseko as well, as both were driven from 
the protection of Nqabaneni. Whether the Maseko threw in their 
lot with Sobhuza at this point is not clear, but if they did 
it is unlikely that they stuck with him for long. Sobhuza had 
become a pariah whom it was advisable to shun, as was made 
abundantly clear a short while after, when Zwide attacked him 
for a fourth time at his new resting place in the Ezulwini Valley. 
Thereafter, it seems, Sobhuza journeyed on alone (9).
Sobhuza's future was now looking increasingly bleak. Battered 
and buffetted by Zwide, he had been driven further and further 
from his bases of support, and subjected all the while to a 
continuous drain of men. Somehow or other he had to gain respite 
if he was ever to have a chance of recouping his strength. His 
first idea was to throw himself on the mercy of the Sotho chief
(8) F.C., Vol. 37, No. 4(c), 'History of Swaziland', by 
David Forbes, (Mss. fragment). Interview Logwaja and 
Uhlangamiso Mamba, 15 July, 1970, Ka Mamba, Swaziland; 
interview Majibhini Ngcamphalala, 18 June, 1970, Ngcamphalaleni, 
Swaziland; interview Thabede and Khumalo informants, 21 July 
1970, Kwendzeni, Swaziland.
(9) F.C., Vol. 37, No. 4(c), Forbes, 'History'; S.P., Notebook 
30091, 87, Tikuba, 27 Nov. 1898.
living somewhere north of the Mdimba mountains, but this his 
would-be benefactor prudently declined (10). Rebuffed in that 
direction, Sobhuza was obliged to look for succour elsewhere, 
and eventually found it with Magoboyi, a Sotho chief, living in 
the Dlomodlomo mountains, a little way to the north-west. The 
precise extent of Magoboyifs power is unclear, but he seems to 
have exercised a vague sort of hegemony all around Dlomodlomo, 
and from the moment he gave Sobhuza sanctuary, Sobhuza's fortunes 
began to pick up. This was not just because of Magoboyi's 
protection, as Zwide's attacks also presently petered out.
Having set in motion an early phase of the Difaqane when he 
drove Sobhuza out of Shiselweni, he was now diverted by its 
later stages, which culminated in his struggles with Dingiswayo 
and Shaka. Sobhuza put the respite to good use. He regrouped 
his forces under the cover of Magoboyi's authority, and then 
cut loose on his own account by attacking neighbouring chiefs. 
Within the space of a year his power had grown to such an extent 
that he was even able to destroy the chiefdom of Mkize, which 
stretched from near Dlomodlomo to the vicinity of modern Mbabane, 
(Maps 1 & 3). Magoboyi's response is uncertain. He may have 
initially tolerated Sobhuza's behaviour, but as the full extent 
of Sobhuza's ambitions became known he seems to have taken the 
lead in a Sotho back-lash against his ungrateful protege'.
Sobhuza fell back on the defensive and might ultimately have 
had to withdraw, but he was saved a decisive trial of strength
(10) Ibid.
by an unexpected intervention from the south (11). .
Since Sobhuza’s hasty withdrawal across the Lusutfu, the Ngwane 
heartland of Shiselweni had been the scene of turmoil and strife 
Zwide*s armies roamed back and forth, and its people were 
reduced to a state of anxious dependency, acknowledging Zwide*s 
overlordship but never sure whether this would confer immunity 
from attack. In time some degree of regrouping took place.
The Mamba who occupied the transitional zone between the middle- 
veld and the lowveld around Mbelebeleni were never really 
subdued, and soon came to be looked upon by the leaderless 
remnants in Shiselweni as the natural heirs to Sobhuza’s power. 
This they declined, perhaps for fear of inviting Ndwandwe 
reprisals, but there were others more eager to take on that 
role (12). Foremost among these were several of Sobhuza's close 
relatives. Forbes talks of a brother of Sobhuza called Nkwekazi 
assuming control of the area, while both Bryant and Honey refer 
to another brother named Magwegwe, who was aided in Bryant's 
account by several sons of Sobhuza (13) . Current Swazi 
tradition helps us pinpoint things further, for according to the
(11) Ibid; ibid, Giba and Mnkonkoni, 25 Nov. 1898; F.C., Vol. 37 
No. 4(c), Forbes, 'History'; M.P., 1.08.1., 'Swaziland' by 
Miller, lecture, 4 March, 1905, 18; Bryant, Olden Times, 
321; Sw.A., Honey, 'History'*, 20; S.S., 30, 482, R.3359/59, 
statement by 'Kappoen' and Makuasitiel , Lydenburg,
19 Dec. 1859. For the extent of Mkize's power see 
A.M. Miller, Swaziland: the California of South Africa, 
(Johannesburg"^ 1907), 14^ On this point, however, see 
Bryant, History, 3.
(12) Interview Logwaja Mamba; interview Majibhini Ngcamphalala; 
A.J.B. Hughes, Swazi Land Tenure, (Institute for Social 
Research, University of Natal, Durban, 1964), 38.
(13) F.C., Vol. 37, No. 4(c), Forbes, 'History'; Bryant, Olden 
Times, 321; Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 20.
history of the Nsibande, Nkwekazi mounted his challenge not
after Sobhuza's flight from Shiselweni but on his initial 
accession to power (14). By a process of elimination therefore 
it would appear that it was Magwegwe who usurped Sobhuza’s 
position and who tried to marshal the broken remnants of the old 
Ngwane state.
Magwegwe's efforts met with some initial success, but registered 
a serious setback with the refusal of the Mamba chief, Maloyi, 
to countenance his claims. That was soon to cost him dear. In 
1819 Zwide's armies were finally routed by Shaka, and Maloyi took 
the opportunity of sending an expedition to Dlomodlomo to bring 
Sobhuza back (15). Facing a hostile Sotho combination, Sobhuza 
was only too happy to return, and with Mamba assistance swept 
Magwegwe from power. Thanks to this, and no doubt to Maloyi.'s 
de facto autonomy, the Mamba were granted the ritual and military 
privileges which they still hold today. Maloyi was permitted 
to raise his own regiments; to give refugees from Sobhuza 
sanctuary, and to hold a version of the first fruits ceremony, 
all of which was tantamount to treason for anyone else. The 
Mamba in effect had become a state within a state (16).
Despite the ease with which he had been reinstated Sobhuza was
(14) Interview Phuhlaphe Nsibande (conducted by Balam Nyeko and 
Hugh Macmillan) early 1972, Zombodze, Swaziland.
(15) Above, 30.
(16) Hughes, Land Tenure, 39; interview Logwaja Mamba; interview 
Mhambi and Damusi Dlamini, Mangaliso Malambe, Magamba Khoza, 
Nkomiyaphy Mamba, Dubingoma Gwebu, Mangaliso Ndlala,
3 June, 1970, Mvembili, Swaziland. This seems to have 
induced a later Mamba chief or sub-chief, Polile Mamba, 
to assert his complete independence of Swazi control, which 
ended in his destruction by Sobhuza's forces (Logwaja Mamba) 
Kuper, Aristocracy, 111.
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still extremely insecure. According to Mamba historians, Zwide 
had first attempted to retreat into Mamba territory, but had 
been forced to withdraw by the resistance they put up (17). 
Whether this was so, or whether the forces the Mamba encountered 
were other displaced elements of the Ndwandwe state, the Ndwandwe 
continued to present a potential threat. Zwide regrouped his 
forces at ama Nzambomvu, the northern tributary of the Komati, 
and although seriously mauled, they were still a force to be 
reckoned with (18). Eight years later Zwide's heir Sikhunyane 
could muster a fighting force of perhaps eight thousand, and 
they must have been a constant worry to Sobhuza as they perched 
on his eastern flank (19). Nor was that all. Only three years 
later, Mzilikazi also fell out with Shaka and fled into the 
same part of the modern Eastern Transvaal (20). By this stage 
Sobhuza had himself begun colonising central Swaziland, with the 
result that three major Nguni powers were all rubbing shoulders 
in the same restricted space. Exactly what relationships 
developed between them would be fascinating to know, but in the 
first instance at any rate they seem to have been cordial 
enough. According to two fragments of oral tradition relating 
to this time, the Ndwandwe assisted the Ngwane in their attacks 
on the Magagula, and it was only later that open conflict may
(17) Interview Logwaja Mamba.
(18) Bryant, Olden Times, 208-10.
(19) James Stuart and D. Mck. Malcolm (eds), The Diary of Henry
Francis Fynn, (Pieterraartizburg, 1930), 126.
(20) W.F. Lye, ’The Ndebele kingdom south of the Limpopo River1,
Journal of African History, X,I (1969), 87-104.
possibly have flared up between the two (21). As for Mzilikazi, 
Sobhuza made his by now familiar marriage overtures, and an 
arrangement was made whereby a daughter of the Ndebele king 
would become the chief wife of Sobhuza’s heir (22).
The impact of the Mfecane was not confined to the movements of 
Zwide and Mzilikazi. After Zwide’s second defeat, splinters of 
the Ndwandwe state flew off in all directions, lodging in some 
cases as far away as Lakes Tanzania and Victoria. Soshangane 
sped north to Delagoa Bay, and with a small band of followers 
began incorporating the local Tsonga chiefdoms into the nucleus 
of the Shangane state; Zwangendaba followed in his footsteps 
shortly after; and at more or less the same time Nxaba skirted 
the western borderlands of the Ngwane, picking up Ngwane Maseko 
on the way (23). Like the Ndebele and the Ndwandwe their menace 
was more latent than actual, and in some instances their
(21) Interview Mbhuduya Magagula, Ganda and Sigungu Magagula 
and Mavelebaleni Ginindza, 20 Dec. 1971, Dvokolwako, 
Swaziland; S.P., Notebook 30091, 87, Giba and Mnkonkoni,
26 Nov. 1898. In an interesting but somewhat garbled 
account derived from ’an old follower of Sobhuza', the 
Berlin missionary Nachtigal writes of how Zwide fled in 
the first instance to the region of the Steelport River 
only to die there the following year. Sikhunyane then 
apparently brought his father's body back to the Pongola, 
attacking Sobhuza on the way, after which he settled 
somewhere north of the Pongola River. At some later stage 
he went back to the Pongola and again defeated Sobhuza, 
who sought refuge on this occasion with Shaka in the 
south. Shaka now administered the coup de grace to 
Sikhunyane who fled to Manicusa (i.e. Soshangane),
A. Nachtigal, 'Das Tagebuch des Missionars' , II, (type­
script, University of South Africa Library), 381 (original 
Mss. pagination).
(22) S.S. 34, R 3852/60, 49-50, S. Schoeman to C. Potgieter,
18 July, I860; S.S. 75, R 303/66, 302, Minutes of meeting 
with Swazi messengers, 6 Mar. 1866.
(23) For a general account see Omer-Cooper, Aftermath, Ch. 4-5.
movements may even have served Swazi ends. Shemane, Zwide's 
heir, whom Bryant considers as being lost in the confusion, 
begged refuge from Sobhuza, as did sections under Ngolotsheni 
and Sihalahala Nxumalo and Zanqika Gumede, and between them 
these three must have greatly added to Sobhuza's strength (24). 
Still more valuable were a host of individual refugees who fled 
to Sobhuza's "armpit" (25). Lacking any territorial or kinship 
base in Swaziland, these were totally dependent on royal favour, 
and came.to constitute some of the most reliable pillars of royal 
power (26). Nevertheless it is unlikely that the advantages 
of the confusion outweighed the disadvantages for Sobhuza. As 
parties migrated round or through Ngwane territory, or even 
begged for refuge among the Ngwane themselves, there was always 
the danger that they would ally themselves with some disgruntled 
faction inside his own kingdom, and it was probably with a 
growing sense of relief that he saw first Nxaba and Zwangendaba 
(1821-23), and then Mzilikazi (1825), Sikhunyane (1826) and 
Soshangane (1828) vanish over his horizon (27).
It was in this climate of insecurity that the new Swazi state 
was born. Having re-established his authority in Shiselweni, 
Sobhuza turned more or less at once to the colonisation of the 
north. In part he may have wanted to exclude Zwide and Mzilikazi,
(24) Interview James Nxumalo, 14 March 1970, near Masundwini, 
Swaziland; interview Mandlenkosi Nxumalo, 23 April 1970, 
Dhume, Swaziland; interview Simahla Msane and various 
Nxumalo informants, 18 March 1970; interview Simahla Msane, 
23 April 1970; interview Mahloba Gumede, 11 June 1970, 
eBulandzeni, Swaziland.
(25) Kuper, Aristocracy, 17.
(26) The Zwane are one example. I have this from a Zwane infor­
mant at the Swazi traditional court in Hlathikhulu, 
interview 8 May 1970, (tape lost).
(27) Omer-Cooper, Aftermath 38-9, 58, 64-5, 133.
but more important in his thinking was the need for greater 
security from Shaka (28). During the course of his exile 
Sobhuza had been impressed by the strength of the natural 
fortresses of central and northern Swaziland, and since his 
return it had become increasingly plain to him that if he were 
ever to evade subjection he would have to take himself further 
out of Shaka*s reach. The obvious answer was to conquer central 
Swaziland, and this he proceeded to do in 1820 or 1821.
The area which Sobhuza made the centre of his expanded kingdom 
shared in many of the advantages of Shiselweni. Based on the 
Ezulwini valley, it was blessed with an abundance of water and 
fertile alluvial soils, besides being within easy reach of a 
finger of lowveld which pushed in from the east. (Map 3) Its 
only disadvantage was that Ezulwini itself and most of the 
country around it was covered in lowveld sour bushveld, described 
by Acocks as "of sourish mixed nature, of poor quality for 
grazing and difficult to manage" (29). (Map 2) Amply compensat­
ing for this, however, were the Mdimba mountains which rose 
from the west side of the Ezulwini valley. These contained the 
largest cave fortresses in the whole of the region, and it was 
almost certainly their reputed impregnability that made Sobhuza 
choose this particular spot (30). Stretching out on every side 
was a terrain very similar to the south. A few miles to the
(28) For example see interview Mandlenkosi Nxumalo.
(29) J.R.H. Acocks, Veld Types of South Africa, Union of South 
Africa, Department of Agriculture, Division of Botany, 
Botanical Survey Memoir No. 28, (Pretoria, 1953), 46;
G. Murdoch, Soils , 61.
(30) Sw.A., R.C.S. 454/40, Seme, 'Petition1, 4.
east the middleveld gradually gave way to the lowveld which was 
infested with tsetse at intervals for the last twenty to 
twenty-five miles before the Lebombo. -To the west the middleveld 
was soon displaced by the highveld, with its relatively harsher 
environment for cattle and crops (31). Only in the north was 
there any major difference. There the line of the middleveld 
and the highveld drew back into the interior, leaving a relatively 
larger expanse of tsetse ridden lowveld in the area that fell 
under Swazi control (32).
Dotted across this landscape were various chiefdoms of Sotho, 
Nguni, and Tsonga stock. Most numerous were the Sotho, and in 
particular the Magagula/Ngomane. Over a space of four or five 
generations these had split into a number of independent branches, 
spreading out from the Mdimba mountains as far as the Sabie 
River in the north (33). Other Sotho groups in the area were 
the Mncina and Gama at Mdimba (34), the Mnisi near modern
(31) Doveton, Geography, 48-9, 55.
(32) For the references to tsetse see above, 16 ~ note 34, and
T. Baines, The Gold Regions of South-Eastern Africa, (London, 
1877), 108-9, 182-3; E. Cohen, Erlauternde bemerkungen zu 
der routenkarte einer reise von Lydenburg nach den gold- 
feldern und von Leydenburg nach der Delagoa Bai im dstlichen 
Sdd-Afrika,(Hamburg, 1875).
(33) Interview Mbhuduya Magagula; interview Mankwempe, Mevane, 
Mcedzane Magagula and Mmemo Masilela, 23 June 1970, 
Madlangampisi, Swaziland; A.C. Myburgh, The Tribes of the 
Barberton District, Union of South Africa, Department of 
Native Affairs, Ethnological Publications No. 25,
(Pretoria, 1949), 106-7, 126.
(34) Matsebula, History, 9; Sw.A., Honey, ’History1, 21; 
interview Guzana and LaMnandisi Mncina, Nkunzane and Mchoza 
Dlamini, 12 June 1970, Silothwane, Swaziland; J.J. Nquku,
’The Swazis’, the Times of Swaziland, 1 July, 1943, 4.
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Mbabane (35), the Ngwenya, Mavimbela and Dhladhla west of Mahlangatja
(36), and the Malambe at Hhohho (37), but more powerful than any of 
these were the Maseko at Nqabaneni.. Of Ntungwa-Nguni origin these 
had arrived at the Lusutfu at least two generations before, and 
had constructed a minor confederacy composed of at least twenty 
subordinate clans (38). Further west were more Sotho interspersed 
with Koni and Ndzundza Ndebele. Magoboyi lived at Dlomodlomo (39), 
next to a section of the Ndzundza Ndebele (40) while a scatter 
of Koni settlements fanned out from the Steenkampsberg towards 
the south (41). Finally, in the east lay a number of Tsonga or
(35) Interview Mboziswa Mnisi, 16 June 1970, Phumplele, Swazi­
land; J.J. Nquku, ’The Swazis', the Times of Swaziland,
1 July 1943, 4; Kuper, Aristocracy, 110-111.
(36) Interview Hehhane Ngwenya, 9 June 1970, Mgomfelweni,
Swaziland.
(37) Interview Mhambi Dlamini. Other Sotho groups possibly in 
the Hhohho area were the Mndzawe, Mathonsi, Mphila, Malind- 
zisa, Shabangu and Sikhondze, A.B. Nxumalo, 'Oral Tradition', 
34, 53, interviews with Andreas Dlamini of Mpofu, Swaziland, 
December 1973, and Mangaliso Malambe of Emvembili, 13 April 
1974. The latter was one of the informants in the first 
interview mentioned in this footnote.
(38) Dlamini, 'Expansion', 4; interview Maloba Maseko; interview 
Thintitha Malaza, 13 June 1970, Mbabane, Swaziland.
(39) Above, 30.
(40) Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 21; Bryant, Olden Times 311;
Kuper, Aristocracy, 14; interview Jobe and Mambosego 
Dlamini, Mbane Msibi, Mgwenya Simelane, 26 April 1970, 
Steynsdorp, S. Africa.
(41) N.J. Van Warmelo,'Genealogy of the House of Sekhukhuni',
Union of South Africa, Department of Native Affairs, 
Ethnological Publications, No. 21, (Pretoria, 1944),
17-22; A.P. Van der Merwe, 'Die Naturelle en die Maatskappy 
te Ohrigstad en Lydenburg (1845-1857)', Historiese 
Studies, II (1940-1941), 87; D.R. Hunt, 'An Account of
the Bapedi', African Studies, 5, (1931), 285.
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semi-Tsongaised Sotho chiefdoms. The Mahlalela and Maziya 
occupied a section of the Lebombo together with the Sifundza 
and Masilela (42), leaving the Thabede and Ndzimandze in command 
of the Lebombo flats below (43), and the Mathenjwa and Mngometfulo 
occupying the moutain range further south (44). (Map 6)
Sobhuza began his campaign of conquest cautiously, and in a way 
that underlines how very weak he still was. The most formidable 
power in central Swaziland were the Maseko, and Sobhuza was 
still in no position to antagonise them. Instead he chose the 
safer course of marrying his daughter Lambombotsi to Mgazi, and 
conferring a wide degree of autonomy on the Maseko king (45). 
Next in order of importance were the Magagula chiefdoms, but 
they presented a much less united front. Moyeni, who was 
ruling at Bulandzeni, was at loggerheads with his kinsman Mnjoli 
at the Mdimba, and both acted entirely independently of their 
genealogical superior at Nyakatho (46). Even so, Sobhuza was 
reluctant to tackle them head-on, and sent emissaries to Mnjoli
(42) Interview Mphundle Maziya, 5 July 1970, Maphungwane, 
Swaziland; interview Gija Mahlalela and Mandela Dlamini,
7 April 1970, Lomahasha, Swaziland; interview Mjole Sifundza, 
28 April 1970, Ka Shewula, Swaziland.
(43) Interview Mphundle Maziya; interview Mashabhane Magagula, 
Manchulwane and Nganga Thabede, Ndvoku Mavimbela, 17 June 
1970, Malindze, Swaziland. The Thabede may however be of 
Ntungwa-Nguni origins, see Bryant, Olden Times, 342.
(44) Bryant, Olden Times, 340-3.
(45) Dlamini, ’Expansion', 4; interview Maloba Maseko; interview 
Mandanda Mtetwa, 13 March 1970, Sigodzi, Swaziland; interview 
Thintitha Malaza.
(46) Interview Mbhuduya Magagula; S.P., Notebook 30091, 84,
86-7, 25 and 26 Nov. 1898; M.P., M.S. 1478, Miller, ’Short 
History' 9. A disagreement exists here between current 
Magagula tradition whose account I have broadly followed, 
and the other sources cited, which speak of an elder brother 
of Mnjoli called Mhlangala occupying the Mdimba and being 
defeated by Sobhuza. In these accounts Mhlangala fled and 
Mnjoli was killed.
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to propose some sort of alliance. Mnjoli’s answer was crude 
and to the point. He had Sobhuza’s messengers beaten and 
returned them to his encampment covered in bruises and weals. 
Mnjoli's response had placed Sobhuza in a quandary. Mnjoli’s 
headquarters were well defended, and Sobhuza did not have the 
forces to take them by storm. On the other hand his capital 
commanded the Ezulwini valley which had been chosen by Sobhuza 
as the centre of his new state. Fortunately one of Sobhuza’s 
followers came forward with an idea. Why not, he suggested, 
smuggle Swazi soldiers in under cattle hides as the Magagula 
brought their cattle in from pasture at dusk, and use these to 
open up the encampment from the inside? Makhubu’s suggestion 
was gratefully accepted, and with its help the Magagula strong­
hold was stormed (47). Magagula resistance did not end there. 
Although Sobhuza had acquired the Magagula rainmaking charms, 
and hence an immense increase in ritual power (Mnjoli was in 
fact slit open because the Swazi thought he had swallowed the 
charms), Moyeni was still determined to hold out. Reluctantly 
therefore Sobhuza again prepared to fight, and it was only 
after a protracted siege of Moyeni’s mountain stronghold, 
during which Sobhuza may have had to call in Ndwandwe support, 
that he finally bolted to Madolo (48). Thereafter Sobhuza's
(47) Interview Chief Makhubu, June 1970, Luyengo, Swaziland.
(48) Interview Mankwempe Magagula; above, 34,note 21.
Another version of the same conflict, or just possibly 
another conflict altogether, is recorded by Nachtigal. 
According to reminiscences he derived from ’an old follower 
of Sobhuza’, Moyeni fought with Sobhuza after a son of Zwide 
named Madzanga had fled to Moyeni, following Sikhunyane's 
defeat by Shaka (i.e. in 1826). Moyeni had thereupon 
refused to give Madzanga up and Sobhuza had only been able 
to compel him to do so after he had secured the help of 
Portuguese riflemen from Delagoa Bay. (Nachtigal, 
’Tagebuch', 382.) If this chronology is correct it further 
supports the argument for the slow imposition of Ngwane 
control.
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progress was more smooth. The Mncina resisted and were forced 
to flee, but for the most part the chiefdoms of the area took 
note of the fate of the resisters, and accepted Ngwane rule 
without putting up a fight (49). Thus the Ngwenya, the Dhladhla 
and the Mavimbela immediately subordinated themselves to 
Sobhuza, while the Maziya and Mahlalela capitulated after the 
neighbouring Ndzimandze had been destroyed (50). In this way 
Sobhuza gradually extended his control over the country, until 
in a few years he was able to subordinate chiefdoms as far 
afield as Chief Luguba’s on the other side of the Sabie River, 
and those of the Sotho and Koni on the Steenkampsberg (51).
It was an impressive record, but one should be careful not to 
exaggerate the extent of Sobhuza1s power. Sanders remarks how 
often Moshoeshoe’s existence during the early Mfecane hung on 
a single thread, and the same is true of Sobhuza throughout the 
1820s (52). Quite apart from his problems with Shaka and various 
Mfecane states, Sobhuza’s domestic regime was still far from 
sound. The Maseko for example jealously guarded their autonomy, 
and may even have cherished ambitions to be free of all Dlamini 
control. An outward sign of such sentiments was their treatment 
of Lambombotsi, whom Sobhuza had sent to be Mgazi’s wife. The 
idea of giving Lambombotsi .in the first place was that she would
(49) Interview with Guzana Mncina.
(50) Interview Hehhane Ngwenya; interview Mphundle Maziya. The 
Ndzimandze chief was Ngwenyama. The defeat of the Thabede 
chief Gojisa in the lowveld may also have influenced this 
decision. Interview Mashabhane Magagula.
(51) Below, 61, note 106.
(52) P. Sanders, Moshoeshoe, Chief of the Sotho, (London/Cape 
Town, 1975), 59.
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be mother to Mgazi’s heir, and so bind the Maseko that much 
more closely to the Dlamini, but this the Maseko made strenuous 
efforts to avoid. A village was built for her ten miles from 
Mgazi’s capital and an Ndzimandze woman was surreptitiously 
installed as chief wife. Lambombotsi was deeply offended, and 
she left her village at Kufinyeni to report her situation to 
the king. To lend colour to her story she is said to have 
soaked her leather skirt in the Mhlambanyatsi River, and then 
put on the dried and misshapen garments for her meeting with 
the king. Sobhuza was suitably provoked, but as yet was too 
weak to tackle the Maseko head-on.. A less direct way had to be 
found, and the one he eventually selected was to call Mgazi’s 
regiments for a hunt, and to use the opportunity to take them 
unawares. The stratagem worked, and Mgazi’s regiments were cut 
to ribbons on Mawelawela island in the middle of the Lusutfu 
River. A few soldiers escaped to warn Mgazi to flee, but this 
was still not enough to let him get away, and he was overtaken 
and killed at Intsakane mountain before he had travelled more 
than a dozen or so miles. The Maseko were thereafter scattered 
in various directions. Some were settled in the eastern 
Transvaal; some fled as far as Lesotho; while one minor section, 
which had remained loyal to Sobhuza during the hostilities, was 
allowed to remain at Nqabaneni (53).
The clash with Mgazi was exceptional in as much as fighting 
broke out, but it was symptomatic of a wider set of tensions 
between rulers and ruled. On the Komati the Mncina were exposed
(53) Above,40,note 45. Intsakane mountain is a little to the 
east of modern Bunya.
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to periodic looting, while the Magagula were still smarting 
from expropriation and defeat, and there must have been many 
others in the same position who resented Ngwane rule (54).
Indeed the picture that emerges from this period is of an army 
camped out in hostile territory rather than of a settled 
administration, "in those early days", one oral history recalls 
"there were no chiefs, only princes and leaders of regiments"
(55), and the same picture can be derived, from the evidence given 
by Swazi messengers to Captain Gardiner when they visited the 
Zulu capital of Mgungundlovu in 1835. The capital of Swaziland, 
they told him, was Elangeni, and a- little to the south was 
another village of Lobamba, which between them housed the entire 
male population of the Swazi, then numbering no more than a few 
hundred men (56). The messengers were apparently exaggerating, 
no doubt for Zulu ears. The villages which they mentioned were 
the capitals of Sobhuza and his queen mother, and there were 
certainly other Swazi settlements beside those. Sonyezane Dlamini 
was posted on the strategic southern tip of the Esincneni hills, 
soon after Sobhuza moved north, and Macetshane Fakudze was given 
a similar position around the Bulungu range (57). Similarly 
in Mankayana Matsebula talks of a royal homestead being 
established with a gift of cattle from Shaka, while on the 
southern bank of the Komati, Nyamayenja Dlamini was given charge 
of the scattered Mncina people (58). Least of all could the
(54) Interview Mbhuduya Magagula; interview Loncayi Hlophe.
(55) Ibid.
(56) A.F. Gardiner, Narrative of a journey to the Zoolu country, 
in South Africa, (London, 1836), 165 and 167.
(57) Interview Maphoyisa Manana; interview Nyanda Nhlabatsi; 
interview Mandlabovu Fakudze.
(58) Matsebula, History, 12; interview Guzana Mncina.
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messenger's description apply to the Shiselweni area. Some 
shift of population may have taken place after Sobhuza's move 
north, but at the end of Sobhuza's reign there were well over 
a dozen chiefdoms firmly established there (59).
The messengers were therefore misleading, but in the area of 
conquest there was some truth in what they had said. Few of 
Sobhuza's brothers or sons were assigned chiefdoms in the central 
areas until the closing years of Sobhuza's life, and the type 
of 'placing' to which Kuper refers did not occur on any extensive 
scale until the reign of his successor (60). The history of 
Maphalaleni illustrates the trend. Maphalaleni was established 
for LaNdwandwe, who was one of Sobhuza's favourite wives, but 
so late in Sobhuza's reign that by the time she got there 
Sobhuza was already dead (61). A similar pattern recurs 
throughout central Swaziland. Neither Maloyi nor Malunge seem 
to have taken effective occupation of their chiefdoms in the 
Mbuluzane River area until the reign of Mswati, and on the 
north side of the Komati River none of the Hhohho district was 
even allocated until the 1840s and 1850s (62). In the south 
things were somewhat different. As many as five of Sobhuza's 
sons seem to have been given chiefdoms there, but if Mantintinti 
is anything to go by, they only took possession comparatively 
late in Sobhuza's reign (63). After accompanying Sobhuza to
(59) For example the Mamba, Ngcamphalala, Nsibande, Mdluli,
Ndlela, Kunene, Shiba, Hlophe, Mndzebele, Nxumalo, Khumalo 
Simelane and several Dlamini chiefdoms like the descendents 
of Liba Dlamini.
(60) Kuper, Aristocracy, 57-8.
(61) Interview Sambane Dlamini, 14 May 1970, Maphalaleni, Swaziland.
(62) Interview Mbhuduya Magagula; below, 164-5.
(63) The other sons were Fokoti, Malambule, Ndlaphu and Mfipha 
(interview Makhosini Dlamini, 12 August 1970, Mbabane, Swaziland).
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Mdimba, Mantintinti "never set foot alive" in the chiefdom he 
had been given, and it was only "during the time of the return 
of the princes" to neighbouring Velezezweni that his successor 
Mtfonga "was instructed to return" (64). In sum then, the 
story told to Gardiner is at least partially confirmed. In the 
area of conquest the Ngwane were, for most of Sobhuza's reign, 
a nation under arms. Little of the conquered territory was 
settled, and the bulk of the population clustered for security 
in military towns. Only in the final years of Sobhuza1s reign 
did the situation begin to change. Men could now be spared to 
reinforce the south, and an administrative presence was 
gradually extended in the conquered zone. Imperceptibly a 
shift was taking place to a society less overtly parasitic,
and one less obviously reliant on a naked use of force. /
A conquering aristocracy was gradually sinking its roots, but 
it would be a generation or more before they were adequately 
secured. The situation was not helped by the absence of any 
real effort on the part of the Swazi leaders to assimilate the 
conquered groups. They were expected to provide levies of 
soldiers and tribute, but in the inner councils of the nation 
they had little voice at all (65). The contrast with the early 
phase of Swazi state formation could not be more complete.
Then the Ngwane nucleus assimilated thoroughly with the groups 
they overcame. The Matsebula were soon providing the chief 
ritual wife of the king, and the Sotho Motsa his second insila 
(a blood brother who became the closest companion of the king
(64) Interview Mpitha Dlamini, Gombolo Nkhosi, John Nhlabatsi,
8 May 1970, Mbelebeleni, Swaziland.
(65) Interview Mbhuduya Magagula.
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for the rest of his life) (66). Likewise, within a generation, 
the Mndzebele were called upon to supply the chief wife of 
Ndvungunye, and the Nsibande the chief induna to his son (67). 
Finally, cultural indices tell an identical tale, with Sotho 
influences penetrating every sphere of Swazi life. Language, 
dress and marriage customs were all equally affected, while the 
particular position of the libandla (national council) and 
queen mother in Swazi society are often attributed to the''same 
source (68).
Why did the Swazi respond so differently in the second phase of 
their expansion? One possible explanation may lie in the 
different needs of the respective periods of growth. In the 
1770s, when the Ngwane nucleus entered southern Swaziland, they 
were small and vulnerable, and their first priority was to 
expand their nuclear core strength. A policy of intensive 
incorporation was accordingly pursued. The second phase of 
Swazi state formation imposed different imperatives. The era 
of ’primitive accumulation1 was passed, and the Ngwane nucleus 
was sufficiently numerous to coerce the supply of tribute and 
military support without sharing the full privileges of 
citizenship. The same was true of the Ndebele when they 
incorporated the Holi caste from the Shona, but strengthening 
this tendency in the Swazi case was a factor peculiar to them- 
selves. One of the influences facilitating rapid incorporation 
in the first period of Swazi state formation had been the
(66) Kuper, Aristocracy, 58, 79-83 (especially 83), 114.
(67) Matsebula, History, 6-7.
(68) Bonner, ’State Formation’, 15-16.
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character of exogamy practised by the Ngwane. No Ngwane adult 
was allowed to marry into clans of his grandparents, with the 
result that they had to marry extensively into the clans of 
subject groups (69). Rapid acculturation inevitably followed, 
and it is one of the ironies of Swazi history that one of the 
most important customs to be adopted by the Swazi was the 
practice of preferential marriage within kin. It has been 
suggested that this evolved among the Sotho to cope with the 
less abundant natural resources of the highveld (particularly 
of stock), and to ensure that what little there was remained 
in the hands of one’s kin (70). To the Swazi during the Mfecane 
this would have been a particularly useful device. Various 
references in Stuart and other places bemoan the scarcity of 
cattle at this time, owing to the frequency of Ndwandwe and 
Zulu raids (71), and it is likely that it was this, as much as 
anything else, which served to keep cattle "concentrated largely 
in kraals of the national leaders" (72).
(69) This seems clear from the absence of similar marriage 
practices among all other Nguni and Tsonga groups,
A.T. Bryant, The Zulu People as they were before the White 
Man Came, (Pietermaritzburg, 1949), 581-5; H. A. Junod, The 
Life of a South African Tribe, (2 Vols, Neuchatel, 1912), 
Vol. I, 221-248; E. Preston-Whyte, ’Kinship and Marriage’, 
in Hainmond-Tooke, Peoples, 192-3, 205, 208-9.
(70) Preston-Whyte, ’Kinship', 206; Sansom, ’Economic Systems’, 
153. For Sotho sentiments about the circulation of cattle 
and cross cousin marriage see for example A. Kuper, ’The 
Social Structure of the Sotho speaking peoples of Southern 
Africa’, Part II, Africa, 45, 2,(1975) 144.
(71) S.P., 30091, 12, Mabola, 25 Nov. 1898; ibid, 12, Mgoqo,
19 Nov. 1898; ibid, Giba and Mnkonkoni, 25 Nov. 1898, 104; 
A. Mersensky, Erinnerungen aus dem Missionsleben in 
Transvaal, 1859-1882, (Berlin, 1899) , 9.
(72) Kuper, Aristocracy, 151.
\
The net result was the political and economic stratification 
of Swazi society in the second phase of Swazi expansion.
Whereas the earlier period of growth had seen the rapid 
assimilation of the conquered group, the very extent of that 
assimilation meant that in future it was at least partly ruled 
out. Once cousin could marry cousin amongst the intruding Ngwane 
and kin could marry kin, the need to recruit wives from the 
conquered was correspondingly diminished, and so long as such 
exchanges were uncommon, political and other barriers remained 
high. These, it is true, were neither permanent nor impermeable. 
The marriage of matrilateral cross cousins is much more flexible 
than its patrilateral parallel variant which fixes genealogical 
relationships in a virtually unchanging rhythm (73). The 
Swazi moreover marry their classificatory cross cousins and 
not their actual mother's brother’s daughters, and have 
preferential marriages with a variety of other kin (74). Finally 
a more general political expediency could easily involve an 
entirely different order of preference and led Mswati to exchange 
wives with both main Magagula chiefs (75). From the broader 
structural point of view nevertheless the relationships which 
developed with the conquered were decisively different from 
those which characterised the first phase of Swazi expansion. 
Although offering a more flexible range of marriage options 
than parallel and true cross cousin marriage the various Swazi 
marriage preferences still concentrated them within a restricted 
group of kin (76). Marrying a father’s mother’s daughter,
(73) C. Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, 
(Boston, 1969) 451-2; R. Needham, Structure and Sentiment;
A Test Case in Social Anthropology^ (Chicago, 1962) , 14-17.
(74) Kuper, Aristocracy, 95-61; Kuper, ’Kinship', 104-6.
(75) Interview Mbhuduya Magagula; interview Mankwempe Magagula.
(76) Needham, Structure, 14-17.
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which was perhaps the most popular marriage preference, 
involved recreating the alliance that one’s grandfather had 
made; while marrying a classificatory mother’s brother’s 
daughter, the next most popular Swazi marriage, meant doing 
the same thing with the alliance of one’s own immediate father, 
while avoiding the competition for spouses which direct mother’s 
brother's daughter marriage involved (see Figs. 1 and 2).
Wealth, if anything, tended to follow a still more restrictive 
route. Even where marriages were contracted outside the ruling 
group, thereby blurring political divisions between the aristoc­
racy and the rest, property usually followed an entirely 
different circuit, and was continually funnelling back into 
the hands of the ruling group. For female relatives of the 
king inflated bridewealths were demanded, and this even 
extended to female captives attached to the royal house, 
whereas the king was at liberty to take wives from whomever 
wanted without any corresponding bridewealth being levied on 
himself (77). Nor did the transfer of resources simply end at 
that point. The heir to a chiefdom, and hence to most of its 
property in cattle, would automatically be the son of the 
chief's royal wife (78). He in turn would be subject to the 
typical marriage preferences which would encourage him to 
recreate ties vzith his mother’s (royal) house, which thus
(77) Kuper, Aristocracy, 151-2. The same goes for the aristocracy 
as a whole. As Kuper remarks, "cattle come to aristocrats 
rather than go from them on the marriage market", ibid, 152.
(78) Ibid, 94, 152.
Figure 1. Marriage to a woman of one's father s brother s clan
Figure 2. Marriage to classificatory mother’s brother’s daughter
classificatory MBdaughters: marriage
preferre
actual MBd: marriage prohibited
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channelled marriage payments in the same direction again (79). 
Small wonder then that nineteenth century Swaziland is 
remembered for its gross disparities in wealth. "In former 
days", Kuper remarks, "cattle were concentrated largely in the 
kraals of the national leaders", and the evidence of John Gama 
and Mnkonkoni leaves a similar impression (80). According to 
John Gama, "before the time when cattle began to be used for 
this purpose /l”.e. lobola~/ it was normal practise to use goats, 
cattle only belonged to the great people", while Giba and 
Mnkonkoni talk of the small numbers of cattle used in such 
transactions, particularly during the reign of Sobhuza (81).
The broad effect of these practises therefore was that while a 
degree of social and political mobility was permitted, differences 
of political and economic status were perpetuated, which persist 
to this day. In Sobhuza1s time these were at their most intense. 
Marriages were confined politically within the dominant Ngwane, 
and spatially to their military encampments, while wealth 
tended to circulate in the same restricted group. The implica­
tions for political stability were of course profound.
Political and cultural tensions ran high, and economic grievances 
bit deep, with the result that every crisis in the nation’s 
affairs carried with it the threat of disintegration and collapse.
And there was no shortage of crises. No sooner had the dust of
(79) Kuper also points out that, "in the early days ’lobola did 
not end' - a few cattle were paid after marriage, and 
demands continued throughout the marriage", ibid, 98.
(8°) Ibid,' 151.
(81) Webb and Wright, Stuart Archive, 138, John Gama. 18 Dec. 
1898, 150-1, Giba and Mnkonkoni, 25 Nov. 1898.
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the Mf ecane begun to settle than Sobhuza was left to face his
most dangerous adversary yet - the newly arisen power of Shaka
in the south. His success in these encounters has puzzled
many writers, and various hypotheses have been advanced. For
Bryant, Swaziland's
unusual good fortune was in no wise due to 
the invincibility of its people, nor yet to 
the impregnability of its fastnesses.
Neither of these conditions ever restrained 
or baffled Shaka ... the explanation? It
is this - either Shaka died too soon, or
Sobhuza, the Swazi king, was too wise to 
necessitate forceful submission. (82)
Ritter, however, takes a different view, and believes that
Sobhuza1s secret lay in the strength of his fortresses, which
enabled him to withstand Zulu agression (83). More recently
still A.M. Dlamini has steered a middle course, and puts his
success down to a combination of factors: Sobhuza's diplomatic
marriages to the Zulu; the efficacy of his rain-making powers;
the impregnability of his fortresses; and the short duration
of Shaka's reign (84).
If we take Bryant's explanation as our starting point, it seems 
clear that the brevity of Shaka's reign was a major factor in
I
Swazi survival. In twelve brief years even Shaka could only do 
so much, and for most of that time his priorities seem to have 
lain largely elsewhere. From the moment Zwide was overwhelmed, 
Shaka spared scarcely a thought for the north. Apart from
(82) Bryant, History, 1.
(83) E.A. Ritter, Shaka Zulu, (new reset edition, London, 1969), 
269-71.
(84) Dlamini, 'Expansion', 1-7.
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establishing control over the Tsonga and the trade to Delagoa 
Bay, and making an early assault on Soshangane, all his efforts 
were devoted to restoring order across the Tugela River, and 
establishing political and trading links with the Cape (85).
Only in 1827 did his interest revive in the north, by which time 
he had only another year to live.
Bryant is therefore right to say that the brevity of Shaka’s 
reign was of major importance to Swazi survival, but he still 
begs the question of why Shaka chose to concentrate on the 
south. In part, this may have been because of his vision of 
partitioning the eastern sea-board between British and Zulu 
spheres of influence, but it is likely that northern factors 
themselves helped to determine this emphasis. It can surely 
be no accident, for example, that Shaka1s interest in the north 
re-awoke only after the final destruction of the Ndwandwe in 
October 1826 (86). In that bloody encounter Sikhunyane deployed 
an army of formidable proportions, and the prospect of meeting 
such a force in the broken terrain north of the Pongola must 
have acted as a powerful brake on expansion into those parts.
Sobhuza encouraged this natural hesitancy by adopting an 
appropriately submissive stance. He gave his daughters Lonkulumo 
and Mphandzeze in marriage to the Zulu king, and probably
(85) P.R. Kirby, (ed) Andrew Smith and Natal: Documents
relating to the early History of that Province, (Cape 
Town, 1955), 68 (extracts, apparently copies from Fynn’s 
original notes). The army referred to here appears to 
have gone against Soshangane; see also Stuart and Malcolm, 
Diary, 20, where Fynn talks of Soshangane being attacked 
three times.
(86) Below, 59-60.
55
became tributary to the Zulu at more or less the same time (87).
Swazi sources are universally silent on this point, but there seems
little doubt that it was so. Fynn makes this clear when he
speaks of the Swazi as having "several times joined the Zulus
and as often revolted" (88), and the same relationship is
implied by Cetshwayo's history of the Zulu nation. According
to Cetshwayo, Shaka periodically summoned subject chiefs to
visit him, and it is presumably in this capacity that Sobhuza
journeyed south at about this time (89). According to Swazi
sources, it happened in the following fashion:
Again it was known throughout the land that he
was a good ruler. Even Shaka the Zulu king
heard of his virtues, and consequently there 
came messengers from Shaka to Somhlolo's royal
residence (90). They came to invite Somhlolo
to visit Shaka, so that Shaka could satisfy
himself of his virtues, as he had heard of
Somhlolo’s admiration by other people. Some 
people did not favour the invitation, because 
they suspected that Shaka would murder their 
king. But Hlophe of Mahbongane favoured the 
invitation, confident that no harm would 
befall him. The Swazi then agreed to Hlophe’s 
suggestion. Preparations were made and the 
king started for Zululand. When he neared 
Shaka’s palace there was an abrupt change in 
the weather - a thunderstorm was brewing.
The Zulu call that "the elephant rumbles".
During the period of the thunderstorm Somhlolo 
arrived at Shaka’s palace. Unfortunately 
Shaka had caught flu. After Maphokela and 
another man had returned from Shaka after 
reporting the arrival of the king, Shaka
(87) Dlamini, ’Expansion’, 2; S.P., Notebook 30091, 84, Giba and 
Mnkonkoni, 25 Nov. 1898; Sw.A., Honey, ’History’, 22-3; 
Bryant, Olden Times, 321.
(88) Stuart and Malcolm, Diary, 153.
(89) Natal Mercury, 15 March 1880, 'Cetshwayo’s Story of the Zulu 
Nation', 3 , (reprinted from MacMillan’s Magazine).
(90) Somhlolo, meaning ’prodigy’ or ’wonder’ is the name by which 
Sobhuza is popularly referred to. It alludes either to the 
circumstances of Sobhuza’s birth or to Ndvungunye’s reaction 
on first seeing him - interview Maboya Fakudze; interview 
Ndambi Mkhonta.
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sent his induna and mother to greet the son 
of Ndvungunye and assure him of safety, also 
saying that he would perhaps see him tomorrow. 
Shaka1s warriors were full of malice, and 
they danced and cried out that Shaka should 
give the command to kill Somhlolo. But the 
guests were given ten head of cattle and were 
assigned to a nearby homestead for lodging. 
Before they could undo the mats to prepare 
for sleep, Somhlolo told his escort that they 
should wait a moment. There was then a torrent 
in Zululand. Somhlolo asked his people to go 
out and look at the sky. On their return they 
told him that the king was fully clad. Then 
Somhlolo asked his escort if they had seen 
the warriors dancing in their anxiety to kill 
him, and if they thought that they would see 
the next daylight. He himself suggested that 
they had rather depart then and there. They 
went out. The cattle were resting. They 
touched one of them, and then they went off 
into the night. All night long they went on 
their way. Just before dawn they were about 
to cross the Pongola River. It was still 
raining, but not on the Ngwane party who were 
walking on dry land. Across the Pongola they 
spotted a hillock with caves. They got there, 
slaughtered one beast and undid their sleeping 
mats. Some flayed the beast while others 
prepared for sleep. Just then they looked 
across the river, in the direction which they 
had come, and they saw a great army there.
The Zulu could see the cattle but could not 
readily see the Swazi. Suddenly, in the 
overflowing river there floated a big tree, 
which was being washed down by the flood.
The anxious Zulu army began to throw assegais 
over the flooded river. All the assegais they 
threw did not cross the river, but were 
washed away. Then there came another regiment 
of Zulu. The latter urged the first regiment 
to cross the flooded river. They decided to 
attempt it. This was the first heavy rain 
experienced on Zulu soil after six years of 
drought (91). Unfortunately their courage 
led them to their death - all were washed 
away downstream and drowned. None managed to
(91) If this is not just a dramatic embellishment it may refer 
to the drought which afflicted these parts c.1820, which 
finally broke in 1823, Hall, 1Dendroclimatology1.
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reach the Swazi. Those who remained on the 
bank of the river remorsefully remarked that 
their fellow warriors were just chasing the 
mhlengas (a term of abuse). (92)
As the foregoing passage suggests, relations between the two
rulers were not uniformly cordial, and either then or shortly
after, they lapsed into open confrontation. It is in this
period presumably that Shaka executed his Swazi wives on the
pretext of their becoming pregnant (Sobhuza would never have
visited him if it had happened before), and there are various
indications of subsequent Zulu attacks (93). Bryant and Ritter
mention an expedition being despatched in 1827 to attack the
Swazi and Pedi, and it is presumably to this which Cetshwayo
is referring when he talks of an expedition going north after
the Mpondo campaign, of which a quarter went westward (presumably
against the Pedi), and the remaining three quarters attacked
the Swazi king (94). Finally, Fynn, as we have seen, refers
to several Zulu invasions, as does the occasional fragment of
Swazi oral tradition (95).
Shaka’s success in these encounters is variously interpreted.
(92) Interview Maboya Fakudze. This version is confirmed in 
Dlamini, ’Expansion1, 2-3, and by a further account of 
the same episode from Ndambi Mkhonta, with the addition 
that Shaka was restrained by his mother. Matsebula 
(History, 12) claims Shaka treated Sobhuza kindly and let 
him go in peace. For less complete references to Sobhuza’s 
visit see, S.N.A., Vol. 1/4/1, Report of Acting S.N.A.
26 June 1878 .
(93) F.C., Vol. 37, No. 4(c), Forbes, 'History'; Kuper, 
Aristocracy, 14. S.P. Notebook 30091, 104, Giba and 
Mnkonkoni, 25 Nov. 1898; Sw.A, Honey, ’History’, 23; 
Dlamini, ’Expansion’, 2.
(94) Bryant, Olden Times, 604-5; Ritter, Shaka Zulu, 269-271; 
Natal Mercury, 15’March 1880, ’Cetshwayo!s Story’.
(95) For other references to Shaka’s attacks see Merensky, 
Erinnerungen, 9; interview Joseph Dlamini.
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Cetshwayo considers the Swazi to have been comprehensively 
beaten and compelled as a consequence to resume the payment of 
tribute, but Ritter and Fynn suggest a rather different result. 
According to Ritter the Swazi retired into their strongholds 
from which they could not be dislodged, while Fynn is quite 
definite that they were up in arms against the Zulu only a short 
while thereafter (96) : at the very least it is clear that they 
were not completely overwhelmed. A clue to their success may 
lie in Shaka1s continued southern preoccupations, for it is plain 
that he was not deploying his maximum strength. It would be 
unwise all the same to underrate the part played by Swazi 
resistance. Fynn makes this clear when he writes of the "several 
caves and rocky eminences /which7 from the difficulty of access 
to them, have been resorted to by various tribes", and talks 
of "a tribe of Amaswas under Sopuusas and others under Umboach 
^beingJ7 now the only remaining, the others being entirely 
destroyed by the repeated attacks of the Zulus" (97). So too 
does, one of Stuart's informants when he relates how "Beja ka 
Maguzi Zwho.7 was eNgome, and Sobuza ka Ndungunya /whoJ7 was 
eSwazini, ahlula'd ^avoidedJ  TShaka by taking refuge in 
fortresses" (98). As much as anything else it was the strength 
of Swazi fortresses which kept the Zulu armies at bay.
The references to Beje and Mlotshwa (Umboach) are, in this 
context, particularly illuminating. One of the great myths of
(96) Stuart and Malcolm, Diary, 153; see also Bryant, Olden 
Times, 629.
(97) N.A., F.P., Part 2, No. 67.
(98) S.P., No. V, 48, Ngida alias Magambul, 7 Nov. 1904.
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South African historiography is the supposed invincibility of
Shaka1s troops, and both of their cases help repudiate that
claim. In open terrain, Shaka's armies reigned supreme, but
against enemies who barricaded themselves in strongholds they
had much less success. The resistance of Beje and Mlotshwa
illustrates the point. Both occupied parts of Zululand (Beje
the Ngome Forest; Mlotshwa a hill north of the Mkuze River),
and both defied Shaka for astonishing lengths of time.
Mlotshwa's people, according to Fynn, had been
repeatedly attacked by the Zulus Zan<£7 have 
always succeeded in rising C O  the mountain 
with their cattle, having their corn 
generally there in readiness and having a 
sufficient supply of water, (99)
and it was only a surprise attack which found them temporarily
unprovisioned after Sikhunyane's defeat, that finally forced
them to give in (100). Beje if anything was even more
successful. The attempt by the Umota regiment in 1823 to
dislodge him was an utter fiasco, while the subsequent effort
that followed the defeat of Sikhunyane in 1826 had even less
success. On this occasion an entire regiment of two thousand
men perished, and Beje was only brought to book the following
year by the guns of the Natal traders (101). Boasting superior
fortresses and a larger reservoir of men, Sobhuza could hardly
(99) N.A., F.P., Part 2, No. 67.
(100) Stuart and Malcolm, Diary, 128.
(101) Bryant, Olden Times, 596-7; Stuart and Malcolm, Diary, 
128: L. Herrman, (ed.), Travels and Adventures in 
Eastern Africa by Nathaniel Isaacs, (2 Vols. Cape Town, 
1936), 158-9, 163-171, Vol. I.
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do much worse. He held out against the numerous Zulu attacks, 
and was even on occasions able to deploy his ritual powers to 
good advantage by 'witholding' rain during drought, until his 
people were left in peace (102). Whether this would have been 
enough to resist a sustained assault will presumably never be 
known; suffice it to say that on the eve of Shaka*s death 
Sobhuza was able to withstand the full might of the Zulu army 
sent against Soshangane, and was still sufficiently unbowed 
both to sever its communications and to harry its regiments as 
they straggled their way home (103).
During the army*s absence against Soshangane great changes had 
occurred. With Shaka temporarily defenceless a conspiracy had 
been set afoot, involving his half-brothers Dingane and Mhlangala, 
together with his personal attendant Mbopa, and his aunt Mkabayi. 
Their plans went forward without a hitch, and on September 22 
1828 Shaka was killed (104). The assassination ushered in a 
period of calm for the Swazi. Unsure of his position, Dingane 
sought to curry favour with the army by partially dispersing 
the regiments, and allowing them to marry (105). Sobhuza took
(102) Dlamini, 'Expansion1, 5-6. The one concrete reference 
given here is to the withholding of rain until Shaka had 
returned the famous rainmaker Malamlela Magagula (he had 
been captured during an invasion). My own information 
suggests this must have happened much later, probably 
during the reign of Mpande - interview Mbhuduya Magagula.
(103) Stuart and Malcolm, Diary, 153. The version given here 
somewhat abbreviates the account in the manuscript of the 
diary (N.A., F.P., Fynn's Diary, 87-8); Bryant, Olden 
Times, 629.
(104) Herrman, Isaacs, Vol. I, 257; Bryant, Olden Times, 659-662.
(105) Stuart and Malcolm, Diary, 162, 164, 174; S.P., MS 29392, 
Sucwatsha, 2 Jan. 1902; Bryant, Olden Times, 674.
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advantage of the situation to consolidate and expand. It was
probably in this period, that he pushed his boundaries in their
furthest extent, reaching the Sabie River in the north and the
Steenkampsberg in the west, and at the end of it the Swazi were 
greatly strengthened and revived (106). Thus by 1836 Swaziland 
was sufficiently prosperous for the third and least successful 
section of Dinganefs army of conquest to return with six thousand 
cattle in train, while in 1839, when the Swazi were finally 
forced to confront the Zulu in open battle, they were sufficiently 
powerful and numerous to rout Dingane!s troops (107). So much,
then, for the Swazi messengers whom Gardiner interviewed in 
1835 who spoke of a male population numbered in hundreds, and 
an almost total absence of stock! (108)
This interlude of tranquillity was relatively short lived. The 
principal bond uniting Shaka's Zululand had been its regimental
(106) F.C., Vol. 37 No. 4(c), Forbes, 'History'; Sw.A., R.C.S. 
454/40, Seme, 'Petition', 6; G.S. Preller (ed.) Dagboek 
van Louis Trigardt (1836-1838), (Bloemfontein, 1917), 215. 
H.C.M. Fourie, Amandebele van Fene Mahlangu en hun 
Religieus-Sociaal Leven, (Zwolle, 1921), 38-9; J.A. Winter,
The history of Sekwati', Report of the South African 
Association for the Advancement of Science, (1912), 331; 
Hunt, 'Bapedi1, 288; S.N.IA, No. N, 118/79, G. Schotz to 
Clarke, 31 March 1879, 'Fragments of History of the Natives 
in the Lydenburg District'. For the region to the north 
of modern Swaziland Nachtigal gives the most detailed 
account of Sobhuza's conquests, mentioning the chiefdoms of 
the Mahokeni, the Baloi, the Tschisungule, the Ntimpani 
the Tsekololo, the Mongo, and the Langane, Nachtigal, 
'Tagebuch',Vol. II, 238-241.
(107) Below, 63-4, 69-70.
(108) Gardiner, Narrative, 165-7.
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system, and once this became weakened separatist tendencies 
re-emerged. The most striking example was the secession of the 
Qwabe chiefdom under Nqeto, which was made doubly serious by the 
Zulu army’s failure to hunt them down (109). As the implications 
of this sunk in, other rumblings were heard, and Dingane was left 
with little alternative but to reinstate a more rigorous regime. 
All those suspected of secessionist leanings were rounded up and 
removed, and this was rapidly followed by a tightening of military 
discipline and a resumption of campaigning (110). Thus in 1832 
a major expedition was sent against Mzilikazi, and this was 
followed in 1833 by an attack on Delagoa Bay (111).
The Swazi could not hope to remain immune from these events.
In 1834 Dingane imposed a blockade on Swazi trade to Delagoa Bay 
(an event which prompted J.A. Nobre, the secretary of the 
Louren90 Marques Commercial Company, to write to Fynn to ask 
him to request Dingane "to open the port of Sabusse in order 
that we may buy cattle on account of that which he ZDingane[I7 
sends us dying at the arrival, in consequence of the long 
journey") (112), and by 1835, when Gardiner met the Swazi 
messengers at Mgundgundlovo, they were once again tributary to 
the Zulu (113). A few months later the situation took a further
(109) Stuart and Malcolm, Diary, 165-6.
(110) Ibid, 164.
(111) Lye, ’Ndebele Kingdom’, 91-2; G. Liesegang, 'Dingane’s 
attack on Loure^o Marques in 1833', Journal of African 
History, X,4, (1969), 565-579.
(112) K.C.L., F.P., Fynn’s letters, Vol. I., A.J. Noble to ..., 
10 Oct. 1834, (Noble is a misprint for Nobre’; personal 
communication, David Hedges).
(113) Gardiner, Narrative, 165-7.
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turn for the worse. Eight years had elapsed since the last Zulu 
attack, and these had been put by the Swazi, to almost too good 
effect. They had become prosperous and strong, or so it appeared 
from outside, and they had done so on the very edge of Dingane!s 
domains. They were in a sense, a living reproach, and one which 
he could not indefinitely ignore.
Dingane took up the challenge in 1836. His army went off, so 
Bryant tells us "with the firm intention of turning Swaziland 
into a second Natal", and other sources tell the same tale (114). 
"All the strength of the country ... was drawn out to fight 
against Sopuza", wrote one American missionary, while Brownlee, 
who seems better informed than any other white, saw it as "an 
exterminating expedition against the Swazies" (115). Dingane’s 
idea was to catch the Swazi in a trap. Three columns moved off 
in three separate directions, with instructions to reach their 
respective destinations at a prearranged time. From there they 
could converge on the Swazi, separating them from their strong­
holds and forcing them to fight. As so often happened with 
Dingane, the plan went awry. Ndlela and Dambuza reached their 
respective positions at the allotted time, but Mongo was delayed 
by swamps and forests along the coast, and arrived three days
(114) Bryant, Olden Times, 321.
(115) D.M. Kotze (ed.), Letters of the American missionaries, 
1835-1838, (Cape Town, 1950), 120; C. Brownlee, Reminiscences 
of kaffir Life and history, and other papers, (Lovedale,
1896), 86-90. The rest of the account is drawn from 
Brownlee.
64
late. Unaware of Mongo’s predicament, Ndlela and Dambuza went 
ahead, and left a gaping hole on the third side of their trap 
through which Sobhuza gratefully slipped. Their quarry gone, 
Ndlela and Dambuza engaged in some desultory looting and then 
returned home. Mongo meanwhile put in an appearance, and in the 
absence of the others found himself under attack. Whatever 
happened in this engagement, it was unlikely he was drubbed, 
since he returned to Zululand shortly afterwards with six 
thousand cattle in tow. Dingane however was not the least bit 
appeased. Mongo’s column was received in silence (acclamations 
being the norm) , and Dingane went on to strip him of his wives 
and his property, and to reduce him to the ranks. Dingane had 
been humbled,and Mongo had to pay (116).
Once more one of the Mfecane * s great survivors had survived, but 
at this point, according to Bryant, he died (117). As usual it 
is impossible to determine what Bryant’s sources are, but in this 
case it is likely that he drew on Swazi traditions which say that 
Sobhuza died in the midst of a major Zulu attack. From histories 
I myself have collected this would appear to be correct, but it
(116) Partial corroboration for Brownlee’s account comes from an 
entry in Champion’s journal dated 16 September, 1836, in 
which he refers to the under captains and dependents 
recently killed for their tardiness in the war against 
Sobhuza (Missionary Herald, Vol. for 1838), and from a 
portrait in Gardiner's book which depicts Jojo being tried 
for his poor leadership in battle, (Gardiner, Narrative,
50). Jojo was Mongo’s military name (Brownlee, Reminiscences, 
89). In the text Gardiner claims that this was for poor 
leadership against Mzilikazi,(Narrative, 48-9), but the 
caption that Samuelson gives the same picture is explicitly 
for poor leadership against the Swazi, R.C. Samuelson,
Long, Long ago, (Durban, 1929), 8th illustration between 
144-145.
(117) Bryant, Olden Times, 322.
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seems far more plausible to place Sobhuza’s death during the 
invasion of 1839, rather than that of 1836 (118). Allison’s 
account is consistent with this, and the timing of Mswati’s 
circumcision supports the later date. Mswati is widely reported 
to have been in his teens on the death of his father, and he is 
known to have been circumcised in 1845. Since he was at most 
seventeen or eighteen at the time of his circumcision, this 
would have left him an unlikely nine or ten years old if Sobhuza 
had died in 1836, or a much more probable thirteen if Sobhuza
had died in 1839. (119).
Bryant’s dating of Sobhuza's death has implications for other
parts of his narrative, for among its repercussions he sees a
slackening of central authority, and the raiding of Zulu cattle 
by undisciplined border chiefs (120). Raiding of some sort 
certainly took place (121), but it is more likely to have been 
because of mounting scepticism among the Swazi about the strength 
of Zulu arms, and because of the extensive losses of cattle 
sustained the previous year. Reprisals soon followed, but did 
little to dispel the impression they had formed. The Zulu party
(118) Interview Loncayi Hlophe; interview Ndambi Mkhonta.
Because of the turmoil Sobhuza’s body lay at Dlangeni for 
some considerable time, before being transferred to 
Embilaneni (interview Msebenzi Gama). Sokhukhuza 
apparently kept the news from the regiments for some while 
so as not to lower their morale (interview Loncayi Hlophe).
(119) Kuper, Aristocracy, 15; Sw.A., R.C.S. 454/40, Seme, 
’Petition1, 5; G.P., File IV B (Swazis), 1158, 1163-4,
1167 and especially 1172.
(120) Bryant, Olden Times, 322.
(121) J. Bird (ed.), The annals of Natal. 1495 to 1845, (2 Vols., 
Pietermaritzburg, 1888), Vol. I, 377 (Statement respecting 
Dingaan by William Wood).
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charged with the recovery of the cattle proved helpless when the 
Swazi took refuge in a mountain, and Dingane had to summon the 
support of traders from Natal to get them dislodged. William Wood, 
who was a member of this party, leaves an account of what followed. 
The Swazi had apparently drawn themselves up on the brow of a 
hill immediately over and commanding a natural cavern in which 
they had stowed the stolen cattle, and from which they had defied 
Dingane's soldiers for several days. The guns of the traders soon
made them change their minds. The Swazi were already aware
from the Portuguese of the damage these could do, and promptly 
agreed to surrender all the stock in their possession. The 
offer was graciously accepted, and the cattle changed hands,
after which the Zulu and their allies somewhat tamely retired (122).
Sobhuza by this stage could consider himself relatively content.
The Zulu had shown themselves incapable of seriously threatening 
Swazi security, and on the evidence of the most recent encounter 
a spirit of slackness and irresolution was spreading through 
their ranks. Within the year moreover Dingane was to suffer a 
shattering defeat at Blood River at the hands of the Boers, which 
depleted Zulu manpower and futher sapped their morale. Ironically, 
it was precisely this engagement which put the Swazi in their 
worst predicament yet. In the past the Zulu kings had made no 
attempt to exercise direct political control beyond about eighty 
miles of their capitals, after which they either raided and 
depopulated, or enforced the payment of tribute. Sobhuza had
(122) Ibid, 377-8.
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experienced both these practices, but had been shielded by the 
strength of his strongholds, and the short duration of Zulu raids. 
The defeat at Blood River now promised to alter all that. In 
terms of the peace, Dingane had agreed to withdraw from the 
territory south of the Black Mfolozi (123). At the same time, 
like the Boers, he regarded it as no more than a temporary lull. 
New hostilities would come, or so Dingane thought, and for these 
he proposed to abandon southern Zululand and to expand across 
the Pongola (124). Consequently, whether it be peace or be war 
Dingane*s attention had fastened on the north, and on the final 
extinction of Swazi autonomy.
Dingane disguised his intentions in an ingenious way. In an
unpublished clause of the Blood River treaty, Dingane had agreed
to tunga, that is, to sew headrings on all his soldiers (125).
The reason for the demand was to disband his standing army,
since the headring conferred the right to marry and settle down.
It was this provision that Dingane turned to unexpected use.
According to Ndukwane, who was one of Stuart's informants,
his secret purpose £Tn thi£7 was to continue 
to defy the power he pretended formally to 
have tendered his submission to. Dingane 
always felt that he had and could ahlula 
Z^overcomej the Boers. He never really 
feared them. What he really wanted was time 
and opportunity to increase his fighting 
forces. (126)
(123) G.S. Preller, Voortrekker Wetgewing: notule van die Natalse 
Volksraad, 1839-45, (Pretoria^ 1924), 2.
(124) S.P., Mss. Stuart, 1.09, 138-9, 151-2, Evidence of Ndukwana, 
15 Sept. 1900.
(125) Ibid, 151.
(126) S.P., Mss. Stuart, 1.09, 152, Ndukwana, 15 Sept. 1900.
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Elsewhere Ndukwana explained further, recalling that,
Dingane’s object was to occupy two countries 
/ak' izizwe esibili i.e. Zululand and 
SwazilancO so that although the Boers 
attacked and succeeded in one country,
Dingane could still defend and hold the
other, and, in order to occupy this other
country it was necessary to cause an 
extra number of men to marry in order to 
populate and hold the proposed state. (127)
Yet misfortune continued to dog Dingane’s every step. Expecting
the Swazi to adhere to their traditional pattern of warfare, he
only used four of his regiments to carry out the mission (128).
The orders they were given were also limited in scope: they were
to build a military village at Lubuya near the sources of the
Ingwavuma, but were otherwise to avoid any military clash (129).
On previous experience this should have presented no problem,
but this prelude to settlement was no normal event. Certainly
the Swazi themselves were under no such illusions, and took
unprecedented steps to drive the Zulu out. According to one of
Stuart's informants, "the whole country rose to a man, including
the abaLondokozi kaSobuza", as they went to evict the Zulu (130),
and the ensuing battle of Lubuya is justly famed in Swazi
tradition. Of the many acts of individual heroism still recounted
today perhaps the most famous is that of Dambuza Lukhele.
(127) Ibid, 138.
(128) Bryant, Olden Times, 324. Bryant refers to four regiments; 
Stuart’s informants name three, the Mbelebele, the 
Imkulutshane and the Nomdayana, S.P., Mss. Stuart, 1.09, 
152, Ndukwana; ibid, 29, Evidence of Mkando, 11 June 1902, 
but according to Mpande’s testimony to the Volksraad 
Bryant seems to be right, Bird, Annals, Vol. I, 537,
Minutes of Volksraad, 15 Oct. 1839.
(129) South African Commercial Advertiser, 21 Dec. 1839, 2;
Kuper, Aristocracy, 14, note 2; S.P., Mss. Stuart, 1.09, 
152, Ndukwana, 15 Sept. 1900.
(130) Ibid.
According to Ndambi Mkhonta,
One defect or mistake made in that war was the 
division of the warriors. A major portion 
of the Swazi force attacked from above the 
hills, while a comparatively minor portion 
attacked at the foothills. Unfortunately 
the smaller groups of Swazi warriors met 
the major groups of Zulu warriors. It was 
in this smaller group that Dambuza showed 
his valour and discretion before he fell.
He had realised that they were already 
doomed, but before he fell he was prepared 
to play his part, which he did. The 
advantage Dambuza had was the fluency of 
the Zulu tongue. In the evenings he used 
to steal into the Zulu camp and meet the war 
officer, like one of their warriors. The 
next moment Dambuza would be heard, "Ye 
Dambuza", as he struck a surprise blow at 
the unwary Zulu officer and stabbed him.
Then off he would bolt. Later Dambuza 
hid in a cave fortress at the Mkhondvo 
River. But the Zulu were not satisfied 
until they had killed him. They followed 
him to the fortress. There he stabbed 
and killed many warriors before one of them 
got him. One got away from the cave and 
hit him with a stone. He wearily continued 
to stab them, but his strength ebbed and he 
could no longer stand it. Then he gave his 
spear to a woman (even women were hidden 
there), and she bravely played her part in 
blocking the entrance and killing the Zulu 
warriors. They nearly gave up until
Dambuza finally yielded. Just before they
stabbed him he told them not to kill him 
in the cave, and agreed to come out. As 
he emerged they still feared, but he was 
stingless and they killed' him. (131)
The main force of the Swazi nevertheless triumphed. Led by
Mngayi Fakudze, they fought the Zulu to a standstill, so that
by the end of the day two of Dingane’s regiments lay dead in
the field (132). For the time being at any rate the occupation
(131) Interview Ndambi Mkhonta; see also interview Lukhele 
and Ngota Nkambule.
(132) Bryant, Olden Times, 324; P.A.W. Cook, ’History and 
Izibongo of the Swazi Chiefs’, African Studies, V (1931), 
182; Bird, Annals, Vol. I, 537, 539, Minutes of Volksraad, 
15 October 1839.
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had been blocked.
The defeat at Lubuya marks the second stage of Dingane's fall.
As a result, he was obliged to hurry off two more regiments into 
Swaziland, and to summon the people of his half-brother Mpande 
to help colonise the north (133). Mpande was understandably 
suspicious. The bulk of his support was concentrated in the 
south, and would, if Dingane's order were obeyed, be scattered 
far and wide. Mpande therefore stalled, which in turn served 
to crystallise Dingane's suspicions about his brother, and led 
him to consider a plot against his life. Once this had leaked 
out Mpande had no option but flight, and he had little trouble 
in persuading his supporters to follow suit (134). Dingane 
was already unpopular from his long string of defeats, and was 
now doubly so among those he proposed to resettle in the north. 
Consequently, when Mpande crossed over to the Boers on the other 
side of the Tugela, he did so with a following of seventeen 
thousand or more (135). The Zulu nation was now divided in two.
Mpande's flight put paid to any thoughts Dingane may have had 
of colonising southern Swaziland. Fearing an attack from the 
south he recalled the regiments he had despatched against 
Sobhuza, and shifted himself and his capital to a site further
(133) South African Commercial Advertiser, 21 Dec. 1839; Bryant, 
Olden Times, 324; Bird, Annals, Vol. I, 536-8, Minutes of 
Volksraad, 15 Oct. 1839.
(1.34) Ibid.
(135) AJlelegorgue,Voyage dans l'Afrique australe notamment dans 
le territoire de Natal, dans celui des Caffres, Amazoulous 
et Makatisses jusqu^au 1840, 1841, 1842, 1843 & 1844^
(2 Vols, Paris, 1847), Vol. I, 166.
north (136). There for a time matters stood. Mpande was 
viewed with suspicion by the trekkers, who feared a Zulu plot, 
and it was some time before they appreciated the extent of the 
rift. Once they did they proposed a joint invasion of Zululand, 
which finally got underway in January 1840. As it turned out, 
Mpande's army had little need of Boer support. For much of the 
time the trekkers simply sat on the sidelines and let Mpande’s 
army fight, and at the decisive battle of Maqonqo only Mpande 
was involved (137). Thereafter Dingane’s reign drew rapidly 
to a close. With diminishing forces he fled to Esankoleni,just 
to the north of the Pongola, in the dense Klathikhulu bush..
There a Swazi patrol under Sonyezane Dlamini was soon told of 
his presence by the Nyawo regent in whose territory Esankoleni 
lay. On receipt of the information Sonyezane moved south with 
his forces, to find Dingane temporarily undefended by his few 
remaining troops. With the Nyawo in support Sonyezane 
immediately siezed on this advantage, and Dingane was killed 
by Silevana Nyawo, the brother of the acting Nyawo chief.
By this stage Sobhuza had already died, but not before taking 
another policy initiative which directly bore on the way Dingane 
died. One night, shortly before his death, Sobhuza is supposed
(136) South African Commercial Advertiser, 21 Dec. 1839; Bird, 
Annals, Vol. I, 536-8, Minutes of Volksraad, 15 Oct. 1839.
(137) J.J. Guy, ’Some Aspects of the History of the Zulu kingdom1 
paper presented at the History Workshop, Gaberone,
Botswana, Sept., 1973, 9.
\
(138) H.C. Lugg, Historic Natal and Zululand, (Pietermaritzburg, 
1949), 163-4; Bryant, Olden Times, 325-6; Sw.A., Honey, 
’History1, 27; J.Y. Gibson, The story of the Zulus,
(London, 1911), 90; G.P., File II (iii) , 519.
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to have had a vision. He dreamed, so he told his counsellors, 
of white-skinned people with hair like the tails of cattle who 
would arrive in his country bringing two things; umculu (a 
scroll or book) and indilingu (a round piece of metal or money). 
Sobhuza advised his people to accept the book (the Bible) but 
to refuse the money, and warned them never to harm these white 
people, since if they did their country would be destroyed, and 
they would disappear as a nation (139). In detail the story 
is probably apocryphal, but it may give some idea of the 
importance that the approach of the white frontier came to hold 
for Sobhuza in the latter years of his life. At a relatively 
early stage Sobhuza had recognised the potential value of 
firearms, and had enlisted Portuguese support in an internal 
dispute (140). In the mid 1830s (probably in 1834) he went one 
step further and sent emissaries to the Wesleyan missionaries 
at Kuruman, with a request that missionaries be sent to minister 
to his people (141). The missionaries did not arrive until
(139) Matsebula, History, 13 (from which this is taken more or 
less verbatim); Dlamini, 'Expansion’, 6; interview 
Mandanda Mtetwa, 13 March 1970.
(140) Matsebula, History, 12; M.P., MS 1478, Miller, 'Short 
History', 10-11. According to Miller this conflict was 
with Moya Magagula, a son of Mhlangala, and took place 
some while after the Magagula defeat. Moya is presumably 
Moyeni who was only a distant relative of Mhlangala, and 
the conflict in question must have been during Sobhuza's 
initial campaign of conquest (above, 41). Sobhuza was 
also apparently aided by 'Magwamba' levies raised by the 
Portuguese during other battles in this period, G.S. Preller 
(ed.), Dagboek, 359.
(141) B. Shaw, Memorials of South Africa, (London, 1840), 262; 
W.M.M.S., South Africa XII, Bechuanaland, 1838-57, 1844,
10, Report by J. Allison, 15 Aug. 1844. Sobhuza also 
made overtures of alliance to the southern Sotho and in 
particular Moroko, Merensky, Erinnerungen, 9.
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1844, five years after Sobhuza's death, but the use to which 
they were put probably conformed to his ideas. Allison, the 
party's leader, was offered a site deep in the south with the 
aim of creating a missionary buffer against the Zulu, and he 
was further encouraged to proselytise around the headwaters of 
the Pongola where the Swazi and Zulu were competing for control
(142). The desire for an insurance against the Zulu which marks 
Sobhuza's dealings with the missionaries is also characteristic 
of his dealings with the Boers. After the battle of Blood 
River an embassy was sent to seal an alliance with the Voortrekkers, 
and the same policy was continued in the months after Sobhuza's 
death (143). Even before Mpande's invasion got under way in 
January 1840 Swazi envoys visited Pretorius with a pledge of 
support, and together with Jobe and Matiwane were given the 
task of containing Dingane in the north-west (144). In the 
event Dingane fled north-east and Pretorius made it a condition 
of future cooperation that the Swazi either deliver Dingane 
alive or bring in his head (145). The Swazi evidently complied.
(142) W.M.M.S., S. Africa, XII Bechuanaland, 1838-57, 1844,
Report by Allison, 15 Aug. 1844; Natal Witness, 18 Oct. 
1846, extract letter from Allison to Rev. Richards, n.d.
(143) Bird, Annals, Vol. I, 375, D.B. Bezuidenhout, 'The 
Pioneer's Narrative'.
(144) South African Commercial Advertiser, 28 March 1840, extract 
letter dated 3 Feb. 1840 from Port Natal; Bird, Annals,
Vol. I, 579, 580-1, 'Journal of the commando under the 
chief commandant, Andries Pretorius, against Dingaan.' 
According to G.S. Preller, Voortrekkermense, (6 vols.,
Cape Town, 1918-1938), I, 59, note 110 the Sobhuza here 
referred to is not the Swazi one, but I have seen no 
evidence to support this. In fact Preller seems to con­
tradict himself on this point elsewhere, G.S. Preller, 
Andries Pretorius: Lewensbeskrywing van die Voortrekker 
kommandant-general, (Johannesburg, 1937), 111.
(145) Bird, Annals, I, 375. Bezuidenhout, 'Narrative',
M.W. Pretorius, Beschieiden, 10-11; Preller, Voortrekker- 
mense, I, 295, 'Losse mededelinge Van J.Z. Uijs.
74
After Sonyezane had assisted in the killing of Dingane,
Carel Trigartd, who had just sailed up the Maputu River, was 
summoned to view Dingane’s corpse (146). Then, scarcely had 
the commandos returned than another Swazi party arrived bearing 
the scalp of the former king together with the ornaments from 
his body (147). Mpande and his captains were called on to 
identify these remains, and once they had satisfied themselves 
they were Dingane’s the Volksraad concluded a treaty of 
friendship with the Swazi and sent them back to Swaziland with 
a present cf twenty head of cattle (148). Another major plank 
of Swazi foreign policy had been tentatively set in place.
In conclusion, how does one assess Sobhuza's reign? Sobhuza 
once described himself as "only a broom to sweep the way for 
something better", and in one sense he was correct (149). When 
he died Swaziland was still riven by numerous divisions, and it 
was only Mswati who bridged them to create an integrated state. 
Similarly, in combating the Zulu or in his relations with whites 
Sobhuza had never come up with a lasting solution, and it was 
left to Mswati’s diplomacy to secure protection from them both. 
Nevertheless, as an epitaph to Sobhuza it is one-sided and 
unjust. From his contested succession with his brother Nkwekazi
(146) Preller, Vooitrekkermense, II, 17-19, Herinneringe van 
Karel Trichardt'. Preller Voortrekkermense, I, B1 note
(iii).
(147) Preller, Voortrekkermense, I, B1 note (iii); ibid, III, 
105, Herinneringe Van I.J. Breytenbach ; ibid, I, 295, 
J.Z. Uijs; ibid, IV, 103-4, S.W. Burger Sr. Burger gives 
a list of these ornaments and says that Dingane’s head 
was in a decomposed state.
(148) Ibid, III, 105, I.J. Breytenbach; ibid, V, 134-5, 
Herrineringe Van II.H. Hattingh.
(149) G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1158.
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until the Zulu invasion during which he died Sobhuza showed him­
self to be one of the Mfecane’s great survivors, which was 
undoubtedly the quality most demanded of the times. More 
importantly it was he who laid the foundations of modern 
Swaziland. Its administration might be sketchy and its 
settlements sparse, but its basic structure and composition can 
be traced back to him. In the end, then, modern Swaziland must 
be seen as Sobhuza’s creation, and one needs look no further 
than this for a lasting monument to his reign.
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CHAPTER III
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SWAZI STATE - 
ADMINISTRATIVE RE-ORGANISATION AND 
ZULU ATTACKS, 1839-1852 
The heir apparent was Mswati, a young boy of thirteen (1). On 
purely constitutional grounds he had an almost watertight 
claim. His mother, Thandile, was regarded as Sobhuza’s chief 
wife, and he himself did not suffer from any obvious diabilities, 
like a younger full brother or a disabled right hand (2). His 
succession for all that was controversial and stormy, and he 
had to ride out a series of challenges in the first decade of 
his reign. When considered against the particular history of 
this area, and ’Bantu speaking’ succession practices in general, 
this should not perhaps be a cause for much surprise. In 
African societies throughout southern Africa, succession laws 
are not as fixed or readily interpretable as have often been 
assumed. Among the Rolong, for example, Comaroff shows how 
succession laws can be manipulated to the point of even ousting 
established chiefs, and how custom can then be retrospectively 
re-interpreted to tally with that claim (3). The Swazi have not
(1) Above, 65 .
(2) As for example was claimed in the cases of Magudlela and
Ndlela (below). Thandile had been recognised as chief wife
ever since her marriage to Sobhuza, G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1158; 
’History’, 25; Kuper, ’Primitive Nation1 , 343. Matsebula,
History, 11; Sw.A., Honey, ’History’, 25; interview Maboya 
Fakudze. Mswati did have a sister Mzamose as well as an 
elder brother named Nzimandze who had died in childbirth - 
Kuper, Aristocracy, 14; Matsebula, History, 14; interview 
Maboya Fakudze.
(3) J.L. Comaroff, ’Rules and Rulers: political processes in
a Tswana chiefdom’, Paper presented to the University of
the Witwatersrand, African Studies Institute, African Studies 
Seminar, Sept. 1975, 1-27.
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usually gone to such lengths, but on occasions were not above 
ignoring old principles and manufacturing new ones to put in 
their place. Thus one hears of Magudlela being excluded from 
the succession because he was left-handed, and Ndlela being 
overlooked because he had a younger full brother, both of which 
have a suspiciously retrospective ring, while the controversies 
surrounding .the succession of Sobhuza suggest that even he did 
not possess a generally acceptable claim (4).
With succession laws honoured as much in the breach as in the 
observance, Mswati could hardly expect his own elevation to be 
completely trouble free, and the .chances of that were made all 
the more slender by the actions of his father in the last years 
of his reign. Some while before he died Sobhuza had suffered 
a serious illness, during which he had been persuaded by his 
wife La Vumisa to alter the succession in favour of her own 
son Malambule (5). The case that she argued was brutally simple. 
Mswati’s succession would entail a protracted minority, and 
would almost certainly encourage challenges from both within an 
without. Malambule on the other hand was a fully grown man, 
and had the necessary legitimacy to succeed his father by virtue
(4) Interview Maboya Fakudze; interview Phuhlaphe Nsibande.
(5) G.P., File IV2 (Swazis), 1158. The source of Garden’s 
information is apparently the Rev. James Allison who 
worked as a missionary among the Swazi between 1845 and 
1847. Allison himself presumably drew on information 
supplied by adherents of Malambule with whom he fled after 
a dispute had blown up between Malairbule and Mswati in 
1846 (below, 96). It is therefore possible that this is a 
somewhat embellished account to justify Malambule’s later 
conflict with Mswati. Even if that were so however, it 
probably still reflects the arguments going on at this 
time about the prospect of a minority.
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of the Ndwandwe parentage of La Vumisa herself (6), Had 
La Vumisa succeeded, Mswati would no doubt have joined the 
ranks of Magudlela and others with some disqualifying disability. 
Sobhuza, however, had the good fortune to recover, and was 
obliged by elements hostile to Malambule to revoke his decision. 
For the moment La Vumisa was foiled, but she had nevertheless 
implanted the seeds of doubt in Sobhuza's mind. What if he did 
die soon, and what if Swaziland did fall apart during a 
protracted minority? As he brooded over these questions 
Sobhuza became more and more convinced that an older 
son would have to succeed, and nominated Thekwane and Fokoti 
in turn to take Mswati's place. His council however remained 
adamantly opposed. No further tinkering with the succession 
would henceforth be allowed, and Sobhuza was forced to live out 
his remaining years under the shadow of the minority that might 
follow his death (7).
Mswati duly succeeded, but the damage had been done. Princes 
were openly contemptuous of the Mherd“boy king", and an atmosphere 
of suspicion grew up between Mswati and his brothers which was 
to poison their relations for the rest of his reign (8). An 
initial response of Mswati's regents may have been to accelerate
(6) Garden refers to La Vumisa as "a relative of Zwide's"
(ibid). For her first name see interview Mandlenkosi 
Nxumalo; interview Makhathi Mkhatshwa.
(7) G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1158.
(8) Sw.A., R.C.S. 454/AO, Seme, 'Petition', 5.
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the dispersal of Mswati’s brothers to the provinces (9). 
Nowadays this is seen as giving princes an outlet for their 
ambitions away from the centres of power, and in the context of 
the 1840s this need was especially acute (10). A large part 
of the Ngwane (11) were still concentrated around Ezulwini, 
as were the majority of the princes, and this left the new 
regime highly vulnerable to a princely-coup d ’etat. Dispersal 
however held its own disadvantages. Princes could easily 
become the vehicles of local grievances, and could in turn be 
the catalysts of regional revolts, which indeed was precisely 
what happened a few months after Sobhuza's death, when Fokoti 
launched a rebellion from a regional tase in the south. The 
rebellion itself was a rather half baked affair. No support 
was forthcoming from the royal capitals at Ezulwini, and on the 
eve of the battle many southerners slipped away. • Consequently 
when the two rival armies lined up against each other, Fokoti 
found himself decisively outnumbered, and his forces were 
decimated on the slopes of Mahamba hill (12).
(9) Above, 45 . The descendents of prince Ndwandwe for example 
speak of his settlement at Mb idlimbid1ini, "during the 
time of the dispersal of the princes", interview Dlamini 
informants, 24 June 1970, Mbidlimbidlini, Swaziland. Hhobohhobo
. probably moved nearby at much the same time (interview 
Dlamini informants, 10 June 1970, Kuhlamukeni, Swaziland.
(10) Kuper, Aristocracy, 57.
(11) I use this term to describe the 'true Swazi’ who had 
migrated north with Sobhuza, and who were still a class 
apart in the new Swazi state.
(12) G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1167; Sw.A., Honey, ’History’,
25; Sw.A., R.C.S. 454/40, Seme, ’Petition’, 5; Kuper, 
Aristocracy, 15. Among the few who remained loyal to 
Fokoti were Mfipha and Ndlapu, both sons of Sobhuza, and 
Sihalahala Nxumalo. Of these Mfipha was killed and 
Ndlapu and Sihalahala fled (interview Makhosini Dlamini; 
interview Mandlenkosi Nxumalo).
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The rebellion did nevertheless give the ruling party a jolt.
Too many chiefdoms had initially sided with Fokoti, and it 
served notice of the development of regional cleavages in the 
enlarged Swazi state (13). The regents responded by embarking 
on the biggest single reordering of Swaziland’s administration 
and political system to be seen since Sobhuza’s migration north. 
The moving spirit was Thandile, who may well have patterned 
her reorganisation on the institutions of her father's Ndwandwe 
state (14). One part of this related to the ritualisation of 
the king (15), but her most important single reform was in the 
field of military-administrative organisation. Here she 
systematised earlier structures by creating nation-wide age 
regiments as a framework of Swaziland’s military organisation, 
and by establishing parallel to this a far more extensive 
network of royal villages, to serve both as rallying points for 
regiments, and as centres for monitoring and supervising local 
political activities (16).
These reforms in themselves evoked a further wave of reaction, 
but before considering that, it is worth looking at the evolution 
of Swaziland’s relations with Mpande, since these affected that 
reaction in a variety of ways. After Dingane’s defeat Mpande 
had found himself in an almost identical position to that of his 
brother two years earlier. Large numbers of cattle had been
(13) Below, 216-8.
(14) Sw.A., Honey, ’History’, 29; Kuper, Aristocracy, 15.
(15) Interview Makhathi Mkhatshwa; Hughes, Land Tenure, 43.
(16) Sw.A., Honey, ’History’, 29; Kuper, Aristocracy, 15, 124.
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lost, which his subjects were anxious to replace, and Mpande 
was obliged to accept the same Black Mfolozi boundary which had 
driven his brother north. In addition there was the prospect 
of growing friction with the Boers. Refugees streamed across 
the border with their cattle, and every attempt at recovery 
risked an escalation into war. Hemmed in on the Mfolozi Mpande 
looked to the north, where the first people to catch his 
attention were the minor chiefdoms a little to the north-west. 
Sandwiched between the Zulu on the one side and the Swazi on 
the other, these had maintained a precarious quasi-independence, 
and Mpande now attacked them with a new determination and 
vigour (17). Beginning in 1842 with an attack on Langalibalele, 
the chiefdoms of Magonondo and Putile each suffered in turn, 
until Mpande had either exacted total submission, or forced 
their luckless inhabitants to flee to Natal (18). However,
Mpande's long term objective was to gain a foothold further 
north. Towards the end of 1841 he asked the Swazi for permission 
to build a military village on the north side of the Pongola,
(17) Allison speaks of them as "professing a nominal allegiance 
to Panda and Mosuasi", W.M.M.S., South Africa XII 
Bechuanaland, 1838-57, Allison, 15 Aug. 1844, 19, and 
elsewhere as paying an "undefined sort of deference to 
Panda", G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1170. Messengers from 
Putile describe the relationship in similar terms, C.O., 
179/5, Encl. in Encl. 2 in No. 119, statement by Pangasile, 
21 Feb. 1848; ibid, Encl. in Encl. 6 in No. 119, message
of 5 June 1848.
(18) Natal Mercury, 22 March 1880, 'Cetshwayo's Story1, 2;
H.S. Pretorius and D.W. Kruger, (ed.), Voortrekker 
argiefstukke, (Pretoria, 1937), 127, A.T"! Spies to
A.W. Pretorius, 24 May 1841; W.M.M.3., South Africa XII, 
Bechuanaland, 1838-57, Allison, 15 Aug. 1844, 2-3; C.O., 
179/5, Encl. in Encl. 2 in No. 119, statement by messengers 
from Magonondo's mother 21 Feb. 1848; ibid, Encl. in Encl.
2 in No. 119, statement by messengers from Putile,
5 June 1848.
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and then when this was refused he approached the Natal Volksraad 
for permission to recover the cattle that the Swazi had taken 
from Dingane (19). The difficulty that Mpande anticipated in 
making this request was the alliance that existed between the 
Swazi and the Boers, but on that count at any rate he had little 
to fear. The Volksraad, it is true, did prohibit his expedition, 
but not out of a sense of obligation to their former allies in 
war. It was rather their own interests which they thought they 
could promote, and this they proceeded to do in the most cynical 
of vrays. Dingane’s cattle, they argued, were their’s by right 
of conquest, and a commission was appointed to bring them back 
to Natal. If the Swazi seemed to behave honestly, the 
commissioners were told, they should be allowed to retain a 
portion of Dingane’s cattle. If on the other hand they betrayed 
the least sign of duplicity, any concession of this kind should 
be instantly withdrawn. Lastly, if the Swazi turned out to be 
completely recalcitrant, they should be told that the Volksraad 
would "take into closer consideration whether to send a commando 
against him in conjunction with Panda” (20). All else failing, 
in other words, naked blackmail should be used.
The Swazi regents were now faced with an extremely delicate 
decision. No record exists of how many of Dingane’s cattle the 
Swazi took, but it is highly unlikely that they amounted to very
(19) Pretorius and Kruger, Argiefstukke, 152, unsigned letter 
to Naual Stad, 30 Dec. 1841; S.A.A.R. Natal I ,(Cape 
Town, 1958) 128, Minutes of meeting 6 Jan. 1842, Art. 1; 
ibid, 141, Meeting of 22 Feb. 1842, Art. 4.
(20) Ibid, 128, Meeting of 6 Jan. 1842, Art. 1; ibid, 146,
Meeting of 26 Feb. 1842, Art. 1.
83
much (21). A sizeable proportion would moreover have found 
their way into private hands, thus further reducing the numbers 
that entered the royal herds. Since Mpande would almost 
certainly inflate even the original numbers, the regents were 
faced with the prospect of either stripping the royal herds of 
cattle which had never been inducted, or of imposing a general 
levy on the population at large. Neither solution can have 
been particularly attractive. The royal herds were a trust 
which they dare not treat lightly, while a general levy in 
cattle would have put their authority under potentially 
intolerable strain (22). The regents were saved from this 
dilemma by the outbreak of war in Natal. Only a few days before 
the commission was due to depart, fighting broke out between 
the British garrison and the Boers, and further action was 
suspended until the conflict was resolved (23). After a period 
of stalemate the British ultimately won, and with that the Swazi 
position was completely transformed. Many Boers trekked back 
onto the highveld, where they were to become a further counter 
in Swaziland’s struggle against the Zulu, when they eventually 
settled in the eastern Trans-vaal. As for the British, they 
pursued a far more consistent policy of restraint of Zulu 
ambitions than the Volksraad had done. As early as October 
1842 Mpande sent to Major Smith in Natal informing him of the
(21) Sw.A., Honey, ’History1, 28.
(22) The regents were not as seriously placed as Moshoeshoe when 
faced with the same problem, since the royal herds were not 
distributed under a mafisa (Swazi kusisa) system (Sanders 
Moshoeshoe, 296—7; Kuper, Aristocracy, 155-6). Coupled with 
unpopular administrative reforms however (below, 84) it would 
have brought discontent to a dangerous level.
(23) C.O. 48/223, Despatch no. 116, Encl. 3(c), W. Cowie to 
Captain Smith, 1 April 1842.
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desire of some of Mswati’s sub-chiefs to abandon their country, 
and implying that it might be necessary for him to go to their 
aid (24). Smith made his disapproval clear, and maintained 
the same attitude when Mpande made a further request to enter 
Swazi territory to recover Dingane’s children and cattle (25). 
Despite the obvious importance Mpande attached to these projects, 
he heeded these warnings, and it was not until 1846 that he was 
finally able to engineer a situation which would enable him to 
intervene in Swazi affairs (26).
The crisis wThich gave Mpande his excuse was closely related to 
Fokoti's rebellion. This it will be ?:ecalled had prompted 
major administrative and political changes,and these in turn 
had strained relations between the royal capitals and the 
provinces. Implicit in the reform programme was an assault on 
local liberties, and the discontent that this engendered finally 
welled up in the confrontation witnessed by the Weslyan 
missionary, Allison, and his two African preachers, in 1845-6.
By this stage new grievances had been grafted on to old, the 
most important of which was the wave of attacks on regional 
chiefdoms which attended Mswati’s circumcision. It was this 
it seems which finally spurred the provincial chiefs into action, 
and which led to their issuing an ultimatum to Mswati that any 
further depredations would be resisted by the chiefly hierarchy 
as a whole. The threat had an immediate, devastating impact.
(24) C.O. 48/224, 136-7, Encl. in No. 201, Smith to Napier,
15 Oct. 1842.
(25) E.C.A., Vol. I, 15, Annexure I of meeting 2, statement by 
Mpande’s messengers, 11 Feb. 1846.
(26) Ibid, 9, 15.
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For a spell the royal capital was in the grip of panic, with 
some councillors even advising flight to Mswati’s Portuguese 
friends in Lourenjo Marques, and it was not until a series of 
concessions had been made by the royal party that a semblance 
of normality returned to Swaziland’s affairs (27). What these 
concessions were is not recorded, but it is tempting to wonder 
whether we do not have here a partial explanation for the 
failure of the Swazi administrative and military system to attain 
the full rigour of its Zulu counterpart.
Superimposed on this pattern of 'chiefly' opposition to 
centralising policies can be detected a renewed conflict within 
the royal house, which may itself have played some part in 
encouraging the regional chiefs to be so vocal in their opposition 
to the royal party. Mswati had been formally installed as 
King in 1839 or 1840, in the aftermath of Fokoti's rebellion (28),
(27) G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 58-60, 1158; C.L., Methodist 
Archives, Minute Book of the Bechuana Methodist Meeting. 
Report of the Baraputse Mission, 1845, Allison it should 
be noted was only dimly aware of the wider ramifications 
of the dispute. He placed the blame for the rupture 
squarely on the last attack made by the royal party on a 
regional chiefdom. Yet there was clearly more to the 
dispute than this. On Allison's own admission, there was 
evidence of a growing estrangement between the two parties 
even before the circumcision ceremonies. Allison put this 
down to the simple capriciousness of the royal clique, 
but it seems certain that what he thought of as caprice 
was in fact the outward sign of a much deeper conflict of 
interest. The scale of the violence, and the bitterness
it provoked seem both to confirm this view. In the absence 
of more explicit documentation one cannot say for certain 
what this conflict of interest was, but the general back­
ground of events just outlined, and the odium attaching
to the royal clique suggest that it was the reforms
initiated by them that were to blame.
(28) Kuper, Aristocracy, 15.
86
but since he was still young, the handling of affairs remained 
in the hands of his former regents. As late as 1844 when 
Allison visited Mswati, he could not speak officially with him 
because Mswati was as yet uncircumcised, and unfit to conduct 
public affairs, while policy, as Allison's general narrative 
of events makes clear, was still in the hands of his mother, 
Thandile, and of the senior regents, Malambule and Malunge (29). 
Mswati was circumcised some time in 1845, but whether he 
immediately assumed full control over affairs is far from clear, 
since even as late as July 1846 Mswati's eldest brother, Somcuba, 
was still designated in a treaty of cession between the Swazi 
and the Ohrigstad Boers as "ruling in place of the King", while 
Mswati merely figured as "captain" (30). What is certain though 
is that Mswati's circumcision did mark at least a beginning to 
his assumption of the full powers of kingship, and it is 
significantly from this time that new tensions began to emerge 
within the royal party. At the centre of these was Mswati's 
elder brother, Malambule, who like Mswati could boast a mother 
from the family of Zwide (31), and who had acted as a principal 
regent for the young king since Sobhuza's death. In the 
period following Mswati's circumcision Malambule and Mswati 
became progressively more estranged, until finally, in the
(29) W.M.M.S., South Africa, XII Bechuanaland 1838-1857,
J. Allison, 15 Aug. 1844, 10.
(30) Pretorius and Kruger, Argiefstukke, 233-4. Attention should 
however be drawn to an element of confusion in the treaty. 
This arises out of the conflicting designation of Mswati, 
who appears as "King" in the text but as "captain" in the 
signatures appended to the text. The description of 
Somcuba as "ruling in place of the king" also occurs in
the signatures.
(31) G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1158; above,78,note 6.
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latter part of 1845, a point of open rupture was reached.
Exactly why the final breakdown occurred is contested. One 
source claims that hostilities started after Mswati uncovered 
a plot of Malambule’s to kill him during a hunt (32). Others 
allege that they arose out of Malambule’s refusal to surrender 
cattle to Mswati (33). But in either case the implications are 
much the same. Mswati was tiring of Malambule’s tutelage, and 
Malambule was beginning to find the increase of the young king’s 
authority too much to accept.
In the early stages of open confrontation Malambule pre-empted 
much of the diplomatic ground. He not only acquired the backing 
of Mpande, but even succeeded in manoeuvring the missionary 
Allison into an unwitting association with his cause (34). 
Following so soon on the heels of the confrontation with the 
regional chiefs, these new developments bristled with dangers 
for Mswati, for now there was a very real possibility that 
Malambule, at the head of a victorious Zulu army, might be 
installed in Mswati’s place, or that a Zulu puppet state might 
be created in southern Swaziland. But Malambule did overlook 
one new power which had only just made its appearance in this 
area, and which had not as yet made any appreciable impact on 
the politics of the region. This was the settlement of the 
Ohrigstad Boers, which was established to the north of Swaziland
(32) Sw.A., Honey, ’History’, 32.
(33) G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1167; Natal Witness, 24 May 1850,
Letter from Allison to Editor, 21 May 1850; Bryant, Olden
Times, 326; Matsebula, History, 16.
(34) G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1164; For a fuller account see
Perkins, ’Missions', 95-104.
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in August 1845. For Mswati, the appearance of this new power 
was an unlooked for piece of good fortune, and almost directly 
attempts were made by the royal party to obtain its support and 
co-operation (35). Initially their success was limited. At 
that stage the Swazi could offer little to the Ohrigstad 
authorities to compensate them for becoming embroiled in local 
disputes. Although the Swazi had some claim to the land on 
which the Ohrigstad community had settled, and were prepared to 
negotiate about it, Potgieter, the Commandant General, had 
already concluded an agreement with the Pedi chief Sekwati, in 
terras of which he had secured cession of the land for himself 
in return for the promise of Boer protection against the Swazi (36). 
To have obtained its cession from the Swazi would thus have 
been self-defeating, and would merely have duplicated the 
agreement with Sekwati for the dubious benefit of protecting 
the Swazi against Mpande.
Equally important in explaining Potgieter's brusque response 
was the support that‘the Sekwati agreement lent to his own 
internal position, at a time when this was coming increasingly 
under challenge from opponents within the community. The quarrel 
between Potgieter and his opponents had its roots in the dispute 
which had divided the Voortrekker communities from the time of
(35) Pretorius and Kruger, Argiefstukke, 227, Memorie aan 
Volksraad, 8 June 1846; E.C.A., I, Annexure I of meeting 
2, statement by Mpande's messengers, 11 Feb. 1846.
(36) Preller, Voortrekkermense, IV, 9, S.W, Burger Sr. The 
pressure that Sekwati had been under from Sobhuza is 
corroborated by Louis Trichardt, Preller, Dagboek, 21.
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the Natal settlement and before. At its most visible level it 
was between the proponents of two opposing systems of government, 
the one of whom demanded a government in which all authority 
was lodged in a civilian and democratically elected Volksraad, 
and the other who wished to institute the autocratic and 
personalised government of individual military leaders (37).
The Sekwati agreement was integral both to Potgieter's own 
internal predominance and to this concept of highly personalised 
government. Being personal and informal it not only accorded 
exactly with Potgieter!s own ideas of good government, but 
also gave him a grip on an important branch of external affairs 
which his opponents found extremely difficult to loosen. This 
in turn had important consequences for the internal political 
struggle within Ohrigstad. In the past the domestic significance 
of the Sekwati agreement has been seen exclusively in terms of 
the personal title to Ohrigstad’s land that it allegedly vested 
in Potgieter (38). As a factor in the internal power struggle 
in Ohrigstad however this has almost certainly been exaggerated (39). 
At least as important was the mediating role that the agreement 
conferred upon Potgieter in relations with the Pedi and
(37) See for instance D.W.Kruger, 'Die Weg na die See', A.Y.B., 
1938, I, (Cape Town, 1938), 96-7.
(38) See J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton, The Native policy of the Voor- 
trekkers, an essay in the history of the interior of 
South Africa- 1836-1858, (Cape Town, 1928), 57-60;
F.A.F. Wichmann,'Die Wordingsgeskiedenis van die Zuid- 
Afrikaansche Republiek 1838-1860', A.Y.B., 1941, II,
(Cape Town, 1941), 50-51; T.S. Van Rooyen, 'Die Verhouding 
tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in Die Geskiedenis 
van die Oos Transvaal tot 1882', A.Y.B., 1951, I, (Cape 
Town, 1951), 4-5.
(39) Potgieter for instance had to apply for a farm in Ohrigstad 
in the same way as anyone else, S.A.A.R. Transvaal, I , 
(Cape Town, 1949), 15, Art. 5, 2 Aug. 1845.
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associated groups, and the precedent that this set for other 
African communities to treat with the Republic through the same 
channels. In the environment in which the Ohrigstad community 
was situated, Potgieter's control over this key area of internal/ 
external affairs was of major importance in the internal 
distribution of political power, because it allowed him an 
influential, if not decisive voice, in such varied matters as 
labour, trade, hunting and the enrolment of African auxiliaries 
against other black groups (40). Besides this, it also enabled 
him to enforce a particular economic orientation on the community 
as a whole. The hunter/raider/trader proclivities of Potgieter’s 
adherents had been evident from the start, and these came into 
immediate conflict with the more pastoral inclinations of later 
immigrants from Natal. The division, it must be emphasised, 
was by no means absolute, and was a matter of emphasis as much 
as anything else, but it imposed a sufficiently different set 
of priorities at either end of the economic spectrum to promote
(40) One complaint against Potgieter was that he was able to 
derive personal economic advantage from his position by 
appropriating the ivory sent in as tribute from neighbour­
ing chiefs. Another was that he gave freedom of access 
to the English trader Hartley. The two are not generally 
related but a connection can be made. The Volksraad 
party objected to Hartley not so much because he was an 
Englishman (as is usually suggested) but because he was 
a trader who could market Potgieter’s ivory and help 
consolidate his economic power. Pretorius and Kruger, 
Argiefstukke, 227, Memorie aan Volksraad, 8 June 1846;
230, Bekendmaking, 19 Jan. 1846. For the importance of 
hunting and trading to the Ohrigstad settlement see 
F.J. Potgieter, ’Die Vestiging van die Blanke in Transvaal’ 
(1837-1886)’, A.Y.B., 1958, II (Cape Town, 1959), 39, 44, 
48, 60, 84-7, 95, 145, 148. J. Stuart, De Hollandsche 
Afrikanen en hunne Republiek in Zuid~Afrika (Amsterdam, 
1854), 210, 219, 225. Boer dependence on black auxiliaries 
in their tussles with other African groups is a constantly 
recurring theme in the'history of the Transvaal. It 
would require a separate chapter to document this properly 
but for one example see below,108,note 94.
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continuing conflict over African affairs. To what extent this 
underlay competing political philosophies is difficult to say, 
but what is certain is that when combined with more specifically 
political rivalries it gave control over black/white relations 
a central position in the developing struggle.
The earliest Swazi overtures were thus a source of serious 
embarrassment to Potgieter. The Swazi could hardly have demanded 
much less than the Volksraaders subsequently agreed to (110 head 
of cattle), and this Potgieter was neither willing nor able to 
pay. At the same time they also cast doubts on the validity of 
the community's title deeds, besides drawing attention to the 
existence of alternative African powers with whom his opponents 
could deal. Potgieter's reaction was to suppress all mention of 
the Swazi envoys who returned to Swaziland empty handed (41), 
but news of some sort eventually leaked out, and by the end of 
December 1845 the services of four free-booters from Ohrigstad 
had been secured for Swaziland's defence (42). One may judge 
the value of these efforts by their impact on Mswati's enemies. 
Until then neither Mpande nor Malambule seemed to have had any real 
idea of the role that Ohrigstad could play in the coming conflict. 
Now realization dawned, and a flurry of messages was sent out in 
an effort to make good the lapse. To the British Mpande 
protested about the Boer intrusion and requested some men be sent 
to him to counteract the advantage that Mswati had gained (43),
(41) Pretorius and Kruger, Argiefstukke, 227, Memorie aan 
Volksraad, 8 June 1846.
(42) E.C.A., I, Annexure 1 of meeting 2, statement by Mpande's 
messengers, 11 Feb. 1846.
(43) Ibid.
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while on the Boers he urged the desirability of evacuating 
unhealthy Ohrigstad for the more bracing climate of Swaziland, 
and of expelling the Swazi in the course of their move (44).
Neither Natal nor Lydenburg responded to his messages. Each 
had an equally good reason for suspecting Mpandefs motives, and 
each was deaf to his appeals (45).
The differences between Potgieter and his opponents gradually 
mounted in intensity as the Volksraad party became strengthened 
by an influx of new settlers from Natal in the early part of 
1846 (46), and the Sekwati agreement soon emerged as one of the 
principal bones of contention between the two groups. Intent 
on wresting power from Potgieter, and on securing more respectable 
title deeds for the settlement, the Volksraad party now began 
to insist that the treaty be renegotiated in the name of the 
community as a whole, and that some payment be made to Sekwati 
in return for the land (47). Potgieter, not unnaturally was 
opposed to any such move (48), but by May 1846 the opposition 
was sufficiently strong to override his objections, and the 
half-caste, Doris Buys, was commissioned to. enter into negotiations 
with Sekwati (49). The Buys negotiations are a typically murky
(44) S.A.A.R. Transvaal I. , 27, Volksraad Notules, 20 Jan. 1846,
1st Resolution.
(45) Ibid ; Pretorius and Kruger, Argiefstukke, 227, Memorie 
aan Volksraad, 8 June 1846.
(46) Wichmann, 'Wordingsgeskiedenis’, 53; Kruger, *Weg*, 98-99.
(47) Pretorius and Kruger, Argiefstukke, 227, Memorie aan Volks­
raad, 8 June 1846; 230, Bekendmaking, 19 June 1846.
(48) Ibid.
(49) S.A.A.R. Transvaal I , 50, Eerste Volksraad Notules 
(hereafter E.V.R.), 15 May 1846, Art. I. It is possible 
that Potgieter tried to accommodate some of the Volksraad*s 
demands before this. In the middle of March he agreed to 
summon Sekwati to Ohrigstad, but this could equally well
have been for some other reason - ibid, 41, 18 March 1846, Art. 8.
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episode in the early history of the eastern Transvaal. The 
degree to which Potgieter himself supported the mission (50), 
the affiliation of Buys at this time - he changed sides at least 
twice later on in the dispute (51) - and the extent to which 
Sekwati's response represents an attempt to exploit the Potgieter/ 
Volksraad rift, are all equally blurred. All that is certain is 
that Buys's efforts proved abortive. Sekwati was as averse as 
Potgieter to renegotiation, and told Buys that since he had 
once given the land to Potgieter he could not sell it again (52). 
Consequently, whether by accident or design, Potgieter was able 
to maintain for a little longer the fiction that he personalised 
the authority of the Republic in its dealings with neighbouring 
blacks.
But nemesis, in the shape of the Volksraad/Swazi agreement of 
July 1846, was soon to overtake Potgieter. The 1846 agreement 
is doubly interesting for the historian as it not only illustrates 
the sort of factional inter-relationships that characterised 
Transvaal/Swazi politics at this time, but also provides an 
example of how an exaggerated concentration on white policies 
and motives in- South African historiography has warped inter­
pretations of historical events. The usual gloss given to the
(50) Above, note 49.
(51) Pretorius and Kruger, Argiefstukke, 252, Verklaring van (?), 
Maraba, 23 Jan. 1847; 253, Verklaring van Mapela, 26 Jan. 
1847; 273, A.H. Potgieter to J.C. Klopper and J.F. Schutte,
5 June 1847; 295, Verklaring van I, 18 Jan. 1848; 308-9, 
Verklaring van Doris Buis (Buys), 4 Feb. 1848.
(52) S.A.A.R. Transvaal I., 50, E.V.R., 15 May 1846, Art. I.
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treaty is that the Volksraad party followed their rejection by 
Sekwati by redirecting their efforts to the Swazi, from whom 
they secured a massive cession of land, stretching between the 
Crocodile and Oliphants Rivers, in return for the payment of one 
hundred and ten head of cattle (53) (Map 7). It has occasionally 
been doubted that the appropriate Swazi authorities were 
consulted, or that its provisions were fully explained, but 
nobody has ever questioned that the initiative for the cession 
lay entirely with Boers, or that they were chief beneficiaries 
of the treaty (54). An examination of the evidence in the 
context of the Swazi politics of the period places both assumptions 
in doubt. It is commonly overlooked, for example, that it was 
a Swazi initiative that first acquainted Potgieter with the Swazi 
claim to Ohrigstad’s land, and which first raised the question 
of cession. Potgieter suppressed the information, but by early 
June the Volksraad were also acquainted with the Swazi claim, 
and with Swazi willingness to cede (55). How this information 
reached them is unclear, but given the community’s ignorance of 
even the most rudimentary facts about the politics of the region 
only four months earlier, it is at least possible that it was 
deliberately transmitted to them by the Swazi (56). The timing 
of the cession further reinforces this impression. The first
(53) For example Wichmann, 'Wordingsgeskiedenis’, 51;
Kruger, ’Weg’, 100. For the text of the treaty see 
Pretorius and Kruger, Argiefstukke, 233-234.
(54) For example Agar Hamilton, Native Policy, 61.
(55) Pretorius and Kruger, /argiefstukke, 227, Memorie aan 
Volksraad, 8 June 1846.
(56) One source of intelligence for the Swazi and Volksraad party 
alike would probably have been the four Boer free-booters 
who joined Mswati early in 1846. There was little love 
lost between them and Potgieter, as can be seen from 
Potgieter's denunciations of their activities early in 1847, 
C.O. 179/3, Encl. in Encl. in 87, Cutting from The Patriot, 
23 April 1847.
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official mention of the Swazi offer, for example, coincides 
exactly with important new developments in Swaziland. By mid- 
June, Malambule had secured the support of Mpande, and was ready 
to take active steps in his campaign to oust Mswati. While 
Mpande called up half his army for duty in Swaziland (57), 
Malambule moved his headquarters to the vicinity of Allison’s 
mission station at Mahamba in southern Swaziland (58). By 
mid-July the conflict was imminent, and the ruling party was 
desperate for assistance and protection. Finally on the 27th of 
that month the treaty of cession was signed. The conclusion 
that the difficulties of Mswati provided the chief impetus for 
the cession thus seems almost impossible to escape.
The agreement between Mswati and the Ohrigstad Boers came not a 
moment too soon for the royal party in Swaziland. After a 
preliminary skirmish with Mswati’s forces at Mahamba (59), 
Malambule returned for reinforcements to his chiefdom at LaVumisa. 
Six weeks later, in accordance with a plan already arranged with 
Mpande, Malambule left LaVumisa, and moved off parallel to the 
Pongola River to Allison’s mission station at Mahamba (60).
Here he engaged one of Mswati's armies, but was repulsed and fled 
southwards before pursuing forces into the territory of Nyamainja, 
Magonondo and Mhlangampisi (61). This supplied Mpande with
(57) E.C.A., Vol. I, 62, Annexure 2 of meeting 6, Moodie to 
Secretary to the Government, 20 July 1846.
(58) G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1164..
(59) Ibid, 1166-8 .
(60) Ibid.
(61) Below, 98.
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a long-awaited excuse to invade Swaziland and annex its strategic 
southern areas. For some months now Mpande had been displaying 
a revived interest in Swaziland. Early in February he had 
sent a further request to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal 
asking for permission to exact reparations from the Swazi, and 
when all this elicited was a promise of mediation, he offered 
to renounce all further claims on the cattle of Mawa, which 
until then had been a major source of contention, if only the 
British would grant him a free hand in the north. The 
Lieutenant-Governor was unimpressed, and Mpande was gradually 
forced to accept that without being given a convincing casus 
belli by the Swazi the British authorities would never waive 
their objections to any such plan (62). The pact with Malambule 
should be seen in these terms. Malambule was instructed to 
flee towards the headwaters of the Pongola where Mpande could 
then waylay any pursuing Swazi force. The ostensible reason 
for this tactic was to draw the Swazi away from their usual 
sanctuaries in Swaziland, but equally important in all 
probability was the desire to tempt the Swazi into an area of 
dubious sovereignty so that this could be branded by Mpande as 
an invasion of Zulu territory. If this was the plan it worked 
to perfection. In August, soon after the initial plot had been 
laid, Mpande informed the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal that he 
was assembling his armies because, in the light of the current 
troubles in Swaziland, "he judged it prudent to be prepared for
(62) C.O. 179/1, Encl. I in Encl. in No. 110, Report of
N.C. Armstrong and Cowie, 30 March 1846; ibid, Encl. 2 in 
No. 110, message from Panda, 6 April 18461
98
any emergency". The Lieutenant-Governor gave a predictably 
discouraging response, but the situation was already slipping 
beyond his control (63). In mid-September Mswati’s armies 
again engaged Malambule, and aided by their four Boer mercenaries 
easily carried the day. As arranged, Malambule now fled towards 
the headwaters of the Pongola. Mswati’s armies followed suit, 
and also took the opportunity to attack Magonondo and Mhlangampisi. 
Mpande had now been given his excuse. He notified the 
Lieutenant-Governor of his intention to repel the invasion, and 
to"follow the enemy as far as they may go to recover cattle".
Under the circumstances the Lieutenant-Governor could do nothing 
but acquiesce, and Mpande was thereby given a free hand in the 
north (64).
Mpande's intentions by this stage were becoming ominously clear. 
Already in May the American Board missionary Grout had received 
reports from two separate sources that Mpande was organising 
an expedition to seize possession of some caves in the north,
"where he hopes he may save himself if attacked by a strong 
enemy" (65). Somewhat later Allison's preachers reported in 
similar vein. -Mpande had expelled Mswati’s forces the previous 
October, and in the process had seized large numbers of cattle.
It was now his intention, they claimed, "to send out a strong
(63) E.C.A., Vol. I, 75, 78, 82-3, Annexure I to Meeting 7, 
message of Panda to Lieutenant-Governor, 6 Aug. 1846 and 
the latter’s reply of the same date.
(64) Natal Witness, 9 Oct. 1846, message from Mpande to the 
Lieutenant-Governor and the Lieutenant-Governor’s reply.
(65) P.P., 1847-8, ’Correspondence1, 87-8, Encl. 5 in Encl. in 
No. 38, A. Grant to Secretary for Government, 6 May 1846.
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force composed of all his married men to subdue the Swazi, and 
then with his unmarried men remove all to Swaziland". Only 
the opposition of certain councillors had so far prevented this 
happening, but the plan was now scheduled to go ahead as soon 
as winter approached (66). Messengers arriving from Swaziland 
painted a similar picture. According to their information 
Mpande had instructed Putili and Mhlangampisi to cut poles to 
assist in the making of villages in the north, and had informed 
them of his intention to plough in Swaziland that year. Even 
as they were leaving, they added, they had seen signs of an 
impending invasion, with Mpande’s armies already massing on 
the southern bank of the Pongola (67).
The threatened invasion materialised early in 1847. Advancing 
across the Pongola in several independent divisions, Mpande’s 
armies swept straight through the country until they reached 
the Crocodile River. Here they found that many Swazi and 
their cattle had taken refuge with the Boers, and with outright 
victory denied, stalemate set in. On the one hand the Zulu 
could not subdue the Swazi because they took refuge in caves 
or with their Lydenburg neighbours. On the other the Swazi 
were not in a position to expel the Zulu invaders since their 
Volksraad supporters were themselves on the verge of hostilities 
with Potgieter, who had in turn made an effort to align with the 
Zulu (68). As a result, it was not until July 1847 that the
(66) Natal Witness, 2 Oct. 1847.
(67) S.N.A., Vol. 1/6/1, No. 17, Statement of Swazi messengers
Bulane and Kwahla, 27 Jan. 1847.
(68) C.O., 179/3, Encl. in Encl. in No. 87, Cutting from
The Patriot, 23 April 1847.
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Zulu army finally retired from Swaziland (69), apparently in 
response to pressure from the Volksraad, which had by this 
stage reached a temporary solution to its differences with 
Potgieter (70).
While the influx of settlers from Natal and the conclusion of 
the July treaty heralded the beginning of Potgieter’s decline 
in Ohrigstad, it was some time before this became sufficiently 
pronounced to make him march away for good to form a new 
settlement in the north. His attempts to rally an Afrikaner 
constituency have been documented extensively elsewhere, but 
his efforts to mobilise African support have received little 
or no attention (71). The reports concerning his negotiations 
with the African chiefdoms to the north and west of Ohrigstad 
are highly partisan in character, and must be treated with 
caution (72), but for his dealings with the Swazi there is a 
more reliable record. Potgieter had every reason for making a 
special effort in this direction. The Volksraad party in 
Ohrigstad remained his most implacable enemy in the Trans-vaal 
and much of their legitimacy and security rested on the treaty 
of July 1846. Consequently, if he could sabotage that agreement, 
or cast doubt on its authenticity by some new arrangement with
(69) P.P.1847-8 ’Natal',end.in encl.in No.75, messengers 8 June 1847.
(70) Kruger, ’Weg’, 100. Evidence of the Volksraad party finally 
compelling Mpande’s forces to leave Swaziland is in S.N.A.,
Vol. 1/6/1, ’Statements’, No. 12, Message of Panda to 
Lieutenant-Governor, 13 Aug. 1847.
(71) See for example Kruger, ’Weg’, 99-113; Wichman, 'Wordings- 
geskiedenis’, 48-64, F.A. Van Jaarsveld, Die Eenheidstrewe 
van die Republikeinse Afrikaners: Deel I Pioniershartstogte 
(1836-1864), (Johannesburg, 1951), 78, 81-3, 92-5.
(72) Pretorius and Kruger, Argiefstukke, 295-6, Memo of interview by 
J. de Clerq, 18 Jan. 1846; 308-9, Declaration by Doris Buys,
4 Feb. 1848. Sekwati and Zebedela are amongst the chiefs 
named in these reports.
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the Swazi, he would give a much needed boost to his flagging 
cause. And this is what he evidently tried to do in the summer 
of 1847-1848.
For a number of reasons it is difficult to gauge the exact 
measure of Potgieter's success. The evidence for such an 
attempt ever having been made comes from a transcript of an 
interview between representatives of the Volksraad and envoys 
from Somcuba, which seems to date from June 1848 (73), and if 
the Swazi did make any agreement with Potgieter it is unlikely 
that they would have revealed it here. All that emerges clearly 
from this document is that the Volksraad representatives believed 
that the Swazi had been tampered with by Potgieter, and probably 
the most satisfactory interpretation of this episode is that 
the Swazi had been keeping their options open with both parties 
until the situation clarified itself.
One further explanation of the ambiguities of the interview of 
June 1848 may also lie in the increasingly ambiguous position 
of Somcuba himself, with whose representatives the interview 
was conducted.- After Malambule's defection Somcuba had 
apparently assumed at least some of the powers that Malambule 
had enjoyed. Thus he was not only the leading figure in securing 
the treaty of July 1846, but was even described in its text as 
"ruling in place of the king" (74). While it is highly 
improbable that Somcuba had succeeded in appropriating the full
(73) Ibid, 320-321. Statement of six men of 'Saptobas', 
(probably) early June 1848.
(74) Above, 94, note 53.
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powers of regency as is suggested here (75), what is evident is 
the light in which he was viewed by the Boers. In their eyes 
he was seen as the dominant figure in Swaziland, and it was 
accordingly with him that they treated on matters of mutual 
concern. In many ways this appreciation of Swazi politics was 
self fulfilling. Large as Somcuba’s authority already was, 
this sort of patronage expanded it a great deal further, and 
enabled Somcuba to dominate Swazi politics during the crisis of 
1846-1847 (76). Once the crisis had passed however, Somcuba 
found his position under pressure from above. By now Mswati's 
earlier experiences had bred in him a morbid distrust of over- 
mighty brothers (77), and it was almost inevitable that he would 
take steps to limit his power. Meanwhile opposition to the 
1846 cession had also begun to stir. Hopes of repudiating the 
treaty had probably been fostered by Potgieter’s efforts to 
undermine it, and by the visible weakening of the Ohrigstad 
community from desertion and disease (78). But there was more 
to the opposition than narrow expediency of this kind. Criticism 
of the treaty could not fail to reflect on its chief architect,
(75) There is no suggestion of this from any Swazi source old 
or new, and it would have been highly irregular.
(76) Thus he led the Swazi armies against Malambule, G.P., File 
IVB (Swazis), 1167-8; C.L., Methodist Archives, M.S. 15,
3, extract of a letter from Allison dated 6 Oct. 1846;
Sw.A., Honey, ’History', 35, and was in charge of all 
negotiations with the Boers during and after the hostilities. 
Pretorius and Kruger, Argiefstukke, 233-4, 273, A.H. Potgieter 
to J.C. Klopper and J.F. Schutte, 5 June 1847; 320-1,
Statement of six men of ’Saptobas’, (probably) early June 
1948; S.A.A.R. Transvaal I , 70, E.V.R., 22 June 1847, Art. 4.
(77) See for instance J.S.M. Matsebula, Izakhiwo ZamaSwazi, 
(Johannesburg, 1953), 9-11, 15, who also pictures Mswati’s 
chief personal attendant and confidant, Khambi Sikondze as 
playing on these fears;
(78) Van Rooyen, 'Verhouding’, 6-7.
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Somcuba, and must in part have been an expression of opposition 
to him. Whether Mswati was implicated in this is not known, 
but if he did actively canvass against the treaty, the internal 
politics of Swaziland must have increasingly polarised around 
this external issue. What effect this had on the meeting between 
Somcuba*s messengers and the Volksraad representatives in mid- 
1848 one cannot be sure, but it presumably contributed its 
share to the general opaqueness of their answers and the 
inconclusiveness of the interview as a whole.
Any thoughts that Mswati*s party may have entertained of 
repudiating the agreement vanished with the departure of 
Potgieter and his disgruntled followers from Ohrigstad in the 
middle of 1848. Now any such act could only drive the Boers 
into Somcuba*s camp, and the only sensible course of action 
left open to those loyal to Mswati was to reaffirm the legality 
of the cession and to try and detach the Boers from Somcuba*s 
cause. Somcuba, for his part, was encouraged to take an even 
more independent line, and relations between the two took a 
sharp turn for the worse (79). The traditional version of 
these events makes clear how seriously Somcuba was challenging 
Mswati's authority at this time. Much earlier, when Somcuba
(79) One problem in connection with the departure of Potgieter 
and his followers from Ohrigstad is to decide when its 
finality became apparent to Mswati and Somcuba. Potgieter 
had made expeditions to the north before this, and the 
exodus of his followers on this occasion took some time 
before it was complete. It does however seem safe to 
assume that by the middle of 1849, when the first signs 
of discord between Somcuba and Mswati appear in Ohrigstad 
records, the full implications of Potgieter*s move were 
grasped by both sides.
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had been installed at the Eludlambedwini village in the eastern 
Trans-vaal,he had been given charge of Ludlambedlu cattle (80). 
This was an important charge because of their ritual and 
symbolic significance to the Swazi, and it was also one that 
was held explicitly in trust for the king. Somcuba's crime 
was to treat the herd as his private possession, and to seem to 
appropriate the economic and ritual powers of the king. The 
critical moment came in 1846 when instead of handing over all 
the cattle paid by Ohrigstad for the cession he kept some back 
for himself. Once the Zulu were gone Mswati demanded their 
return, but Somcuba declined. Mswati thereupon repeated his 
demand, extending it this time to the entire Ludlambedlu herd. 
Once again Somcuba refused, and the stage was set for war (81).
The final stages of the dispute can be charted in comparative
detail. In August 1849 Somcuba was the source of a rumour
current amongst the Ohrigstaders that a force of Mswati's, 
which was already in the field, was on its way to attack Field
Cornet de Beer (82). Evidently Somcuba either feared an attack
on himself by this force and hoped the Boer mobilisation would 
deter it, or he was trying to foster suspicion and ill-feeling 
against Mswati in anticipation of such an event. In September 
Somcuba was once again the source of a report that Mswati had
(80) Myburgh, Carolina, 86.
(81) Kuper, 'Ritual', 230 note 2; Kuper, Aristocracy, 203-4, 
214, 2.20-1, 222; Myburgh, Carolina, 88; G.P., File IVB 
(Swazis), 1176, Statement by Kwlahlakwlahla and two others 
to the Lieutenant Governor, 7 Aug. 1851; P.P. 1880, C. 
2695, 23, Encl. 7 in No. 17, Report of the Swazi Transvaal 
Boundary Commission.
(82) S.A.A.R. Transvaal I , 285, W.F. Versveld to Volksraad, 
17 Sept. 1849.
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sent to Manicusa (Soshangane) to suggest that the two kings 
undertake a joint attack on the Boers (83), and by December 
relations between Mswati and Somcuba had deteriorated to such 
an extent that each was sending messengers to the Landdrost at 
Krugersdorp to protest against the misdemeanours of the other (84). 
It must have been at about this time that Mswati finally sent 
an army to attack Somcuba (85). Somcuba however managed to 
repulse this at a battle in the region of the Komati River, 
and fled to the protection of the Ohrigstad Boers, under whom 
he was to shelter in safety for the next five years (86). The 
protection extended by the Ohrigstad Boers to Somcuba cannot 
have come entirely as a surprise to Mswati and his advisers, 
as Somcuba*s close proximity to their settlement and special 
relationship with their leaders had made this a potential hazard 
for Mswati from the moment they arrived. Indeed, for some time 
before the final rupture between the two brothers, there are 
indications that Mswati and his advisers had concluded that 
they could not rely on even neutrality, still less the support, 
of the Boers in any future conflict with Somcuba. Thus towards 
the end of 1849 or the beginning of 1850, the Swazi sent 
messengers to Natal with a view both to securing an alternative 
means of restraining Zulu attacks, and in the hope that the 
British might exert influence to prevent the Boers openly
(83) Ibid., 103, Meeting of 19 Sept. 1845, Art. 18.
(84) Ibid., 289, W.F. Versveld to Volksraad, 27 Dec. 1849.
(85) This happened probably towards the end of 1850. This is 
deducible from a message sent by Mswati to the L.G. of
Natal, 11 Sept. 1852, T.S.C., Case 22.
(86) Myburgh, Carolina, 88-9: P.A., Soutter Collection, Packet 6, 
No. 2, 285, Resolution of Krygsraad, 5 Nov. 1853.
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supporting Somcuba against Mswati (87) . At approximately the 
same time overtures seem also to have been made to Manicusa, 
though whether these were directly connected with the Somcuba 
dispute is less certain (88).
But until these diplomatic initiatives bore fruit Mswati was 
still anxious to prevent relations with the Boers from lapsing 
into open hostility. Apart from the presence of Somcuba on 
his flank, Mswati was still plagued with the same kinds of 
opposition as had.confronted him at the beginning of his reign.
At least two more brothers are supposed to have conspired against 
him in this period, both of whom occupied politically sensitive 
areas in the south (89). Worse still, the loyalty of many 
Emakhandzambi1e chiefdoms continued to remain in doubt, more 
particularly after the Zulu invasions, which seem to have 
encouraged renewed restiveness in Emakhandzambile ranks (90). 
Lastly, overshadowing all of these problems, and in itself 
partly responsible for ‘them, was the spectre of fresh Zulu 
attacks, to which each new manifestation of disunity made the 
Swazi ever more prone. It was hardly surprising therefore that 
Mswati should not have wished to break with the Boers before 
obtaining some firmer commitment from the British, and contacts
(87) S.N. 1A No. N 105/79, Report by G. Roth.
(88) S.A.A.R. .Transvaal I , 103, Meeting of 19 Sept. 1849,
Art. 18.
(89) These two brothers were Mgidla (interview Tigodvo Hlophe; 
interview Nkambule, 24 April 1970, Buseleni, Swaziland; 
interview Maphoyisa Manana) and Hhobohhobo (interview with 
various Dlamini informants, 10 June 1970, Kuhlamukeni, 
Swaziland); Sw.A., 48/07/220 J, Reply to Resident Commissioners 
Circular, No. 9/1907, Hlathikhulu District.
(90) Below, 174;Emakhandzambile, meaning 'those found ahead', is 
the generic term applied to those chiefdoms in central and 
northern Swaziland who were absorbed in the years after 
1820 (Kuper, Aristocracy, 14).
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with selected Lydenburg officials were continued well into 
1851 (91).
The Zulu raid that Mswati feared finally materialised at the 
end of 1848, only shortly after Somcuba broke away. Once more 
Mswati was given a partial reprieve by opposition to the expedition 
within Zululand itself. As a result, the scale of the invasion 
was much smaller than intended, and it retired in disarray 
after some minor skirmishing in the south (92). Still, there 
was no doubting the respite was no more than temporary, and the 
raid sounded a warning of what Mswati could expect if he did 
not find a suitable counterweight to Zulu ambitions. The 
problem was with whom could he ally to achieve lasting security?
No neighbouring African state had the military capability 
required, while the presence of Somcuba near Lydenburg ruled 
out any co-operation with the eastern Trans-vaal Boers. Apart 
from the difficulty of compromise on the issue of Somcuba 
itself - he had located himself less than 40 miles from the 
royal capital at Hhohho and was becoming a greater and greater 
threat to Mswati as he recruited local Sotho, Pai and Mapulana
(91) Thus as late as August 1850 Mswati still sent a child as 
a gift to J.B. de Clerq, the Landdrost at Lydenburg - 
S.A.A.R. Transvaal I , 143, Meeting 24 May 1850, Art. II. 
Even after the final breakdown of relations with Lydenburg, 
Mswati still seems to have maintained connections with 
individuals inside Lydenburg, presumably with an eye to 
exploiting continuing divisions within the community - 
see, L.L. Vol. 172, 10, No. 6, Entry for 29 Nov. 1851;
P.A., H.T. Buhrmann Versameling Vol. 7. Buhrmann to his wife, 
25 May 1851.
(92) S.N.A., Vol. 1/1/2 No. 107, W. Cowie to S.N.A., 24 Sept.
1849; T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents bound together), 
Statement by Mapitshan and others, 11 Sept. 1852. It seems 
likely that it is also this same event that is referred to 
in S.A.A.R. Transvaal I , 289, W.F. Versveld to Volksraad,
27 Dec. 1849.
108
into his forces (93) - the Boers no longer had the same need 
of a Swazi connection now that they had Somcuba’s services (94). 
The British in Natal on whom Mswati pinned his main hopes were 
little more help. All they would do was advise Mswati to seek 
some sort of accommodation with Mpande, even if this meant 
becoming his tributary (95).
In the end this was what Mswati was compelled to do, and for a 
time the balance of power in the region was completely transformed. 
The new alignment was a particular shock to the Lydenburg Boers
(96), to whom its negative consequences became very quickly 
apparent. In August 1850 a commission which set out through 
Swazi territory to supervise the making of a road to Delagoa 
Bay was bundled unceremoniously out of Swaziland (97), and 
twelve months later the Lydenburg Republic was suddenly engulfed 
by a Zulu army attacking the Pedi chief, Sekwati (98). In the 
person of Somcuba, moreover, still worse danger resided.
(93) Ziervogel, Eastern Sotho, 11; interview Majahane Dlamini,
5 June 1970, Ludlawini, Swaziland.
(94) Somcuba for example was now used to supply both intelligence 
and military assistance to the Lydenburg Boers, see S.A.A.R.
.Transvaal 3 , 87, E.V.R. 4 July 1855, Art. 12; Fourie, 
Amandebele, 34; S.S. 487, R 4978, Encl. R 4809, G. Roth to 
Col. Secretary, 5 Nov. 1880.
(95) T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents ...), Statement by 
Mapitshan and others, 28 Sept. 1852.
(96) This had been a prospect which had haunted the Boers in the 
earliest days of the Ohrigstad settlement (see S.A.A.R. 
,Transvaal I , 33, E.V.R. I, Sitting of Commissie Raad
27 Jan. 1846, Art. 2). Slowly however these fears had 
evaporated as they came to comprehend the deep-seated 
antagonisms that existed between the two groups.
(97) S.A.A.R. Transvaal 2 , 224-5, P.C. Minaar and 22 others 
to Volksraad, 18 Aug. 1851.
(98) S.N.A. Vol. 1/7/1, 65, Statement by Gebula and Gambushe, 
messengers from Mpande, 14 Oct. 1851.
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Mswati could hardly abstain much longer from reprisals here, 
more especially now the Zulu were no longer to be feared, and 
if Lydenburg stood firm on their treaty obligations outright 
hostilities could be the only result (99). The Republic was 
only rescued from this dilemma in 1852, when the prejudices of 
a generation re-asserted themselves and Mpande's armies once 
again took the field against the Swazi.
There are several versions of why hostilities resumed, Mpande 
himself being the author of two. At a meeting with Captain 
Garden who travelled through Zululand in 1852, he maintained 
that after Mswati had tendered his submission, he had sent some 
of his own representatives to live in Swaziland with the 
intention of having them report back to him, but that Mswati had 
killed them, and all those who had been associated with them (100). 
In an alternative version given to the Lieutenant-Governor of 
Natal, Mpande advanced a different explanation, claiming that 
when his army was campaigning against Sekwati the previous year, 
a brother of Mswati named Gehle had entered into communication 
with its leaders. Mswati had thereupon executed Gehle, and 
had then gone on to make overtures of alliance with Sekwati, 
and it was in retaliation for this that Mpande attacked (101).
(99) For the treaty between Somcuba and Lydenburg see P.A., 
Soutter Collection, Packet 6 No. 2, 205-6, Treaty between 
Krygsraad and Sincoeba, 6 Nov. 1853.
(100) G.P., File II (iii), 522, Journey to the Pongola,
July-Sept. 1852.
(101) P.P., 1852-3 'Further Correspondence relating to the 
Settlement of Natal', 73, Encl. I in No. 21, Message from 
Panda via Gebula and Gambushe, 20 July 1852. Gehle is just 
conceivably the same as Mgidla, who occupied the chiefdom 
of Buseleni near the junction of the Mkhondvo and Lusutfu, 
and is remembered as being executed by Mswati for some 
alleged act of treachery, interview Nkambule, 24 April 
1970, Buseleni, Swaziland; interview Tigodvo Hlophe.
110
Lastly, there is also the Swazi account, according to which 
Mpande had invaded Swaziland at the instigation of a Swazi 
traitor named Mgopo, after learning of the marriage of Mswati’s 
sister to Langalibalele. Mgopo however had been detected and 
for his pains had been killed (102).
While it is obviously impossible to reconcile all the inconsis­
tencies in these accounts, there are certain points which emerge 
from them all. The most obvious is that Mpande was trying to 
exercise effective authority in Swaziland, in opposition to the 
effort of the Swazi to keep it as shadowy as possible. More 
specifically, Mpande was seeking tighter control over Swaziland’s 
foreign affairs, and was using the information of agents in 
Swaziland to facilitate that end. The Swazi, predictably, 
rejected this ploy and responded by having the guilty parties 
killed. This in turn exposed the contradictory premises from 
which the two parties had been acting. The Swazi had apparently 
still not adjusted fully to the changed circumstances created 
by the colonisation of Natal, and expected Mpande to be 
satisfied by a token submission and tribute. Mpande on the 
other hand was intent on turning Swaziland into a physical 
sanctuary should he become embroiled with Natal, and was not 
prepared to settle for anything less than effective control.
Misunderstanding Mpande’s objectives, the Swazi were caught
(102) T.S.C., Case 2 (Swazi documents ..), Statement by Mapitshan 
and others, Swazi messengers, 11 Sept. 1859.
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entirely unprepared by his decision to invade. Comprising the 
entire strength of the Zulu kingdom, his army entered in two 
divisions in July 1852, and had swept through the country before 
the Swazi knew what was happening (103). Many Swazi were 
killed and vast numbers of cattle swept off, while even those 
who managed to reach the sanctuary of their caverns were 
subjected to a more systematic practise of 'smoking out' than 
had ever been used before (104). So sudden and devastating 
was the Zulu attack that it is difficult to escape the impression 
that the Swazi were faced for a time with the prospect of 
disintegration and collapse. When Captain Garden's party 
travelled through northern Zululand and Swaziland in July and 
August 1852, for example, they encountered large numbers of 
Swazi fleeing in every direction (105). A month later advance 
parties were streaming into Natal, prompting the Secretary for 
Native Affairs, Shepstone, to conclude "the Amaswazi are 
destroyed as a tribe, and are a needy, destitute, starving 
people" (106). Indeed, so bleak was the situation that towards 
the end of September Mswati sent messengers to the Lieutenant- 
Governor asking for permission to take refuge in Natal. "Our 
tribe is fast dispersing", the messengers reported, "and seeking
(103) P.P., 1852-3, 'Correspondence ...', 73, Encl. in No. 21, 
Message from Pande, 26 July 1852.
(104) T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents ...), Statement by 
Mapitshan and others, 11 Sept. 1852; Bryant, Olden Times, 
329-30; C.T. Binns, The Last Zulu King: the life and death 
of Cetshwayo, (London, 1963), 33.
(105) G.P., File II (iii), Journey..., 506, 574.
(106) G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1189-90, Extract Report by 
Resident Magistrate Fynn, 27 Sept. 1852; S.N.A., Vol. 
1/7/2, Report on letters from Resident Magistrate, Klip 
River, 24 Dec. 1859, 24-5; G.P., File IVB (Swazis), 1190, 
Extract from report by Diplomatic Agent, 28 Sept. 1852.
112
asylum with the Zulu... Umswazi begs the Government to receive 
him and the last remnant of the Swazi tribe" (107).
It is just possible that Mswati’s messengers were exaggerating 
Swaziland's plight; that anticipating the instinctive horror 
the Government had of refugees, they decided that this was the 
best way of making sure it would act. Certainly, whether 
intentionally or otherwise, they touched a raw nerve. The last 
thing Natal wanted was a massive flood of refugees, and its 
messages to Mpande assumed an increasingly urgent note. Moreover, 
even if Mpande wished to ignore them there were others who 
would not. Opposition had been voiced to the invasion of 1846, 
and had virtually wrecked the one sent out in 1848, and this 
could only be strengthened by the stand taken by Natal. At the 
same time a new force was emerging on the Zulu political scene, 
which would increasingly act to tie Mpande1s hands. Despite 
his usual image as a kind of roi faineante, Mpande had so far 
had a reasonably successful reign (108). By 1852 he had reigned 
for 12 years four years more than Shaka and one more than 
Dingane - and had just capped a number of previous military 
successes with a highly successful campaign in Swaziland. The 
same invasion had however brought to the fore a potential 
challenge to his rule. Unlike Shaka or Dingane, Mpande had 
never taken the precaution of eliminating his male progeny, and 
already several of these had reached the status of fully grown 
men. The eldest was Cetshwayo whose regiment, the Tulwana,
(107) T.S.C., Case 22, (Swazi documents..), Statement by Mapitshan 
and others, 28 Sept. 1852.
(108) See for example D. Morris, The Washing of the Spears, 
(London, 1966), 192.
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was enrolled in 1851. The ensuing campaign in Swaziland, known 
as the "Ukufunda ka Tulwana", the "teaching of the Tulwana", 
evidently marked Cetshwayo out as a political rival to Mpande.
Its "outstanding result", according to Binns was "to increase the 
prestige of Cetshwayo", and from then on Mpande had to keep 
too close an eye on domestic affairs to allow him to indulge in 
adventures abroad (109).
Mpande's response to Cetshwayo’s rise was to promote the claims 
of another son Mbuyazi as a foil to Cetshwayo’s ambitions. 
Together with Cetshwayo, Mbuyazi was given a large area of 
Zululand to administer, and was also singled out to "Ncinda 
ode Ngezini" after Mpande at the annual First Fruits ceremony 
when Cetshwayo was not allowed to "Ncinda" at all (110). This 
last was apparently designed as a public recognition of Mbuyazi 
as Mpande's senior son, and with that, Zululand rapidly 
polarised into two contending camps, the TJsuthu supporting 
Cetshwayo, and the Isiqosa backing Mbuyazi (111). A physical 
struggle had become inevitable.
(109) Binns, Zulu King, 34; Samuelson, Long, Long Ago, 230; 
Bryant, Olden Times, 329.
(110) The term refers to one of the more important rites of the 
Zulu First Fruits ceremony, in which the king extracts 
and consumes a magical decoction from a heated clay pot.
The act is supposed to confer special powers upon him. 
Bryant, Zulu People, 512-3.
(111) S.P., No. 2(b), ’The Battle of Ndondakusuka’, (Revised 
draft, T/S), 4; ibid, 29392, ’History of Zululand’, 
Ndukwana, 7 Nov. 1902, 34. It is even possible that Mpande 
encouraged these antagonisms in the hope that the pro­
tagonists would destroy one another and enable him to 
nominate a young and less threatening successor. If these 
were his calculations they went badly awry after Cetshwayo 
emerged triumphant from the Battle of Ndondakusuka in 
December 1856.
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The Swazi played on these divisions with considerable skill. 
Whether wittingly or unwittingly Mswati's plea for sanctuary 
had made a deep impression on Natal, and the Swazi exploited 
this by a clever adaptation of traditional diplomacy. From 
Majumba Kunene, the messenger employed by the Swazi in their 
communications with Langalibalele, the Swazi had learnt of 
Shepstone's position, and may even have gained an inkling of 
his ambitions to preside over a confederation of south-east 
African states. At the urging of Malunge and Mpikelele therefore, 
they decided to suggest a marriage between the family of 
Shepstone and Mswati's sister Tifokati, as a means of securing 
his support, in particular against the Zulu (112). To later 
writers this idea has seemed a trifle naive, but they vastly 
underestimate the subtlety of Swazi diplomacy (113). We have 
already seen how the Swazi had a far more acute appreciation 
of affairs of the Boer republics than did the republics of the 
Swazi, and the same is likely to have been true of relations 
with Natal. Only five or six years later the Anglican missionary 
Robertson expressed his astonishment at Zulu sophistication in 
analysing Natal politics, and with sources like Langalibalele 
and the Edenvale Swazi it is unlikely the Swazi lagged very 
far behind (114). Certainly the importance the Swazi attached 
to such information is not a matter of doubt, and is borne out
(112) S.P., 30091, 88, Tikuba, 27 Nov. 1898; ibid, 118-9, Gama,
18 Dec. 1898; According to Matsebula, Majumba's sibongo 
was Mndzebele not Kunene - History, 16, 19.
(113) Bryant, Olden Times, 330; M.P., MS 1478, 'Short History', 15-16.
(114) S.P.G. 'E', Vol. 7, 1021, Robertson to Secretary of S.P.G.,
31 Oct. 1860. Schreuder also told Robertson about "a complete 
system of espionage in the Zulu country which extends itself 
to Natal", (ibid, 1040, Robertson to Secretary of S.P.G.,
6 Dec. 1860).
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by their attempts to penetrate Shepstone's household. According 
to oral evidence collected by Stuart in the 1890s, the Swazi 
never expected that Tifokati would actually marry Shepstone, but 
specifically suggested a proxy in the shape of his chief induna 
Ngoza (115). The advantage would be two-fold. On the one hand 
this would signify a symbolic union of the houses which would 
deter Zulu attacks; on the other it would open a channel of 
communication into the heart of the Shepstone camp. That this 
is not merely fanciful can be seen in Swazi attempts to revive 
the arrangements after Ngoza fell from grace. Once this had 
happened Mhlopekazi was despatched to enter Shepstone’s service, 
and soon rose to fill Ngoza’s place as the chief induna in 
Shepstone’s household (116).
Shepstone’s response to Mswati’s overtures was warm. Two 
waggon loads of blankets were sent through Zululand to the 
Swazi, together with a demand that Mpande allow the bridal 
party be left to travel unmolested to Natal (117). The identity 
of Natal and Swazi interests could not have been made more 
plain, and the effect on Zululand was correspondingly large.
Even with Zulu confidence at its most buoyant the impact would 
have been great. In a divided nation in which both of the 
principal protagonists were preoccupied with fears of the other 
acquiring external support, it was enormous. Now neither party
(115) Above, 114, note 112.
(116) H. Rider Haggard, The Days of My Life, Vol. I (2 vols., 
London, 1926), 74-5; Natal Witness, 26 Oct. 1897.
(117) S.P., 30091, 88, Tikuba, 27 Nov. 1898; ibid, 119, Gama, 
18 Dec. 1898.
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could contemplate an invasion of Swaziland, for this might 
involve British (or even Boer) support on the side of their 
rival (118). Until the power struggle in Zululand had in some 
way been resolved, the security of the Swazi was assured.
From being on the point of virtual disintegration the Swazi 
were now relatively secure. Mpande was effectively hobbled, 
and measures to reform Swaziland’s internal administration 
could now be carried through. At the same time Mswati could 
also spare attention for somewhat grander designs, like the 
elimination of Somcuba and renewed expansion into the territory 
Sobhuza once controlled. It is with this second phase of 
consolidation that the next chapter will be concerned.
(118) As early as 1852 Mbuyazi’s faction was spreading rumours 
about the Natal government’s intention of sending a 
military force to Zululand, (S.N.A., 1/3/5, 508,
M. Schreuder to H.F. Fynn, 27 Dec. 1852).
CHAPTER IV 
SWAZI-BOER RELATIONS 1852-1865 
As the sense of crisis gradually lifted on Mswati’s southern 
border, Swazi attention reverted to the north. Here Somcuba 
remained a nagging irritation, and continued to poison Mswati’s 
relations with the Lydenburg Boers. The sudden dwindling of 
diplomatic intercourse between the two communities after the 
Commission of 1851 gives some idea of the ebb to which relations 
had sunk. Reference is not even found in surviving documents 
to the unprecedently disruptive invasion of Swaziland by Zulu 
forces in the first six months of 1852, and even ordinary trading 
enterprises slowly ground to a halt after Mswati neglected to 
pay for the goods he had previously received (1).
The problem of Somcuba was not simply one of his presence in the 
Republic; his removal of the Ludlambedlu cattle, and his 
performance of the iNcwala ceremony meant that he was directly 
usurping Mswati’s political and ritual power (2). Nor indeed 
had he been content to live peaceably under Lydenburg's 
protection, but had subjected Mswati's people to a variety of 
harrassments, including the murder of Swazi messengers sent to 
parley with the Boers (3). Somehow or other his depredations 
had to be stopped. To begin with, Mswati made at least one
(1) D.W. Krynauw and H.S. Pretorius (eds), Transvaalse
Argiefstukke. Staatsekretaris; Inkomende Stukke, 1850-1853, 
(Pretoria, 1949), 375-6, letter from Landdrost J. de Clerq
19 Aug. 1853; L.L.l, R 561a/53, T.J. Beetge to J. de Clerq,
17 Aug. 1853; R 561c/53, M.F. da Souza to J. de Clerq,
17 Aug. 1853; L.8, No. 9/56, J.M.De Beer to Kommissie Raad, 
17 May 1856.
(2) Myburgh, Carolina, 86, 88-90; Kuper, ’Ritual’, 230, note 3,
239; Kuper, Aristocracy, 225; above, 104.
(3) S.A.A.R. Transvaal 2 , 418, G.J. Joubert to Volksraad,
11 June 1853.
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effort in 1853 to tackle the problem by negotiation, but not 
surprisingly these efforts quickly broke down (4). In the last 
analysis Mswati could only be satisfied with Somcuba!s death 
or his delivery into Swazi hands, and this was something to 
which Lydenburg could plainly not agree.
As the threat of Zulu attacks receded, Mswati became less and 
less disposed to accept that verdict as final, and, in September 
1853, he brought the matter to a head by invading the Republic 
and forcing its citizens to flee into laager at Lydenburg, from 
which, despite a barrage of entreaties and threats, they were 
unable to emerge for the next seven days (5). The exact object 
of these exercises is difficult to ascertain. Van der Merwe 
claims that they were part of an attack on Sekwati, but since 
the documents to which he refers can no longer be traced, and 
since no similar attack is recorded in Pedi tradition, it is 
just as likely that the siege was intended to cut off the 
Lydenburgers from their ally Somcuba, leaving him to stand alone 
against the Swazi attack (6). If this was the case Mswati's 
plan proved abortive, for according to Swazi tradition, his 
assembled forces could not penetrate Somcubafs perimeter defences,
(4) Ibid.
(5) Krynauw and Pretorius, Transvaalse, 380, Landdrost J. de Clerq 
to W.F. Joubert, 3 Oct. 1853. The Swazi also devastated
a number of farms in the area, ibid; L.L., Vol. 172a,
10-13, sixteen claims by II.T, Buhrmann, P.J. Kruger,
J.J. Viljoen and J.W. Schoeman, Nov. 1853.
(6) Van der Merwe, 'Naturelle', 93-4.
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and his forces were compelled to retire empty handed (7).
The impact on Lydenburg was immediate and profound. First 
reactions were expressed in a petition to the Volksraad signed 
by sixty-four people, requesting that P.J. Coetzee be appointed 
as Commandant-General (8). The line of reasoning that seems to 
have been followed here is that if anyone could placate the 
Swazi, that person was Coetzee. He had regularly acted in 
negotiations with Mswati, the esteem in which he was held being 
later attested to by Aylward (9), and it was evidently felt 
that it would help to substitute him for W.F. Joubert, who was 
already too closely identified with Somcubafs cause. Before 
long, however, Joubert1s group reasserted itself and it was 
decided to reaffirm the connection with Somcuba. At a meeting 
between the Krygsraad, led by W.F. Joubert, and Somcuba one 
month later it was resolved that their agreement be confirmed 
and endorsed, "to forestall further unpleasantness and to place 
everything in good order" (10).
The attitude adopted by the Republic's authorities makes a good 
deal of sense, particularly when one considers the amount of 
prestige they had already invested in Somcuba. What is less
(7) The engagement took place at Katsibeni in the Barberton
district, Myburgh, Carolina, 88; Kuper, 'Ritual', 230, note 3.
(8) S.A.A.R. Transvaal 2 , 480-1, H.T. Buhrmann and 64 others
to the Volksraad, 4 Oct. 1853. Van Heerden mentions this 
petition as well as Joubert's request to be relieved of his 
duties in Nov. 1852, but explains neither event. J.J. Van 
Heerden, 'Die Kommandant-Generaal in die Geskiedenis van die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek' A.Y.B . 1964, II (Cape Town, 1964), 17.
(9) A. Aylward, The Transvaal of Today, (London, 1878), 18,20-23.
Also below, 203.
(10) S.C., Packet 6, No. 2, 285-6. Treaty between the Krygsraad 
and Sincoeba, 6 Nov. 1853.
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explicable is the original decision to harbour him at all.
Mswati had after all proved himself to be a reliable and 
cooperative neighbour; he was not averse to Boers trading in 
his dominions; he furnished a certain number of apprentices1 
to the Republic; and, until the flight of Somcuba, he appears 
to have been prepared to allow a vitally important access route 
to be built through Swaziland to Delagoa Bay (11). Ultimately, 
he might even have been persuaded to aid the Republic with 
their neighbours. So what induced them to sacrifice all these 
various advantages when they decided to allow Somcuba to seek 
sanctuary among them?
A satisfactory answer to this question would require a far more 
comprehensive analysis of the political economy of the Trans-vaal 
than is possible here. A preliminary attempt should however 
be made, although what follows, it must be emphasised, is only 
a sketchy account. When the trekker parties first moved into 
the Trans-vaal they did so in compact bodies whose mobility 
and fire-power made them almost impossible to withstand. That 
initial tactical and technological superiority was made all the 
more pronounced by the recent ravages of the Difaqane. Many 
chiefdoms had been shattered, many others displaced, and they 
could be expropriated relatively easily of their labour and 
their land. Once the trekker parties began to spread out over 
the Trans-vaal the situation was to some extent reversed. Now 
it was the trekkers who were thinly spread over the land, and 
African chiefdoms who began concentrating in more consolidated
(11) Above, 107-8.
121
blocs. The situation would not have been so serious had the 
trekkers been more effectively able to combine, but this proved 
beyond their capabilities from the moment they split up. Much 
has been made by MacCrone and others of the heightened sense of 
group consciousness and solidarity which emerged from the 
isolation and insecurity of the frontier situation, but this is 
not borne out by a close examination of the Trans-vaal (12).
In the eastern and northern Cape, Legassick and Giliomee have 
shown how the period of open frontier was characterised by the 
fragmentation of frontier society, together with multiple small 
scale interactions across the colour line, governed by situational 
as much as by racial criteria (13). The closing of the frontier 
(that is to say the establishment of a single recognised 
authority), the shift of economic emphasis from pastoralism to 
agriculture, and the increasing labour repressiveness which this 
entailed, bred a more virulent sort of racial consciousness than 
had previously existed, and this was finally elaborated into a 
fully fledged racial ideology under the impact of the British 
assault on that system, embodied in Ordinance 50 and there-
(12) I.D. MacCrone, Race Attitudes in South Africa; historical, 
experimental and psychological studies, (Johannesburg, 1937) 
98-135.
(13) M. Legassick, ’The Frontier Tradition in South African 
Historiography’, S .S.A., - Vol. 2, Oct. 1970 - July 1971 
(London, 1971), 14-20; H. Giliomee, ’The Cape Eastern 
Frontier, 1775-1812', paper presented to the University
of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Post-Graduate 
Seminar, The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 
20th Centuries, London 1973, 8-9, 18, 20-25; M. Legassick, 
'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries 1780- 
1840: the Politics of a Frontier Zone’, (Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of California, Los Angeles, 1969), 86, 90-1, 
122-3.
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after (14). It was largely the latter factor which led the 
trekkers to hive off into the interior, but there is little 
evidence of this much more developed racial ideology surviving 
long in the Trans-vaal. Rather than isolation and insecurity 
heightening a sense of group solidarity and separateness from 
other racial groups, the weakness and isolation of the constituent 
elements of trekker society seems to have forced them into 
relations of symbiotic dependence with local African groups, 
which helped further accentuate their differences one from 
another. This is not to say that racial prejudice did not 
persist; the constitution of the South African Republic and 
the atrocities perpetrated by Potgieter and his fellows made it 
clear that they did (15). What it does indicate however, is the 
flexibility of racial attitudes in the frontier situation, the 
lack of white unity and group consciousness in relation to 
neighbouring African peoples, and the intimate relations of 
dependence of which this was both the effect and the cause.
These circumstances are best illustrated in the events of 1852 
to 1854. Since the treaty of Derdepoort in 1849 a formal unity 
had existed among the white groups of the Trans-vaal, but every
(14) Legassick, 'Frontier Tradition', 9-10, 13-14; Legassick,
'The Griqua*, 100-1, 125; W.M. Freund, 'Thoughts on the 
Study of the History of the Cape Eastern Frontier zone', 
in C. Saunders and R. Derricourt (eds), Beyond the Cape 
frontier: studies in the history of the Transkei and Ciskei, 
(Cape Town, 1974), 89-91; G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling 
van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, (10 Vols, 
Johannesburg, 1967 - ), Vol. II, 220-248, 264-7; C.F.J. Muller, 
Die Oorsprong van die Groot Trek, (Cape Town and Johannesburg,
1974), 189-191, 197-208.
(15) See, for example, Merensky's comments on A.H. Potgieter,
Berliner Missionsberichte, 1862, 'Beitrage zur Geschichte 
der Bapeli1, 339.
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attempt to inject any real substance into this had floundered 
on their distance from one another, and on the nature of their 
relations with local African groups. As Wichmann points out, 
a major obstacle to white unity was the enormous distances 
which lay between various white communities of the Trans-vaal. 
Lydenburg, for instance, was eighty hours by waggon from 
Potchefstroom, and similar distances separated the other main 
groups. An attempt was made to overcome these difficulties by 
establishing a national Volksraad, whose meetings rotated 
between the main concentrations of white population, but these 
broke down on the non-attendance of representatives of whoever 
was not host. Such extreme parochiality can usually be traced 
to local African affairs. Between 1852 and 1854, for example, 
meetings of the Volksraad were invariably incomplete because 
one or other of the communities was absorbed with local African 
disputes. In 1852 it was conflict with Secheli in the west, 
and Sekwati and Mabhogo in the east; in 1853 the Swazi seige 
of Lydenburg and further trouble in the west; and in 1854 an 
expedition against Makapane in the north and into Marico in the 
north-west, as well as a new Swazi war scare on the eastern 
frontier. Little wonder then that Lydenburg’s officials that 
year went to the length of memorialising the Volksraad about, 
’’the insecurity of this land /which7 continually becomes 
greater", and the absence of peace with African chiefdoms "on 
{evevj a single side (16).
(16) S.S. 9, 111-2, R 24/54, Memorial signed by W.J. Joubert 
and others to Volksraad, 16 Sept. 1854.
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Such entanglements were highly subversive of the fragile unity 
of the Republic. Proper sessions of the Volksraad were impossible 
to hold so that meetings of Kommissie Raads or Krygsraads were 
sometimes held in two communities at once. The scope for 
misunderstanding was naturally vast. Acts passed by one 
Kommissie Raad or Krygsraad were often not acceptable to the 
other, and it was in these circumstances that the predikant 
van der Hoff was welcomed by the western Trans-vaal without the 
prior sanction of the east, and prompted first religious and 
then political schism between the two (17).
Along with political divisions went military weakness. In 1852 
the west could not help the east, nor the east the west, 
because both had their troubles with African communities on 
their borders, and even when all sections of the Republic were 
not at war at once, there was always a fear among those not so 
engaged that a crisis might blow up in their own particular 
community should they go to the assistance of beleagered allies, 
not to mention the suspicion that their neighbours had brought 
their troubles on themselves. The withdrawal of Potgieter from 
the 1852 commando against Sekwati was tied up with something 
of this kind (18), so too was the opposition in the Trans-vaal 
to Pretorius1 assumption of the presidency of the Orange Free 
State, which was inspired at least in part by the fear of becoming
(17) This account is based largely on Wichmann, 'Wordings- 
geskiedenis’, 119-131, 153-161; Van Rooyen, ’Verhouding’,
8-9. For references to the Swazi seige of Lydenburg and 
the war scare of 1854 see above, 118, below, 137.
(18) Van Rooyen, ’Verhouding1, 102; Berliner Missionsberichte, 
1862, 353-4.
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embroiled in the Free State’s disputes with Moshoeshoe (19).
More striking still was the loss of Schoemansdal in 1867, which 
resulted directly from the reluctance of other parts of the 
Trans-vaal to lend aid to a community whose dealings with blacks 
they condemned (20). In this way conflict bred disunity and 
disunity weakness, and that weakness made those conflicts all 
the more difficult to resolve.
War was not of course the norm, but it was a close reflection
of it. Discussing the Cape northern and eastern frontier
Legassick has made the point that,
Trade and war ... were but two sides of the same 
coin: so-called co-operation and conflict 
both entered simultaneously ... trade shaded 
into patently unequal barter, unequal barter 
into theft, and theft into the organized 
raiding by commandos which characterized the 
first "frontier wars". (21)
More recently Trapido has outlined a similar thesis for the
Trans-vaal, asserting that even though "there was a considerable
amount of trade in which force was absent ... most exchange
relationships were pervaded by coercion". In a very direct
way, he argues, the Boer economy rested on coercion, its main
branches being,
slaving expeditions ..., a parallel or
simultaneous raiding for booty, and the
maintenance of tributary relations created 
by reducing tribal peoples to ever increasing 
servitude. (22)
(19) Van Rooyen, ’Verhouding', 234.
(20) J.B. De Vaal, ’Die Rol van Joao Albasini in die Geslciedenis 
van die Transvaal’, A.Y.B. 1953, I (Elsies River, 1953), 
94-5; R. Wagner, 'Zoutpansberg: Some notes on the Dynamics 
of a Hunting Frontier’, S .S.A., Vol. 6 (London 1976), 33.
(21) Legassick, ’Frontier Tradition’, 17.
(22) s. Trapido, ’Aspects in the Transition from Slavery to 
Serfdom: the South African Republic 1842-1902’, S .S .A. , 
Vol..6, (London, 1976), 24-5.
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Implicit in the Boer economy therefore, was an element of 
dependence on African societies, which required a degree of coercion 
to be fully realised, and so left them constantly in a state 
of imminent or undeclared war.
Trapido1s argument can in fact be taken a stage further, 
although only by modifying certain aspects of his analysis. 
Accepting the central importance of slave and tribute labour 
in the Boer economy of the Trans-vaal, and the structure of 
coercion by which it was underpinned, it is still far from clear 
whether the Republics were in a position to secure that commodity 
at will. In the beginning this may have been so. Despite the 
impression conveyed by Agar-Hamilton and others that the land 
settled by the Ohrigstaders was free of African occupation, and 
that they were then able to set up a segregated state, at least 
five African chiefdoms were incorporated by the trekkers within 
their boundaries, and were soon transformed into a serf labour 
supply (23). In the west a broadly similar situation obtained. 
After the departure of Mzilikazi in 1837, the trekkers had 
considered themselves entitled to both the lands and the labour 
of the people he left behind. In time this also extended to 
chiefdoms he had expelled, as one by one they asked permission 
to resettle their old territories, and one by one they were 
given the appropriate authority, on the assumption that they
(23) Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy, 55; Stuart, Hollandsche, 189; 
Van Rooyen, 'Verhouding^, 3; S.A.A.R. Transvaal I , Register 
van Aantekening van Plase behorende onder Andries 
Ohrigstad, Spekboomrevier (sic), Steelpoort revier (sic), 
Mageneets hoogten (sic), 116-197.
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would provide labour for the farms (24). By the early 1850s 
that assumption had proved to be wrong. Most of the evidence 
for the coercion of labour and tribute supplies, or for indis­
criminate raiding seems to be concentrated in the first decade 
of Boer occupation. Thereafter such practices slackened off 
as the balance of power between black and white gradually evened 
out. In the eastern Trans-vaal the withdrawal of Potgieter and 
his supporters from Ohrigstad to the north greatly weakened both 
communities, and deprived Ohrigstad in particular of much 
coercive strength (25). At the same time the Pedi, the Kwena 
and others began arming with guns, which helped further tilt 
the balance against the trekker states (26). There was a dual 
effect on labour supply. In the first place, African communities 
were far more able to protect themselves against expropriation 
than had previously been the case; in the second,.any intensifica­
tion of labour oppression beyond the fourteen days initially 
demanded by the trekkers, was liable to spark off wholesale 
emigration to neighbouring African powers, who were now them­
selves better placed to refuse to give them up. It was at 
least partly these circumstances which gave rise to the conflicts
(24) Cape of Good Hope (Colony), Commission on the claims to 
the Diamond fields, Evidence taken at Bloemhof before the
Commission appointed to investigate the claims of the South 
African Republic, Captain N. Waterboer, Chief of West 
Griqualand, and certain other Native chiefs, to portions
of the territory on the Vaal river, now known as the 
Diamond Fields, (Cape Town, 1871), 144, Evidence of Molema,
6 May 1871; 181, Evidence of Isaac Matlabane, 15 March 1870.
(25) Wichmann, ’Wordingsgeskiedenis’, 33; Van Rooyen,
1Verhouding1, 6.
(26) Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy, 62-4, 82, 85, 207-9; S.J.P. 
Kruger, The Memoirs of Paul Kruger, four times president
of the South African republic, told by himself, (London, 1902), 
43-4; S.A.A.R. Transvaal I , 262, P. Nel to Volksraad, 1 Oct. 
1848 (105 Volksraad minutes, 20 Sept. 1849, Art. 23),
Van Rooyen, ’Verhouding', 198-201.
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of 1852-4, and which seem to mark a watershed in the relations 
between the Trans-vaal's black and white groups. In the 
western Trans-vaal labour demands on the Bakaa, the Lete, and 
the Kgatla of Mosielele led to them fleeing to Dimawe to settle 
under Sechele, and gave rise to fears of a black combination 
against white demands (27). In the east similar currents fed 
into the hostilities with Sekwati. Aimed officially at 
divesting the Pedi of their firearms, the attack in 1852 had an 
obvious bearing on Lydenburg's capacity to exact labour, and 
according to one source at least was bound up with Potgieter1s 
serf labour demands (28). Much the same sorts of pressures 
seem to have led Msuthfu to abandon the Republic for the Pedi 
at the end of the same decade, and the problem finally came to 
a head in the late 1860s/early 1870s when the produce and labour
markets provided by the Diamond Fields and the Pilgrim's Rest
/
gold diggings led to mounting labour repression, sharpened 
racial attitudes, and an exodus of farm labour from the Republic 
to Sekhukhune (29).
Dependence on African labour thus bred conflict; failure in that
(27) A. Sillery, Sechele: The story of an African chief, (Oxford, 
1954), 140, 145; Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy  ^ 143-4;
Krynauw and Pretorius, Transvaalse, 233~5. P.E. Scholtz, 
Acting Commandant General to A.W.J. Pretorius, Commandant 
General, 12 Sept. 1852.
(28) Berliner Missionsberichte, 1862, 'Beitrage zur Geschichte 
der Bapeli1, 339-40, 353-5; Maleo and Mapoch also resisted 
in a similar fashion, Krynauw and Pretorius, Transvaalse,
85-6, J. de Clerq, Landdrost to A.W.J. Pretorius, 16 May 1851.
(29) Ibid, 92, 356.
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conflict entailed a new order of dependence. For the republics 
to secure labour they now had to take one of several equally 
invidious choices: they could enlist the support of other 
African chiefdoms in their slave raiding enterprises, and gain 
labour in that way; they could purchase the victims of wars 
undertaken independently by neighbouring African chiefdoms; or 
they could allow the refugees from these conflicts sanctuary 
on relatively easy terms. All of these options involved more 
a relation of dependence than the dominance that Trapido suggests, 
and since they meant becoming enmeshed in the web of intra- 
African politics, further narrowed the horizon of the communities 
concerned, and further diluted the group consciousness distilled 
in the Cape. So much then for Van Jaarsveld's judgement that 
Africans played an important part in the development of national 
consciousness, but only by creating a sense of racial 
antagonism through conflict and struggle (30), or F.J. Potgieter*s 
comment that although the Boers employed African labourers they 
remained "something outside of him - something which he accepted 
as part of his environment, like the mountains, the grasslands 
and fever" (31).
Dependence on African resources fofmented divisions within 
white communities, as well as between them, but before moving 
on to that, it will help to delineate one further area of white/ 
black interaction which was crucially important to the balance 
of political and economic power. For Trapido, although there
(30) Van Jaarsveld, Eenheidstrewe, 30-31.
(31) Potgieter, ’Vestiging1, 195.
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were some exchange relationships between black and white that 
were not pervaded by coercion, these were not a central part of 
the Boer economy in the way that booty raiding or tributary 
relations were. As I have already suggested, the booty and slave 
raiding phase of the Boer economy was on the wane by the early 
1850s, and was overshadowed by a far more important aspect of 
surplus appropriation in the shape of hunting and trading. Like 
booty raiding the centrality of these activities varied from 
community to community, as well as over time. To take just one 
example, Ohrigstad which started out life as an elephant hunting 
community, gradually assumed a more pastoral orientation as the 
elephants move north-eastward with Potgieter in pursuit.
Nevertheless, to a greater or lesser extent, hunting and the 
sale of its products remained an important part of the entire 
Boer economy, and more particularly of that of its leaders, and 
further deepened Boer dependence on neighbouring African groups (32). 
In the same way that Potgieter and Albasini used African 
auxiliaries or mercenaries when raiding for slave labour, they 
were also dependent on their services for hunting in tsetse ridden 
zones. Moreover, as the game retreated further east and north, 
these parties were drawn deeper and deeper into the territories 
of African peoples, or were alternatively obliged to trade rather 
than hunt the commodities they desired (33). In both cases a 
relationship of dependence was forged, together with an often 
debilitating involvement in local African disputes. Zoutpansberg, 
with its almost total dependence on hunting and trading,
(32) Potgieter, 'Vestiging', 53, 60, 84-7, 95, 145; Kruger,
!W e g \  127, 140, 194.
(33) Potgieter 'Vestiging1, 125-6, 146-8; Kruger, fWegf, 140;
Wagner, ’Zoutpansberg', 36-7.
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provides the classic case. On at least two occasions Albasini, 
the Secretary for Native Affairs, gave sanctuary to important 
refugees from the Shangane state, and in so doing revealed the 
conflicting foundations of Boer prosperity and power. On the 
one hand he needed the human and military resources represented 
by the refugees for his hunting and trading and tribute collect­
ing expeditions; on the other, his offer of sanctuary immediately 
embroiled him in conflict with the state from which they had 
come. In 1859 the Shangane king Mawewe's demand to have his 
brother Mzila restored led to a trade embargo on the Zoutpansberg, 
which only ended when Mzila fled away from the community to 
challenge Mawewe for the throne, and two years later precisely 
the same thing happened when Mzila, who was now king, insisted 
on the return of a leading functionary of his father named 
Monene, who himself had previously taken refuge in the Zoutpans­
berg. Albasini evidently contemplated ransoming Monene, but 
as we shall see was thwarted by his rivals in the community, 
so that Monene remained behind in the Zoutpansberg and again 
trade was shut off (34).
The trade embargo or boycott pinpoints a further weakness of 
the white economy, in so far as it demonstrates the importance 
of black cooperation and acquiescence for trading or hunting 
to be pursued. The experiences of J.B. Botha and Piet Potgieter 
during a hunting expedition in 1846 provide a rare insight into 
the way in which this cooperation worked. Botha and Potgieter 
began their expedition by calling on Sebetiele to ask for guides
(34) Below, 196;De Vaal, 'Rolf, 77-8. A similar situation arose 
when Davhana fled to Albasini after a dispute with Maghato 
over the succession to Ramabulana's Venda chieftaincy, 
ibid, 75-6.
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to take them to a friendly chief who would not harm them, and 
were escorted to Makapan and thence to Makapela. At Makapela’s 
Botha asked where they could hunt in safety, and was warned 
against straying into the territories of Maletsi and Matja, who 
were prepared to attack any whites entering their lands. It 
would be better, Makapela suggested, for them to go on to 
Gannana in the Blaauwberg, to whom they were accordingly 
escorted by Makapala's guides. At Gannanafs they were given 
men to help them in the hunt, but soon became aware that they 
were being followed by Maletsi and stood in danger of attack.
They therefore left with what ivory they already had, and later 
learnt from Sebetiele that they had narrowly escaped being 
attacked by Maletsi's men (35). Eight years later another 
hunting party, under Piet Potgieter, was not so fortunate. In 
the intervening years some injustice had apparently been done 
to Makapan, and when Potgieter's party ventured into his territory, 
they paid for it with their lives (36).
Boer society,of course, was not powerless to react. In 1847,
A.H. Potgieter launched an attack on Maletsi, after the 
killing of Piet Potgieter's party, and in 1854 Makapan and his 
people were starved to death when they took refuge in a cave (37). 
All the same, in hunting as in other fields of interracial 
interaction, the retributive capacity of the Boers declined 
over time. In the Zoutpansberg, which initially had great 
coercive powers, because its hunters and traders were in a sense
(35) S.A.A.R. Transvaal I, 45-7, Minutes of Volksraad, 20 April, 1846.
(36) Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy, 163-4.
(37) Ibid; Winter, 'Sekwati', 332; Berliner Missionsberichte,1862,
'Beitrage', 339-40.
'i
133
permanently under arms, one sees a weakening taking place as a 
result of the factors just mentioned, as well as through 
divisions inside the community itself. Somewhat earlier, an 
allusion was made to the way in which a reliance on African 
support fostered intra-communal divisions, and nowhere is this 
clearer than in the Zoutpansberg case. There, rival factions 
vied with each other for African followings to act as hunters 
or mercenaries, or in the collection of taxes. There too, 
African communities responded by exploiting these tensions, 
and intensifying the hostility between rival white groups (38). 
The Zoutpansberg is admittedly an extreme case to select, but 
elsewhere in the Trans-vaal one sees a similar pattern of Boer 
communities competing among themselves for African support, and 
African factions manipulating those divisions for their own 
sectional ends (39).
Viewed against this background the few shreds of information we 
have about Lydenburg1s decision to harbour Somcuba begin to 
make a little more sense. Most of Mswati’s reign had, hitherto, 
been spent on the defensive, and there are clear signs in this 
period of a crumbling of his power. On all of his frontiers his 
jurisdiction was narrowing, and this was compounded in 1848 by 
defections from his ranks (40). Faced with a weakened Swazi
(38) See for example De Vaal, ’Rol’, 75-8.
(39) Above, 89-95, 100.
(40) The one was Somcuba, the other Mgazi, S.A.A.R. Transvaal I , 
103, Volksraad minutes, 19 Sept. 1849, Art. 18.
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king, and growing shortages of manpower, it must have seemed 
worth running the risk of giving refuge to Somcuba. He was, 
after all, accompanied by something like five hundred male 
supporters, who would constitute an invaluable addition to 
Lydenburg’s fighting strength (41). At the same time they were 
useful as guides and for the gathering of intelligence, besides 
constituting a valuable reservoir of labour supplies (42). 
Finally, it is likely that certain sections of the community 
benefited disproportionately to others, and may have welcomed 
his presence to serve factional ends. If that is so this may 
explain the petition to replace W.F. Joubert, and Joubertfs 
riposte in the shape of the treaty with Somcuba.
As a result, relations with the Swazi remained in a critical 
state. In July 1854 the Krygsraad was convoked to hear complaints 
from Mswati, but pronounced them once again largely inadmissable(43). 
Almost immediately afterwards, it expressed its forebodings 
about the future in a letter to Utrecht. nFor our part", it 
wrote, "we still have Ta so-called peace* with Mswati, but we 
cannot determine with any certainty whether or not to expect a
(41) S.N. 1A No. N 105/79, Report by Roth, n.d.; Fourie, 
Amandebele, 34, for example cites the use of Somcuba's 
forces against Maboko, chief of the Transvaaal Ndebele, 
and this is confirmed by Roth, S.S. 487, R 4978, Encl.
R 4809, Roth (Landdrost, Lydenburg) to Colonial Secretary, 
15 Nov. 1880.
(42) S.C. Plct. 6, No. 2, 285-6, Treaty between Krygsraad and 
Sincoeba, 6 Nov. 1853; S.A.A.R. Transvaal 3 , 88, Kommissie- 
raad’s meeting 4 July 1855, Art. 12; Van der Merwe, 
'Naturelle1, 97. Van der Merwe refers to an agreement 
that Somcuba should supply labour for building a canal 
near Lydenburg, but I have not been able to track down
the reference.
(43) S.S. 9, 104-5, R 217/54 Vergadering van Krygsraad, 7 July 
1854, Lydenburg.
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speedy war with him because we cannot and will not give up 
Sincoeba whom we have now taken in already for 5 years." (44) 
Rumours even began to circulate of a new alliance between 
Mpande and Mswati, directed against the Republic (45), but 
these, while carrying some weight in Republican councils, are 
likely to have had their origin nearer home than Swaziland or 
Zululand, most probably at Eludlambedwini, the chief homestead 
of Somcuba.
By now Lydenburg's authorities were becoming increasingly uneasy, 
and they shortly afterwards memorialised the Volksraad about, 
the dangers they were facing and "the absence of peace on a 
single side"(46). The remedy they suggested was that a Commission 
be despatched to conclude a treaty with Mswati, and that a 
commando be summoned to lend authority to their demands. 
Eventually, nearly two months later, a Kommissie Raad sat to 
consider this petition, and between the 6th and 10th of November 
it passed resolutions to the effect that the Republic should 
completely overhaul its relations with the surrounding chiefdoms, 
with a view to placing them on a more satisfactory footing.
All written peace treaties previously concluded with Africans 
were to be considered null and void, and new ones, more 
conducive to the "general welfare" of the Republic, were to be 
submitted in their place. Once again the Swazi figured
(44) S.A.A.R. Transvaal 3 , (Cape Town, 1951), 606, W.F. Joubert
to J.C. Steyn, 8 July 1854.
(45) Ibid.
(46) S.S. 9, 111-12, R 24/54 Memorial signed by W.J. Joubert 
to Volksraad, 16 Sept. 1854. A solution to the dispute 
between Mswati and Somcuba was high on their list of 
priorities. It was in point of fact the only dispute 
specifically mentioned.
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prominently in these plans, not only in connection with the feud 
with Somcuba, but also as an agent of the Republic in implement­
ing these policies, as it was also resolved that the assistance 
of Mswati should be obtained, "in accordance with an agreement 
earlier made with him" (47) to reduce the Republic's rebellious 
African subjects. The quid pro quo, it would seem, was the 
removal of Somcuba to a less provocative distance from the 
borders of Swaziland (48).
These resolutions underline the bankruptcy of Lydenburg's 
foreign policy at this time. The original resolutions of the 
petition of 16 September 1854 had been based on the assumption that 
a show of force, in conjunction with Commandant-Generals 
Pretorius and Potgieter, was the only satisfactory way of 
re-establishing the Republic's authority over neighbouring 
African peoples, but the Kommissie Raad's resolutions of November 
1854 make it clear that such a project was hopelessly unrealistic. 
Far from raising re-inforcements from neighbouring communities, 
Lydenburg's military authorities had not even been able to 
persuade a sufficient number of burghers from their own 
Republic to take part in an ordinary negotiating mission to the 
Swazi (49). Unless the Republic had already come to some secret
(47) As the Commission which the Petition of 16 Sept. 1854 
resolved should go to Mswati never in fact left, owing to 
lack of cooperation by Commandant P.J. Coetzee and others 
(see S.A.A.R. Transvaal 3 , 25-6, Kommissie Raad's meeting 
18 Nov. 1854, Afd. 18-20) it seems that this must refer 
to the 1846 agreement. President Burgers later claimed 
that the Swazi at the time of this transaction had offered 
to "clean the land" which they had ceded, of other Africans.
(48) S.A.A.R. Transvaal 3 , 22-5, Sitting of Kommissie Raads,
6 Nov. 1854, Afds 3-15; but see also below, 191.
(49) Above, note 47.
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understanding with Mswati (50), its proposals were a hollow and 
meaningless sham. The entire strategy which they had formulated 
depended on obtaining the support of Mswati, and this would 
quite patently not be forthcoming.without either the threat of 
coercion, or a meaningful concession on Somcuba.
Whether a Commission ever set out for Swaziland to implement 
the above resolutions, and if so whether it achieved anything 
are not recorded (51). The absence of any further mention of 
its activities in the Volksraad or Executive Council minutes 
suggests that it probably never departed at all, and the most 
likely explanation for this is to be found in the reports which 
reached Lydenburg in the middle of November, that a force of 
Mswati's was waiting on the other side of the Vaal River, with 
the intention of attacking the Boer settlements in the Republic 
as soon as the flood water subsided (52). Shortly afterwards, 
in mid-December, there followed still more airy rumours that 
Mswati's force was by now on the Boer side of the Crocodile 
River, and this was apparently enough to dissuade the Commission 
from setting out at all (53).
(50) The heavy penalties threatened to anyone revealing informa­
tion about the Raad's resolutions, and the omission of 
Afd. 7 from the Public Notice of these resolutions (this 
was the one making reference to the use of Mswati's forces -
S.S. 9, 154), together with the provision for the removal
of Somcuba to a place without caves (it was this that had
saved him at the time of Mswati's earlier attack upon
him), all raise suspicions on this score.
(51) A Commission to do so was provided for in Afd. 6 of the
Kommissie Raad's Resolutions.
(52) S.S. 6, 321, R 721/54 P. Schutte, Commandant Mooi River 
to G.J. Kruger, Acting Commandant General, 14 Nov. 1854.
(53) S.S. 9,164, R 371/54 J. de Clerq and others to P. Schutte,
11 Dec. 1854.
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As the subsequent movements of this Swazi force went unremarked, 
it seems unlikely that the incursion did in fact materialise.
However, in view of the many other lacunae in Lydenburg’s 
records, one cannot entirely discount the possibility that 
these movements were in fact the prelude to an unrecorded 
attack on Somcuba. From later sources, it is known that Somcuba 
was killed by the Swazi at some time during this general period (54), 
and from the evidence supplied by Swazi oral traditions, it 
appears that his chiefdom was attacked in circumstances similar 
to these. The army evidently approached Somcuba1s area while 
the Crocodile River was in flood, and achieved total surprise 
after crossing it by means of a human chain. Somcuba’s village 
was thereupon obliterated, and contrary to Mswati's alleged 
instructions, Somcuba himself was also killed (55).
If the evidence for locating Somcubafs death at this particular 
juncture is flimsy, the chronology does at least have the merit 
of providing some explanation for the otherwise unaccountable 
thaw in Swazi/Boer relations, which took place in the first half 
of 1855, and which found expression in a treaty of cession 
between the Swazi and the Lydenburg Boers in July of that year.
The background to this treaty is utterly obscure. The first 
that we hear about it is in the Volksraad minutes of July 1855,
(54) S.S. 30, 480, R 3359/59, Interview of C. Potgieter with 
Swazi messengers, Lydenburg, 19 Dec. 1854.
(55) Myburgh, Carolina, 90; D. Steyn, ’Die Swazis' in De Koevelder,
11 Feb.1927; Kuper, ’Ritual’, 230, note 3. According to 
Nachtigal ('Tagebuch', II, 237-8) the bulk of Somcuba’s 
followers (amounting to a similar number to those of Maleo 
before he was attacked, that is, several thousand) there­
after stayed on the farms of the Boers.
139
where an offer by Mswati to part with more of his land is 
recorded, and only two and a half weeks later we find a formal 
treaty embodying this proposal already signed and sealed (56). 
What had happened in the period since the non-departing Boer 
Commission had been summoned by the Volksraad to go to 
Swaziland, to try and salvage something of Lydenburg*s 1native 
policy', is a complete mystery.
It was subsequently assumed that fear of the Zulu was the main 
spur to Mswati's concluding the treaty, for by its terms a ten 
mile wide corridor along the northern bank of the Pongola River 
was ceded to the Boers, on condition that they should populate 
it with white settlers, and thus form a cordon sanitaire (57). 
However, even a glance at the history of the previous few years 
makes it clear that any agreement of this kind was highly 
improbable without preliminary solution to the question of 
Somcuba. Even were this not so, it is difficult to understand 
why the Swazi should have made this proposal at this particular 
time. Fear of Cetshwayo no doubt still loomed large in Swazi 
minds, and it is possible that they felt that only a substantial 
concession could repair their damaged relations with the Boers. 
But even so, the outlay does not seem to match the return, for 
the Zulu threat was far less conspicuous than it had been prior 
to 1852, and it is not difficult to imagine the Lydenburgers 
being happy with far less land than they ultimately obtained.
(56) C. 2220, 293, Encl. 2 in No. 109, Appendix 'A', Treaty of
Cession of 21 July 1855.
(57) C. 2220, 292, Encl. 2 in No. 109; C. 2252, 49, Frere to
Hicks Beach, 24 Jan, 1879.
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Moreover, to sustain the argument that this cession was in part 
a sort of indemnity for a foregoing Swazi incursion, one really 
requires stronger evidence for believing that an incursion 
actually took place. As has already been indicated, there is 
no hard evidence that Mswati's army ever crossed the Crocodile 
River in the December of 1854, only, as the Landdrost of 
Lydenburg observed at the time, "wild rumours, chiefly from the 
Kafirs of Sekwati and Mapoch", which even managed to attribute 
to Mzilikazi some part in the dispute (58). The last verified 
location of Mswati's forces late in 1854 was on the other side 
of the Vaal River, in the territory of Mlambo, the Nhlapo chief, 
and as Mswati is known to have been in conflict with Mlambo 
throughout this period, a far more plausible interpretation of 
these reports and rumours is that Mswati's forces had taken the 
field against the Nhlapo late in 1854 (59). One further piece 
of evidence, which also suggests that Somcuba was not disposed 
of at this time, is to be found in the resolution of the 
Volksraad dated 4 July 1855, which directed the Landdrost of 
Lydenburg to summon "two kaffirs from Sincoeba", to act as 
guides to a Commission that was going to Delagoa Bay (60).
Once again this reference is not completely conclusive, since 
it is possible that Somcuba was already dead, and that these 
were simply some of his remaining followers. However, the form
(58) S.S. 6, 321, R 721/54, P. Schutte, Commandant Mooi River 
to G.J. Kruger, Acting Commandant-General, 14 Nov. 1854.
(59) For the Nhlapo see below, 182-3.
(60) S.A.A.R. Transvaal 3 , 87-8, Kommissie Raad's meeting,
4 July 1855, Arts. 9-12.
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of words used, and the fact that they do not recur again in 
official documents, suggests that what is referred to here is 
a Somcuba who is both alive and well.
We are still left, therefore, with mystery over the date and the 
circumstances of Somcuba's death. The only remotely contemporaneous 
reference is to be found in 1859, when Swazi messengers to 
Lydenburg mentioned his having earlier met his death at Swazi 
hands (61). As for other Republican records, Somcuba's name 
simply fades from view after one final reference in the Volksraad 
minutes of July 1855. It is perhaps merely accidental that 
this last reference to Somcuba's name coincides with the first 
and only reference to Mswati's offer to cede more land to the 
Republic. It is, on the other hand, undeniably suggestive, 
particularly when, apart from the text of the 1855 treaty itself, 
there is no single further allusion to either event. Other 
lacunae in the Republic's records undoubtedly abound, but such 
a deafening silence about these two centrally important events 
in the history of Lydenburg can surely not be merely a matter 
of chance. More likely is the much more sinister conclusion 
that the removal of Somcuba was the stated or unstated condition 
of the 1855 cession. This would go a long way towards explaining 
why Mswati was prepared to sign away such a vast area of land, 
for only something of this sort could have bought Lydenburg's 
acquiescence in his plans. Moreover, if Mswati's primary goal 
was the short-term tactical one of eliminating Somcuba, and
(61) S.S. 30, 480, R 3359/59, Interview of C. Potgieter with 
Swazi messengers, Lydenburg, 19 Dec. 1859.
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not the long term strategic one of establishing a bulwark against 
the Zulu, then there was nothing to stop him from reneging on 
the cession as soon as Somcuba was dead; and this in fact was 
what he subsequently did (62). Mswati could cede away this 
vast tract of land with perfect equanimity because he did not 
endow it with any finality. The cession was simply one more in 
a succession of diplomatic stratagems, whose validity would 
last as long as its immediate use. Once that ceased to be so, 
in Swazi eyes, it lapsed.
And lapse it rapidly did. The basic contradiction in the 
agreement from Lydenburg's point of view was, that once Somcuba 
was dead, its principal bargaining counter was gone. Mswati's 
fear of the Zulu did, admittedly, provide a continuing point 
of leverage, but even here Lydenburg*s ability to help was coming 
increasingly in doubt. As part of the 1855 agreement the 
Lydenburgers were supposed to have occupied a strip of territory 
along the north bank of the Pongola River, to create a buffer 
against the Zulu, but no move in this direction was made until 
the early 1890s (63). Instead, the Swazi were forced to witness 
the galling spectacle of Zulu settlers from the other side of 
the Pongola River colonising the land they had left (64). Nor,
(62) Below, 104-6.
(63) U.A., Briewe Boek 13, Rudolph to Shepstone, Memorandum on 
the present state of relations between the Transvaal 
Government and the Swazi king and people; personal communi­
cation, Richard Cornwell.
(64) T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents...), Statement by Cabanise 
and others, messengers from Mswati, 24 April 1860.
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given Lydenburgfs current state of military weakness, could the 
Swazi necessarily count on availing themselves of the right of 
refuge in the event of Zulu attack. Having burnt its fingers 
with Somcuba, the Republic was now far less inclined to accept 
refugees on that sort of scale, and five years later refused 
precisely that request from the Swazi, on the grounds that it 
would oblige them "to check and prevent Panda’s commando which 
would occasion great difficulties and evils" (65). What 
remaining use the 1855 agreement had for the Swazi therefore 
vanished, and Mswati came instead to lean increasingly heavily 
on the good offices of the Natal government, keeping up a 
stream of communications to them, acquainting them of his 
intentions, requesting their permission for his actions, and 
constantly reaffirming his dependent status (66).
Symptomatic of Lydenburg's inability to fulfil the broader 
political obligations of the treaty was its failure to meet 
even its specific contractual terms. In its written version, 
the only explicit return for the cession was the payment of 
seventy cattle in two six monthly instalments, but even that 
proved beyond the parlous financial and administrative resources
(65) L.L., I, 215, C. Potgieter to P.L.Uys (Landdrost) and 
J.D. van Collen (Commandant) Utrecht, 24 April 1860.
(66) See for instance T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents...), 
Statement by Kwahlakwahla and others, 3 July 1857, "UmSwazi... 
wishes us first to say he has always looked on this 
Government as a friend and he has for years past always 
communicated with it on the occurence of any difficulty
or emergency. The whole country is in the hands of the 
Government. Whether nominally or not UmSwazi looks upon 
himself as a subject of this Government".
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of the Republic, so that the balance remained unpaid (67). If 
the Swazi needed an excuse to repudiate the cession this gave 
them one, and in the following years they encroached systematically 
into the land bartered away. The earliest recorded incident 
was in 1858, when Mswati launched attacks into the chiefdoms of 
Mhlangampisi and Mhlangala located on the land ceded to the 
south-west of Swaziland (68). The lack of reaction on the part 
of the Lydenburg authorities to these attacks suggests that they 
considered their rights over these areas as flimsy as did the 
Swazi, and Mswati followed them up in 1860 by a renewed attack 
on Mhlangala and other campaigns in the north and north-east (69). 
Of more immediate significance were Mswati's attempts to reoccupy 
land in the north-west, which was considerably nearer the 
Lydenburg community, and of far greater importance to them for 
the winter grazing it contained. Prior to the treaty of 
cession this had been sparsely populated by Pai and Pulana 
chiefdoms, but in the late 1850s and early 1860s these had been 
either obliterated or expelled, to be replaced by royal villages 
under Mswati's wives or close lieutenants (70). The objectives 
of the exercise were of two distinct kinds. In its more modest 
form it was aimed at restoring control over the winter pasturage 
of the Komati valley, which was perhaps securest of all from
(67) Van Rooyen, 1Verhouding', 76-7; below, 253-4.
(68) Below, 181-2.
(69) Below,182-3. According to the Berlin missionaries, the 
Lydenburg authorities forbad any white from settling in 
this territory for fear of creating friction with the Swazi, 
Berlin Missionsberichte, 1860, 62.
(70) Von Wielligh, Lebombo, 169-70; Myburgh, Barberton, 33-4,
47~8, 59; L 8, No. 9/56, J.M. de Beer to Kommissie Raad,
17 May 1856.
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Zulu attack (71). At its most ambitious it was to set up 
military villages, which would serve as launching pads to take 
control of the eastern lowveld as a whole (72). Mswati was 
preparing to project himself into the role of Swaziland’s 
"greatest fighting king" (73).
The Lydenburg authorities, or at least a section of them, did 
not let this go unchallenged, and the changing fortunes of the 
two parties in the dispute over the next decade provide a 
useful lens through which to view changing relationships in the 
region as a whole. Mswati drove in his first wedge, by taking 
advantage of what appear to be continuing factional divisions 
in the Lydenburg hierarchy. At this stage its two leading 
personalities were W.F. Joubert, the Commandant-General, and 
Cornelius Potgieter, Chairman of the Volksraad, and political 
heir to J. J.Burgers s Volksraad party (74). Judged by his 
later utterances, Potgieter was strongly opposed to the idea 
of allowing the Swazi to resettle parts of the ceded territory (75). 
Joubert on the other hand was much more amenable, and without 
consultating either the Volksraad or Potgieter, gave permission 
to the Swazi to occupy the land north of the Crocodile River
(71) S.S. 30, 480, R 3359/59, Interview between C. Potgieter 
and 2 captains of Mswati, 19 Dec. 1859; below, 149-50.
(72) Myburgh, Barberton, 33-4, 47-8, 59; Sw.A., Honey, ’History1, 31.
(73) Kuper, Aristocracy, 15.
(74) Van Rooyen, ’Verhouding’, 10, 17; Wichmann, ’Wordings- 
geskiedenis’, 130, note 47.
(75) V.R.B., 13 June 1859, Art. 39; S.S., 30, 480, R 3359/59, 
Interview between Potgieter and several messengers,
19 Dec. 1859.
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up to the edge of the Drakensburg range (76). His reasons for 
behaving in this fashion are difficult to unravel, but it is 
likely that he was actuated by that mixture of personal and 
public interests which seem common to most officials in the 
Republic at the time, particularly those charged with military 
matters. Joubert had evidently been in bad standing with the 
Swazi, ever since the position he took up on the Somcuba affair. 
As a result he had received little of the cooperation he.might 
otherwise have expected, and was held responsible in some 
quarters for the lack of labour and tribute (77). It seems 
quite likely therefore that by giving Mswati the run of the 
lowveld he was seeking a means of repairing that relationship, 
or at least trying to prevent it coming under greater strain, 
with a view to securing those various advantages which a closer 
friendship with the Swazi would presumably bring.
If these were arguments that influenced Joubert, they were not 
the kind that would appeal to his rivals, and within the year 
he had been taken up on his offer to resign (78). Even now 
Potgieter did not act on the question of encroachment, and 
in the end it was the Swazi and not Potgieter who broached 
the matter, when Mswati sent envoys to the Republic in December 
1859. At least one of Mswati’s objectives is evident from the
(76) Ibid, 479-80.
(77) L 8 No. 9/56, J.M. de Beer to Kommissie Raad, 17 May 1856.
(78) S.S., 33, 418-9, R 3800/60, 12 June 1860; Van Heerden,
’Die Kommandant’, 17, 58.
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transcript of that interview (79). Joubert was no longer in a 
position of authority, and Mswati felt the need for some 
confirmation of his actions from the other officials of the 
Republic. Why Mswati was so anxious to get that is less clear, 
but it was probably related to Mswati's fear of Zulu reprisals 
for his attacks on chiefdoms in the south. That being so,
Mswati was envisaging a setback to his plans, for it is clear 
that the Republic would demand the recognition of its 
sovereignty, if not some other more material gain. This in 
fact is what happened when Potgieter replied to Mswati's message 
by demanding the payment of three substantial tusks of ivory 
for the right to occupy his land. Mswati's response to 
Potgieter's demand is illuminating, for it reveals his continued 
commitment to expansion, as well as the kind of manoeuvring 
that^was possible in such a fluid situation. Some two and a 
half months later the Swazi envoys returned bearing only a 
fraction of the tribute, the relative inadequacy of which was 
apparently carefully gauged. Instead of the three large tusks 
of ivory demanded, they brought with them two very inferior ones, 
giving as their excuse that Mswati had not been able to lay 
his hands on any more (80). This was as transparently feeble 
to Potgieter as it is to the modern historian, for Potgieter 
had also said that they could bring oxen as an alternative if 
ivory were not at hand, but it was enough to secure Mswati's 
basic aims. On the one hand a connection was maintained with
(79) S.S., 30, 479-82, R 3359/59, Interview between C. Potgieter 
and Swazi messengers, Lydenburg, 18 February 1859.
(80) S.S. 33, 74-5, R 3620, Statement by messengers from Mswati, 
18 Feb. 1860.
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Lydenburg at a time when the possibility of Zulu attacks was 
becoming daily more real; on the other, the right of the Republic 
to levy any specific quantity of tribute had been denied, 
leaving Mswati in a position to argue at some later stage that 
the ivory had been a gift, implying no acknowledgement of 
Republican sovereignty over the occupied ground. Potgieter 
was only too well aware of the implications of the act, and 
gave vent to his irritation by remarking that the envoys would 
not even have brought the first two tusks had it not been for 
the threatening demeanour of Mpande (81). Potgieter was right, 
but there was nothing he could do, and,with relations soured 
but not yet severed,the messengers made their way back home.
The messengers took back a demand for the outstanding tusks of 
ivory, but it is clear from the tenor of their previous 
conversations, that they had little intention of complying with 
these terms (82). However, during their absence from Swaziland 
the situation had changed; rumours of a Zulu invasion had 
hardened into concrete intelligence, creating panic out of the 
previous climate of unease (83). Mswati’s intransigence in 
these circumstances understandably vanished. The outstanding 
ivory reached Lydenburg in the latter part of February, and a 
few weeks later the Swazi were petitioning the Republic to take
(81) Ibid.
(82) Ibid.
(83) S.S. 33, 326, R 3756/60, C. Potgieter to President and 
Volksraad, 23 May 1860; L.L. 1, 123, J.J. Combrink to
C. Potgieter, 30 April 1860, 173, G.J. Joubert to C. Potgieter, 
24 April 1860, 215, C. Potgieter to P.L. Uys etc. 24 April 1860.
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refuge in its lands (84).
One could conclude from all this that Mswati had miscalculated, 
and in one sense Mswati obviously had. The South African 
Republic had never been particularly keen on the idea of Zulu 
armies pursuing Swazi refugees into the heart of its territory, 
and the behaviour of Mswati over the previous few months had 
ensured they would do all they could to keep his people out. 
Mswati had also jeopardised his territorial ambitions. The 
extra ivory had implied a recognition of the Republic’s 
territorial rights, and it may have taken this opportunity to 
consolidate its claims by handing over the balance of cattle 
owing on the 1855 cession, and by making a new treaty with one 
of the chiefs in the south-west (85) . Yet in other ways the 
situation was not as bleak as it seemed. The Zulu had not 
invaded, which partially vindicated Mswati’s longer-term 
calculations, and even if they had, Mswati would almost certainly 
have taken refuge in the Republic whether it liked it or not. 
Indeed it seems likely that Mswati took the precaution of
(84) S.S. 33, 79 R 3620/60, interview with messengers from Mswati, 
probably March 1860.
(85) The situation with the balance of the payment is unclear, 
see for example Van Rooyen, 1Verhouding', 76-7; S.A.A.R. 
Transvaal 4 , (Cape Town, 1952) , 410, Report of expenditure
1 Nov. 1860 to 31 Dec. 1860, Payment of debt to Mswati,
664 Rds; P.P. 1878-9, C 2316, 23, Encl. 2 in No. 15. With 
the treaties things are more clear, S.A.A.R. Transvaal 4 ,
332, Treaty between Mantlapies (Mhlangampisi) and the 
S.A.R., 20 July 1860; see also S.S. 33, 416, R 3799/60, 
Declaration by 3 Swazi messengers at Lydenburg, 12 June 1860.
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lodging his cattle in the ceded territory in open defiance of 
the Republic’s objections, and then went on to stake a further 
claim to the disputed territory by using their presence there 
as a lever to persuade his reluctant followers to set up villages 
deeper into it than had previously been the case (86). Covertly, 
if not overtly, the process of expansion still went on.
What one sees in these events is an emerging contradiction 
between substance and form. The Swazi had formally acknowledged 
Republican rights to the area, but in practice were simultaneously 
repudiating them on the ground, and there was little chance of 
the Republic converting the one kind of recognition into the 
other unless Mpande actually decided to attack. The same 
contradiction runs through most of the next year. In June 1860 
when.new villages were still being populated in the ceded 
territory, Mswati sent messengers to the Commandant-General of 
Lydenburg asking permission to be allowed to attack Maleo and 
Sekwati and recover the cattle that they had seized from Somcuba. 
Van Dyk sent back the uncompromising reply that Mswati had no 
right to send a commando into Republican territory without 
direct orders from the Commandant-General himself, and to this 
rebuke Mswati meekly submitted (87). The following month 
Mswati’s messengers were back asking for an escort to bring a 
Swazi marriage party back from the Zoutpansberg, and again this 
was couched in equally humble terms. "He could easily send a
(86) U.W.A., A845, A. Merensky, ’Tagebuch unserer Reise zu den 
Swazi Kaffern', March-May 1860, 36-8; L.L.I, 215, G.J. Joubert 
to P.L. Uys, Landdrost Utrecht, 24 April 1860.
(87) S.S. 33, 418-19, R 3800/60, Interview between J. van Dyk 
(Commandant-General), C. Potgieter (Landdrost) and
G.J. Joubert (Commandant) and the Swazi messengers Zies, 
Malcwazietel and Mabokwan, 12 June 1860.
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commando to fetch the woman back", Mswati said, "but that would 
not be showing obedience". He consequently asked for the 
Republic’s help in the matter (88).
The Republic complied with Mswati’s request, as much out of 
suspicion as anything else, but this was to be the last it 
heard of obedience for some considerable time (89). The under­
lying trend of Swaziland’s relations with the Republic since 
the early 1850s had been in the direction of a growing dependence 
of the latter on the former, which was only occasionally checked 
by threats of Zulu attack, and after 1861 that trend reasserted 
itself for the rest of Mswati’s reign (90). Supporting it now 
were two new elements in the situation. The first was the civil 
conflict in the South African Republic, which broke out in 1862 
and was only resolved in 1864, and which paralysed the Boers in 
their dealings with blacks. The second was the Shangane 
succession dispute, which entered a new phase in 1862, when the 
Swazi entered the lists on the side of the defeated party of 
Mawewe. From the Swazi point of view these two conflicts were 
linked. The civil war in the South African Republic enabled 
many African chiefdoms to shrug off the last remnants of
(88) S.S. 34, 49-51, R 3852/60, C. Potgieter to S. Schoeman 
(Commandant-General, Schoemansdal), 18 July 1860; L.L. 1, 
199-192, S. Schoeman to C. Potgieter, 21 July 1860.
(89) S.S. 34, 50-1, R 3852/60, C. Potgieter to S. Schoeman,
18 July 1860.
(90) In June of that year for example, the Republic requested 
Mswati’s assistance to 'root out’ Mapoch, S.S. 40, 8, 
meeting of G.J. Joubert with four representatives of Mswati, 
6 June 1861. Mswati refused on the grounds that an epidemic 
of measles was raging among his people, S.S. 45, 112, 115, 
Resolution of Krygsraad, Art. 4, no. 3, 22 Jan. 1862.
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Republican control, and so further imperiled an already 
precarious labour supply (91). The Shangane civil war permitted 
the Swazi to range over huge areas of lowveld in the modern 
Eastern Transvaal and southern Mozambique, and from there to 
secure the captives of which the Boers were desperately in need. 
Taken together they denote a major realignment of forces, which 
had profound repercussions for the area as a whole.
Enough is known of the Transvaal civil war and its impact on 
black-white relations for us to pass over it here. What stands 
in need of further clarification is the emergence of the Swazi 
as the principal captive trading state in south-eastern Africa. 
In the next chapter I suggest that it may have had something 
to do with the stratification of Swazi society, and the role 
that .captives came to play in a more agriculturally orientated 
economy (92). For our present purposes, however, all that needs 
to be shown is the existence of slaves on a fairly large scale 
in the Swazi economy, and a substantial traffic in this commodity 
to the Boers of the Transvaal. Both points are as easily 
attested as they are difficult to compute. Hilda Kuper has 
hinted at the importance of slaves in the Swazi economy, and 
other sources bear her out (93). According to Ndambi Mkhonta, 
the Ezulwini village once boasted large numbers of captives, 
and the same is likely to be true of all royal capitals (94).
(91) Van Rooyen, ’Verhouding’, 106, 233-5; De Vaal, ’Rol’,
65-104.
(92) Below, 175-6.
(93) Kuper, Aristocracy, 67-8.
(94) Interview Ndambi Mkhonta.
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Other examples which I have come across without directly
questioning on the subject are those of the Dube, who were
attacked and made captive during the reign of Mswati, and of the
Thabede who suffered a similar fate at much the same time (95).
Sources for captives fell in two broad categories, although
the distinction was probably blurred in the early days of the
state. The first group comprised non-Swazi, who were raided
outside their kingdom's boundaries (the Titfunjwa) (96). In
Sobhuza's early conflicts with the chiefdoms of Magoboyi and
Mkize, for example, captives were taken, and their presence in
Swazi society was used in later years to justify Mswati's right
to cede the eastern Trans-vaal(97). Later it was the Tsonga
who bore the brunt of these attacks, and it was they who were
most usually traded as slaves. The other major source of supply
were.children seized from households within the Swazi kingdom
(the Tigcili) (98). As Tikuba told Stuart in 1898,
It often happened that when a person was 
killed for some crime or other and his 
cattle and children seized, those children 
were taken by the Swazi and sold to the 
Boers in the Transvaal. (99)
(95) Interview Mlingwa Dube, Machango Kunene, 17 May 1970, 
Mpholonjeni, Swaziland; interview with Thabede and Khumalo 
informants, 21 July 1970, Kwendzeni, Swaziland. For other 
references see Nxumalo, 'Oral Tradition', 30-1, interview 
with Zwane Gwebu, Helehele, 8 Dec. 1973, 48, interview 
with Paul Mndonga Ngubane, Evusweni, 11 March 1974.
(96) Kuper, Aristocracy, 67-8.
(97) S.S. 30, 481-2, R 3359/59, Interview between C. Potgieter 
and the Swazi messengers Kappoen and Makwasitiel,
19 Dec. 1859.
(98) Kuper Aristocracy, 67-8.
(99) S.P. 30091, Tikuba, 27 Nov. 1898.
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The Berlin missionary, Merensky, reported on similar practices
after his visit to Swaziland in March 1860. "Even now" he
wrote in his diary,
if a man of his /Mswati’s_7 people has many 
daughters or good cattle his soldiers come, 
surround the Kraal, murder the old, and 
take the young people and cattle as booty.
Children are being sold or given to the 
’great of the realm’. (100)
And this seems to have been precisely what happened in the
Thabede example just given (101).
Children captured in these ways were often sold in the Trans­
vaal. There is evidence that captives were given in return 
for the assistance lent by the Boers during the Zulu invasion 
of 184V, and as the 1850s wore on the traffic seems to have 
grown increasingly regular (102). "The first white man to 
visit Swaziland", Stuart was told by Giba and Mnkonkoni,
was a Boer named Ngalonkulo. He was 
accompanied by Potolozi said to be 
president Kruger’s father. Kruger 
also came to /thej country in /TtheJ/ 
early days to hunt elephants as well 
as [to] purchase Tonga children with 
horses and oxen from Swazis who had 
raided the children from the Tongas.
Other Boers made similar purchases. (103)
In 1863 a messenger from the ex-king Mawewe to Natal commented
in similar vein, stating that,
While at Umswazi’s three months back a
party of Boers brought 30 horses and 20
(100) U.W.A., A 845, Merensky, ’Tagebuch’, 41.
(101) Interview Thabede and Khumalo.
(102) Sw.A., Honey, ’History’, 49; Berliner Missionsberichte, 
1860, 267-8; De Vaal, ’Rol', 7-8.
(103) S.P. 30091, 85, Giba and Mnkonkoni, 25 Nov. 1895.
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guns in exchange with Umswazi for slaves.
The Boers wanted 2 people for each horse, 
but Umswazi refused to give them more than 
one. Upon this negotiations were broken 
off and the Boers went away.
Umayi added that,
This trade is very commonly carried on by 
Umswazi and is supplied by captives of war 
or confiscated families among his subjects. (104)
The exact proportions of the trade are difficult, to calculate 
either absolutely or in relation to the total intake of the 
Trans-vaal, The Landdrost of Lydenburg's control book of 
inboekings lists four hundred and thirty children booked into 
service between August 1851 and April 1866, but these entries 
fail eitner to specify their origin, or to include many of 
those impressed in a variety of other ways (as for instance 
through field-cornets) (105). Certain impressions can never­
theless be gained. The first is that the Swazi were by far and 
away the most important dealers in captives in the eastern 
Trans-vaal. Wherever the actual origin of the captive is 
specified it is almost always the Swazi who are so named, and 
at least two of the bulges in the number of slaves booked in 
at the Lydenburg Landdrosty can be correlated with engagements 
in which the Swazi took captives and/or were concerned as a 
result to maintain the goodwill of the Trans-vaal (106). It 
is also possible to discern the trade changing over time. To 
begin with captives seemed to have been given by the Swazi as 
a kind of prestation in order to cement the political alliance
(104) S.N.A. 1/6/2, No. 121, Statement by Umayi, messenger from 
Langa, 16 Nov. 1863.
(105) L.L. 172, Landdrost Kontrol Boek, Inboek Kaffers 1851-1878.
(106) Ibid, 1855-1856, 1860-1862.
156
which was developing with the Boers, and the trade appears to 
have remained on that level until the mid to late 1850s.
Thereafter, with the onset of the Republican and Shangane civil
wars, a major expansion took place. Stepping into the vacuum 
left by both the Shangane and the Boers the Swazi ranged all
over the lowveld in an ever broadening search for ivory, cattle
and captives. Looking back on these events in 1899 Grandjean 
wrote of,
ten years of battles and of ’razzias' 
from which the country has still not 
recovered. Initially there were five 
years of continual wars when one could
not even think of working in the fields.
People survived on roots and branches
of palms. Women and children followed 
armies to have their part of the meagre 
booty. For the next five years there 
was less fighting but people were 
ceaselessly on the lookout. Each year 
Mawewe's people came back to ravage 
fields and burn villages. (107)
Other sources confirm this tale of war and devastation. In
1868 Albasini, the Secretary of Native Affairs in the Zoutpans-
berg, complained to the Governor of Mozambique that,
This district is in the greatest possible 
distress given rise to by the continual 
kaffir wars which since the beginning of 
1864 have wasted not only this district 
but as far as the English colony /andJ 
have caused a complete standstill in 
trade, (108)
and the following year the traveller Erskine was told by people
(107) A. Grandjean, ’Une page d'Histoire inddite. L"lnvasion 
des Zoulous dans le Sud~est Africain’, Bulletin de la 
Society Neuchateloise de Geographie,11, (1899), 85.
(108) A.B.B. Serie 1868, No. 3, Albasini to Governor, 1868.
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on the southern banks of the Limpopo that,
they had at one time kept cattle but
that the Swazi had so plundered and 
harrassed them that they had ceased 
to keep any. (109)
A proportion of the captives acquired on these campaigns were
absorbed directly into Swazi society. In 1859 an epidemic had
carried off large numbers of Swazi, and at least some of the
captives went to make good that loss (110). Still others,
perhaps the majority, were traded to the Boers, and there are
signs from 1860 of an upswing in supply. When the Berlin
missionaries Merensky and Grutzner visited Swaziland in February
of that year they were asked to take captives to Lydenburg and
trade a horse in return, and by December one may even be seeing
signs of a surfeit of supply when Mswati failed to dispose of
eight of his captives at a satisfactory price (111). Fragments
of information from the Lydenburg records give evidence of the
continued vigour of the trade, but even then may well conceal
the full proportions it assumed (112). In May 1864, for example,
Maleo's Bakopa were almost annihilated, and large numbers of
their children were traded to the Boers. According to the Berlin
missionaries, something like five hundred Bakopa captives were
taken by the Swazi, of whom the majority eventually found their
way into Boer hands, yet one finds only a dozen or so appearing
(109) St. V.W. Erskine, 'Journey of Exploration to the Mouth of the 
River Limpopo', Journal of the Royal Geographical Society 
XXXIX, (1869), 244.
(110) T.S.C. Case 22, (Swazi documents...), statement by Xabanisa, 
messenger from Mswati, 4 Oct. 1859.
(111) L19, 99-101, G.J. Joubert to C. Potgieter 21 Dec. 1860.
(112) L.L. 177, C. Potgieter and J. van Dyk to G.J. Joubert,
24 July 1862; S.A.A.R. Transvaal 4 , 411, Report of 
expenditure 1 July 1861 to 30 Sept. 1861; ibid, Dagboek,
12 Oct. 1863, 22 Oct. 1863, 3 Feb. 1864, 14 April 1865;
L.L. 172, Landdrost Kontrol Boek, Inboek Kaffer, 1851-1878.
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in the Landdrost of Lydenburg!s diary, while the official 
jnboeking register is if anything down (113). All one can say 
therefore is that from 1860 there appears to have been an 
appreciable increase in the trade, which reached its peak in 
the year or so after Maleo's fall, but that its volume cannot 
be even approximately estimated, and with our present documentary 
sources will probably never be known.
If the disposal of the Bakopa captives marks the peak of the 
trade, the attack that preceded it was itself the culmination 
of a trend. Like many other petty chiefdoms in the northern 
and eastern Trans-vaal the Bakopa had always chafed under the 
constraints of Boer control, and had been one of the earliest 
to acquire firearms to resist their demands (114). Because of 
their, numbers and their terrain they were not as successful as 
their neighbours Sekwati and Mabhogo, but their position 
gradually improved in the 1850s as that of Lydenburg declined.
The civil war in the Trans-vaal greatly accelerated the process, 
so much so that once it was over the Boers could not re-establish 
control. The Republic's failure against the Bakopa illustrates 
the straits into which it had sunk, for they were hardly a 
powerful chiefdom by the standards of the Trans-vaal. Others 
could, and many did, follow the same example, and the South 
African Republic was driven to rely increasingly heavily on the
(113) Berliner Missionsberichte, 1865, 207; Merensky,
Erinnerungen, 54; L.L. 179, Dagboek 1864-8, 7-8, 15, 62, 
200, 218, 222-3; L.L. 172, Landdrost Kontrol Boek, Inboek 
Kaffers, 1851-1878.
(114) Above, 127.
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help of the Swazi to retain their political and military control. 
In 1864 Swazi help was enlisted against Maleo, and a few months 
later against Mabhogo, and in 1867 a plea went out for help 
against the disunited Venda in the north (115). What was 
happening was a basic shift of power relations, with the Swazi 
now fulfilling many of the positions of the Boers.
The last pieces of the jigsaw to be fitted into position are the 
objectives of the Swazi in trading on this scale. To some this 
may seem self evident; in its earlier phases the trade had been 
prosecuted for primarily political purposes, and those rewards 
would presumably grow in rough proportion to the trade* In 
the 1860s, however, one can detect a new factor in the equation, 
with the emphasis gradually shifting to the goods received in 
return. Again this might be viewed as a purely 'natural1 
progression, since such reciprocatory gifts had always figured 
in the trade. The difference in this case was in the type of 
goods solicited, and it is here that one sees a certain re­
orientation of the trade. One of the earliest hints of what 
was happening comes from Merensky and Grutzner’s account of 
their visit to Mswati in April 1860. Merensky and Grutzner 
were requesting permission to establish a mission in Swaziland, 
and despite a delay caused by Mswati's taking refuge from the 
Zulu, were initially optimistic at the response they received. 
Mswati seemed to welcome the prospect of their secretarial
(115) S.S. 50, R 905/63, van Dyk to Kruger, 2 Dec. 1863,
Staatscourant, 14 June 1864; Wangemann, Sekoekoeni, 62-3;
S.S. 89, R 752/67, Albasini to President and Executive
Council, 20 July 1867; L.L. 177, 295, Statement by 
J.A. de Beer, 11 March 1864.
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services, and was prepared to let his children be taught in a 
school they would run. The handling of correspondence 
missionaries could readily agree to, but it was not long before 
they were faced with more difficult demands. In return for the 
favours he was conferring on them Mswati also wanted more 
concrete returns, the most important of which were the gift of 
a gun they were carrying, and a horse from Lydenburg when the 
missionaries returned. Merensky and Grutzner interpreted this 
as the thin edge of the wedge, which it probably was, and were 
promptly ejected from the kingdom when they refused Mswati's 
demands (116). As they returned they learnt of other duties 
which Mswati had envisaged them performing, like the building 
of a European house, his 'straw house' being too warm; the 
building of a bridge over the river at Hhohho; teaching him to 
shoot; and helping in the hunting, so that white hunters could 
be excluded and he could get the ivory for himself (117). One 
hesitates on this evidence to call it a programme of selective 
modernisation (118). What is clear however is Mswati's desire 
to secure horses and guns, and the services of the missionaries, 
both to lessen his dependence on the Boers of the Trans-vaal, 
and to increase his control over his own natural resources, 
as the former grew less serviceable, and the latter more scarce (119).
(116) Wangemann, Sekoekoeni, 15-16, 23-5; Berliner Missionsberichte, 
1860, 64; S.S. 33, 342, R 3762/60, Merensky and Grutzner
to Ex.Co., 27 March 1860.
(117) U.W.A., A 845, Merensky, 'Tagebuch', 96.
(118) U.W.A., A. 845, Merensky, 'Tagebuch', 103-4; L.L. 177,
100-102, Statement of G. Endres, 19 Nov. 1862; ibid, 110-11, 
Statement of A.F, de Beer, 1 Dec. 1862. Somewhat later 
Merensky tried to trade back some of the Bakopa captives 
from the Swazi, but they would only consider trading them 
for guns, Berliner Missionsberichte, 1873, 75, 358.
(119) Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 34-5.
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The same pre-occupation with horses and guns runs through the 
rest of his reign, although our information on both subjects 
is often garbled and scarce. Considering the clandestine 
nature of the trade, this is hardly surprising. Traffic in 
horses and guns was against the law of the Republic, which meant 
that it was not the sort of information people would readily 
divulge. Moreover, given the importance of Swazi services to 
leading officials and to the Republic, it is likely that they 
turned a blind eye to such breaches as did occur. Finally, 
to make these transactions still more difficult to unravel, 
there may well have been a quasi - legitimate trade operating 
at one remove, in which the Portuguese or British bought captives 
for guns and horses, and then traded them to the Boers for 
other goods again. As a result, the only glimpses one catches 
of the traffic are chance comments like that made by the 
messenger from Mawewe, or where disputes over payment were 
referred to Natal (120). Whether this is enough to establish 
the trade of captives for firearms is obviously debateable, 
and one may be wiser for the moment to separate the two trades. 
That both grew in the 1860s is clear from the documents, but 
the extent to which they were exchanged for one another is more 
difficult to pin down. The evidence of the messenger from 
Mawewe suggests that this happened, but without further 
documentation we cannot be sure.
(120) Above, 155; L.L. 177, 151-2, Statement by Swazi messengers, 
10 Aug. 1863, 262, letter to Gov. Natal, 24 Nov. 1863.
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Summing up this survey of relations between the South African 
Republic and the Swazi in the last decade of Mswati’s reign, 
perhaps the most striking thing about them is the contradiction 
that emerges between political substance and legal form. In 
1855 the South African Republic had acquired rights to a massive 
tract of land stretching from the Pongola to the Komati and 
had got confirmation in 1860 and again in 1866; their strength 
against the Swazi seemed hardly in doubt. On the ground, the 
situation was almost completely the reverse, at least in the 
few years before Mswati's death. The Swazi retained effective 
control over the area east of the escarpment, and intervened 
in numerous polities which were nominally controlled by the 
Boers. More generally the Republic was reliant on the Swazi 
for a whole variety of services in military, commercial, and 
economic spheres. The significance of this contrast must 
obviously be evaluated, and varies with the. perspective from 
which it is approached. It could be argued that Mswati had 
mortgaged his kindgom's future by being unaware of the enduring 
nature of written treaties and cessions. On the other hand, 
it could equally well be contended that these considerations 
were immaterial to the politics of the time. For the Swazi, the 
treaties and their provisions were simply a reflection of 
current strengths and current needs, and could easily be 
superceded when those strengths and needs changed. Thus in the 
same way that the Boers exploited their position of relative 
strength in securing the treaty of 1855, the Swazi exploited 
theirs in the years thereafter by diluting or abrogating its
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principal provisions. In reality the written treaty was 
largely irrelevant to both sides. What counted was the power 
to enforce it or to set it aside. And this of course 
leads on to the further conclusion that where there was the power to 
enforce, the treaty was redundant. Documents, particularly 
in the nineteenth century African context could be fabricated, 
provocations engineered, and this indeed would probably have 
happened had not the British intervened. In the last analysis, 
therefore, it must be concluded that it was not the enduring 
quality of the treaty that the Swazi failed to perceive, but 
the massive changes which took place in the balance of power of 
the region after the annexation of the Transvaal, and the 
discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand, neither of which they 
could have readily foreseen.
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CHAPTER V
DEEPENING AND WIDENING OF DLAMINI POWER 
1852-1865
The final years of Mswati's reign had as far reaching repercussions 
internally as they did in foreign affairs. Externally Mswati 
used his freedom from foreign challenge to restructure relations 
with neighbouring powers. Inside of Swaziland he took advantage 
of the same lull to consolidate his domestic administration, 
without having to worry about denying an internal constituency 
to enemies abroad. The precise nature of these changes, the 
circumstances which brought them about, and the way in which 
they impinged on Swaziland's relations with the Zulu, the 
Portuguese and the Shangane are the subject of the present 
chapter.
For Mswati, 1852 was a year of almost unrelieved disaster.
Under the impact of invasion and foreign occupation, large 
numbers of Swazi had fled to neighbouring states, and one can 
only presume that this was just the visible tip of a much larger 
submerged group, whose loyalty wavered during the crisis. Once 
the Zulu armies had departed, Mswati took steps to weed out the 
waverers and sought to eradicate the conditions which had 
brought him so near to collapse. The strategy he adopted fell 
into two distinct parts, each of which had been tentatively 
developed even before the attack. Some time after the Zulu 
invasion of 1847, Mswati had evacuated his capital from Ekufiyeni
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to Hhohho, which had meant shifting the main locus of royal 
power considerably further to the north, and after the occupation 
of 1852 Mswati greatly accelerated this process by allocating 
numerous chiefdoms in the area to his brothers and his wives (1). 
By siting his capital north of the Komati River, Mswati gained 
the twin advantages of greater 4i-stance from the Zulu, and 
greater proximity to the Boers, among whom he could shelter his 
cattle in the event of Zulu attack, but the bulk of his kingdom 
still lay south of the Komati, and it was there that he still 
needed to strengthen his grip. The steps he took in this 
direction had again been foreshadowed in the early years of 
his reign. In the early 1840s, Mswati's mother Thandile had 
pressed through a number of reforms aimed at stabilising royal 
power, and in the same period one finds one of the earliest 
invasions of Emakhandzambile autonomy, when Mswati expelled 
the Maseko from the Lusutfu valley to Embhuleni (2). After
(1) It is difficult to date these developments exactly. One
clue, however, is that the first chiefdom in that area was 
assigned to Mswati's wife, La Nyandza, as a consolation for 
the execution of her father Magongo who had been accused 
of conspiring with Somcuba after he had fled - probably 
between 1849 and the early 1850s. Thereafter this was 
subdivided and other chiefdoms were added until Ndzingeni, 
Vusweni, Nkamazi, Mshingishingini, Ka-Ndwandwe, Sidwashini, 
Mgundundlovu, Nsangwini, Nginamadvolo, Ludlawini, Helehele 
and others had been established. S.P. 30096, Tikuba,
18 Dec. 1898 "q"; Nxumalo, 'Oral Tradition', 22, 46-7, 
Mgobozane Dlamini, 13 Oct. 1973, 10 Feb. 1974, 23, Mhambi 
Nkambule, n.d., Samuel Dlamini, Oct. 1973, 25, La Matobhi 
Mavimbela, Oct. 1973, 48, Paul Mdonga Ngubane, 11 March 
1974; interview Manyonyoba Magagula, 4 June 1970, Ndzingeni, 
Swaziland; interview Mambazu and Macala Vilakati,
Makhambane Motsa, 4-5 June, Ndzingeni, Swaziland; interview 
Majahane Dlamini; interview Nkunzi Shongwe, Ganinjobo 
Dlamini, Mtondzeki Mamba, 5 June 1970, Vusweni, Swaziland; 
interview Mtutwanana Shabalala, 23 June 1970, Nkamazi, 
Swaziland.
(2) Above, 80, Myburgh, Carolina, 84-5; S.P. 30091, 86, Giba 
and Mnkonkoni, 26 Nov. 1898.
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1852, the pace speeded up as can be seen in the wave of assaults 
on Emakhandzambile chiefs. Whether these were prompted by any 
overt disloyalty on the part of the Emakhandzambile chiefdoms 
during the invasion, or whether the invasion merely focussed 
attention on their rather ambiguous position is difficult to 
tell. All that we know is that, in one way or another, nearly 
all the Emakhandzambile chiefdoms experienced an encroachment 
on their autonomies in the period that followed. Of the nineteen 
of which I have definite information, fourteen suffered in some 
way or other at Mswati’s hands, and in the cases of the others 
it required the intervention of special factors or unusual 
circumstances to save them from a similar fate (3). Thus the 
Mnisi, the Thabede, the Gamedze, the Mngometfulo, the Sifundza, 
the Masilela, and the Mavimbela were all attacked by Mswati’s 
forces, and it is also reported that the chiefdoms of the 
Mahlalela and Moyeni’s Magagula would have been accorded similar 
treatment had it not been for the intercession of chance on the
(3) I possess no information on the Bhembe or Gwebu chiefdoms.
As for the chiefdoms that survived unscathed, three are 
from the same root - the two Maziya chiefdoms and the 
Mahlalela chiefdom, and seem to have some early undefined 
connection with the Dlamini. This presumably accounts for 
their favourable treatment (although even then the Mahlalela 
came very close to being attacked - see below, 114, 190, note 59). 
Interview Mphundle Maziya; interview Gija Mahlalela; 
interview Mandanda Mtetwa and Mkhabela, 23 April 1970,
Sigodzi, Swaziland. The Thabede chiefdom that survived 
untouched probably did so at the expense of the neighbouring 
Thabede chiefdom that was decimated (interview Mashabhane 
Magagula; interview Mandlabovu Fakudze), while the Magagula 
chiefdom which Mswati left alone had already been crushed 
by Sobhuza (interview Mankwempe Magagula; A.M. Dlamini, 
unpublished notes on Magagula history, January 1970).
167
one hand and a royal relative on the other (4). As for the 
others, their autonomies were no less completely restricted with 
the Ngwenya, the Dhladhla, the Mncina and Moyeni’s Magagula 
being demoted and placed under trusted officers of the king (5). 
The Emakhandzambile had become the first casualties of peace.
However, to say Mswati was rationalising his control, or 
whittling away at Emakhandzambile autonomies does not tell us 
very much,and it is also important to ask controls over what, 
and with what objects in mind? For the sake of analytical 
clarity I will distinguish three levels of control, in economic, 
political and ritual spheres, although as we will see, these 
are in the end dimensions of the same thing. Of the three it 
is often ritual rivalries that are remembered most vividly today. 
Explanations of conflict framed in ritual or magical terms must 
obviously be treated with considerable caution, since they can 
easily be no more than a convenient shorthand for a more complex 
causation, or simply a device for explaining conflict away. 
However, with the Swazi, there are signs that there are more 
to such explanations than simply mystifying conflict of a more 
material kind. Sobhuza’s attack on Mnjoli Magagula underlines 
this point. When Sobhuza occupied central Swaziland, one of 
his earliest campaigns was against Mnjolifs branch of the
(4) Interview Mboziswa Mnisi; interview Mashabhane Magagula; 
interview Mhawu Gamedze, Loshina Gamedze, Moyeni Mamba,
29 June 1970, Mandlenya,Swaziland; interview Mandlabovu 
Fakudze; interview Mjole Sifundza; interview Hehhane Ngwenya; 
Bryant, Olden Times, 341-4; Kuper, Aristocracy, 16; M.P.,
MS 1478, Miller, ^hort History* 17; interview Mahloba 
Gumede.
(5) Interview Hehhane Ngwenya; interview Guzana Mncina; interview 
Loncayi Hlophe; interview Mahloba Gumede; interview Mankwempe 
Magagula.
Magagula. Part of his reason was because the Magagula were in 
occupation of the choice Ezulwini valley, but what made Sobhuza 
doubly determined to break Mnjolifs power were the rain-making 
attributes he reputedly enjoyed. As a general rule in southern 
Africa, Sotho chiefdoms have enjoyed a greater reputation for 
rain-making than their Nguni counterparts, and Sobhuza was 
sufficiently anxious to assure himself of Mnjolifs medicines 
to have him allegedly slit open when he thought they had been 
swallowed (6). By this or some other means the Magagula1s 
rain-making powers were appropriated, and from this derived 
much of his vaunted power in this field. However, what Sobhuza 
neglected to do was to extend the same policy to other 
Emakhandzambi1e chiefdoms, whose ritual authority remained 
largely intact. The challenge that this came to represent to 
royal authority is difficult to understand, unless one appreciates 
the close identification between religious and political 
activities in Swazi thought. In common with most other pre­
capitalist societies, nineteenth century Swazi society did not 
conceptualise its various activities in terms of discrete and 
sharply defined categories of religion, politics, economics and 
so on. Religious and secular life were interwoven with each 
other at all levels, and no hard and fast division existed in 
every day life between religious and political roles.
Consequently, as in medieval Europe where religious schism was 
automatically equated with political secession, in Swaziland
(6) Above , 41.
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the assertion of independent religious or magical powers almost 
invariably connoted an attempt to usurp political powers as 
well. Moreover, because of the interchangeability of these 
two fields of action, a political challenge was expressed as 
often as not in religious or magical terms. The political 
significance of this cosmology can be seen at its starkest in 
the iNcwala celebrations, where ritual subordination to the king 
was a declaration of personal loyalty, and where a failure to 
participate represented an act of revolt (7). In much the same 
way, the simple retention of magical and religious powers by 
various of the Emakhandzambile chiefdoms was liable to be 
interpreted by Mswati as a potential threat to his position, 
for it not only challenged his ritual ascendency, but also 
emphasised links with their independent past, which in turn 
could be viewed as a kind of cultural separatism. As a result, 
the desire to eliminate ritual autonomies figured prominently 
in Mswati’s motives for attacking Emakhandzambile chiefs. The 
clearest and least ambiguous example can be found in the case 
of the Mnisi, who were attacked because their pretensions as 
rain-makers rivalled those of Mswati, but similar elements were 
present in a number of other clashes (8). Thus, according to 
some accounts, Shewula, the Sifundza chief, is supposed to have 
compounded his other crimes by asserting his ritual autonomy, 
while both the Mngometfulo and one section of the Mahlalela 
seem to have underpinned their political ambitions with extensive
(7) Kuper, ’Ritual’, 230, note 3, 239; Kuper, Aristocracy, 223-5.
(8) Interview Mboziswa Mnisi.
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claims to magical and ritual powers (9).
Despite the emphasis placed on ritual factors in some accounts 
of this period, it is also evident that Mswati was activated by 
specifically political designs. Some kind of political or 
institutional reform was certainly long overdue. Swaziland 
remained the deeply stratified society it had been in Sobhuza1s 
time, combining the elements of political exclusion at the centre 
and a wide measure of autonomy outside, which was a ready-made 
prescription for political unrest. Mswati tackled the problem 
both positively and negatively by attempting to impose a greater 
degree of integration, and by weakening the powers of the localities 
to resist. Again the origins of these policies lie earlier in 
his reign. Even before the 1847 invasion, Mswati set about 
restructuring the administrative system by accelerating the 
dispersal of Dlamini princes to the provinces; by mobilising 
the regiments on a more permanent basis; and by setting up a 
more comprehensive network of royal villages to monitor and 
control a variety of local activities. Each of these measures 
has been discussed in a previous chapter, as has the wave of 
unrest that followed the reforms (10). Mswati was forced to 
back-track for a while when faced with this resistence, but 
once the capital was shifted from Ekufiyeni to Hhohho the process 
was once again cautiously resumed. According to Tikuba, Mswati, 
"constantly kept his regiments about him", and it is likely that 
he sought an increasingly permanent mobilisation with the passage
(9) Interview Mjole Sifundza; Kuper, Aristocracy, 198, note 1.
(10) Above, 80, 84-7.
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of time (11). The permanent presence of the regiments at the 
royal capital conferred benefits of a variety of kinds. It 
withdrew young men from the productive cycle of the provinces 
into that of the capital, and so constituted a kind of disguised 
surplus appropriation; it reinforced the coercive strength of 
the centre at the expense of the periphery; and it socialised 
young men of the Emakhandzambi1e chiefdoms, and especially those 
of their chiefly lines, into the new Swazi state. Lastly, of 
course, the regiments also raided and exacted tribute, and 
appropriated surplus in a more overtly coercive kind of way.
Other techniques employed by Mswati to stabilise his regime 
were the forging of marriage alliances with various Emakhand­
zambile chiefdoms, and distributing his wives and other relatives 
in outlying parts, but more immediately important than any of 
these devices was what we have described as the negative side 
of the consolidation of power (12). VThat this boiled down to 
in the end was stamping out the last vestiges of Emakhandzambi1e 
autonomy, and this was accomplished sometimes with violence and 
sometimes without. The Gamdeze, the Thabede, the Mavimbela, 
the Mngometfulo, and one section of the Mahlalela for example 
were all the objects of physical attacks, aimed at bringing them 
under closer political (and probably economic) control (13).
(11) S.P. 30091, Tikuba, 27 November 1898; see also Nxumalo, 
'Oral Tradition1, 46, Ngobozane Dlamini, 10 Feb. 1974.
(12) For example the Magagula - interview Mbhuduya Magagula; 
interview Mankwempe Magagula; interview Phica Magagula, 
19 April 1970, Kutsimuleni, Swaziland.
(13) Above, 167, note 4; Sw.t\., Honey, 'History1, 31.
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Elsewhere Mswati did not go so far, and simply demoted without 
resort to physical force. The Maseko, for instance, fell foul 
of him fairly early on in his reign when they trumped up charges 
of adultery against his wife La Ngodzela Mkhonta, who had been 
sent to rule amongst them, and were banished to outlying 
Dlomodlomo for their pains (14). More instructive in many ways 
was the fate of Moyeni Magagula. Moyeni had returned to 
Swaziland at some point after his initial defeat by Sobhuza, 
and seems subsequently to have led the life of an exemplary 
citizen. However, over time, he had accumulated considerable 
wealth and a considerable following, so that he eventually 
became the object of envy and suspicion, to the extent that 
Mswati began contemplating stripping him of both. Moyeni was 
saved by the intercession of Madzanga Ndwandwe, who had taken 
refuge in his chiefdom after the last Ndwandwe defeat. Being 
a son of the Ndwandwe king Zwide, he was also a half-brother 
of Mswati's mother Thandile, and was able to use this particular 
leverage to stop the intended attack. Moyeni did not however 
get off scott free. As the price of royal forebearance (and 
Madzanga1s 'intercession') Mswati insisted that Madzanga be 
given control over the Magagula chiefdom, and Moyeni was 
summarily reduced to subordinate rank.(15). Less dramatically 
the same thing was happening all over the kingdom. Royal wives 
and their attendant princelings were being given charge over 
chiefdoms in the provinces (16); royal functionaries like
(14) Above, 165.
(15) Interview Mahloba Gumede; interview Mankwempe Magagula;
Nxumalo, 'Oral Tradition', 27, Paul Dlamini, Oct. 1973.
(16) Above, 79.
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Mhlaba Motsa, Mtshengu Mdluli and Sandlane Zwane were being 
placed in control of previously autonomous chiefdoms (17); and 
the extension of royal authority was pressed inexorably on.
Finally, Mswati sought to rationalise and extend his powers of 
surplus appropriation. Here he encountered obstacles which were 
if anything more formidable than those in political and ritual 
spheres. In the final decade of Sobhuza1s reign, the size of 
the problem had been to some extent masked as Sobhuza raided 
regularly and extensively in the north and the west. The 
various vicissitudes of the kingdom in the years after his 
death h£.d meant that Swazi military capacity had been seriously 
diminished, and the ability to raid and exact tribute correspond­
ingly curtailed. The emphasis, as a result, switched back to 
domestic appropriation, and it is perhaps about this as much 
as politics that the early struggles were concerned. The 
artificiality of distinguishing issues of surplus appropriation 
from those of political control now comes sharply into focus, 
since they are so often in one way and another dimensions of 
the same thing. The Mavimbela,for instance, who refused a 
wife from Mswati, were also rejecting the inflated sum of bride 
wealth they were expected to pay, and so were simultaneously 
opposing both kinds of control (18). All that can be drawn 
for the moment are therefore provisional conclusions about 
which 'level' or other was principally involved, and we will 
have to await a series of micro studies of individual chiefdoms
(17) Sw.A., R.C.S. 381/21, Encl. Assistant Commissioner Mankaiane 
to Government Secretary, 21 June 1921; interview Dlamini 
informants, Mbidlimbidlini; interview Mambojwana and Njikisa 
Zwane, 28 May 1970, Mkudzawe, Swaziland.
(18) Interview Hehhane Ngwenya.
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or regions before a more satisfactory statement is capable of 
being made.
It was not only political crises which placed a strain on the 
mechanisms of surplus appropriation; natural ones did too.
When Mswati tried to exact tribute from the Sifundza and Masilela 
peoples during a period of drought, his party was intercepted 
as it returned and stripped of all it had seized. Mswati did 
not react immediately but, according to tradition, bided his 
time until the offenders’ fears had been lulled. A more serious 
consideration was probably fear of the Zulu, since it is likely 
that these events took place in the drought of 1848. However, 
once the Zulu threat had begun to recede, the Masilela were 
made to pay dearly for their crimes. A hunting party was 
arranged to which the Masilela were summoned, and they were 
then surrounded and annihilated by the rest of the assembled 
host (19).
Their children, like many others, joined the ranks of Swazi 
captives, which involved labour appropriation of a somewhat 
different kind. The question which now arises is the extent to 
which the appropriation of labour power in this form became an 
object in itself, and not merely the by-product of a rationalisa­
tion of economic and political controls, and from this flows 
questions of two related kinds. Firstly, to what extent does 
this signify the emergence or consolidation of classes in the 
Swazi state? And secondly, to what degree did these developments
(19) A.H.M., Boletin Geral Das Colonias, 187-90; Sw.A., Assistant 
Commissioner Ubombo to Government Secretary, 2 Jan. 1908, 9.
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involve an intensification of exploitation, and the emergence 
of classes not just ’’in" but "for” themselves? (20). I will 
begin by considering the position of captives, and will then 
move on to the other under-classes in Swazi society.
Captives had probably been a feature of Swazi society since the 
days at Shiselweni, if not before. Despite the particularly 
desirable combinations of resources encountered there, the 
Swazi had still been confronted with the constraints common 
elsewhere in Africa, of low levels of productivity and of 
surplus extraction, and were obliged to raid for booty and 
labour power if they were to make those levels up (21). After 
the removal to Ezulwini these difficulties may well have grown, 
for whereas Shiselweni had provided an ideal environment for a 
pastoral economy, the central areas of Swaziland in and about 
Ezulwini imposed a more agricultural orientation, with the 
extra labour requirements it automatically entailed. Part of 
that was secured by raiding neighbouring communities, the 
evidence for which has already been given (22). What was not 
considered at that point, however, was how far these captives
(20) For a general discussion of this problem and an attempt 
to investigate it in a specific West African context see 
E. Terray, ’Classes and Class Consciousness in the Abron 
Kingdom of Gyaman1, in M. Bloch (ed.), Marxist analysis 
and social anthropology, (New York, 1975), 85-135. For a 
more extended comment and critique than is found here see 
P.L. Bonner, ’Classes, the Mode of Production and the State 
in pre-colonial Swaziland’, paper presented to the History 
Workshop on Pre-capitalist Social Formations, and Colonial 
Penetration in southern Africa, National University of 
Lesotho, 23-4 July 1976.
(21) J. Goody, Technology, Tradition and the State in Africa, 
(London, Ibadan, Accra, 1971) 25-7, 30-1.
(22) Above, 61.
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came to constitute a slave class in the sense that Terray,
among others, uses the term (23). By any strict definition it
would appear they did not. Captives in Swazi society were
enveloped by such a range of protections and reciprocal
obligations, that it makes it almost impossible to conceive of
them as a distinct or especially disprivileged group. MA sigcili”,
Kuper writes,
was allowed to lodge a complaint against
his master, and no sigcili could be killed
without the permission of the king... The 
men were entitled to speak on the council 
and to marry, provided they had the cattle 
to obtain a wife... The girls received as 
high a lobola as his ^the owners7 own 
daughters... The main draxtfbacks of bugcili 
were the absence of own kinsmen, the lack
of supporters in ritual, and the limited
economic security. (24)
Like captives in many other parts of Africa moreover, they could
rise to positions of authority and trust, and completely outgrow
any possible stigma that may have attached to their origins.
In this way Jabhane Dube, who was captured as a young boy in
the reign of Mswati, was gradually elevated in status until
he was eventually given charge of the king’s herds at Mpolonjeni
and Ehlanzeni (25), and less spectacular rises were accomplished
by others as well. To call this group slaves, therefore, conveys
a completely false impression of their true status, which seems
to correspond more to a protracted, and then not even necessarily
permanent, cadetship.
(23) Terray, ’Classes’, 85-135.
(24) Kuper, Aristocracy, 68.
(25) Interview Mlingwa Dube. Another example was Mashilmane 
who became indvuna of Ezulwini village - interview Ndambi 
Mkhonta.
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The range of restrictions governing the treatment of captives 
and their eventual incorporation into their adoptive society is 
something which is also common to the Gyaman state studied by 
Terray, and is explained by him partly in terms of the political 
instability which the existence of such a permanently dis- 
privileged slave class would create, and partly by reference 
to their role as the generators of use and not exchange values,
(i.e. the goods they produced were consumed and not exchanged) (26). 
The same constraints applied equally forcibly to Swazi society, 
and gave rise to similar pressure for the replenishment of 
captive supplies (27). Over and above this, however, one sees 
in both societies an added incentive being given to the taking 
of captives by the possibility that existed for trading in 
slaves. In his study of the Upper Guinea Coast, Rodney credits 
this with having massively depressed the status of captives, 
and with creating chattel slavery where none previously existed, 
but it seems to have had a much less serious impact on Abron or 
Asante, and still less again in our particular Swazi case (28). 
Perhaps the crucial difference with the Swazi example lies in 
the type of captive supply demanded by potential purchasers, 
for in the case of the Boer republics it x<ras only young children 
who could be legally absorbed into an unfree labour force. 
Consequently, in addition to the transience of captives-for-
(26) Terray, 'Classes’, 125-128.
(27) Ibid, 127; I. Wilks, Asante in the nineteenth century.
The structure and evolution of a political order, (Cambridge, 
1975), 85,177.
(28) W. Rodney, 'African Slavery and other forms of social 
oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast in the context of 
the Atlantic Slave Trade', Journal of African History, 3 
(1966), 432-40; Terray, 'Classes', 112-3, 126-7; Wilks,
Asante, 8. .
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trading in Swazi society, they were also usually too young to 
be severely exploited, or to constitute a class either "in" or 
"for" themselves.
Where the trading of captives may have had a greater impact 
was amongst the other under-classes in Swazi society, and it 
is here that the main burden of Rodney's argument lies. In 
Rodney's analysis, the expansion of slave trading on the Upper 
Guinea Coast brought about intensified social oppression, and 
a hardening of class divisions, as the chiefly class progressively 
debased customary law with a view to enslaving their subjects, 
and raided extensively for the same purpose among neighbouring 
chiefdoms, while retaining relative immunity from this practice 
themselves (29). To what extent does one see a similar pattern 
developing among the Swazi? The answer appears to be, not 
very much. To begin with,the economic pressures being applied 
to the Swazi were of a substantially different kind. West 
Africa had to take the brunt of a mercantile capital of the most 
predatory kind, and hundreds of thousands were enslaved to meet 
its demands. The pressures faced by the Swazi were of a far 
more attenuated kind. The Boer republics were at best the 
indirect agents of mercantile capital, and their demands were 
of a much more limited sort (30). As a result, the trade in
(29) W. Rodney, A history of the upper Guinea coast 1545-1800, 
(Oxford, 1970), 100-118.
(30) This leads us into difficult terrain which I have not 
space to explore. In general I would rest my argument on 
private property in land, close connections with the market 
at the coast, and accumulation of land by mercantile capital 
from Natal and the Cape.
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captives from the Swazi was initially of miniscule proportions, 
and even at its height it cannot have exceeded much more than 
a few hundred a year.
Nevertheless, several hundred children a year is by no means a 
negligible figure, particularly when one remembers the slaughter 
of adults this also entailed, and provides at least a prima 
facie case for wondering whether captive taking within Swaziland 
was not becoming an object in itself. A number of points can 
be raised against this view. Firstly, while children of home­
steads or villages assailed within Swaziland were often traded 
to the Boers, the really dramatic expansion of the trade 
coincided with the extension of Swazi marauding into the lowveld, 
and there is every reason to believe that the bulk of those 
traded were obtained from that source (31). Secondly, the 
attacks on individual villages or chiefdoms, and the trading 
of their children, seems to have tailed off with the consolidation 
of royal economic and political power during the late 1850s and 
1860s. The evidence, it must be emphasised, is far from 
conclusive, since Mswati’s death in 1865 would also have had 
the effect of curbing such practices. Nevertheless, the odd 
fragments of.evidence we have from the end of Mswati’s reign 
do seem to confirm that impression. Where Mswati could 
rationalise his economic and political controls without a 
resort to gratuitous violence, it would appear that he did.
(31) Above, 155-8.
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Thus, when Mswati's attention was drawn to the indecent pros­
perity and influence of Moyeni Magagula, he allowed himself to 
be persuaded to install Madzanga Ndwandwe as Moyeni's superior, 
rather than physically stripping the Magagula of both (32). 
Obviously one cannot place too much weight on this and similar 
examples, but the broader point does, nevertheless, stand, 
which is that it was not so much Swazi society that took the 
brunt of captive taking in this period, but the increasingly 
pillaged and underdeveloped areas of the lowveld and southern 
Mozambique. It is to the ramifications of this that we will 
now turn in the second part of this chapter.
Mswati's attacks on Emakhandzambile chiefdoms fully incorporated 
into the Swazi state also shaded into a wider strategy, which 
cannot be called either strictly internal or strictly external, 
and which involved actions against chiefdoms in 'grey' areas 
on the periphery, who had in the past managed to retain a measure 
of autonomy. Our information with regard to the north and 
north-west is extremely sketchy, but it seems clear that at 
least two of the Ngomane chiefdoms suffered from attacks 
designed to bring them into closer subordination to Mswati (33). 
In the north-east much the same sort of pattern can be 
observed, with Mswati gradually assuming control over the 
Madolo, and driving Portuguese influence back to within cannon
(32) Interview Mankwempe Magagula; Nxumalo, 'Oral Tradition',
27, Paul Dlamini, Oct. 1973.
(33) Myburgh, Barberton, 108, 127. Other groups who were also 
attacked in this period were the Baloi, the Tshisungule, 
the Mati and the Mongo, Nachtigal, 'Tagebuch', II, 238-242.
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range of Lourenjo Marques (34). Further down the Lebombo the 
same cycle is repeated again, with Mswati killing the Mngometfulo 
king in battle, and restoring his chiefdom to the subordinate 
status that it had occupied in Sobhuza's reign (35).
It was in the south-east, however, where Mswati’s new policies 
were most pregnant for the future, as this had been the scene 
of rivalry with the Zulu for the previous two decades. After 
the Zulu invasion of 1847, Mpande had made a major effort to 
consolidate his hold over this area. Using a mixture of cajolery 
and threat he had persuaded Nyamainja to move from his chiefdom 
on the northern side of the Mkhondvo River to somewhere between 
the Buffalo and Pongola Rivers, and at the beginning of 1848 he 
had launched a series of raids on the chiefdoms of Langalibalele, 
Putili and Magonondo, which in the end had compelled the former 
two to flee for asylum to Natal (36). It was only after 1855
that Mswati attempted to re-assert any control over this trans-
Pongola region, secure in the knowledge of British and Republican 
backing, and of internal divisions among the Zulu. Beginning 
in 1858 with an attack on Nyamainja, who was obliged as a 
result to take refuge in Natal, he then went on, not long 
afterwards/ to attack both the Nhlapo and the Nkosi Shabalala,
(34) Below, 205.
(35) Above, 166-7.
(36) C.O. 179/5, Encl. in encl. in Encl. 2 in No. 119,
Statements by Pangasila, son of Putini, and by messengers 
from Magonondo's mother, 21 Feb. 1848; Encl. in Encl. 4
in No. 119, Statement by Uninalume, 21 March, 1848; S.A.A.R. 
Natal 2 , (Cape Town, 1960), Statement by Radebe, messenger 
from Langalibalele, 21 March 1848.
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and compelled the latter to fall back across the Buffalo (37).
The Nhlapo fall into a slightly different category from the 
other chiefdoms just mentioned, in that their territory was 
much more clearly within the Swazi orbit than the others, being 
situated considerably further to the north, in an area a little 
to the east of modern Ermelo (38). The Nhlapo had moved there 
in the early 1820s, after fleeing from Natal in the wake of 
Matiwane’s raids. On arrival they, too, adopted an equivocal 
stance. The area fell clearly within the Swazi sphere of 
influence, but on their migration from Natal they had become 
subject to the Zulu. They consequently continued to pay an 
undefined sort of fealty to Shaka, but also entered into a 
tributary relationship with the Swazi, acknowledging 
authority of Magubhela Dlamini, Sobhuza’s local representative 
in the area, and forging a marriage alliance with Magubhela’s 
kin. Somewhat later that relationship broke down, when a
(37) S.N.A. Vol. 1/3/7, 456, No. 151, R.M. Ladysmith to S.N.A.
25 Oct. 1858; ibid, 511, Encl. in No. 165, Statement by 
Ian, 10 Nov. 1858; S.S. 66, R 1237/65, Encl. H.T. Buhrmann 
to M.W. Pretorius 23 Nov. 1865; S.N.A. Vol. 1/3/8, 302,
No. 209, R.M. Ladysmith to S.N.A. 1 Feb. 1859; Transvaal 
Native Affairs Department, Short History of the native 
tribes of the Transvaal, (Pretoria, 1905), 61; R.M. Massie,
The native tribes of the Transvaal: prepared for the general 
staff, war office, (London, 1905), 92.
(38) The following reconstruction of events derives largely from 
J.H. Nhlapo’s, 'The story of the Amanhlapo’, African Studies, 
4, (1945), 97-100. Confirmation for the latter part of the 
account dealing with Swazi intervention in the Nhlapo 
succession crisis is to be found in S.S. 66, R 1237/65, 
Buhrmann to Pretorius, 23 Nov. 1865; Wangemann, Sekoekeoni,
7; T.N.A.D., Tribes, 42. The oral account given to Myburgh 
(Carolina, 87-8), by Ngungunyane Dlamini, a descendent of 
Somcuba, seems to confuse this incident with an earlier 
altercation between the Swazi and the Nhlapo, which appears
to have taken place before Somcuba fled under Boer protection.
183
quarrel flared up between Bhunu Nhlapo and his Dlamini superior. 
A battle ensued in which Magubhela was killed, and which can 
be tentatively placed during the period of dislocation that 
followed Sobhuza1s death. Thereafter Mswati was too nervous of 
Zulu retaliation to make any attempt to re-assert control, and 
it was not until the relatively tranquil period after 1852 that 
he made any further effort in that direction. A move may have 
been made in the December of 1854, but the evidence for it is 
inconclusive (39), and Mswati’s main thrust was to wait until 
1858 when a succession crisis blew up among the Nhlapo, and 
the unsuccessful aspirant, named variously Gama or Khuiwane, 
approached Mswati for help. Mswati obliged, and an attack was 
launched against Mhlangala, the alleged usurper. Mhlangala is 
supposed to have been successively saved by a lightening bolt 
and by a snowstorm (40), and it was only during a third attack, 
made towards the end of 1860, that Mswati was able to inflict 
sufficient damage to make Mhlangala flee.
The Zulu response to these actions is difficult to gauge, 
largely because of the backdrop of internal dissension against 
which they have to be viewed. On at least two separate 
occasions there was talk in Zululand of a new invasion of 
Swaziland, but in neither instance is it possible to disentangle 
the extent to which this was simply a camouflage for internal 
jockeying for power. Of a rumoured invasion in 1858 nothing 
more was heard beyond the original report, and there seems to
(39) Above, 140.
(40) This at least was the story given out by unsuccessful 
returning troops, interview Maboya Fakudze.
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have been little, if any, substance to the talk (41). Less 
illusory was the invasion scare of late 1860, for a Zulu army 
was undoubtedly summoned by Mpande, and created a big enough 
fright in Swaziland to cause the authorities there to send a 
gift of cattle as compensation for the attack on Mhlangala (42). 
Yet even here the common, if untutored, view of these events in 
Zululand was that the summoning of the army was simply another 
phase in the power struggle between Cetshwayo and Mpande, and 
the fact that the army never proceeded on its mission can perhaps 
be construed as corroborating that view (43).
Nevertheless, if the invasion scare of 1856 was an illusion, 
and that of 1860 a blind, the very fact that it should have 
been felt appropriate to cloak internal political manoeuvres in 
such a guise does provide some index of the persisting interest 
that there was in some quarters in Zululand in reviving an 
aggressive policy towards Swaziland. Cetshwayo, for one, 
maintained an abiding interest in the north, which was shared 
by other important members of his faction. As early as the 
end of December 1856, Fynn wrote from Zululand that, "after the 
feast of the first fruits Cetshwayo proposes to remove to the 
north", and only seven months later Mpande reported to Natal 
that, "it is Cetshwayo’s intention to abandon the present Zulu
(41) For the original report see S.N.A. 1/3/7, 508-11, Ends, 
in No. 165, Statement by Royland, native constable,10 Nov. 
1858, and statement by Jan, 10 Nov. 1858.
(42) Above, 148, A. Mackenzie (ed.), M ission Life among the 
Zulu-Kafirs: memorials of Henrietta Robertson, wife of the 
Rev. R. Robertson, (Cambridge, 1866), 127-8, 151.
(43) Ibid. Such a view was apparently common talk amongst the 
Zulu around the Robertson’s Kwamamkwaza Mission Station.
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and cross the Pongola River towards where Dingane was killed" (44). 
Six months later again Mpande was making more serious allegations: 
Masipule had tried to make him divide the country into three 
parts, and give the northern part to Cetshwayo, while Mapita 
had been urging Cetshwayo to remove to the Lebombo, on the 
grounds that he feared the authorities in Natal would send a 
force to help Mpande (45). Finally, in April 1859, Mpande 
communicated to the Lieutenant Governor that he had discovered 
that Ceshwayo had "been treating with other chiefs.to leave the 
Zulu country and thus dismember the nation" (46).
Mpande*s testimony cannot, of course, be regarded as disinterested, 
but other evidence lends weight to his view. In July 1857, for 
example, one finds Mswati complaining to the Lieutenant Governor 
of Natal about the encroachment across the Pongola River by 
people specifically identified as belonging to the Usuthu 
faction (47). Mswati seems to have taken steps to expel the 
intruders, but Cetshwayo*s interest in the area continued 
undimmed, and at one point he was even contemplating launching 
a full-scale invasion of Swaziland, until more prudent counsels 
persuaded him that to do so would jeopardise his domestic 
position (4*8). Thereafter, he seems to have directed his energies
(44) S.N.A. Vol. 1/3/5, No. 189, Diary 21 Dec. 1856; G.H.N., Vol. 
1394, message from Panda to Lieutenant Governor, 20 July 1857.
(45) S.N.A. Vol. 1/6/2, No. 22, message from Panda to L.G.,
6 Jan. 1858.
(46) S.N.A. Vol. 1/6/2, No. 3J, message from Panda to L.G.,
2 April 1859.
(47) T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents...), Statement by 
Kwahlakwahla and others, 3 July 1857.
(48) D.C.F. Moodie (ed.), John Dunn, Cetywayo and the three 
Generals, (Pietermaritzburg 1886), 27.
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at consolidating his position internally, and it was not until 
after his succession that his gaze was directed seriously 
towards Swaziland again (49).
Mswati’s expansionist policies in the south and south-east were 
also matched in the north and the north-east. Here, if anything, 
they were conceived on an even grander scale, and in the brief
t
space of ten years he was able to deal a succession blows to 
Portuguese power in the area, and to compel the withdrawal of 
Shangane influence to the valley of the Limpopo. As a result, 
by the time of his death in 1865, Mswati had made himself into 
one of the most feared and powerful figures in this part of 
south-east Africa.
Swazi relations with the Portuguese had not always been on 
such a hostile footing. Indeed, in the preceding years they 
seem, by and large, to have been of a comparatively cordial 
kind. In 1823, a caravan of one thousand porters is reported 
as having arrived in Louren^o Marques from the west, and this 
can only mean that it had come from, or had passed through, 
land controlled by the Swazi king (50). Later, in the early 
1830’s, the‘Portuguese sent armed assistance to Sobhuza, 
probably for use in suppressing an internal rebellion (51),
(49) Below,- 7.
(50) W. Owen, Narrative of Voyages to explore the shores of 
Africa, Arabia, and Madagascar: performed in H.M. Ships 
Leven and Barracouta, (2 vols., London 1833), Vol. I, 20.
A*] Smith, (rTradei) , seems to ignore the fact that Owen 
specifically states that the caravan had come from the 
west, and argues instead that it had set out from northern 
Zululand. Trade links between Portuguese are also testified 
to later in Sobhuza’s reign, above, 62.
(51) Preller, Dagboek, 359.
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and in the troubled times following the accession of Mswati, 
they seem to have redoubled their efforts to consolidate their 
commercial and diplomatic position in Swaziland (52). But this 
favoured position of the Portuguese rested on very shaky founda­
tions, relying as it did on Zulu predominance on the one hand, 
and Swazi divisions on the other. Areas of potential conflict 
abounded, and as soon as either of these constraints diminished 
in importance, growing frictions between them would almost 
certainly arise.
The major sources of competition related to the questions of 
sovereignty and trade. The very proximity of the two powers 
was in itself a potential source of irritation as each inevitably 
became a kind of political magnet to dissident groups on the 
periphery of the other. Add to that the tensions generated by 
competition for trade, which itself presupposes a degree of 
control over the territories through which trade routes pass, 
and one had a ready made prescription for political conflict.
The first suggestion of friction comes late in 1852, when 
reference is made to a Swazi attack on the Madolo, whom the 
Portuguese considered to be subject to themselves (53). Here 
Mswati is referred to by the Portuguese as "our enemy", so it
(52) G.P. File IVB (Swazis), 1163.
(53) A.H.M., Cod. 2168, 2 FC 3, 12, Gov. Cardenas to Gov. 
General Mozambique, 22 Nov. 1852.
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is possible that other incursions may have previously occurred (54). 
However, given the unsettled conditions of the early part of 
Mswati’s feign, it is unlikely that they can have amounted to 
much, and in this area, as elsewhere, it required the end of 
Zulu raids and the resolution of internal divisions before 
Mswati could make any really significant impact on the politics 
of the area.
It is difficult to assess whether this incursion of 1852 marked 
the beginning of such a process of political regeneration or 
whether it was simply the last of a number of sporadic raids 
intent on no more than seizure of slaves and booty. Portuguese 
records reveal little other than that a number of invasions 
actually took place during this period. A body of oral 
evidence collected in 1888 tells us a little more, but since 
it only refers to two invasions in this period, when Portuguese 
sources record several more, it is difficult to know which of 
the invasions recorded by the Portuguese correspond to those 
mentioned in the oral depositions of 1888 (55). On balance,
(54) There is an oral record that the Swazi attacked the Tsonga 
to obtain slaves to give to the eastern Transvaal Boers, 
this being the price of the protection extended by the 
latter during one of the Zulu invasions of Swaziland,
(see Bryant, Olden Times, 330). The Swazi raid of 1852 
could conceivably be identified with this, but as all the 
available information points to the fact that the Lydenburg 
Republic did not extend protection to the Swazi in 1851/2, 
it seems more likely that this refers to the aftermath of 
the 1846/7 invasion of Swaziland, when the Ohrigstad Boers 
undoubtedly did provide protection to the Swazi. If this 
is the case it may well account for the term, "our enemy" 
used here by the Portuguese.
(55) Below, 189.
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it seems more likely that the 1852 invasion was only a 
comparatively insignificant episode, and that the real revival 
of Swazi authority in this region was to be postponed until 
the Swazi invasions of 1855 or 1858 (56). Certainly, if the 
withdrawal of Zulu influence from this area was a precondition 
for the extension of Swazi control there, one can scarcely view 
the 1852 invasion of Madolo as marking the beginning of this 
process, for it followed far too closely on the Zulu invasion 
of the same year, when Zulu influence throughout the area was 
still at its zenith. The oral evidence, although difficult to 
interpret, appears to confirm the same view, since the Swazi 
inforraar. ts of 1888 appear to have regarded the 1855 or 1858 
invasion as the "first" invasion of the Madolo, while that of 
1852 seems to have faded from popular memory (57).
In many ways the 1855 invasion of the Madolo can be regarded 
as a direct consequence of the Zulu incursions of 1847 and 1852, 
as it was provoked, at least in part, by the disintegration of 
Swazi authority on the Lebombo, which those attacks seem to
(56) S.A.A.R. Transvaal 3 , 351, R.T. da Costa e Silva to 
Volksraad, 1 May 1855.
(57) This oral evidence takes the form of depositions made by 
various witnesses - Swazi, Madolo, Tembe, Portuguese and 
English - to the Portuguese Boundary Commission of 1888 
(see C.O. 879/29, 150-172). One possible clue to identify­
ing which raids correspond to which is the fact that a 
number of witnesses refer to the Portuguese firing upon
the Swazi during the second raid, a detail which dates it to 
1858 or 1860, (see A.H.M., Cod. 2168, 2 FC 3, IIIV, Machado 
to G.G., 14 Aug, 1858; C.O. 879/29, 174.) However, the 
use to which this piece of information can be put is 
limited to the individual testimonies in which it occurs, 
since there can be no certainty that different testimonies 
are not referring to entirely different invasions, or that 
different invasions have not been elided together in all 
of the testimonies.
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have caused. In all probability, Swazi control of that area 
had never been very strong, given the rival influences exercised 
from the Madolo, the Tembe and the Portuguese, and even in 
the heyday of Sobhuza both the Mahlalela and the Sifundza are 
reputed to have paid tribute to the neighbouring Madolo chief (58). 
The same or worse presumably applied to the early years of Mswati, 
until it was catalysed in 1847 and 1852 by Mpande’s 
invasions of the Swazi. Then, with the Swazi kingdom on the 
verge of collapse, the Sifundza chief, Shewula, seized his 
opportunity to assert his independence of Swazi control, and 
the Mahlalela chief, Nomahasha, possibly also followed suit. 
Neither, of course, could have realised that a complete with­
drawal of the Zulu from active intervention in the area was 
impending, and when this happened both were left politically 
high and dry. As a result, shortly before the 1852 or 1855 
invasion of Madolo, the Sifundza, and possibly the Mahlalela, 
were attacked by the Swazi (59), and then when Shewula fled for
(58) C.O. 879/29, Minutes of Portuguese Boundary Commission, 
160-170, Minutes of the 8th and 11th meetings on 16 June 1888 
and 22 June 1888, Evidence of Uhlabanini, Makubeni and 
Umabekwana. The evidence given here must be treated with a 
certain degree of caution, since the witnesses just mentioned 
all represent the Madolo side of the case. All that can be 
said for it is that it seems to be internally consistent.
(59) C.O. 879/29, Boundary Commission, Minutes of 5th meeting,
8 June 1888, Evidence of Mahlale (Maziya) - pro Swazi; Mins, 
of 8th meeting, Evidence of Uhlabanini; Mins, of 4th meeting 
22 June 1888, Evidence of Umabekwana - latter two both pro 
Madolo; interview Mjole Sifundza. Uhlabanini is the only 
one who speaks of Namahasha actually being attacked. 
Umabekwana refers to both Nomahasha and Shewula as having 
paid tribute to the Madolo. Mahlale refers to Shewula1s 
rebellion and flight as having been the occasion for the 
first Swazi attack on Madolo. Miller (M.P. MS 1478, fShort 
History1, 17), only goes as far as to say that the Mahlalela 
narrowly escaped attack on this occasion, while another 
variant of modern oral tradition claims that a Swazi force 
was called in against Shewula at the Mahlalela!s behest 
(interview Mandanda Mtetwa and Mlchabela).
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sanctuary to the Madolo, they too, together with the Tembe, were 
attacked by the Swazi forces (60).
Punishment of the Madolo for complicity in Shewula’s rebellion 
was not, however, the only motive behind the Swazi invasion.
Even without their connivance at all, the Madolo could not 
have stayed at peace with the Swazi for long, now that the latter 
were free of Zulu entanglements. Their very existence as a 
powerful and independent kingdom close to Swaziland undermined 
Mswati’s authority along his border, and gave him ample reason 
for wishing to subject them to his control. Moreover, the 
internal dissensions in Zululand had a further consequence 
besides the ending of Zulu invasions of Swaziland,which was the
creation of a power vacuum in the whole Tsongaland/Delagoa Bay
area. A struggle for influence consequently ensued, in which 
all of the major powers in the region became involved, and out 
of which the Swazi and Mabudu eventually emerged with the greater 
part of the commercial, territorial and political spoils (61).
The invasion of 1855 did not achieve all this for Mswati at a 
stroke. It was in fact a relatively short-lived affair lasting
no more than three to four days, and although it effected a
number of significant gains for the Swazi, such as the annexation 
of certain parts of Madolo territory and the detachment of at
(60) For the attack on the Madolo see below, 192,note 62.
For the attack on the Tembe see C.O. 879/29, Boundary 
Commission. Mins, of 12th meeting, 23 June 1888, Evidence 
of Umtshotshi.
(61) Below, 207-9.
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least one dissident group from the Madolo regime (62), it failed 
in its main professed aim of bringing the Madolo into a 
tributary relationship with the Swazi (63). That objective 
had to await realisation until 1858, when Mswati launched a 
third invasion of Madolo, accompanied this time by an attack on 
the Tembe (64). Both attacks seem to have enforced the payment 
of tribute (65), and although the Portuguese claimed that the 
invasion had been repulsed (66) , it seems more likely that they 
retired voluntarily after having successfully accomplished 
what they had set out to do.
While Mswati was prosecuting his campaigns against the Portuguese 
and their satellites, other developments were taking place 
elsewhere in the area, which before long were to expand the 
scale of the conflict enormously. On 11 October 1858 
Soshangane, the Shangane king, died, and almost immediately a 
dispute broke out over the succession. Mawewe, the lawful 
successor according to Nguni custom, won, but only after fierce
(62) C.O. 879/29, Boundary Commission, Minutes of 3rd and 11th 
meetings, Evidence of Usibamu and Isigwembu, where it is 
asserted that both Uhele and Gehlisa defected to the Swazi 
after this raid. Both were apparently placed in Madolo and 
Tembe territory that had been annexed. Ibid, Evidence of 
Usibamu and Isigwembu; Evidence of Umabekwana (mins. 11th 
meeting) and Umtshotsi (mins. 12th meeting).
(63) C.O. 879/29, Boundary Commission, Minutes of 3rd and 5th 
meetings, Evidence of Usibamu and Ugwababa respectively.
(64) Ibid, Minutes of 12th meeting, Evidence of Mabusenqeni and 
Umtshotsi; A.H.M., Cod. 2168, 2 FC 3, lllv, Machado to 
G.G. 14 August 1858.
(65) C.O. 879/29, Boundary Commission, Minutes of 5th and 8th 
meetings, Evidence of Ugwababa and Mahlela.
(66) A.H.M., Cod. 2168, 2 FC 3, lllv, Machado to G.G. 14 Aug. 1858.
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fighting in which four of his principal rivals were killed.
The fifth, Mzila, fled to the Zoutpansberg to the protection of 
Joao Albasini, who held the dual position of Portuguese Vice- 
Consul to the South African Republic, and the South African 
Republic's Commissioner for Native Affairs in the Zoutpansberg (67).
It seems to have been Albasini1s anomalous position, linked to 
his lack of commercial or political scruple, which lay at the 
heart of the ensuing conflict, although this is not the inter­
pretation of events that has found favour either with contemporary 
chroniclers, or with Albasini's most recent biographer (68). 
Instead, they have ascribed more or less complete culpability 
for the subsequent wars to Mawewe, depicting him as a cruel 
and capricious tyrant, who quickly alienated his subjects by his 
excesses, and thereby encompassed his own eventual destruction.
(67) G.L. Liesegang, 'Beitrage zur Geschichte des Reiches der 
Gaza Ngune im Siidlichen Mozambique 1820-95', (Ph.D. Thesis, 
Koln 1967), 74, 76-8. There is not entire agreement about 
the death of all four of Mawewe's rivals. One source 
claims only two were killed, while another merely records 
their flight to the north (Liesegang, 'Beitrage', 78).
(68) For contemporary or near contemporary accounts of Mawewe 
see D.F. das Nevas, A hunting expedition to the Transvaal, 
(London 1879); Erskine, ’Journey', 248. An equally 
jaundiced view of Mawewe is also purveyed by later accounts 
which are based largely on oral evidence, derived from 
adherents of the winning side, see Grandjean,'L'Invasion', 
83-4, and H.A. Junod, 'The Ba-Thonga of the Transvaal', 
British Association for the Advancement of science.
Addresses and papers read at the joint meeting of the British 
and South African associations for the advancement of 
science, held in South Africa, III (1905) 222-262; T.N.A.D., 
Tribes, 60; J. Stevenson-Hamilton, The Low Veld; its wild 
life and its people. (London 1929), 170-1. The most recent 
study of the subject (Liesegang, 'Beitrage', 74-82), while 
drawing few conclusions on the subject, seems tacitly to 
accept the same view. For Albasini's recent biographer
see De Vaal, 'Rol'.
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Such a view is absurdly one-sided. Mawewe, while no doubt far 
from blameless, was equally far from the vicious tyrant that 
he is generally portrayed to be. Much of his supposedly 
mindless tyranny can be viewed as a set of rational responses 
to the peculiarly difficult situation to which he was heir, for 
even after Mzila’s flight to Albasini, a number of subordinate 
Tsonga chiefdoms continued to conspire with his brother, leaving 
him little option but to pursue the kind of repressive policies 
for which he later became known (69). Mawewe’s reign was also 
characterised by a quite different contradiction. Much of the 
power and prosperity of the Shangane state rested on its 
control over the export of ivory, stocks of which were becoming 
progressively depleted with the penetration of Portuguese - 
mercantile capital. Mawewe tried to combat the situation by 
opening up contacts with Natal, in the hope that this might 
help him to escape the worst extremes of unequal exchange (70).
The Portuguese trading community was naturally outraged, and 
retaliated by making efforts to destabilise his regime, by 
plotting and intriguing with disaffected factions in the land (71) .
(69) Mawewe’s father, Soshangane, had never been able to resolve 
the underlying tensions in Shangane society, based on the 
cultural cleavages between its Nguni and Tsonga components, 
and as a result there was a tremendous latent energy for 
political disintegration within the Shangane kingdom. The 
dispute over the succession was merely symptomatic of this, 
with the leading Nguni figures in the country supporting 
Mawewe, who was the son of Soshangane's chief wife, and so 
in their eyes the legitimate heir, and many Tsonga, on the 
other hand, backing the candidature of Soshangane’s eldest 
son Mzila, partly because this conformed to their own 
customary practices, but largely one suspects, in the hope 
of ameliorating their own depressed position within the 
Shangane state.
(70) P.Harries. ’Labour Migration from the Delagoa Bay Hinterland 
to South Africa: 1852 to 1895’. Paper presented to University 
of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, African History 
Seminar, 5 May 1876, 2, 9.
(71) Below, 195.
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It was Mawewe’s reprisals against admitted conspirators such as 
these that provided the raw material for later stories about his 
senseless barbarity - stories that have since been perpetuated 
by a variety of writers, who seem to be unable to account for 
Mawewe’s anti-Boer and anti-Portuguese policies except in 
terms of an indiscriminate blood lust. In fact, Mawewe's 
hostility towards whites was neither senseless nor undiscriminating. 
Of the other Portuguese ports besides Lourenjo Marques that 
were within Mawewe’s orbit, Inhambane suffered only marginally 
from his accession, and Sena and Sofala were not affected at 
all (72), while further south Mawewe took a leaf out of Mswati's 
book, and made energetic efforts to get on friendly terms with 
Natal (73). Only the Portuguese of Lourenpo Marques and the 
Boers of the Zoutpansburg suffered to any degree, and it is 
fairly clear that the principal reason for this was the 
persistent intriguing of individual hunters and traders from 
these places with disaffected elements in the Shangane king­
dom (74). Amongst these hunters and traders, Albasini was the
(72) Liesegang,’Beitrage', 74-5.
(73) S.N.A. Vol. 1/6/2, No. 120, Statement of Unkumhlana, 
messenger from Langa (i.e. Mawewe), 5 Oct. 1859; ibid, Vol. 
1/7/4, 30-31, Statement by Mabulaba and others, messengers 
from Langa, 12 Jan. 1860; ibid, 1/6/1, Statements by Native 
Messengers, No. 51, Statement of Umango, 12 Jan. 1860.
(74) Das Neves was one of the main figures involved (see Das 
Neves, Expedition, 119-22; Liesegang, ’Beitrage’, 76.
Liesegang does not seem to invest this with any particular 
significance). The involvement of other Portuguese merchants 
is suggested by the fact that the treaty later drawn up 
between the Portuguese and Mzila in September 1861 (below 
was signed in the first place by four leading Portuguese 
merchants, with the Governor of Lourenpo Marques only append­
ing his signature after theirs (see Liesegang, ’Beitrage’,
81; P.R. Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese relations in South- 
Central Africa 1890-1900, (London 1962), 83-4). On the Boer 
side, F. Combrink, one of the leading figures in the Lydenburg 
Republic, seems to have seized this opportunity to try and 
extort ivory from Mawewe (A.B.B., Serie 1860, No. 2, 11-15, 
Albasini to O.L. d'Andrade n.d., but apparently early 1860).
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arch conspirator. Following Mzila’s flight to the Zoutpansberg, 
he seems to have first tried to extract blood'money from Mawewe 
for every one of Mzila's dead (75), and then when this failed, 
to have entered into an agreement with him whereby, in return 
for a certain quantity of ivory,, he would have Mzila executed (76). 
The ivory was duly handed over, but Mzila lived on undisturbed, 
and this so incensed Mawewe that he immediately sent his forces 
deep into Zoutpansberg territory, and placed an embargo on 
hunting and trading in his lands (77).
Having almost single handedly brought about the rupture of 
relations between Mawewe and both of the governments with whom 
he held office, Albasini now worked tirelessly to get them to 
attack the Shangane (78). In this, however, he was destined 
to fail, for the Trans-vaal was in the grip of its own civil 
dissensions, and was unable to spare the manpower necessary 
for such an undertaking (79) . These dissensions in the end 
nearly thwarted all Albasini1s carefully laid plans for 
reinstating Mzila, for the opposition faction in the
(75) S.N.A-. Vol. 1/6/2, No. 120, Statement of Unkumhlana, 
messenger from Langa, 5 Oct. 1859; ibid, Vol. 1/7/4, 30, 
Statement by Mabulaba and others, messengers from Langa,
12 Jan. 1860.
(76) S.S. 40, 56-8,'Onderzoek gedaan wat dat de reede is dat 
Manekos Distrikte Zoutpansberg met zyn Kommandes in getrek 
het*, 10 Oct. 1861.
(77) Ibid.
(78) A.B.B.,Serie 1860, No. 2, 11-15, Albasini to O.L. d ’Andrade, 
4 March 1860; Liesegang, ’Beitrage’, 75.
(79) De Vaal, ’Rol’, 57-70; Van Rooyen, ’Verhouding’, 234-5.
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Zoutpansberg apparently entered into negotiations with Mawewe 
for the delivering up of Mzila. Mzila got wind of the plan, 
and was, as a result, compelled to make a premature bid for 
power (80). He quickly made his departure from the Zoutpansberg, 
and set out via Khocene and Madolo to obtain assistance from 
the Portuguese at Lourenjo Marques. On the way he was inter- . 
cepted by Mawewe's forces, but beat them off with heavy losses, 
and on arrival at Lourenpo Marques he was greeted as a conquering 
hero. A treaty of alliance between the two sides was now 
drawn up, and the merchants of Lourenijo Marques provided vast 
quantities of arms for Mzila’s army and for the troops of local 
Portuguese tributaries. As a result, their combined forces 
were able to march out of Lourenjo Marques on 8 December 1861, 
and within a week they had inflicted a shattering defeat on 
Mawewe, which left him no alternative but to flee to the 
sanctuary of his brother-in-law, Mswati (81).
Mawewe*s flight to Mswati is evidence of a growing convergence 
of interests between the Swazi and the Shangane, which had been 
becoming apparent since the latter part of Soshangane's reign. 
Swazi relations with the Shangane had always been fairly cordial, 
apart from an.uncharacteristic episode which may have taken 
place after Sobhuza's death, when Soshangane tried to extend
(80) S.S. 39, 242, R 4753/61, Albasini to Schoeman, 31 Oct.
1861; A.B.B., Serie 1861, No. 25, 75-6, Albasini to d'Andrade, 
6 Nov. 1861.
(81) S.S. 4J, 13~15, Albasini to Schoeman, 8 Jan. 1862; ibid, 
25-6, ’Verslag van J. Albasini1.
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his authority into the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Swazi 
influence from the Sabie River area. This may subsequently 
have occasioned a clash between the two powers (82), but if so, 
good relations were soon restored, as both found themselves 
increasingly threatened by the Portuguese and the Boers (83).
After Soshanganefs death, this identity of interest became even 
more marked, as Mswati’s efforts to re-assert control over 
land lost to the Boers (84), and to undermine Portuguese influence 
in the Delagoa Bay region, were closely paralleled by Mawewe's 
own disputes with both of these powers. Mutual enemies promoted 
mutual accord, and before long this situation was formally 
acknowledged by the despatch of two of Mawewe’s sisters to be 
married to Mswati (85).
It was therefore natural for Mawewe to flee to his brother-in- 
law, Mswati, after his defeat by Mzila. Mswati, for his part, 
was only too eager to help, as this offered an unrivalled
(82) A clash between Soshangane and Mswati is referred to in 
Sw.A., Honey,'History1, 35. The most likely occasion for 
this would have been when Soshangane made the Changano 
people tributary to himself. These had previously been 
under, the control of the Ngomane chief Tihi, who, in turn, 
had been subjected by Sobhuza. But they freed themselves 
of Ngomane control at a time when the latter were in 
conflict with Mswato (F. Ferrao, Circumscripioes de Lourengo 
Marques - Reportas aos questitos feitos pelo secretatio
dos negociou indigenas, (Lourenjo Marques, 1909), 83; 
Myburgh, Barberton, 108-9) The most likely date for this 
is the period after Mswati's accession, when the Swazi 
seem to have lost control of a number of their more distant 
tributaries.
(83) S.A.A.R. Transvaal I , 103, Evidence of Sintcoeba (Somcuba) 
and complaint of Umcaas (Mgazi), 19 Sept. 1849.
(84) Above, 144-50.
(85) Das Neves, Expedition, 254; A.C. Myburgh, Barberton, 75; 
interview Mancibane Dlamini, 18 Dec. 1971, Ncakini^ 
Swaziland; Liesegang, ’Beitrdge', 79.
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opportunity to expand in the north. Elephants in Swaziland 
had already largely disappeared, and giving aid to Mawewe would 
open new sources of supply (86). Similarly, participation in 
the war would give access to Tsonga cattle and Tsonga children, 
for which latter there was a growing demand among the Boers.
From the purely material point of view there seemed everything 
to be gained.
Having decided on intervention in support of Mawewe, Mswati's 
chief worry was not the likely reactions of either Boers or 
the Portuguese, but the response that his move might elicit in 
Zululand. The Portuguese position in the area was intrinsically 
weak. Lacking the basic military capacity to enforce their 
demands, they depended on a system of shifting, and inherently 
unstable, alliances for what limited authority they were able 
to wield (87). The Boers, at this stage, were not much better 
off. Wracked by a civil dissension for much of this time, and 
with competing factions in the Zoutpansberg heavily reliant on 
black support, their power to intervene had diminished to almost 
nothing (88). But Mswati treated the Zulu, with greater respect. 
The mustering of the Zulu army in March 1860, purportedly to
(86) Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 35.
(87) See A.K. Smith, 'The Struggle for Control of Southern 
Mojambique 1720-1835', (Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
California, Los Angeles, 1970). Here Smith deals with 
the Portuguese position in the area in the 1820s and 1830s, 
but the pattern of relationships that he describes also 
typifies the later period.
(88) S.S. 42 R 171/62, 26, Extract journal, 15 March 1862; 
A.B.B., 109, Copy of address, 21 March 1862.
\
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exact revenge for Mswati's attacks on Zulu tributaries in the 
south gave rise to a major panic in Swaziland (89), and Mswati 
was well aware that the increased power and prestige that would 
accrue from his intervention against Mzila could only inflame 
the hostile feeling engendered by his earlier activities in the 
south. He therefore did what he could to insure his intervention 
against Zulu reprisals by notifying the Natal authorities of his 
proposed course of action, assuming, no doubt correctly, that 
if the Zulu did wish to attack they would attempt to show the 
British government that his attack on Mzila gave them justifiable 
cause (90).
In the event, the same basic inhibitions on a militaristic 
Zulu foreign policy as had preserved the Swazi for the previous 
seven years continued to operate now, and Mswati was able to 
intervene against Mzila unimpeded. His forces left Swaziland 
in the second week of February 1862 , and on the 15th of that 
month attacked Mzila's homestead at Makotene (91). Astonishingly, 
both.the Portuguese and Mzila were caught completely unprepared. 
Mzila,although having two days notice of the attack, could not 
organise his forces - a point which argues for a further 
disintegration of his control, and against his supposed massive 
popularity with his people. Nor was he able to effect a
(89) Above, 184,L.L.Vol. 1, 123, J.J. Combrink to C. Potgieter,
30 April 1860; ibid, 215-6, C. Potgieter to P.L. Uys 
(Landdrost))and J.D. van Collen (Commandant) at Utrecht,
24 April 1860.
(90) T.S.C, Case 22 (Swazi documents...), Statement of Kwahlakwahla 
and others, Swazi messengers, 12 March 1862.
(91) S.S. 42, R 171/62, 24-5, Extract journal of Portuguese 
Vice-Consul in S.A.R., 15 March 1862. For the name of Mzila's 
homestead see Liesegang, |Beitrage', 81.
juncture with the Portuguese or the Zoutpansberg Boers, for 
Mswati had divided his army into three parts, employing the 
other two sections to bottle up the Portuguese in Louren^o 
Marques, and to cut off communication between Mzila and the 
Trans-vaal. As a result, after an abortive movement east,
Mzila was obliged to fly directly north across an arid, water­
less waste, until he reached the sanctuary of the chiefdom of 
Chiguaraguara. The losses he sustained in the process were 
not surprisingly vast (92).
Mzila did not remain long at Chiguaraguara1s, but proceeded 
further north across the Save River to Mosapa or Buzi (93). 
Mawewe, after taking possession of territory up as far as Bilene 
gave pursuit - apparently without Swazi support - but on this 
occasion found his own army the victim of hunger and thirst as 
it, in its turn, had to cross the desolate tract laid waste by 
Mzila*s troops (94). Mawewe’s impetuosity now proved to be a 
fatal mistake. Many of his men perished, while still further 
losses were inflicted by the outbreak of disease (95), and by 
the time they reached Mzila they were easily repulsed. It was
(92) Ibid; Stevenson-Hamilton, Low Veld, 171, confirms the 
division of Mswati’s army into three parts.
(93) Liesegang, 'Beitrage', 81-2; Junod, 'Ba-Thonga', 234.
(94) Liesegang, 'Beitrage', 82. Liesegang cites Gouvea as his 
source for Swazi non-participation in this battle; Junod, 
'Ba-Thonga', 234,confirms this and refers to Mawewe's march 
across a desert; Grandjean, 'L'Invasion', 85, likewise 
confirms the march across the desert, but is apparently 
ignorant of Mawewe's victory which proceeded it.
(95) Junod, 'Ba-Thonga', 234; Myburgh, Barberton, 77, also 
confirms the outbreak of smallpox.
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now Mzila1s turn to move onto the offensive and he quickly 
despatched his army on the heels of Mawewe’s troops. This soon 
succeeded in ejecting Mawewe from Bilene, and in a final battle 
which took place on the plains of Moambe, between the 17th and 
20th of August, Mawewe's forces were decisively routed, and he 
had to flee once again to his brother-in-law Mswati (96) (Map 8).
It is unlikely that Mswati played a major part in this final 
battle, although it is not clear whether he was deterred by the 
superior fire-power being deployed against Mawewe, or whether 
he was simply given too little notice of Mawewe's plight at a 
difficult time of the year (97) . Whatever the reason, this 
certainly did not mean any Swazi disengagement, and in 1863 and 
1864 they mounted two new expeditions against Mzila, both of
(96) Liesegang, 'Beitrage', 82; Junod, 'Ba-Thonga', 234; Grandjean, 
'L'Invasion', 84. It seems likely that Portuguese tributaries 
assisted Mzila in this battle, as his forces appear to have 
been armed with guns, and possibly even with mortars and 
cannon. G.M. Theal (ed.), Records of South-Eastern Africa,
(9 vols. London, 1898-1903), Vol. IX, 115, Enclosure in 
letter from Count de Seisal to Lord Lytton, 15 Sept. 1873; 
Bryant, Olden Times, 330.
(97) It may well have been a combination of both factors.
Bryant, (Olden Times, 330-1) asserts that Mswati's forces 
besieged the Portuguese at L.M. to prevent them lending 
assistance to Mzila, but then beat a hasty retreat when 
news of Mawewe's defeat became known. This may be correct, 
but since Bryant is unaware of the occasion earlier on that 
year when Mswati's forces assisted Mawewe and cut off 
communication between L.M. and Mzila, it is more probable 
that he has confused the two events and that no siege of 
Delagoa Bay took place on this latter occasion. Bryant, in 
fact, supplies a contradictory version of the same event 
later on in Olden Times (456-7), in which he asserts that 
Mswati did despatch some troops to Mawewe's aid, but that 
when they heard the opposition's guns, and saw the way the 
battle was going, they retreated. Here we probably have the 
correct account of this second battle, with Bryant - unaware 
of the first battle, and unable to rationalise the two 
accounts - allowing both versions to appear in different 
parts of his book.
MAP 8
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which had as their objective the re-installation of Mawewe (98). 
Mzila, however, was prepared to sacrifice that part of his 
country to the south and west of the Limpopo, in order to retain 
the rest - an attitude denoted by his departure for Mosapa -, 
and in the end the difficulties of operating an army at such a 
distance defeated Mswati as they had earlier defeated Shaka (99). 
Nevertheless, while relinquishing hope of re-instating Mawewe, 
Mswati in no way abandoned his efforts to establish himself as 
the leading power between the Pongola and the Limpopo. If 
anything, these increased, and in the years that followed, Swazi 
armies repeatedly ravaged the lands between the Crocodile and 
Limpopo (100). In this second phase of the struggle, Lourenjo 
Marques gradually displaced Bilene as the hub of the conflict, 
as it became increasingly evident that the Portuguese, rather 
than Mzila, now presented the principal obstacle to Swazi pre­
dominance in the region. The Portuguese were completely unprepared 
for this turn of events. Initially, in the euphoria which 
followed Mawewe’s second defeat, they had even deluded themselves 
that Mswati would withdraw from the military and political arena 
altogether, leaving themselves in control of the hinterland of
(98) Junod,’Ba-Thonga’, 234, gives the years 1863 and 1864 for 
these expeditions, but does not specify that Swazi assistance 
was provided. Erskine, ’Journey’, 248, mentions three 
occasions on which the Swazi helped Mawewe to try and regain 
his throne, the latter two presumably being those of 1863 
and 1864. Grandjean, 'L1Invasion’, 85, speaks merely of 
five years of continual warfare with the Swazi, following 
Mawewe's second defeat.
(99) Junod, ’Ba-Thonga’, 234; Erskine, ’Journey’, 248.
(100) Grandjean, ’L ’Invasion’, 85; Stevenson-Hamilton, Low Veld, 
172.
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Delagoa Bay (101). Those hopes were, however, quickly dashed 
when the Swazi resumed their attacks both on Mzila and on the 
so called "Portuguese possessions" a few months later in 1863.
The period that followed was one of humiliating reverses for 
the Portuguese, beginning in September 1863, when Swazi armies 
attacked Louren^o Marques’s Madolo and Mfumo allies, and then 
went on to lay siege to the fort itself. The Portuguese proved 
utterly helpless in the face of this onslaught, being unable 
even to venture beyond cannon range of the fort, and it was 
probably on this occasion that they were compelled to acknowledge 
Swazi sovereignty down as far as the Tembe River, as the price 
of Swazi withdrawal (102). After this humiliation, Portuguese 
power and prestige in the area collapsed, and was not fully to 
recover for fifteen years or more. In the interval, the Swazi 
were indisputably the dominant power of the region.
The scale and suddenness of these successes are striking, and 
require some explanation. Undoubtedly, the main factor which 
made them possible, was Mzila’s withdrawal to Mosapa, and his 
effective disengagement from the struggle in the south. This, 
however,woqld not have had such startling consequences had it 
not been for a number of other considerations. First and fore-
(101) There is little doubt however that Mswati went out of his 
way to foster this impression while he marshalled his 
forces for further attacks on Mzila and the Portuguese - 
A.H.M., Cod. 64, 2 FA 11, 70v, Andrade to Gov-Gen.,
2 Oct. 1862.
(102) A.H.M., Cod. 64, 2 FA 11, 98 & 98v, Andrade to Gov. Gen.,
7 Dec. 1863; ibid; Sec. Militare, 107-106v, Andrade to 
Gov. Gen., 14 April 1C64; C.O. 879/29, Boundary Commission, 
Minutes of 5th meeting, 8 June 1888, Evidence of Ugwababa.
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most of these was the military weakness of the Portuguese. It 
may sound odd to speak of Portuguese military weakness after 
documenting their success against Mawewe, but a closer examination 
of the history of the Portuguese presence in Delagoa Bay, and 
of the resources available to them in the early 1860s, show 
that this was a persistent feature in the life of the settle­
ment (103). The Portuguese military establishment at Lourenjo 
Marques was in fact absurdly tiny, which meant that successive 
Portuguese governors were deprived of the only meaningful sanction 
that they could employ against hostile groups. Instead, they 
had to rely for a very fitful and fluctuating influence on the 
political leverage given them by their control of the Delagoa 
Bay entrepot, their possession of firearms, and their 
neighbour’s disputes. At times this could be surprisingly 
large. Inter- and intra-chiefdom feuding was endemic to the 
area, and the Portuguese could usually rely on the support of 
the neighbouring Mfumo - a semi-client state - in exploiting 
such divisions. Nonetheless, the influence so derived was 
fundamentally unstable, since it relied on its opponent’s * 
weakness and not on the settlement’s own strength. Consequently, 
when its enemies remedied their weaknesses by composing their 
differences, Portuguese influence in the area was prone to sudden 
collapse. And it is this which seems to have happened in 1863.
(103) See Smith, ’Struggle’. For the situation in the 1860s see
A.H.M., Cod. 153, 2 FB 9, 62-5, Letter No. 25, Simao to
G.G., 18 Aug. 1868; ibid, 65 v, Letter No. 46, Simao to
G.G., 18 Aug. 1868; Das Neves, Expedition, 172 ff.
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Another major cause of Swazi success was the wider repercussions 
of the struggle between Mpande and Cetshwayo. In a narrower 
sense the Zulu succession crisis had affected the politics 
of the region by freeing the Swazi from the threat of Zulu 
attack, and by allowing them to patch over their internal 
divisions, Its wider repercussions were equally great. The 
slackening of Zulu control over their more distant tributaries 
left something approaching a power vacuum in the whole Delagoa 
Bay/Tsongaland area, which the major powers in the region all
made efforts to exploit. For a time it was the Portuguese
who made best use of the situation, but the events of 1863
soon drove home the realisation that in the longer term their
interests were better served by the revival of Zulu authority, 
rather than by any hastening of its collapse. The reasons for 
this attitude are not difficult to grasp. Zulu interests in 
the area were essentially limited, whereas those of the other 
’great powers' were far more open-ended, simply by virtue of 
their proximity to Lourenqo Marques. To take a specific example, 
it was a matter of comparatively little importance to the Zulu 
if the Portuguese interfered in the politics of Madolo or Tembe; 
all that mattered to them was the payment of tribute and retain­
ing a measure of control over the trade route to the north. To 
the Swazi or Mabudu, however, such meddling was of vastly greater 
importance, because of the repercussions that this could have 
on outlying portions of their own estates. It was virtually 
certain, therefore, that with the substitution of Mabudu and 
Swazi influence for that of the Zulu, any efforts by the Portuguese
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to establish a more effective sphere of influence in the Delagoa 
Bay area would be much more sharply resented, and would as a 
result be that much more bitterly opposed.
An even more important consequence for the Portuguese of Zulu 
disengagement was that it deprived them of the only counter­
weight to the Swazi that was currently available after Mzila1s 
flight north. Not only were the Zulu themselves unable to lend 
the Portuguese any support - even after Mswati had attacked 
their tributary the Tembe (104) - but the aid of the only other 
major power in the region, the Mabudu, was simultaneously denied. 
Once again this was a product of the struggle for the Zulu 
succession, as this allowed the Mabudu, under Msongi, to take 
a far more independent line, and to ally much more closely with 
their compatriot Mswati. The earliest reference to such an 
alliance comes in 1865, but the trend of events had been apparent 
earlier (105). Ever since the Swazi invasion of September 1863 
the Portuguese had cast about desperately for allies, and had 
hoped for a time to bring together Cetshwayo and Mzila (106).
That expectation proved entirely misconceived. Cetshwayo's 
position in Zululand was far too shaky for him to embark on so
(104) For Swazi attacks on the Tembe see above, 191. A.H.M. 
Cod. 153, 2 FB 9, 24, Letter No. 56, Teixeiro to Gov. 
Gen., 9 Aug. 1865. In 1863 the Portuguese were expecting 
Cetshwayo1s assistance against the Swazi, and it may well 
have been Swazi attacks against the Tembe which led him 
to promise this. Below, 209,note 107; A.H.M. Cod. 64, 
2 FA 11, 98, Andrade to Gov. Gen., 7 Dec. 1863.
(105) A.H.M. Cod. 153, 2 FB 9, 24, Letter No. 56, Teixeira to 
Gov. Gen., 9 Aug. 1865.
(106) A.H.M. Cod. 64, 2 FA 11, 98v, Andrade to Gov. Gen.,
7 Dec. 1863. If Cetshwayo’s assistance had been secured, 
one assumes that Msongi would also have been obliged to 
contribute troops as well. As it was, Andrade obtained 
the aid of neither.
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risky a venture, while Mzila was much too preoccupied defending 
his own territories against the Swazi incursions to assist the 
Portuguese in the defence of theirs. As a result, the Portuguese 
were left only with neighbouring chiefdoms like that of Mabudu, 
who without Zulu prodding could not be relied on to help (107).
After 1863, the situation in the Delagoa Bay area did not alter 
materially until after Mswati’s death. The Portuguese continued 
to exercise a limited and rather elastic influence over the Mfumo, 
and possibly over Cherinda and Magaia as well (108). The Swazi, 
for their part, maintained control over the chiefdoms of Madolo, 
Moamba and Changano, as well as of most of the land up to the 
Olifants River, and a good way beyond (109). With the failure 
of their grand alliance of 1863, the Portuguese seem to have 
accepted their straightened circumstances fairly philosophically, 
and turned their hand more to trade, which slowly began to 
flourish again after the turmoil of the previous years (110).
Simiarly Mswati, now that he had secured his basic interests 
in the area, directed his attention more exclusively towards 
the north and west, where he harried the Shangane, Venda and
(107) A.H.M., Cod. 64, 2 FA 11, 71, Andrade to Gov. Gen., 2 Oct.
1863; ibid, 93, Andrade to Gov. Gen., 7 Dec. 1863; A.H.M.
Paiva Manso, 15, Letter of 20 Aug. 1864 in Bolletin de 
Mozambique, Ho. 41, 217, Document No. 10.
(108) A.H.M., Cod. 64, 2 FA 11, 98, Andrade to Gov. Gen., 7 Dec.
1863; ibid, Cod. 153, 2 FB 9, 4-6, Andrade to Gov. Gen.,
20 Aug. 1864; ibid, Paiva Manso, 15, Letter of 20 Aug. 1864 
in Bolletin .......
(109) The only group that Mswati did not succeed in dominating 
were the Khocene people living to the north of the Komati 
River, but their life was ultimately made so unbearable 
by Swazi raids that they abandoned their land and moved 
northwards to the Olifants River - Grandjean, ’L'Invasion’, 85.
(110) A.H.M., Cod. 153, 2 FB 9, 4-6, Andrade to Gov. Gen.,
20 Aug. 1864.
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Sotho groups for the last years of his life (111).
Some more general conclusions can now usefully be drawn.
Firstly, the consolidation of the position of the Swazi ruling 
class seems to have created both the capacity and the need for 
an aggressive foreign policy. On the one hand the manpower 
was now readily available, while on the other captives could 
not easily be taken inside. Secondly, the tensions in Shangane 
society, generated by the exploitation of the Tsonga by an 
Nguni aristocracy, and the gradual exhaustion of the areafs 
main exportable resource, led to an internal conflict along 
ethnic/class lines, overlain by a struggle for resources with 
the Portuguese trading community. Thirdly, the weakening of 
the coercive capacity of the Boers allowed the Swazi to step 
into the vacuum left by both them and the Shangane, and to become 
their main source of this particular kind of labour supply 
(tribute labour being another thing again). The devastation 
of the lowveld can now be seen in a somewhat different perspective, 
and not just as the product of some intangible martial spirit 
of the Nguni, and the same can be said of the origins of under­
development and migrant labour. Rather than warfare and pillage
(111) T.N.A.D, Tribes, 41, 63; H.A. Stayt, The Bavenda, (London, 
1968), 18, 71, 191; E. Gottschling, 'The Bawende: A sketch 
of their History and Customs', Journal of the Anthropolgical 
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, (1905), 365-6;
Junod, 'Ba-Thonga', 239; E. Thomas,. HiTe Bokaha: quelques 
notes sur le pays, ses habitants et ses resources', Bulletin 
de la societe Neuchateloise de Geographie, 8, (1894-5), 160; 
S.P., File 17, notebook 2, Xaba, 3 May 1910; Sw.A., Honey 
'History', 35, 45; Bryant, History, 15-17; J.D. Krige, 
'Traditional Origins and Tribal Relationships of the Sotho 
of the Northern Transvaal', African Studies, 11, (1937),
331, 333, 343, 347, 352; Massie, Tribes, 15-17.
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being the total explanation of underdevelopment, the penetration 
of mercantile capital into Mozambique and the Trans-vaal, and 
the interaction of this with internal class configurations, must 
also be credited with an important, if not decisive, role.
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CHAPTER VI 
INTERREGNUM : 1865 - 1874 
Mswati died at the beginning of August 1865, leaving behind a 
notably ambiguous legacy. On the one hand, an infrastructure of 
state had been firmly established, so that the country now divided 
more on class. than on ethnic or chiefdom lines, and looked for 
the resolution of its grievances in the machinery of state (1).' On 
the other, Mswati had died very young - he had yet to reach forty 
at the time of his death (2) - and left behind no acknowledged 
successor. Successive efforts to obtain a main wife from Mzilikazi 
and Mpande had miscarried, and before new approaches were underway, 
Mswati had died (3). The resulting struggle provides an interesting 
commentary on the new-found maturity of the Swazi state, both in­
sofar as all parties were competing to control rather than dismember 
the state, and because of the way in which the defeated party reconciled 
itself once the die was cast. This chapter will examine the 
implications of that struggle and the regency that followed, together 
with their repercussions on Swaziland’s regional position.
(1) I take my definitions of class and of the state from
B. Hindess and P.Q. Hirst, Pre-capitalist modes of production 
(London, 1975), 21-41. For an elaboration of these points see 
Bonner ’Classes', 1-15.
(2) Mswati was about thirteen at his accession in 1839 (above, 65.) 
Matsebula’s assertion that he died at the age of forty-seven 
seems to rest on the erroneous belief that Mswati died in 
1868 (Matsebula, History, 23).
(3) Overtures to Mzilikazi were made in the middle of 1860 -
S.S. 34, R 3852/60, 49-50, C. Potgieter to S. Schoeman,
18 July 1860; L.L.I, 188-92, S. Schoeman to C. Potgieter,
21 July 1860. A message from Mbilini in March 1866 confirms 
this, and adds the information about Mswati's proposal to 
Mpande - S.S. 75, R 303/66, 302, minutes of meeting with 
Swazi messengers 6 March 1866. One intriguing discrepancy 
between the two accounts is that in the first Mswati claimed 
that the wife was to be married to his heir, and was to 
provide his heir’s successor, according to an earlier agree­
ment made between Sobhuza and Mzilikazi.
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A leading contender for the kingship was Mbilini, the son of 
La Makhasiso, Mswati’s chief wife at Hhohho (4). Constitutionally 
Mbilini was debarred from taking office, because his mother was 
Mswati's first wife, but there are signs that Mswati had 
considered him as a possible successor (5). Mbilini certainly 
thought so, and claimed that Mswati had announced precisely 
that as he lay dying in the arms of his brother Maloyi (6).
Mbilini’s claim must obviously be treated as a piece 
of special pleading, but it would be equally unwise to ignore 
the reasons that must have existed to push Mswati in this
(4) Matsebula, History, 24; interview Mpholweni Dlamini, 6 Jan. 
1973, Jacks, Swaziland. In a Swazi message to Natal of
22 June 1866, however, Mbilini is only referred to as 
"one of the eldest sons of Mswati", S.N.A. 1/6/1.
(5) Mbilini claimed several times in messages to the Transvaal 
authorities that he "had drunk" to his grandmother, and 
that this signified he was to be king - S.S. 83, 56,
C.v.d. Leeuw to De Beer, 5 March 1866. For a possible 
parallel here see above, 113. Swazi oral traditions
confirm that Mbilini stood high in Mswati’s esteem. 
According to these, Mbilini was assigned the leadership of 
the Imigadlela regiment, and was given the privilege of 
leading them in an attack on the Gamedze chiefdom, located 
on the Lusutfu River near present day Sipofaneni. Some 
oral accounts even go so far as to allege that Mswati 
intended Mbilini as his successor (personal communication 
A.M. Dlamini, 5 Jan. 1973). Both Miller (’Short History’, 
17) and Honey(’History’, 31) corroborate Mswati's pre­
disposition towards Mbilini, and refer to the occasion 
when Mswati organised an attack on a subordinate chiefdom 
to allow Mbilini to "wash his spears". Neither, however, 
agrees as to the identity of this chiefdom, Honey giving 
it as the Madolo, and Miller as the Sifundza. As both 
groups lived on the Lebombo, and as each was attacked 
during the same sequence of campaigns (see above, Chpt. V ) 
the discrepancy is probably not very significant.
(6) S.S. 75, R 303/66, 302, minutes of meeting with Swazi 
messengers, 6 March 1866; S.S. 83, 97, 'Report of 
Commission to Kaffir King Umbalien', 2 April 1866.
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direction.Mbilini, at twenty, was Mswati’s eldest son, and any 
alternative would have entailed a protracted minority - in the 
case of Ludvonga, for example, seven or eight years (7). Even 
without a disputed succession this could not fail to erode the 
diplomatic position that Mswati had built up over the previous 
decade. Combined with an internal struggle, in which rival 
factions competed for external support, it could do irreparable 
harm.
There is nothing inherently improbable, therefore, in the idea 
of Mswati’s seeking to settle the succession on the only adult 
candidate available - more especially if, as seems likely, he 
was personally predisposed in his favour. A similar choice 
faced Swaziland after Mbandzeni's death, on which occasion 
constitutionality gave way to expediency with scarcely a murmur
t
of protest (8). However, the choice of succession ultimately 
did not lie with Mswati, but with the inner caucus of royal 
family and regents (9), and there are signs that they distrusted 
Mbilini’s rash and tempestuous spirit (10). Much preferable to 
a group of their rather stolid composition was the candidature
(7) Ludvonga was aged about ten or eleven at the end of 1865 -
S.S. 66, R 1237/65, 21 Nov. 1865; Sw.A., Honey, ’History’, 
39; S.P.G. Series ’E', Vol. 27, 1552, Jackson to S.P.G.
30 June 1872.
(8) Sw.A., J. 50/03 D.Forbes to R. Commissioner, 27 Jan. 1901.
(9) Kuper, Aristocracy, 88-9; Marwick, Swazi, 257.
(10) S.S. 66, R 1237/65, W.F. Joubert and others to President 
and Executive Council,21 Nov. 1865; S.S. 83, 97,’Report 
of Commission.. ,  2 April 1866; M.P., MS 1478, Miller, 
’Short History’, 18.
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of Ludvonga, whose mother enjoyed the appropriate status (11), 
and who would allow them several years of undisturbed power (12).
By mid-November, with their assistance, Ludvonga had been 
installed, but these..proved to be only the opening shots of the 
battle (13). Mbilini remained unreconciled to the decision, and 
believed he had the support of his father’s most powerful
(11) Sisile was the daughter of Mgangeni Khumalo, a brother or 
chief indvuna of Mzilikazi living in Ntanga’s area around 
Nongoma (northern Zululand) - interview Maboya Fakudze;
Sw.A., Honey, ’History’, 39; Sw.A., R.C.S. 117/4, Encl. 
genealogies by Dyer, Government interpreter, 1907. Dyer 
gives Sisile as the daughter of Ntanga, brother of Mzilikazi, 
but this is palpably incorrect, as she would then have been 
called La Ntanga. Another account of Sisile’s origins is 
given by Mandanda Mtetwa (interview) , who claims she came 
from Mgcoyiza Khumalo's, presently located near Hlathikhulu, 
but this appears to be incorrect - H. Kuper, 'The Swazi
• Reaction to Missions’, African Studies, 15, No. 3 (1946),
178. Sisile had three 'constitutional’ considerations 
working in her favour. First, she came from one of the 
four clans from whom the Swazi customarily choose their 
'great wives’ - Marwick, Swazi, 255; Kuper Aristocracy, 112. 
Second, as a daughter of Mzilikazi's brother or chief indvuna 
her parentage entitled her to a certain seniority among 
Mswati's wives. Third, she had no sons other than Ludvonga 
- Kuper, Aristocracy, 55, 102.
(12) Among its leading members were Thandile, the Queen Regent; 
Sandlane Zwane, who had been indvunkulu yemabutfa (leader 
of the regiments) in Sobhuza's reign, and chief indvuna of 
the capital Luzdzidzini during Mswazi's (Myburgh, Carolina,
84; S.P. 30091, Mgoqo, 19 Nov. 1898; Matsebula, History,
14); and Malunge, a brother of Sobhuza who had been chief 
regent during Mswati’s minority and an important adviser 
thereafter (above, 79, note 12). Two other regents, Sobandla and 
Maloyi were also brothers of Sobhuza.
(13) S.S. 66, R 1237/65, interview with Swazi messengers, 
21 Nov. 1865.
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regiment, the Nyathi (14). In the end this did not materialise, 
but it is unlikely that his belief was entirely without grounds. 
What other backing Mbilini enjoyed is difficult to assess. In 
a message to the Lydenburg authorities in March 1866, he asserted 
that the country was divided into four parties, two of whom 
supported his candidature and two of whom were opposed (15).
In the light of subsequent developments it is clear Mbilini was 
overstating his case. Nonetheless this claim, together with 
other pieces of circumstantial evidence, does suggest that 
Mbilini may well have had regional as well as regimental support. 
In part, the two affiliations overlapped. In the case of Hhohho, 
which seems to have given Mbilini the bulk of his support, 
there were sharply defined regional and regimental interests 
which marked it off from most of the rest of the country.
Hhohho was in every sense a ’new1 district. Unpopulated by 
Swazi until the early part of Mswati’s reign, it had its 
original population expelled to make way for the shifting of
(14) S.S. 83, 97, 'Report of Commission...’, 2 April 1866. See 
also S.S. 75 R 303/66, 301,minutes of meeting... 6 March 
1866. Swazi oral tradition also credits Mbilini x^ith the 
support of his own Imigadlela regiment (personal communica­
tion A.M. Dlamini, 5 Jan. 1973). For information on the 
Nyathi regiment see Matsebula, Izakhiwo, 14. Ludvonga’s 
izibongo also contain a hint of the Nyathi regiment's 
disaffection from him. Compare, "He stayed on the head of 
the Buffalo, so that the Buffalo Regiment ran away from 
him", Cook, ’izibongo’, 197.
(15) S.S. 75, R 306/66, 299, minutes of meeting... 6 March 1866. 
Later on an African messenger of De Beer’s reported that 
the country was divided in two parts, the greatest being 
for Ludvonga - S.S. 77, R 469/66, 27, De Beer to Pretorius 
and Kruger, n.d. (probably mid-march 1866).
the Swazi capital north (16). Resulting itself from conquest 
and expropriation, its whole existence continued to be 
phrased in these terms, as it became the centre for Mswati’s 
numerous expeditions north, west and east. Fittingly, the 
regiments attached to the Hhohho homestead were the youngest in 
Mswati's army (17), and had a vested interest in the continuation 
of war. Even after Mbilini’s flight, this difference again 
surfaced when the Hhohho regiments embarked on several 
expeditions to the north, in the face of the express disapproval 
of Thandile, the queen mother (18). In view of all this, there 
is every possibility that Mbilini appeared for a time as the 
most attractive prospect in the north. Mswati had been, "the 
greatest of Swaziland's fighting kings" (19). Mbilini, with 
the blessing of his father, promised to follow in his steps.
The opposition to Mbilini, in so far as it was localised, seems 
to have been based on a similar juxtaposition of regional and 
regimental affiliation. Its backbone was comprised of the 
older regents - Thandile, Sandlane, Malunge and Maloyi (20) 
the older Tichele, Tindlovu and Emahubhulu regiments, stationed 
at Thandile's homestead, Ludzidzini (21), as well as generally 
the central (and, of course, older) part of the country in which
(16) Above, 164-5.
(17) The Imigadlela, the Giba, and to a lesser extent the Nyathi, 
Matsebula, History, 17.
(18) Below, 241-2.
(19) Kuper, Aristocracy, 14.
(20) The names of these three appear frequently throughout in 
messages from LudvongaTs camp.
(21) Matsebula, History, 17.
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Malunge's, Sobandla's and Maloyi's chiefdoms lay (22). Its 
interests diverged from those of Hhohho, to the extent that it 
was more vulnerable to Zulu attacks, whose resumption was 
threatened with every new expedition north (23). As a result, 
it was less committed to military ventures and was, by and 
large, hostile to the candidate of the north. Beyond this, it 
is impossible to identify the other parties mentioned by 
Mbilini. One could hazard a guess that the south supported 
Ludvonga, and the east Mbilini, each for more or less the same 
reasons as its notional ally, but that still does not take us 
very much further. In any case, one need not dwell very long 
on these putative divisions, since what is important in the end 
is that they never fully materialised, and Ludvonga was able to 
succeed without serious challenge. It is this that we should 
now attempt to explain.
A partial answer lies in the process of consolidation and 
integration which had been proceeding throughout Mswati's reign, 
but there were in addition a number of secondary factors. Of 
some importance was the fact that the Swezi regimental system 
did not easily permit the sort of military coup d'etat that was 
possible under the more developed regimental system operating 
in Zululand. Unlike their Zulu counterparts, Swazi regiments 
were not constantly assembled together in barracks near the
(22) Above, 45, note 62. Malunge lived at Enyageni, Sobandla at 
Nsingweni and Moloyi at Kutsimlani.
(23) Above, 200.
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royal capital (24). Instead, in Swaziland, only a part of each 
regiment (the libutfo) was permanently stationed at one or 
other of the royal homesteads, while the rest of the conscripts 
(the amajaha) remained behind in their villages, and were only 
summoned to the royal capitals on special occasions (25). As 
a result, it did not suffice for a princely contender for the 
throne simply to have regimental backing, and one reason for 
Mbilinifs failure may well have been his inability to carry 
with him the older-established and more populous districts in 
the centre of the country, as well as the northern regiments.
One last reason for Mbilinifs failure was partly fortuitous 
and partly built into the Swazi political system. This was the 
role played by the queen mother in the crisis. The dual monarchy 
in Swaziland has always been a powerful source of stability, 
and never more so than after the death of a king, or during a 
period of minority that followed (26). To this extent the 
stability and continuity provided by Thandile in this testing 
period was inbuilt. What was fortuitous was the remarkable 
personal weight that Thandile brought to this position.
Swaziland has a tradition of exceptional queen mothers, but 
even amongst this distinguished company Thandile was outstanding. 
A leading figure in Mswati's early struggle for survival, she 
had gone on to initiate a series of crucial reforms, and was 
now accorded enormous respect. Respect of a similar order
(24) However, the extent to which even Zulu regiments were 
permanently mobilised is open to question, see, for 
example, Bryant, Zulu People, 497.
(25) Kuper, Aristocracy, 122.
(26) Sw.A., R.C.S. 454/40, Seme, 'Petition1, 25 March 1932, The 
ideological rationalisation is also couched in these terms, 
Kuper, Aristocracy, 55-6.
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attached to the persons of Malunge, a senior paternal uncle of 
Mswati, and Sandlane Zwane, Mswati’s chief minister, for both 
had been important officials in the reign of Sobhuza, and had 
also weathered the storms of Mswati’s accession. It was the 
voices of these people that preponderated in the council that 
decided the succession, and it was their fund of political 
wisdom and experience that thwarted Mbilini when he tried to 
get that decision reversed. Together they must be counted as 
perhaps the most important single obstacle to the realisation 
of Mbilini’s aims.
But Mbilini himself also made a number of mistakes, the most 
serious of which was to misjudge the possibilities of external 
support. While the regents either directly or indirectly 
invoked the assistance of Cetshwayo, Mbilini left his appeal 
to the Trans-vaal hopelessly late (27). As a result, by the 
time it was made, his domestic predicament was such as to have 
deterred even the most ardent interventionist, and he had no 
alternative but to follow Thandile’s advice and flee to the 
Trans-vaal (28).
(27) See S.S. 83, 54, C.v.d. Leeuw to De Beer, 5 March 1866, in 
which Mbilini claimed he had paid one hundred cattle to 
Cetshwayo. An expedition by the Zulu to "weep" for Mswati 
is documented by other sources - S.P., 30091, 119, Gama,
18 Dec. 1898; T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents...), message 
from Ludvonga, 19 March 1866. This message dates the Zulu 
expedition to somewhere between mid-January and mid-February 
1866, and claims .Ludvonga had to pay out 440 cattle. It 
was probably immaterial whether Thandile deliberately 
invoked Zulu aid or not, for the konta* ing symbolised by the 
payment of cattle would have automatically made Cetshwayo 
a guarantor of the settlement. (Cetshwayo, of course, also 
had an interest in the succession of a minor rather than of 
Mbilini). Bryant, (Olden Times, 206) speaks of Mpande 
installing Ludvonga.
(28) S.S. 83, 54, C.v.d. Leeuw to De Beer, 5 March 1866;
Nxumalo, ’Oral Tradition’, 41, Mfolweni Dlamini, 10 Feb, 1974.
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With the departure of Mbilini the Swazi simply exchanged an 
internal malady for an external blight. The Lydenburg Boers 
did not fare very much better. Whereas the Swazi were faced 
with the grim prospect of another Somcuba in the marches of the 
eastern Trans-vaal, the Lydenburg Boers found that the controver­
sies associated with the question of Somcuba were again awakened, 
fomenting additional divisions within the Lydenburg fold. As 
a result a paralysis descended on the centres of decision­
making, which only fully lifted when Mbilini foresook the Trans­
vaal for Zululand on the third phase of his quest to be king (29). 
Trans-vaal reactions during this period are therefore worthy of 
attention, for they give clues to the difficulties which it 
experienced in its dealings with African chiefdoms, and help 
explain its relative passivity towards Swaziland throughout 
much of the next decade.
Possibly the most striking feature of the exchanges between Boer 
and Swazi throughout this period is the state of ignorance with 
which they were conducted by the Boers. The Swazi succession 
dispute was a golden opportunity to gain concessions over the 
border, particularly while Mbilini still remained in contention, 
yet initiative along these lines was largely ruled out by 
Lydenburg’s ignorance as to what was going on. The first they 
learned of the dispute was at the beginning of March, barely 
four weeks before Mbilini fled to the Republic, when Mbilini 
sent them a message acquainting them with his deteriorating
(29) Below, 258, 277.
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position (3Q) . Even after that, the volume and quantity of 
intelligence was pitiful, with J.M. De Beer, the official 
chiefly responsible for dealing with neighbouring African 
chiefdoms, reduced to basing his decisions for much of March on 
information derived from African intermediaries from two semi­
independent chiefdoms in the vicinity of the Crocodile River (31).
Ultimately, however, deficiencies of Boer intelligence were 
subsidiary to a wider problem besetting the Republic in relations 
with African peoples. This was the persistence of divisions 
between officials in its administration, which were often bound 
up with conflicting prescriptions for 'native affairs', and 
which could be exploited in turn by the black communities 
concerned. The reception of Mbilini gives an insight into 
the effect these divisions had. From the very first Mbilini 
was at pains to avoid dealing with the diplomatic agent, De Beer, 
preferring to work through the border farmer D.J.G. Coetzer 
(as well as his messenger, Dinna), and the Commandant of 
Lydenburg, P.J. Coetzer (32). The reason appears to have been 
their differing approaches to 'native affairs'. In his brief 
tenure of office De Beer had proved himself an unrelenting 
exponent of separation, and an unsympathetic - even heartless - 
host to refugees from neighbouring chiefdoms- (33). Coetzer,
(30) S.S. 83, 48, P.J. Coetzer to Ex. Co., 5 March 1866; ibid,
53, C.v.d. Leeuw to De Beer, 5 March 1866.
(31) S.S. 83, 58-61, J. De Beer to Ex. Co., 15 March 1866.
(32) Ibid, 48, P.J. Coetzer to Ex. Co., 5 March 1866; 53-7,
C.v.d. Leeuw to De Beer, 5 March 1866; S.S. 75, 300, R 303/66, 
Minutes of Committee meeting, 6 March 1866.
(33) S.S. 76, 115, R 357/66, Meeting of Landdrost's and Commandant- 
General 's courts, 26 March 1866.
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on the other hand, took a more flexible view. A border farmer, 
who is known to have sold horses to the Swazi and to have also 
had dealings in slaves, he was not averse to a degree of anarchy 
and confusion, and was prepared to welcome Mbilini with open 
arms (34). The case of P.J. Coetzer is a little more complicated, 
and may have been bound up with a personal sense of grievance 
against De Beer, who had usurped part of his responsibilities 
when he was appointed diplomatic agent in the Trans-vaal, and 
possibly his special relationship with the Swazi as well (35).
Much of this latter situation was probably known to Mbilini 
before his embroilment in the succession dispute in Swaziland.
When the time came for him to make his dash to the Trans-vaal, 
however, both his understanding of the dispute, and his ability 
to exploit it were greatly enhanced by his association with
D.G.J. Coetzer, and with his employee Dinna. The role of Dinna 
in these events is particularly interesting, for his activities 
bear testimony to the often very influential part played by 
African intermediaries in political relations of this kind.
Dinna had been used in the past for the collection of intelligence, 
but his importance extends well beyond this. Operating in the 
twilight zone of interracial politics, created by inadequate 
intelligence and the fraying at the edges of politico-ethnic
(34) S.S. 43, R 383/62, 258-284, Extracts Dagboek, Landdrost Lyden- 
berg, 5 Nov. 1862 - 9 Feb. 1863; L.L. 180, Statement P.J. Fick, 
21 June 1870 ; Berliner Missionsberichte, 1872, 10-13.
(35) L.L.I, Government Secretary to Coetzer, 29 June 1864; S.S.
77, 5, R 469/66, J. De Beer to Ex. Co., 28 April 1866; 
ibid, 18-20, C. Potgieter and P.J. Coetzer to Ex. Co.,
3 May 1866.
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solidarities, he was able to employ his access to white 
officialdom, and his contacts with black chiefdoms, to create 
a field of action for himself which was substantially independent 
of both. It is in the nature of such activities that they are 
shadowy, and difficult to document. However, there can be little 
doubt that Dinna's collection of taxes in De Beer's name, after 
he had transferred his allegiance to D.J.G. Coetzer, falls 
within this category of action (36), and one catches glimpses 
of the same thing in his dealings with Mbilini, although in 
this case he may well have been taking advantage of a very 
wide brief - as for instance when he scared off messengers of 
De Beer's with threats of imprisonment - rather than acting 
entirely on his own (37). His period of greatest influence 
seems to have come after he had joined forces with Mabokwan, 
Mbilini's messenger to the Trans-vaal. Together these two so 
effectively fanned the flames of the De Beer/Coetzer feud, and 
so demoralized De Beer that he eventually threw in his hand 
and withdrew from the negotiations altogether (38). As a 
result, when the Mbilini affair entered into its most critical 
phase, and Coetzer rode out to meet him with Field Cornet 
de Villiers and Landdrost Potgieter, De Beer was not there.
When the settlement with Mbilini was reached some two days later,
(36) S.S. 77, 5, J. De Beer to Ex. Co., 28 April 1866; De Beer
to Ex. Co., 3 May 1866.
(37) S.S. 83, 58-61, J. De Beer to Ex. Co., 15 March 1866.
(38) "You should glue your eyes on these two kaffirs", he noted
on one occasion. "They behave with nothing but duplicity 
/TooshandigheicT7", S.S. 77, 26, R 469/66. J. De Beer to ?s 
n.d.; S.S. 76, 114, R 357/66, Meeting of Landdrost's and 
Commandant-General's courts, 26 March 1866.
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therefore, his views went entirely unrepresented, and Mbilini 
was permitted, without objections, to take up residence in 
Lydenburg (39).
Mbilini had in fact escaped to Lydenburg by a whisker. The 
Swazi force pursuing his small band was already snapping at its 
heels when the Boer Commando, led by Potgieter and Coetzer, 
fired upon it, killing four of its number and putting the 
remainder to flight (40). For some, especially the residents 
of Komati, whose title was still disputed by the Swazi (41), 
this skirmish gave pause for thought to what further clashes the 
future might hold if the authorities persisted in championing 
Mbilini, Coetzer and Potgieter however betrayed no such misgivings. 
If Lydenburg did not accept him, they argued, then one or other 
of the neighbouring chiefdoms would, "thereby causing greater 
difficulties" (prophetic words). It was, in any case, desirable 
in principle to encourage divisions between neighbouring chief­
doms and, as if to underline their particular expectations 
in this regard, they granted Mbilini provisional permission 
to settle around Somcuba’s "gat" (hole), just north of the 
Crocodile River, as soon as he was strong enough to live there 
securely (42).
(39) S.S. 76, 212-4, R 403/66, C. Potgieter, P.J. Coetzer and 
P.D. de Villiers to Ex. Co., 7 April 1866.
(40) Ibid; S.S. 83, 121, De Beer to Ex. Co., 28 April 1866;
S.N.A. Vol. 1/6/1, Statements by native messengers, No. 15 
Statement by Swazi messengers, 22 Aug. 1866.
(41) Above, 150 ; below, 237 ; S.S. 83, 98,’Report of Commission1,
2 April 1866.
(42) S.S. 76, 214, R 403/66, C. Potgieter... to Ex. Co., 7 April
1866.
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None of these plans was destined to mature. The first setback 
came when, against all expectations, no really sizeable body 
of refugees came to share Mbilini*s exile in the Republic.
When Mbilini had first set foot over the border he had claimed 
that the Nyathi regiment was still contesting the issue with 
his opponents, and would soon be flooding out to join him (43). 
Before long, however, it became clear that Mbilini had sadly 
over-estimated the commitment of his partisans. Some of his 
own Imigadlela joined him (44), and possibly some Nyathi, but 
the large scale desertions that he had anticipated never 
materialised. It all only went to underline the growing maturity 
of Swazi politics, and was a thoroughly inauspicious opening to 
Mbilini*s campaign to take up the mantle of his late uncle 
Somcuba.
Inauspicious, too, were developments within the Republic. There 
it soon became apparent that De Beer, despite his temporary 
isolation during March 1866, was not alone in his opposition to 
the policies expounded by Potgieter and Coetzer. Those tucked 
away in the relative security of Field Cornet de Villier*s 
ward might lend vocal support to Potgieter*s and Coetzer*s 
initiatives, but others more exposed to the immediate consequences 
of such acts - notably the inhabitants of Komati - were even more 
vociferously opposed (45). They had, as they observed in a
(43) S.S. 83, 97,'Report of Commission1, 2 April 1866.
(44) Personal communication A.M. Dlamini, 5 Jan. 1973.
(45) S.S. 83, 84-5, P.D. de Villiers and 19 others to C. Potgieter
and P.J. Coetzer, 20 March 1866.
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petition to the Executive Council, been through this all before. 
Their Honours had only, "to investigate the course of the affair 
with Sincoeba /Somcuba7 and Omsoet /Msuthf<£7 from September 1849 
till now /to see7 what the case of Ballien /Mbilin£7 would bring 
forth." If the lessons of experience were to count for anything 
Mbilini should be extradited forthwith (46).
The petition, which was an interesting comment on the impact of 
Mswati’s strong-arm tactics of the early 1850s, made an immediate 
impression. De Beer at once took heart and set out for Swaziland 
at the end of the next month. His companion, significantly, 
was H.J. Viljoen, Field Cornet of Komati, and chief signatory 
of the petition (47). Coetzer and Potgieter were equally taken 
aback. Opposition of this kind they obviously had not bargained 
for, and they were soon compelled - under protest - to resume 
attendance at the committee meetings of De Beer, and to gfive 
their sanction to his recent Swaziland trip (48). Potgieter’s 
and Coetzer’s answer to this setback was to appeal to the top.
In a letter to the Executive Council they recapitulated on their 
earlier grounds for accepting Mbilini, and added that Mbilini 
was promising to be enormously valuable as a military auxiliary. 
Already, they noted, the "Mantatees" (i.e. the Sotho) were 
living in fear. T j demonstrate the depth of their feelings they
(46) S.S. 79, R 609/66, H.J. Viljoen and others to Ex. Co.,
6 June 1866.
(47) S.S. 77, 5-7, R 469/66, J. De Beer to Ex. Co., 28 April 1866.
(48) S.S. 77, 9-15, Meeting of Committee following request of 
J. De Beer, 28 April 1866. (De Beer also brought back a 
number of Swazi representatives with him to ensure that 
there would be no subsequent grounds for misunderstanding).
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concluded with a threat. As they were "always in conflict 
with the Diplomatic Agent" they said, "and could not see eye to 
eye with him on a single issue", they wished to be relieved of 
their positions on the Committee forthwith (49).
It is unclear how the Executive Council responded to this 
ultimatum. Their sympathies evidently lay with De Beer, as can 
be seen by Commandant-General P.J. Kruger's reply to the Komati 
petition. In this he concurred in their assessment of the 
danger entailed in harbouring Mbilini, and even went as far as 
to predict a violent confrontation with the Swazi, whose outcome, 
he implied, would be far from certain, since the other districts 
would te unlikely to lend a hand to rescue Lydenburg from the 
consequences of its own folly (50). No misunderstanding there, 
or so it would seem. Yet there must have been some element of 
ambiguity in the Executive Council's attitude, since Mbilini 
continued to reside in Lydenburg for another six months or 
more (51).
As the records are unhelpful, one can only speculate at the 
reasons why. Most important, probably, was the reluctance of 
the Executive Council to alienate such formidable figures as 
Coetzer and Potgieter, for this could have landed them with a 
source of trouble for many years to come. Also influential
(49) S.S. 77, 18-20, R 469/66, C. Potgieter and P.J. Coetzer to 
Ex. Co., 3 May 1866.
(50) S.S. 83, 145-6, S.P.J. Kruger to H.J. Viljoen, 9 June 1866.
(51) Mbilini was still in P.D de Villier's ward at the end of 
December 1866 - S.S. 82, R 1278/66, P.D. de Villiers to 
Pretorius, 23 Dec. 1866.
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must have been the apparent equanimity with which the Swazi 
accepted Mbilini’s residence in Lydenburg, after their initial 
abortive attempts to secure his return (52). Swazi restraint 
however was, in itself, predicated on the very internal 
divisions within the Republic to which we have just been 
referring. Had the Lydenburg authorities been sufficiently of 
one mind to have backed Mbilini wholeheartedly, and had they 
installed him in Somcuba’s fortress, then the Swazi would have 
been a good deal less accommodating, for Mbilini would have 
represented a far greater strategic threat, and an infinitely 
more inviting prospect for potential refugees. As it was 
however, the strong opposition to Mbilini within the Republic, 
and the equivocal attitude displayed towards him by the 
authorities, constituted a powerful deterrent to all would-be 
defectors, and Mbilini’s band-waggon never even began to roll. 
From every point of view the resulting situation is instructive. 
Internal Boer divisions had induced a paralysis of action which 
left Mbilini in a sort of no-man’s land of indecision. The 
stalemate was to no-one's liking, and yet could be resolved by 
none. None, that is,save Mbilini himself, who eventually tired 
of the insecurity of his ambivalent position and departed for 
Zululand, from where, in fulfilment of Coetzer's prediction, 
he became the scourge of the Republic’s south-eastern borders 
for the next thirteen years.
(52) For a time the regents tried to get Mbilini back to "milk 
for” Ludvonga. S.S. 77, 11, Meeting of Committee,28 April 
1866 ; S.S. 77, 3, R 469/66, De Beer and others to President, 
2 May 1866. By early September however they had reconciled 
themselves to Mbilini's presence in the Republic, S.S. 81, 
238-9, R 1142/66, P.J. Coetzer to Ex. Co., 17 Nov. 1866,
Encl. minutes of meeting between De Beer and Swazi represen­
tatives, 4 Sept. 1866.
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As fears of Mbilini slowly faded in Swaziland, other issues 
claimed more of the regents’ attention. Prominent among these 
was the Trans-vaal border question. Traditionally the most 
sensitive barometer of Republican/Swazi relations, the border 
had swiftly registered the change in political climate that 
followed Mswati’s death. Scarcely a month after learning the 
news, the Republic’s Executive Council had met to appoint a 
Commission to re-open the entire border question (53), and the 
moment the season permitted, this was threading its way across 
the burnt winterveld of the eastern Trans-vaal to meet with 
regents’ representatives. By the middle of June, despite initial 
difficulties caused by the non-appearance of the Swazi delegates, 
border negotiations were underway (54).
The 1866 negotiations have been consistently underrated in 
Trans-vaal and Swazi historiography. Kuper ignores them, 
Symington and Garson miss their significance, and Matsebula 
distorts them (55). Yet they constitute the single most 
important link in the chain of treaties and agreements that 
confined the Swazi kingdom to within its present borders. Here, 
for the first time, one finds a territorial treaty being entered 
into by the Swazi as a result of Boer initiative rather than 
their own. Here, too, in sharp contrast to earlier agreements, 
one sees the balance of advantage tipping decisively in favour
(53) U.R.2., U.R.B., 30 Jan. 1866, Art. 8.
(54) S.A.A.R. Transvaal No. 6, (Cape Town, 1956), 221-2, Bylaag
82 (a) Aanhangsel I, Minutes of Commission, 18 June 1866.
(55) Kuper, Aristocracy, 20; Garson, ’Swaziland', 272; Symington,
’Swaziland *, 46-8; Matsebula, History, 21, 51-5.
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of the Republic through the detailed border delimitation that 
they entailed. Effectively embodied in them, in short, was a 
decisive limiting of Swaziland’s territorial jurisdiction, and 
of the strategic flexibility by which this had hitherto been 
based.
So much is clear. Much less easy to understand is why the 
negotiations were ever permitted to get underway. A glance at 
the last year of Mswati’s reign illustrates the problem. Then 
Mswati had taken the final steps in renouncing the territorial 
provisions of the 1855 agreement. Having earlier defied the 
border delimitation in the north-west, he now went on to repudiate 
its application in the west and south west as well. Whatever 
the' long-term limitations of such a strategy, there was no 
doubting its short-term success. No-one in the area was 
prepared to challenge Mswati, and, beyond making a face-saving 
offer to negotiate, nothing more was done (56). The cession, 
in effect, had fallen into abeyance. This was the situation at 
Mswati’s death. Within nine months, however, everything had 
changed. A border commission had come and gone; a boundary had 
been defined along almost the whole of Swaziland’s western 
border; and Swaziland's scope for manoeuvre had all but disappeared. 
What still demands: explanation, therefore, is how a change of 
this magnitude could be so tamely accepted, and how such an 
unequal settlement was so easily imposed.
(56) Below, 237, Note 62.
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Existing writings shed little light on the problem. Few, in 
fact, recognise that the problem exists. In most Trans-vaal 
historiography the agreement is seen as slotting neatly and 
unexceptionally into an onward white advance, and excites little 
in the way of additional comment.. Among Swazi historians it 
elicits a broadly similar response, being viewed as simply one 
more step in the unilateral expropriation of a helpless Swazi 
kingdom, in its own way equally unremarkable, or deserving of 
comment. Aside from inadequate research, the weakness of each 
of these analyses is their crudely deterministic approach.
What both do, in effect, is to invoke the argument of an irresist- 
able white superiority, and to assume that this constitutes an 
adequate explanation of events. This is hardly satisfactory.
Even if one accepts that the progressive curtailment of Swaziland’s 
political autonomy was in the long term unavoidable, it was by 
no means a unilinear of continuous progression. Local initiatives, 
situational variations, individual weaknesses and strengths all 
had their part in the way things developed, with discontinuities 
and contradictions as much a feature of the historical process 
as any systematic expression of white dominance. Only in these 
broader terms can the significance of the 1866 negotiations be 
properly appreciated, and it is in these terms that it is now 
proposed they be examined.
From the timing of the cession it is clear that the death of 
Mswati was of considerable importance in getting it ratified, 
although this has often been obscured by confusion about the
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date of Mswati’s death (57). The exact way in which this 
happened, however, is not as straight-forward as it might at 
first seem. The example of earlier minorities might suggest 
that disputes over the succession, and weak regency control, were 
the immediate causes of the Swazi volte-face, but there is little 
evidence to show that these had much effect. The flight of 
Mbilini illustrates the point. On the face of it, the presence 
of Mbilini in the Republic should have strengthened its hand 
greatly in its dealings with Swaziland. Yet in practice the 
Trans-vaalers were never able to realise Mbilini’s full diplomatic 
potential. Partly through poor intelligence, which prevented 
exploitation of the issue at the appropriate time, partly 
through fears of a Somcuba style backlash, which inhibited 
similar efforts later, Mbilini's flight never had the impact on 
Swazi/Trans-vaal relations that might have been anticipated. 
Similar qualifications have to be made to assumptions of 
divided leadership and weak control, drawn by analogy from 
earlier minorities. Despite occasional examples of both, what 
is more remarkable about the Ludvonga regency is the firmness 
and assurance with which it was conducted throughout. Internal , 
tensions, in short, cannot be regarded as decisive influences 
on the final outcome of the 1866 negotiations. To explain this
(57) Sw.A., Honey, ’History’, 36; Bryant, Olden Times, 337;
Matsebula, History, 23; M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds,),
The Oxford History of South Africa, (2 vols. Oxford 1969-71), 
Vol. I, 346, all of whom give 1868 as the date of Mswati’s 
death. Symington, ’Swaziland’ 48, V. Rooyen, 'Verhouding’, 
77-8 and Garson, ’Swaziland’, 271, are much nearer the mark 
with 1866, but do not relate it explicitly to the cession. 
A.C. Myburgh, Carolina, 95, who gives 1865 is the closest 
of all, but fails to mention the cession. For the correct 
date see above, 212.
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we must probe deeper still.
Probably the best place to start is with the regents themselves. 
Mention has already been made of the regents’ caution and 
political conservatism, and this seems certain to have had 
bearing on the 1866 cession. From the early 1860s on, there 
are signs of a gap opening up between the thinking of Mswati 
and his senior councillors on the question of what to do about 
the border. Where Mswati was prepared to live dangerously to 
evade the restrictions of the 1855 agreement, the regents’ reflex 
response was to seek a more stable compromise settlement.
Their watchword was caution, and to such conservatism, amplified 
still further by the safety first imperatives of regency 
politics, may be attributed much of the inspiration of the 1866 
settlement (58).
It would be wrong however to label the regents’ attitude as 
totally negative. Although probably more cautious than Mswati 
by virtue of age and experience, as well as more inclined to 
cling to the Trans-vaal alliance on the grounds of precedent 
alone, there was also a far more positive side to their think­
ing. What ultimately seems to have underlain their fears and 
hesitations was the realisation of a very real shift in the 
balance of power in the region, which had been going on 
imperceptibly throughout the last years of Mswati's reign. As 
long as Mswati lived, its implications were hardly felt. On
(58) S.S. 66, R 1237/65, W.F. and G.H. Joubert and H.T. Buhrmann 
to Pretorius and Ex. Co., 21 Nov. 1865. In this the writers 
give a brief run-down of the attitudes to the Republic of 
the leading regents.
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the contrary, Mswati*s personal weight coupled with a resurgence 
of internal feuding within the Trans-vaal had facilitated a 
series of striking tactical advances in Mswati*s final years.
But appearances, as the regents realised, were deceptive.
Apart from the healing of both Boer and Zulu divisions which 
was apparent in these years, other less conspicuous changes 
were also making themselves felt, which were ultimately to 
transform Swaziland's entire strategic position. At their most 
general these can be described as the capitalist penetration, 
and the population, of the southern and eastern Trans-vaal.
From the earliest days of white settlement in the Trans-vaal 
one of the key weaknesses of Boer communities in the area had 
been their lack of human resources, and their thin spread over 
the land. The general significance of this for black/white 
relations in the region is obvious. As regards territorial 
rights or contested boudaries, however, there was an added 
dimension to the problem, arising from the inability of the 
Trans-vaalers physically to occupy much of the land which they 
claimed. By the 1860s these weaknesses were being gradually 
removed. In established areas, population density was perceptibly 
building up, while into areas such as those acquired by the 
1855 cession, a steady trickle of immigration was beginning to 
flow. As examples of this process one can cite f'he districts 
of Wakkerstroom and Lower Komati (Map 9). Not settled by whites 
until 1853, Wakkerstroom started acquiring sufficient population 
even to qualify for consideration as a separate district only 
in 1859. Thereafter, with the rapid expansion in wool farming,
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it grew rapidly in numbers (59). A roughly similar pattern 
holds for Lower Komati too. Virtually unoccupied in 1858, the 
area was the scene of continuous quarrelling between Boer and 
Swazi graziers less than a decade later (60) . With the notable 
exception of the far north, this was the pattern of the 1860s: 
growing capitalist penetration; expanding white population; 
increasingly effective occupation; and an almost imperceptible 
tilting of the strategic balance against the Swazi.
In the end perhaps even Mswati began to realise. Having 
consistently cultivated fluidity and imprecision in border 
affairs since the late 1850s - to the extent of even settling 
other groups of Boers on the territory he had ceded, in an 
effort to create new interests in conflict with old (61) - he 
suddenly switched, a few months before his death to demanding 
the total evacuation of the area by whites (62). If this did 
signify recognition of the danger, however, it was exceedingly 
belated. The regents by comparison had drawn the same conclusions 
much earlier. As they seem to have realised only too well, 
tactical flexibility of the sort so dear to Mswati could only 
be purchased at the expense of more fundamental interests.
What Swaziland needed now was not a fudging of political limits 
but some attempt at their definition, and it is in the regents' 
appreciation of this that lies probably the most important
(59) Van Rooyen, ’Verhouding', 44-6; Potgieter, 'Vestiging*, 65-6.
(60) Van Rooyen, 'Verhouding', 78; Potgieter, 'Vestiging', 66-7; 
see also below, 246.
(61) See for example the cases of Gideon Joubert and C.J. Vermaak - 
L.L. II, 165, A. O'Reilly to C. Potgieter, 24 Feb. 1866:
S.S. 91, 81-2, C.J. Vermaak to President and Ex. Co., 30 Aug.
1867; Berliner Missionsberichte, 1860, 62.
(62) L.L. II, 34, G.J. Joubert to C. Potgieter, 4 March 1865; S.S.
66, R 1237/65, H.T. Buhrmann to President and Ex. Co., 23 Nov. 1865.
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single reason for their readiness to endorse delimitation.
Any remaining doubts on the matter were removed by the situation 
in Zululand. Throughout the late 1850s and early 1860s Zulu 
foreign policy had drifted rudderless, lurching first this way 
and then that, in response to conflicting sectional demands. 
Mpande appealed to Natal and the Republic for aid against 
Cetshwayo; Cetshwayo replied in the same coin against Mpande, 
and neither dared risk any foreign adventure for fear of 
provoking external intervention on the side of the other (63).
As the 1860s wore on, however, this situation began to change. 
Mpande!s internal support had always been limited, and, as 
hopes :>f external intervention began to fade, it dwindled still 
further. By 1863, if the volume of appeals to Natal is anything 
to go by, he was beginning to give up the unequal struggle, 
and four years later his abdication from affairs was complete, 
as was formally ratified by his bestowal of a headring - the 
symbol of adulthood and responsibility - on Cetshwayo (64).
Firmer direction internally soon communicated itself to external 
affairs. Where Zulu diplomacy had once been the vehicle of 
factional rivalries, it was now refashioned into an instrument 
of national policy. Thus in 1868, for the first time for over 
a decade, the Zulu actively intervened in the affairs of Delagoa 
Bay, aligning themselves with the Portuguese in an anti-Swazi
(63) Above, 115-6, 185-6.
(64) S;N.A. 1/7/6, 35, Statement of messengers from Mpande and 
Cetshwayo, 9 Jan. 1867.
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axis, and three years later they went so far as to demand 
reparations from the Mabudu for an attack that had been made 
on the Portuguese (65). More ominously still, from the Swazi 
point of view, Cetshwayo!s gaze also began to switch back 
across the Pongola. In 1866 he sent a force to ratify the 
succession, and to demand cattle of the Swazi, while settlement 
north of the Pongola was simultaneously stepped up (66). All 
of which again took its toll of the regents’ self-confidence, 
and contributed to the climate of unease from which the cession 
was born.
In the south, as the cession clearly signals, Swaziland was in 
retreat. In the north, by contrast, developments had an entirely 
different look. In 1866 the Swazi launched new attacks on 
Madolo, and in 1868, when all but two of the Delagoa Bay 
chiefdoms ganged up against the fort, they offered their support 
in return for recognition of their territorial claims (67).
The Portuguese refused, partly in anticipation of Zulu support, 
and in.the middle of 1868 the Swazi began insisting on the 
payment of tribute, and backed this up by an attack into Lualana
(65) A.H.M. Cod. 153, 2 FB 9, Letter No. 45 Simao to G.G. 18 Aug. 
1868; ibid, Simao to G.G. 13 Sept. 1868, 120v - 119v Sec.
Mil.; C.O. 179/106, Encl. in encl. in No. 1.1, extracts 
letter D. Leslie to T. Shepstone - extracts for Aug. 6 and 
24, 1871; S.N.A. 1/1/2, D. Leslie to S.N.A. 28 July 1871.
(66) Above, 220; below, 277.
(67) A.H.M. Cod 345, 2 FB 3, Pacifico to Commandant of Battalion,
11 June 1868, 16 & 16v; A.H.M. Cod 153, 2 FB 9, Pacifico to 
G.G., Letter No. 48, 16 Aug. 1866, 37~39; ibid, 45-6, Pacifico 
to G.G., 8 Feb. 1867; A.H.M. Cod. 153, 2 F T T 7  Simao to G.G., 
22 Aug. 1868, 126v, Sec. Mil.; ibid, 62-4, Simao to G.G., 
Letter No. 45, 18 Aug. 1868.
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and Biloane (68). Developments in the north-west closely match 
those in the east. In the latter part of 1866 Swazi armies 
mounted perhaps their most devastating foray yet into the eastern 
Trans-vaal lowveld. Crossing the Great Letaba River, they 
attacked the Phalaborwa under Majaji, the Lovedu of Madjadji, 
and then swept back along the escarpment to engulf the Nkuna of 
Shiluvane, and possibly the Narene and Pedi Maxakala under 
Sekororo and Mafefe (69). The Swazi, or at any rate the Hhohho 
section, were jubilant. So much so that they decided to repeat 
their performance against the Pedi as well. The ostensible 
reason for this expedition was to restore the pretender, Mampuru, 
to the throne. Mampuru, the rightful successor Sekwati, had 
been ousted from his inheritance by Sekhukhune after Sekwati had
(68) A.H.M. Cod. 153, 2 FB 9, Simao to G.G., 13 Sept. 1868, 
120v-119v Sec. Mil; ibid, Letter No. 46, Simao to G.G.,
18 Aug.1868, 65 & 65v; A.H.M. Cod. 153, 2 FB 9, Sec. Civil 
Simao to Moc. 24 April 1869, 75-6.
(69) For the date of the raid see A.B.B., 243, Albasini.to 
Ibramo David, 4 Dec. 1866, which also mentions Modjadji as 
being attacked. Kwahlakwahla, in a message from Mswati 
(S.S. 90, R 789/67, Minutes of meeting, 30 July 1867) 
mentions Umtjatji and Motjatja, Sotho and Tsonga respectively, 
as being attacked the previous winter. Motjatji presumably 
must refer to Majaji, chief of the Phalaborwa - E.J. Krige, 
'Note on the Phalaborwa and their Morula Complex' African 
Studies, II (1937), 358. For the attack on the Nkuna see 
Junod, 1Ba-Thonga', 239-40. A rumour .of an attack on 
Modjadji, Sekororo and Mafefe is to be found in Wa. A.,
Vol. 1, File Landdrost Correspondent 1866, C. Potgieter 
(Landdrost Lydenburg) to A.A. O'Reilly, 6 D';c. 1866.
Narene traditions record an attack by the Swazi at some 
time during this period, but it is possible these refer to 
a previous attack - see N.J. Van Warmelo, 'The Banarene of 
Sekororo,’ Union of South Africa, Department of Native 
Affairs, Ethnological Publications No. 13 (Pretoria, 1944),
29. The Swazi subsequently claimed to a Boer Commission 
that this attack had initially been despatched against 
Magulu (who I have been unable to identify), and only then 
went on to attack Matjatji - S.S. 140, 322-3, Minutes of 
Commission, 23 Jan. 1872. Further evidence of Swazi raids 
in this period is to be found in Krige, 'Origins', but 
these are undifferentiated and erroneously dated to 1857-60.
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died in 1860, and had subsequently fled to Swaziland to seek 
protection and aid (70). In 1869, the Hhohho section, against 
the advice of Thandile, decided the time was ripe for his re- 
installation. Thandile's objection was, that without the 
ritual protection of a mature king, the expedition was simply 
courting disaster. Other reasons however probably weighed 
equally heavily. From her 'southern' perspective, it must 
have seemed almost criminal to expose Swaziland either to Zulu 
retaliation or the withdrawal of Boer protection which such 
activities might bring. But the princes had other ideas.
Spurred on by Mswati's Hhohho indvuna Matsafeni Mdluli, and by 
the prospect of loot, they overruled Thandile, and plans 
the campaign went ahead. The expedition that followed fulfilled 
Thandile's gloomiest predictions. After arriving at the Lulu 
mountains, they were lured in until entirely surrounded by 
hills. Then suddenly they were set on by rifle fire from all 
sides. As one Swazi informant tells,
The Princes fell like the leaves in autumn, 
and the country mourned the insupportable 
loss; poor and rich; noble and common; 
valiant and villains fell alike.
The battle of Ewulu had been irrevocably lost (71).
(70) Berliner Missionsberichte, 1870, 204; S.S. 140, 323, Minutes 
of Commission 23 Jan. 1872. Both Hunt ('BaPedi', 293-4) 
and H.0. Mb'nnig (The Pedi, (Pretoria 1967), 25-6), are aware 
of Mampuru's flight, but not the subsequent Swazi invasion.
(71) Interview Prince Makhungu Dlamini, 15 May 1970, Ezulwini, 
Swaziland; interview Maboya Fakudze, from which the details 
about Thandile and Matsafeni also come; Junod, 'Ba-Thonga', 
240; Berliner Mlssionsberichte, 1870, 204; interview Maduba 
Dlamini., 15 May 1970, Ezulwini, Swaziland; interview 
Mabuntana Mdluli and John Mcoshwa Zulu, 22 June 1970,
Hhohho, Swaziland.
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All this had extensive repercussions on Swaziland's internal 
policies, although there is some disagreement as to how they 
made themselves felt. According to Swazi oral traditions, 
Thandile's policies were now vindicated, and her voice of sanity 
again predominated in Swaziland's affairs; Matsafeni, for his 
part, was disgraced, and forced to absent himself from Swaziland 
until popular indignation died down (72). With hindsight this 
is obviously how things should have worked out, but in practice 
Swaziland was obliged to suffer the ignominy of two further 
defeats, before Thandile's warnings could make themselves heard. 
Rather than damping the ardour of the northern regiments the 
Ewulu disaster seems, in fact, to have inflamed it, and gave 
rise to renewed pressure for campaigns to erase the bitter 
taste of defeat. In the space of a few months two further 
expeditions had been undertaken to the north and north-east.
The first was an attack on Bilene, which, although unsuccessful, 
at least stopped short of outright disaster (73). The second 
was Swaziland's long-awaited raid into the Zoutpansberg. Ever 
since 1867 this had been under consideration, after Albasini's 
plea for help against the Venda, who were fast overrunning Boer 
settlements there (74). However, the Swazi decision to come 
had little to do with Albasini's plight. As the remaining 
Zoutpansberg Boers found to their cost, the Swazi were as apt
(72) Above, 241, note 71.
(73) Junod, 'Ba-Thonga', 240.
(74) S.S. 89, R 732/67, Albasini to President and Ex. Co., 
20 July 1867; De Vaal, 'Rol', 102, 109.
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to attack the chiefdoms supporting them as those they opposed, 
and their predicament became, if anything worse. The Swazi's 
first target was nevertheless Maghato, the arch-villain of the 
Zoutpansberg Boers. As befitted the recent vanquisher of 
Albasini, he proved a far more redoubtable opponent than the 
Swazi were accustomed to meet. In a violent assault, beginning 
on October 21st, both sides lost heavily, and with honours more 
or less even, the Swazi withdrew to find more vulnerable prey (75). 
Their troubles however were only just beginning. Rankling from 
two previous Swazi attacks, and forwarned by events in the 
Zoutspansberg, the lowveld chiefdoms were already preparing 
for the Swazi return. As the Swazi army wound its leisurely 
way home, its every move was plotted by lowveld spies. Finally, 
as it camped on Tsulamedi Hill by the Makundwe River, they made 
their last preparations for attack. Oblivious to their danger 
throughout, the Swazi were doubly oblivious now. Bemused by 
hemp, and sharpening their spears, they were caught completely 
unawares, and almost entirely wiped out (76).
After three defeats in twelve months Swaziland's military 
reputation lay in tatters, as a raid by Msuthfo drummed home 
the following year. Msuthfo had nursed a grievance against
(75) S.S. 115, 95, ? to Ex. Co., 1 Nov. 1869; ibid, 100,
N. Langer (?) to President, 1 Nov. 1869; S.S. 116,
R.A. van Nispen to President, 10 Dec. 1869. De Vaal's
only reference to this ('Rol', 122) is taken from G.M. Theal, 
History of South Africa 1486-1872, (5 vols. London 1888- 
1900) 5, 222, who is evidently drawing on documents I have 
not seen.
(76) Junod, 'Ba-Thonga', 240; N.J. Van Warmelo,'The Bathlabine 
of MoxobSya,1 Union of South Africa, D.N.A. Ethnological 
Publications No. 11, (Pretoria 1944), 94-5; interview Ndambi 
Mkhonta; interview Maboya Fakudze.
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the Swazi ever since they had been responsible for the death of 
his father, Somcuba, nearly fifteen years before. He had been 
absent when that raid had taken place, and after a brief sojourn 
near Lydenburg had gone on to swell the numbers of Sekhukhune’s 
fast growing state. From this position of security the events 
of 1869 had convinced both him and Sekhukhune, that the time 
was ripe for revenge. At the beginning of August he took the 
plunge, leading his forces against the border village of 
Eshangweni, and either killing or abducting the bulk of its 
inhabitants. The Swazi were powerless to retaliate. By the 
time a large enough force was gathered, Msuthfu was already in 
the Lulu mountains, and although a token pursuit was ordered, 
it was easily beaten off by the Pedi guns (77). Nothing remained 
for -the Swazi to do except to make a rather truculent demand 
on the Boers to deny freedom of transit to any further Pedi 
raiders (78).
This succession of reverses should have devalued Swazi assistance 
in the eyes of the S.A.R., and intensified pressure on Swaziland's 
borders. In fact it did not, at least in any direct or obvious 
way. To begin with, it is unlikely that many Republican officials
(77) S.N.I, N 105/79, Report by G. Roth, Landdrost Lydenburg 
n.d.; Berliner Missionsberichte, 1862, 92; ibid, 1872,
10-13; Myburgh, Carolina, 95-6. For the date of this raid 
see L.L. 180, Dagboek 1868-78, 1 Sept. 1870, in which is 
the complaint of D.J.G. Coetzer to the Landdrost of Lyden­
burg that between August 1 and 14, 1870, commandos from 
Msuthfu and the Swazi had crossed his land four times, and
S.S. 152, Agreement between J. Schildhuis and Nodwada (?) 
etc., 27 Aug. 1870, where it is also referred to. See also 
P.P. 1877, C. 1748, 249, Encl. 2 in No. 188, in which "an 
old resident in the country" talks of the repulse of two 
Swazi raids on Sekhukhune in 1870.
(78) S.S. 152, 162, Extract minutes in matter of Umswaas v. 
Baviaan, 27 Aug. 1870; S.S. 131, 262, A.F. Jansen, Landdrost 
Lydenburg, to President and Ex. Co., 16 Jan. 1871.
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ever heard of these engagements. The Bilerte expedition they 
almost certainly knew nothing about, while the lowveld disaster 
is not recorded in either government sources or in the Berlin 
missionaries' accounts. Even if some rumours had percolated 
through, it is doubtful whether they would have been reflected 
in action. The Republic's own situation was too precarious 
for that. In the north, Republican officials were encountering 
precisely the same problems as the Swazi had done, if anything, 
in even more exaggerated form. Political combination among 
African chiefdoms, the growth of Pedi power, and the widespread 
diffusion of firearms together combined to create a maze of 
difficulties from which there was little hope of immediate 
escape. Reliable African support in this situation remained 
at a premium, which, in turn, allowed Swaziland to retain much 
of the bargaining power to which it had earlier laid claim.
There were various ways in which this state of affairs showed: 
the latitude allowed to the Swazi in the raid into the Zoutpans­
berg may be taken as one example; the relative freedom with 
which they rampaged across the border is another; and the 
impunity with which an armed force was able to barge unannounced 
into the startled village of Lydenburg to make known its 
demands, is yet one more (79). Most important, however, were 
the territorial concessions the S.A.R. were obliged to make.
(79) Berliner Missionsberichte, 1870, 180, 425-6; S.S. 152, 164, 
Agreement between J. Schildhuis and Nodwada (?) etc., 27 Aug. 
1870; 162, Extract minutes in matter of Umswaas v. Baviaan,
27 Aug. 1870. A garbled version of what seems to be the 
same episode is also to be found in Myburgh, Carolina, 102-3.
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These were less significant in the far north where there was 
little white settlement to be threatened. In the Komati winter- 
veld, on the other hand, the situation was more difficult. As 
early as 1853 the Hollander, J. Stuart, had seen this as an 
ideal spot for expatriate settlement, (80) and while an unhealthy 
summer climate had eventually scotched that idea, it was still 
highly prized by Boer farmers for winter grazing. That, however, 
was precisely the Swazi point of view, and after re-asserting 
their claims in 1858, they made it clear that this was one 
place from which they would refuse to be dislodged. This 
remained their attitude even after title deeds had been issued, 
and Boer farmers trickled in. Instead they subjected the 
intruders to a campaign of harrassment, until they were 
eventually forced to evacuate. All of which placed the Republican 
authorities in something of a quandary. On the one side, they 
were faced with a band of vociferously aggrieved farmers. On 
the other, by an African ally whose hostility they dare not 
arouse. In the end, they settled for a typically unsatisfactory 
compromise. De facto control was allowed to revert to the 
Swazi; Republican claims were re-asserted but without being 
enforced; and the Boer farmers were left to fend for themselves.
The conflict, in other words, was left to simmer on, but at
such a temperature as would hopefully prevent it boiling over (81).
To the south of the Komati things were different again. The
(80) Stuart, Hollandsche, 263-4, 431.
(81) See for instance L.L. Ill, 417, O.J. van Niekerk to 
C. Potgieter, 6 Oct. 1869; S.S. 150, 126-7, Naude to 
President and Ex. Co., 26 Nov. 1872.
247
border was undisputed, there was no sign of Swazi irridentism, 
and such tension as did exist was the product of Republican 
rather than Swazi demands. It may be that the reverses of 1869 
contributed something to this situation, but it is unlikely 
that they can have affected it much. In the first place this 
pattern of relations had been in force since 1866, which left 
little room for these later events to have much effect. In the 
second, developments in the north and south had proceeded on 
such divergent lines since that date, that it seems to have 
suited both governments to treat them as separate and distinct, 
so that there was remarkably little backwash from events in 
either direction. Northern explanations for these southern 
phenomena, therefore, clearly cannot suffice, and the reasons 
for. Swaziland1s defensive southern strategy must be sought in 
the south itself.
As we have already seen, the two distinctive features of 
Swaziland’s southern situation were the persisting threat from 
the Zulu, and the political and demographic consolidation of the 
S.A.R. in the south. It was these pressures that had first 
given rise to the 1866 cession, and it was their combined weight 
that continued to impose a strategy of restraint. If anything, 
their power to intimidate had grown since Mswati’s death. Not 
only were Cetshwayo’s aggressive intentions that much clearer (82), 
but political pressure from the S.A.R. had also continued to 
mount. The most obvious manifestation of the latter was
(82) Below, 274.
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McCorkindale’s New Scotland settlement in Swaziland’s south­
west (83) (Map 9). New Scotland, it is true, did not exactly 
prosper. Founded in 1867, it was immediately caught up in 
Volksraad red tape, and never attracted the numbers that 
McCorkindale intended (84). But even in this arrested state its 
presence was sufficient to spotlight many of the problems with 
which the Swazi were increasingly being faced, and to commit 
them even more firmly to a policy of containment and restraint.
What worried the Swazi most about McCorkindale’s scheme was 
not so much the closer settlement that might result, but the 
political thinking which it seemed to represent. In detail 
this varied from person to person, and in McCorkindale's case 
even with whomever he spoke to. When he broached the scheme 
to Pretorius, for instance, he promised the opening up of 
communications to the sea, and the loosening of commercial 
dependence on Natal (85). In his conversations with the British, 
on the other hand, he held out the prospect of extensive
(83) Alexander McCorkindale’s career in South Africa had begun 
with a rather dubious scheme to promote the large-scale 
immigration of indentured orphans into Natal, in return for 
which he would receive a free grant of land on which to 
settle them and have them work. The Colonial Office, not 
surprisingly, turned it down - C.O. 179/18, Petition,
A. McCorkindale to S. S., n.d.; C.O. 179/41, McCorkindale 
to C.O., 2, 12, 24 January; 12, 19 February; 11 August;
13 and 21 September 1855. Thereafter, the only record of 
McCorkindale is as a cattle trader (as unloved as ever) in 
Zululand- S.N.A. 1/6/3, Papers relating to Cetshwayo 1862- 
78, Statement by Gwantsha and Magwasa, Government messengers 
returning from Cetshwayo, 27 April 1862.
(84) Kruger, ’Weg', 174-84; P.P. 1878-9, C. 2316, 24-5, Encl. 2 
in No. 15, Memorandum, H.C. Shepstone to Frere 31 Dec. 1878.
(85) Kruger, ’Weg’, 174-7.
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secessions from the S.A.R., and the revival of British influence
north of the Vaal (86). And when he spoke to the Swazi he
seemed to hint at arrangements to preserve the Swazi from the Zulu (87).
For all their surface contradictions, however, these proposals
had a common theme in the idea of opening up communications to
the sea, and it was this which was viewed by the Swazi with
such particular alarm.
Their anxiety was well founded. In order to get to Delagoa 
Bay, McCorkindale had to gain access through Swaziland, and for 
this he needed control of a land corridor to Lourenjo Marques.
Apart from the question of extra cessions that were involved, 
this held a more general threat for Swaziland's future.
Whatever McCorkindale or anyone else might say, it was obvious 
that the moment these links were established, the land in between 
would become all the more desirable, and Swaziland would come 
under continuous pressure to cede more and more. If the regents 
had any doubts on that score they were dispelled by McCorkindale 
himself. From the moment his colonists set foot in New Scotland 
the Swazi regents were subjected to an endless stream of demands, 
until, in desperation, they appealed to the authorities in
(86) G.H.N., Vol. 595, No. 92, 48-9, Wodehouse to L.G. Natal,
19 Sept. 1868. Perhaps the most transparently dishonest 
part of this entire scheme was his claim that he was acting 
in the interests of all those who, like Britain, were 
opposed to the continuance of the slave trade.
(87) Ibid.
250
Natal (88). McCorkindale, they complained, was continually 
demanding land inside the Swazi line. "We object" they went 
on, "but he perseveres, and we see that sooner or later he will 
occupy this country. It seems useless for us to urge the fact 
upon him that he has not yet fully occupied the country he 
states himself to have purchased from the President of the 
Transvaal. He wants more, and takes little notice of our 
objections." (89)
Even if one dismisses the language of the message as owing more 
to Shepstone than the Swazi, the depth of concern can still be 
gauged from its substance and the way in which it was delivered. 
However much they might try to obscure the issue by dwelling on 
McCorkindale’s British origins, what the regents were attempting 
was to secure redress against the S.A.R. by appealing for 
British intercession. As such, it represents a milestone in 
Swazi diplomacy. In the past, the Swazi had appealed for British 
intervention often enough, but this was the first time it had 
been invoked against the S.A.R. rather than the Zulu. It was,
(88) McCorkindale in fact claimed that he had obtained a land 
corridor through Swaziland, together with additional 
cessions on the border of New Scotland. The Swazi however 
always denied it - S.C., Pkt. 6(b), No. 4, Minutes of 
meeting W.F. Joubert, H.T. Buhrmann with Swaziland regents,
19 June 1868; see also below, note 112; - apart from one
inexplicable message from Makwasidile - S.N.A., Vol 1/1/20, 
Encl. in No. 22, 30 May 1870— ; for Makwasidile see below, 254. 
The disparity between Boer and Swazi claims may possibly 
be explained by a letter written by David Leslie to The Times 
of London, reported in De Volksstem on 4 May 1874, in 
which it was claimed that an attempt had been made by a 
certain Englishman to acquire the corridor by subterfuge, 
through acquiring timber rights in the first instance, and 
claiming ownership later.
(89) P.P. 1878-9, C. 2220 Appendix 2, encl. in encl. in No. 2, 
Statement of Swazi messengers, 31 May 1869.
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in short, a telling commentary on Swaziland’s changing diplomatic 
position. The significance which the Swazi themselves attached 
to the shift is also reflected in the composition of the 
delegation. Not since 1852, in an earlier period of crisis, 
had the Swazi despatched a body of similar distinction (90). 
Present in its ranks were Mhlaba, referred to in the message 
as brother, but in fact insila of Mswati; Mantinwane, the indvuna 
of the Lobamba royal homestead; Konjane, the indvuna of the 
Nkanini royal homestead, as well as an assortment of lesser 
dignitaries. There was no doubt meant to be left about the 
gravity of its mission.
In the event, the immediate danger to Swaziland was averted, 
when McCorkindale died of fever in Lorenzo Marques in May 
1871 (91). After that, New Scotland stagnated and trade up 
the Maputo was reduced to a trickle (92). In a wider sense, 
however, Swaziland’s problems were just beginning. McCorkindale’s 
scheme could never have been implemented had it not coincided 
with Republican thinking about the area, and that remained 
unaffected by McCorkindale’s death. Ever since the collapse of 
Pretorius’s St. Lucia Bay schemes, Swaziland’s place within 
this had been as the S.A.R.’s road to the sea (93). The 
commissioning of David Forbes to search for suitable harbours 
on the other side of Swaziland in 1866, had sounded an early
(90) Above, 111-2.
(91) C.O. 179/102, No. 63, Keate to Kimberley, 22 June 1871.
(92) S.P.G. Series "E", Vol. 27, 1548-9, Letter from Jackson, 
31 Dec. 1871.
(93) Kruger, ’Weg’, 149-169.
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warning of these intentions (94). The decision to levy S.A.R. 
customs on the Maputo River once McCorkindale1s scheme got 
underway, was another (95). Both developments held equally 
serious implications for the Swazi, for what they signalled was 
Pretorius’s ultimate intention to annex. This in fact is what 
he did by a Proclamation in the Staatscourant on 29th April,
1868, and after an initial squabble with the Portuguese, who 
objected to its scope and its unilateral proclamation, it came 
into force in amended form on 29 July 1869 (96).
But it was one thing to annex Swaziland on paper, and another 
to translate this into practice. Portuguese objections to the 
annexation might be brushed aside by granting rectifications to 
the proclamation, but Swaziland’s were of a different order 
again. Pretorius's best chance of securing Swazi acquiescence 
was through the efforts of Alexander McCorkindale, who had the 
money, and the organisation to put his proposals into action - 
and even this was a pretty remote possibility. Once McCorkindale 
had gone the Republic’s own resources proved hopelessly inadequate
(94) G.H.N., Vol. 1388, Osborne to Erskine, 4 Aug. 1868, Encl. 
translation section 553, Staatscourant n.d.; F.C. (A602),
Vol. 18, Diary D. Forbes 1866, 5-19 August 1866; F.C., Vol. 
15, Copy of letter D. Forbes to President Pretorius, 15 Feb.
1867.
(95) G.H.N., Vol. 595, 160-2, Encl. in No. 7, P.E. Wodehouse to 
Kimberley, 20 July 1870.
(96) Kruger, ’Weg’, 185-8.
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to the task (97). An idea of the scale of these shortcomings 
can be gained from a glance at the subsequent history of the 
1866 cession. Before Pretorius could even think of implementing 
more ambitious projects, he first needed to regularise that 
transaction by paying over the balance of cattle owed the Swazi 
since 1855. On the face of it this should have been a simple 
operation, but it proved well beyond the capabilities of the 
S.A.R. up until 1870. So shaky were the Republic’s finances, 
that instructions to hand over the cattle simply could not be 
carried out. The district authorities had no money in their 
coffers to cover the outlay, and government vouchers retained 
so little credibility that no-one would part with their cattle 
in exchange. The result was that every time the authorities 
tried to gain further concessions, the Swazi could side-step
(97) Initially, in fact, McCorkindale had conscripted to pay
off the debt owed by the S.A.R. since 1855 (Wa. A., Vol. .
I, Loose pages McCorkindale to O ’Reilly, 18 July 1866).
Later the S.A.R.’s financial position improved somewhat, 
so that in 1870 it was even able to start paying its 
officials regular salaries,(S. Trapido, 'The South African 
Republic: Class Formation and the State, 1850-1900’, S .S.A.,
3, (London, 1973), 57). Even so the amount of money 
McCorkindale and his Scottish companies could concentrate 
in this restricted area was far in excess of anything 
the S.A.R. could muster. Between 1867 and 1870, for 
example, the Glasgow and South Africa Company spent 
£30 000 on livestock and buildings alone, (S.S. 127, 133, 
Bell to State Secretary, 20 Nov. 1870,), while the amount 
the S.A.R. could expend for the whole of the country in 
1869 was £33 076 (E.H.D. Arndt, Banking and Currency 
Development in South Africa (1652-1927), (Cape Town, 1928), 
107). It should be noted, however, that income and 
expenditure did increase rapidly, rising to double this 
figure in the next few years as a result of the discovery 
of gold (ibid, 115).
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the issue by demanding satisfaction on the missing cattle 
first (98).
Similar difficulties bedevilled the Republic on the level of 
personnel. Inadequate remuneration discouraged even the most 
public spirited of public servants from taking part in missions 
to Swaziland, which meant that initiatives petered out on this
(98) They also used this as a bargaining counter in the dispute 
over the Komati wTinterveld - S.C., Pkt. 6(a), 277, No. 4, 
W.F. Joubert etc. to Volksraad, 29 June 1868. The entire 
question of the payment of cattle is also complicated by 
the behaviour of Makwazidile Dhladhla, the official Swazi 
representative in the matter. After demanding the cattle 
on several occasions between 1867 and 1869 he refused to 
accept them when they were ready to be delivered in April 
]870. When the cattle were finally handed over in June 
1871, he had ceased to act as official intermediary. The 
’ implications of each of these developments is unclear.
It may be Makwazidile was playing a double game with both 
Boer and Swazi, as some Republican officials suspected, 
in which case he may have been removed from his position 
for misconduct. There is, however, no hint of this in 
any Swazi communication, and the alternative hypothesis 
that he had fled the border after being responsible for 
the murder of several bushmen in the S.A.R. could also be 
true. In that case, it is as likely that his actions over 
the cattle were on instructions from his principals. A 
further question mark however is thrown on Makwazidile’s 
role throughout these negotiations by his flight to the 
S.A.R. in Dec. 1874, but the implications of even this are 
unclear, because within a matter of months he had returned 
to Swaziland and was being used again as an official 
representative - S.S. 178, 180, Henderson to President,
9 Dec. 1874; S.S. 190, 25, Rudolph to President & Ex. Co.,
4 July 1875; S.S. 89, 62-3, R 633/67, A.A. O'Reilly to 
President & Ex. Co., 4 July 1867; S.C., Pkt. 6(a), 277,
No. 4, W.F. Joubert to Volksraad, 29 June 1868; L.L. Ill, 
21-4, Pretorius and Ex. Co., to C. Potgieter 25 Mar. 1869;
S.S. Ill, A.A. O'Reilly etc. to President and Ex. Co.,
12 May 1869, 139-142, Encl. mins. of Commission 16 April 
1869, 143-5; S.S. Ill, 121-2, H.T. Buhrmann (?) to President
& Ex. Co., 19 July 1869; S.S. 122, 330-2, Buhrmann to Pres.
& Ex. Co., 22 April 1870; S.S. 134, J.C.C. Moll, Acting 
Landdrost to Govt. Secretary, 9 June 1871; S.S. 134, 678, 
W.F. Joubert to Ex. Co., June 1871; S.S. 140, 324, Mins, 
of Commission, 23 Jan. 1872, Art. 16.
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level as well. Buhrmann set out some of the problems in a 
letter to Pretorius in August 1869 (99). On his last expedition 
to Swaziland he observed that he had spent a quarter of his 
subsistence allowance on presents to the Swazi authorities, 
and another substantial portion on paying the cost of an 
interpreter. Neither of these expenses were provided for in 
his subsistence allowance, which in any case was abysmally 
inadequate for the long journey over burnt and sparsely 
inhabited winter-veld. Because of this, he concluded, he had 
no alternative but to make his services unavailable for any 
other expeditions in the future. Buhrmann, by his own admission, 
"always had been and still was a difficult man," but the same 
charges were re-iterated three years later by P.J. Coetzer (100). 
In August 1871, Coetzer complained he had taken part in an 
expedition to Swaziland for which he still had not received 
remuneration. This was not, he pointed out, an isolated 
incident. He still had not been paid for his services as an 
interpreter on a previous occasion, and until he received 
satisfaction, he would not make himself available again.
In addition to his financial grievances, Coetzer's letter also 
drew attention to the related problems of a lack of administrative 
co-ordination and poor official morale. The second expedition 
in which he had taken part had evidently ended as a fiasco, 
because none of the Commission members had turned up at the right 
time. While the initial source of confusion may have been
(99) S.S. 115, 63-4, Buhrmann to Ex. Co., 20 Aug. 1869.
(100) S.S. 143, P.J. Coetzer to President and Ex. Co., 9 April
1872.
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administrative bungling, the subsequent failure of the 
Commissioners to await their other colleagues indicates weak 
personal commitment, and very ragged morale (101). No-one, it 
is clear, wanted to make the trip to Swaziland. Half the time 
it was fever ridden, and the other half it was burnt, and even 
when one got there, the chances of successfully concluding one’s 
business were remote. In the face of the regents' bland 
intransigence, the prospect of any significant breakthrough, at 
any rate in one mission, was almost nil. Insofar as it was 
humanly possible, therefore, the Republic's officers made sure 
they never went.
It was weaknesses such as these that prevented Pretorius from 
sustaining any sort of momentum in his Swaziland policy. Activity, 
instead, tended to be haphazard and un-cordinated, and, for the 
most part, the Swazi were able to parry or evade successive 
efforts to extend the Republic's control. Nevertheless, however 
ineffectually directed, the tempo of Republican activity in the 
region was undoubtedly quickening, and by 1870, some of the worst 
fears entertained in 1866 were already being confirmed. Apart 
from McCorkindale's constant agitation, the Swazi were being 
bombarded by demands from other quarters as well. 1871 and 1872, 
for instance, saw a spate of projects aimed at opening up road
(101) Coetzer's story is also confirmed by J. Snyman, another
member appointed to the Commission - but with one significant 
difference. He claimed that having arrived four days late, 
being unavoidably delayed, he was told that Coetzer had not 
in any case had any of the necessary equipment for a mission 
with him - S.S. 135, 143-4, J. Snyman to President and Ex. 
Co., 26 Aug. 1871.
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and rail links between Delagoa Bay and the interior. At first 
these were fairly innocuous, as the route that was projected 
skirted round Swazi territory before heading north to Lydenburg. 
Later however the emphasis shifted south, and Swaziland's 
interests were placed more seriously at risk. The idea, at 
this stage, was to link up the coast with the economically more 
vigorous south, a project for which consent was finally wrung out of 
the Swazi early in 1872 (102). Concession hunters and missionaries 
also thronged in, but these were more easily deflected. Although 
a few Boer farmers may have acquired grazing concessions (103), 
neither Wilkinson, the Bishop of Zululand, nor Jackson his 
protege could make much headway here, and the evangelisation of 
Swaziland had to wait another day (104). Nevertheless, if one 
vie.ws all this against a background of mounting official pressure 
from the S.A.R., it is clear that the situation was getting out 
of control. Small wonder that Jackson could report in 1872 
that, "/the Swazi7 are suspicious of every stranger, and fancy 
that he can have no other motive than to obtain their cattle 
or their land." (105)
(102) S.S. 130, R 1869/71, 179-80, J.A. Simao, Gov. L.M. to 
President S.A.R., 1 Feb. 1871; S.S. 133, 129-50, G. Moodie 
to B. Proes, 20 April 1871; S.S. 140, 324-5, Mins, of 
Commission, 23 Jan. 1872.
(103) See for example the case of Andries Botha, S.S. 190, 47-50, 
Rudolph to S.S., 4 July 1875, Encl. minutes of Commission,
3 July 1875, and also Bell’s reference to the bad behaviour 
of Boer winter graziers in Swaziland, just after Ludvonga’s 
death - S.S. 174, 243, Bell to Burgers, 25 Aug. 1874.
(104) S.P.G. Series "E", Vol. 275, 1551-2, Letter from Jackson. 
Here Jackson recounts a story which seems to sum up the 
suspicion in which they were held. On visiting a chief he 
was closely questioned about his intentions. When Jackson 
told him, "... there are people beyond the.sea who love them 
and wish to do them good, he seemed to think my language 
absurd and deserving of ridicule".
(105) Ibid, 1551.
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But, however harrassing these attentions might be, they were 
not individually very serious, and paled into insignificance 
beside the longer standing problems of Swazi diplomacy. As 
ever, the central dilemma was the difficulty of striking a 
balance between the rival ambitions of Zululand and the S.A.R., 
which would succeed in keeping both of them simultaneously at 
bay. Two new developments in the middle of 1870 made that 
problem all the more acute. In July an attack was launched by 
Mbilini on the south-west border of Zululand, which resurrected 
all the old fears of Zulu occupation (106). Then in August 
came Msuthfo1s demoralising raid from the north-west, and the 
spectre, of a Zulu/Pedi pincer from the north and south (107).
The regents' reaction to the danger was the well-worn one of 
shuffling a few steps closer to the S.A.R., and asking for her 
protection (108). This time, however she insisted on a more 
tangible return. Intent on reviving his flagging Swaziland 
initiative, Pretorius despatched yet another Commission to 
Swaziland, armed with instructions to exact political dependence 
as the price of any further aid.
The situation could not have been more propitious for Pretorius*s
(106) S.S. 125, 283, A. McCorkindale to President & Ex. Co.,
27 July 1870. The raid was.carried out on the 11th, 12th 
July by a force of about 900 men.
(107) This is suggested by the regents' first request for . 
assistance in January 1871, in whichthe names of
Cetshwayo and Sekhukhune are linked, and more explicitly
in an interview Bell had with Sandlane, the Swazi Prime 
Minister, two years after this, S.S. 157 R 718/73, 42-3,
Bell to Burgers, 29 March 1873.
(108) S.S. 131, A.F. Jansen to Pres. & Ex. Co., 10 Jan. 1871;
S.S. 139, 186, Govt. Secretary to Pretorius, 11 May 1871, 
Encl. Declaration of Maviet and other messengers from 
Swazi, 24 April 1871.
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move, but once again familiar weaknesses wrecked the entire 
enterprise. Even though the balance of the cattle owing on the 
1866 cession was finally paid in June 1871 (109), the Commission 
that was supposed to convey the Executive’s demands failed to 
meet at the appointed time, and its members returned home 
without anything getting done. This was in August 1871 (110). 
Further action was shelved until January 1872, but here again 
the disparity between ambition and performance was equally 
marked. Once more the Executive Council’s instructions were to 
secure political suzerainty over Swaziland, and the right to 
establish export and postal services to Lourenjo Marques in 
return for Republican aid. To this were also added the exacting 
tasks of estimating the size of Swaziland's population, and 
evaluating the mineral potential of the land. Needless to say, 
not much of this got done. From the beginning the Commission 
got off to a bad start, when its interpreter failed to put in 
an appearance, and when it decided it could not undertake either 
the census or the survey (111). Almost as little progress was 
made with the Commission's main objectives once Swaziland had 
been reached. The Swazi were so vehemently opposed to any 
suggestion of political control, that the Commission had 
tactfully to let the matter drop, and all it had obtained by 
the time it left was permission to allow roads and postal
(109) S.S. 134, 678, Joubert to Ex. Co., June 1871.
(110) S.S. 143, P.J. Coetzer to President & Ex. Co., 9 April 1872.
(111) P.J. Coetzer was eventually obliged, unwillingly to take 
over his tasks.
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services to cross Swaziland,; and, more ambiguously, an undertak­
ing by the Swazi not to attack African chiefdoms in the Trans­
vaal (112).
Following these rebuffs, no more moves were made on a Presidential 
level until the end of the year. In the meantime, however, 
unofficial initiatives continued from Wakkerstroom. Ever since 
Henderson had taken over as Field-Cornet in Wakkerstroom, a far 
more active policy had been pursued from there towards Swaziland. 
Coetzer1s Commission had discovered this when they visited 
Swaziland in January 1872. Much of the alarm about Zulu attacks, 
it transpired then, had been artificially whipped up by exagger­
ated reports sent from Henderson to the effect that the Zulu 
werfe massing (113). Henderson persisted in this fashion after 
the Commission had departed. In August he seems to have 
primed Jeppe to write to Pretoria claiming that the Swazi 
desired to be subjects of the S.A.R., and would pay tax as well; 
and again in March 1873 he was apparently guilty of trying to 
bully the regents into accepting the political suzerainty of 
the S.A.R. (114). For all Henderson’s bluster however, his 
position was too lowly to cause much concern, and the regents
(112) S.S. 140, 32J-29, Minutes of Commission and Report of 
Commission to President & Ex. Co., 23 Jan. 1872.
(113) Ibid, 319-20.
(114) S.S. 147, 99, F. Jeppe to Govt. Secretary Swart, 30 Aug. 
1872; S.S. 155, 284-5, Henderson to President & Ex. Co., 
24 March 1873, and encl. Dec. by Jintje and two others, 
messengers from Henderson to Swazi nation 3 Aug. 1873, 
282-3; S.S. 157, R 78/73, 41, Bell to Burgers, 29 March
1873.
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made no effort to respond.
A more serious threat in any case was already pre-occupying 
them. In July 1872 Burgers had taken over the Presidency of 
the Republic, and had immediately injected a new urgency 
into its affairs. One of the first of his priorities was the 
situation in Swaziland. Never one for undue formality, Burgers 
decided to pay a personal visit there early in 1873. No 
contemporary record seems to remain of this expedition, but 
its objects are fairly apparent from later correspondence. 
Burgers’s intention, it seems clear, was to assert the suzerainty 
of the Republic, and to acquire another strip along the Pongola 
bn which white farmers might settle (115). What he achieved is 
uncertain, but it is unlikely to have been much. He may have 
extracted some minor concessions but on the main issue, like 
his predecessors, he also failed. His mission did, however, 
have one tangible result. This was the first time a President 
of the S.A.R. had visited Swaziland, and the regents were left 
visibly unnerved. If the President of the Republic was 
prepared to come, they seem to have reasoned, the pressure 
must really be on: and something more had to be done to acquire 
protection against encroachment from Zululand and the Republic. 
The means the Swazi chose were the familiar ones of an appeal 
to Natal. For the first time, however, this was directed
(115) T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents...), Statement by
Kwahlakwhahla and others, 26 May 1873; S.S. 157, R 718/73, 
40-44, Bell to Burgers, 29 March 1873; F.C., Vol. 17, 
McCorkindale Papers, Mrs. McCorkindale to Sarah, 25 Jan. 
1873, 80.
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unequivocally against the S.A.R. Burgers, they told the Natal 
authorities, had recently visited Swaziland with a demand that 
they accept Republican control. This they had been unable to 
entertain because they had been tributary to Natal ever since 
the time of Mswati. What they humbly requested now, therefore, 
was some written evidence to set the record right, which they 
would be able to put before Burgers if he came to visit them 
again (116).
There was, however, very little the Natal authorities could do. 
They knew Swaziland was in no meaningful sense a tributary of 
Natal, and that the last time the question had been debated the 
British government had firmly tied Natal's hands (117). What­
ever their personal feelings on the issue, therefore, they had 
to fob off the Swazi, telling them that no decision could be 
taken until they knew the Republic's side of the story (118). 
Fortunately for them, they were spared the embarrassment of 
further inaction by Burgers himself, who had already decided to 
settle for smaller returns. Abandoning for the moment the 
quest for suzerainty, he now concentrated his efforts on 
obtaining the cession of a strip of land for a military 
settlement along the Pongola, and on acquiring an undertaking
(116) T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents...), Statement by 
Kwahlakwahla and others, 26 May 1873.
(117) C.O. 179/90, No. 84, Keate to Wodehouse, 2 Sept. 1868.
(118) T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents...), Reply of Lieutenant 
Gov., 26 May 1873, to Swazi message of same date.
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that the Swazi would not enter outside treaty relations without 
the Republic’s approval. On both of these issues his represen­
tatives were shrewdly deflected. In reply to the question of 
cession the regents promised their answer, "when /the President... 
again visited them while on the issue of treaty relations, 
they drove such a huge hole through Burgers’s restrictions as 
to leave them virtually without effect. For years, they pointed 
out, they had paid tribute to the Zulu, and had maintained 
friendly communications with Shepstone, and in neither case 
could they risk abandoning these practices without danger of 
creating a serious breach with the parties concerned. With 
those qualifications however, they declared themselves perfectly 
willing to comply with Burgers’s request. One imagines they 
were: there was hardly anything left of the proposals against which 
to object. What the Commissioners thought is another matter.
They must obviously have realised that they had been outmanoeuvred, 
but the regents had evidently done this in such an agreeable 
manner, and had managed to sugar their disappointment with at 
least some token concessions, that they could console themselves 
that in future negotiations much more could be done. As the 
Border Commissioner Bell wrote to Burgers on his return, "I 
feel sure that once they get a little more confidence in this 
country's intentions they will do all you ask," and on that 
note both he and Burgers seem to have been prepared to let the 
matter rest (119).
(119) S.S. 157, R 718/73, 40-44, Bell to Burgers, 29 March 1873.
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No further action was taken by Burgers prior to Ludvonga's 
death, so that the regents were able to hand over to Mbandzeni 
a state whose autonomy was largely unimpaired. But Swaziland 
did not emerge entirely unscathed. Although it had weathered 
the diplomatic storm, this had set up strains within Swazi 
society, which were to have serious repercussions on domestic 
affairs. On the domestic front the period would have been a 
testing time anyway. The moment was fast approaching when 
Ludvonga and his mother would assume complete control over the 
nation's affairs, and this was a transition which had tradition­
ally engendered a measure of bad feeling and competition. An 
equivalent period in Mswati's reign had produced Malambule's 
rebellion. This time, co-inciding with such intense external 
pressure, its consequences were to prove almost as severe.
First hints of the difficulties ahead can perhaps be detected 
in 1871. There we find the earliest reference to Sisile's 
participation in regency politics, as well as the first 
suggestion of faction in national affairs (120). Firmer 
indications appear in 1873. By then Ludvonga's impotence and 
continued exclusion from national politics is almost palpable, 
and may even have been drawing him towards an independent 
initiative on foreign affairs (121). In a sense this was to be
(120) S.S. 139, Proes to Pretorius, 11 May 1871, Encl. Proes to 
Landdrost Wakkerstroom, 10 May 1871, 190, and J.C.C. Moll, 
Acting Landdrost Wakkerstroom to Govt. Secretary, 2 April 
1871, 191. This is however the slimmest of hints and may 
have been the product of Boer misapprehension.
(121) S.S. 155, 284-5, Henderson to Pres. & Ex. Co., 24 March 
1873; S.S. 160, Henderson to Pres. & Ex. Co., 20 Sept. 1873, 
284-6. These references must however again be treated with 
caution. Henderson was obviously intent on exploiting 
divisions within Swaziland, and this could have been just an 
exercise in wishful thinking.
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expected, and could even be interpreted as behaviour befitting 
a young king. What was more serious were suspicions of reciprocal 
jealousy against Ludvonga’s growing influence on the part of 
some of the regents as well. The name most commonly mentioned 
in this respect was that of Ndwandwe, Ludvonga's chief regent 
and the son of Sobhuza by Thandile's sister, File (122).
Rumours about him were sufficiently widespread for Wilkinson to 
learn about them when he visited Swaziland in September 
1873 (123). As Ludvonga’s minority neared its end these 
evidently multiplied, so that when Ludvonga inexplicably took 
ill and died on 18th March 1874, Ndwandwe was immediately 
sought out and executed, without even a chance to protest his 
innocence (124).
Just how responsible Ndwandwe was for Ludvonga's death is, 
however, open to question. According to Matsebula, Ndwandwe 
was executed because, as Ludvonga’s guardian, he was responsible 
for his well-being (125), but Swazi traditions go further than 
that, and state quite baldly that Ludvonga was murdered by 
Ndwandwe. On this charge the issues are considerably more 
clouded. Ndwandwe’s executioners were obviously certain of his guilt, 
but from this distance in time it is difficult to be as sure.
(122) Matsebula, History, 25; Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 39;
Bryant, Olden Times, 332.
(123) S.P.G., Series "D", Wilkinson to Bullock, Sept. 1873, 43.
(124) De Volksstem, 2 May 1874, Letter from D. Straker, 8 April 
1874; S.S. 170, 106-8, Bolt to Fres., 21 March 1874; S.S. 
170, 203-4, Bell to Pres., 13 April 1874, 203-4. According 
to Honey, ’History' 39, Thandile consulted with Malunge, 
Maloyi and Sobandla - all sons of Sobhuza, as well as with 
witchdoctors after Ludvonga’s death, and all agreed on 
Ndwandwe’s culpability. Matsebula’s date of 1872 for 
Ludvonga's death is incorrect, (History, 27).
(125)Ibid.
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By what means, for example, was Ludvonga killed? If one discounts 
sorcery, then the agency is not so easy to find. One current 
Swazi tradition suggests that he died after sniffing the barrel 
of a rifle given him by Ndwandwe, but this hardly sounds like 
regicide (126). Contemporary accounts for their part talk 
vaguely of poisoning but again the method is not fully 
spelled out (127). Of course one cannot get away from the 
fact that Ludvonga died suspiciously, and it may be too much 
to expect direct evidence of Ndwandwe*s complicity. But in 
that case it is necessary to provide convincing circumstantial 
evidence of Ndwandwe's guilt. This exists, but again is of 
limited value. Recent Swazi tradition asserts that Ndwandwe 
intended a leviritical union with LaMgangeni, the mother of 
Ludvonga, whereby he would raise up seed to Mswati, and ensure 
himself of power until that child had matured. However, as 
Honey points out, a son so irregularly begotten would still 
have no better right to succeed than numerous other first sons 
of Mswati (128). Perhaps Ndwandwe meant to remedy the situation 
by invoking Cetshwayo as guarantor of the settlement. Something 
like this is certainly suggested in contemporary accounts, 
although here one finds a different slant. According to Thandile, 
as well as to other observers on the border, Ndwandwe was aiming
(126) Interview Maboya Fakudze.
(127) De Volksstem, 2 May 1874, Letter from D. Straker, 8 April 
1874; S.S. 170, 106-8, Bolt to President, 21 March 1874;
S.S. 170, 203~4, Bell to President, 13 April 1874.
(128) Honey, ’History1, 39; Kuper, Aristocracy, 102. Kuper 
however, in a rare mistake, confuses LaMgangene (Sisile) 
with Thandile (LaZidze) here.
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to marry one of Cetshway’s sisters and to set himself up as 
Cetshwayo’s lieutenant in Swaziland (129). But even this 
version has certain inherent implausibilities. At the very 
moment Ludvonga died, for example, Zulu emissaries were in 
attendance, negotiating Ludvonga’s marriage to a Zulu princess - 
hardly what one would have expected had Cetshwayo believed 
Ndwandwe’s takeover to be imminent. Similarly, if Ndwandwe 
were involved in a conspiracy it was remarkably ineptly done, 
since there is no sign of any follow-up after Ludvonga's death. 
Thandile explained this by claiming that the conspiracy had 
gone off half cock after being undertaken prematurely. But 
then one has to ask why was it pushed forward with such risk?
One possible way of harmonising these contradictions, is to 
suggest that the Zulu messengers at Ludvonga’s homestead 
brought news of Ndwandwe's treasonable designs; even so, one 
would have expected Thandile to reveal this to add authority 
to her allegations. Or was she perhaps afraid to reveal too 
close an association with Cetshwayo? Bell thought so, but it 
is impossible to tell. Nor in the last analysis can one pronounce 
on Ndwandwe’s guilt. He may have been a regicide, or he may as 
easily have been the victim of the suspicion and hysteria 
generated by the sudden pressure on Swaziland from outside its 
borders, and by the inevitable frictions encountered in the 
transition from regency to full monarchical rule. Perhaps one 
should at least allow him the benefit of the doubt.
(129) De Volksstem, 2 May 1874, Letter from S. Straker, 8 April 
1874; S.S. 170, 203“4, Bell to President, 13 April 1874.
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CHAPTER VII 
MBANDZENI : 1874-1881 
With Ludvonga gone a new interregnum followed, which has 
subsequently generated a considerable mythology. For this, the 
main culprit is Alistair Miller. Miller first visited Swaziland 
in 1888, and subsequently established himself as a leading 
concessionaire (1). Miller’s natural interest in history soon 
led him to enquire about Swaziland’s past, but his ignorance 
of siSwati, his equivocal position as a concessionaire, and his 
own penchant for the blood curdling, together combined to 
produce an extraordinarily garbled version of events. His 
description of the interregnum is more or less typical in this 
respect. For two years after Ludvonga's death he claimed,
’’The country /was7 in a bloodbath", which was only brought to 
an end when "the older chiefs prevailed, the disaffected 
regiments were broken", and Mbandzeni succeeded to the throne (2). 
Miller’s exaggerations are, unfortunately, with us to this day. 
Even where his unreliability has been detected, his influence 
on more authoritative sources still remains, and nowhere is 
this more so than with the period of the interregnum. Bryant 
talks of twelve months civil war; Gar son refers to a period of 
chaos and fighting, and the idea has remained embedded in the 
popular mythology of the time (3).
Lately Miller’s myths have been succeeded by counter-myths, 
whose object has been to rebut Miller’s extravagances. The
(1) Below, 392-3.
(2) M.P., MS 1478, Miller, ’Short History', 17.
(3) Bryant, Olden Times, 333; Garson, ’Swaziland’, 274.
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Swazi have always known that no civil war followed Ludvonga's 
death, but this has now produced a tendency towards over­
compensation. Matsebula, for example, gives little idea of the 
scale of violence that occurred during this period (4). Not 
only was Ndwandwe's populous Mbidlimbidlini chiefdom destroyed, 
at a possible cost of one thousand, five hundred lives, but a 
host of other associates of Ludvonga also suffered the same 
fate. Mgenge Matsebula, the indvuna of Ludvonga's Nkanini 
village, was the most prominent of these, but a number of other 
leading personalities were also struck down at the same time (5), 
and this wrought such a transformation in the ranks of the Swazi 
ruling council that when Jackson returned to the capital, some 
twenty months later, he could scarcely recognise a face that 
he had previously known (6).
But it still remains true that none of this adds up to the 
protracted convulsions described by Miller. Apart from two 
relatively minor episodes - the execution of a minor chief and 
the pursuit of Prince Mabhedla - the blood-letting was over in
(4) Matsebula, History, 27.
(5) De Volksstem, 2 May 1874, Letter D. Straker 8 May 1874,
which estimates 3 000 killed at Mbidlimbidlini, and also 
refers to the execution of a brother of Mswati named Ndhlela;
S.S. 170, R 538, 106-7, C. Bolt to President, 21 March 1874, 
who gives the figure of 1 500 for those killed at Mbidlim­
bidlini, and mentions the execution of Umgenge and sixteen
others at Ditini; S.S. 190, 31, 46, Rudolph to S.S., 4 July 
1875, Encl. minutes of representatives investigating complaints 
at Ludidi, 2 July 1875, where the death of Mgenge is mentioned, 
as well as the obliteration of the village of Mkanjana, a 
subordinate of Ndwandwe living near the Lebombo; Matsebula 
mentions the death of Mgenge (History, 25), but without 
indicating the context, and the attack on Mbidlimbidlini
(29), but without indicating the casualities.
(6) S.P.G. Series "E", Vol. 31, 1225-6, Letter from Jackson,
31 March 1876.
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a relatively short space of time. So too was the interregnum 
as a whole. Rather than lasting one or even two years, it was 
over in three months, and by the middle of June, Mbandzeni was 
safely installed (7). The absence of bloodshed nevertheless 
did not preclude intense competition, and these three months 
were a period of considerable tension in Swaziland, when the 
possibility of violence never lay far below the surface. 
Ludvonga's death left the field wide open for almost any first 
born son of Mswati to try his luck, and a bitter, and at times 
explosive, struggle between them ensued. If anyone had a 
superior claim it was Giba, but his temperament worked against 
him. Many thought that he would prove too unstable a leader, 
and, with this question mark over him, his candidature was 
blocked (8). So, with no other obvious front runners, the 
struggle went on.
While the princes were jockeying for position, moves were 
going on behind the scenes which were narrowing down the field 
in a quite unexpected direction. At the centre, as usual, 
were Swaziland's veteran elder statesmen, in the shape of 
Sandlane, Malunge and the queen dowager, Thandile. Perhaps the 
most intractable problem left by the death of Ludvonga was the 
question of what to do about his mother Sisile. Was she to be
(7) S.N.A. 1/6/2, No. 105, Statement by Mhlaba and Kwahlakwahla, 
messengers from Thandile, 24 June 1874; S.S. 172, 242, Bell 
to S.S., 25 June 1874.
(8) Sw.A., J 50/03, D. Forbes to Resident Commissioner, 21 Jan. 
1901; Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 42-3.
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ousted in favour of the new king's mother, or should she remain 
in an office whose perquisites she already largely controlled? 
Neither the collective wisdom of the regents, nor the corpus of 
historical precedent, seemed to offer an easy answer to the 
problem, and in the end it was left to Sisile herself to come 
up with the solution. When her advice was taken on the subject 
she put forward the name of Mbandzeni, on the grounds that he 
had already lost his mother, and that she could therefore 
continue her functions undisturbed (9). Anxious for a way out 
of the impasse, the regents readily agreed. Indeed, they were 
in all probability, doubly relieved: not only did Mbandzeni 
solve the constitutional problem, but he appeared to be the best 
guarantee available for their group interests in the years to 
come. Placid and pliable, he could be moulded to their wishes 
in a way none of the other leading candidates seemed to allow. 
Without further ado he was removed, to be prepared for his new 
and unexpected role.
With Mbandzeni suddenly secluded, it was not long before some 
idea of the regents' decision began to filter down to the other 
contenders. Giba's reaction, allegedly, was to set in motion 
a conspiracy, together with the princes Mpangwa and Kwabiti, 
aimed at the assassination of Mbandzeni, but this in the end 
scarcely got off the ground. Giba and Mpangwa could not agree 
on an alternative to Mbandzeni, and with deadlock on that question 
the conspiracy collapsed (10). Mabhedla evidently took his
(9) Matsebula, History, 29; Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 42; 
interview Maboya Fakudze.
(10) Sw.A., Honey, 'History', 43.
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disaffection a step further, leaving himself no alternative but 
flight once Mbandzeni's nomination had been formally ratified (11). 
As for the country at large, it too fell into pro and anti 
Mbandzeni camps, with the north largely in favour of Sisile's 
nominee and the south broadly opposed (12) . Given that 
distribution of support, the result was almost a forgone con­
clusion. Supported by the principal regiments, the principal 
princes and what remained of constitutionality, the regents’ 
choice could hardly fail to win through. Any lingering doubts 
were dispelled by Mbandzeni’s carefully stage-managed installation. 
Flanked by the Mgadhlela and Mlondolozi regiments, Mbandzeni's 
nomination was presented to the nation's representatives as a 
fait accompli, leaving them no other option but to approve by 
acclamation (13). With all possibility of dissent stifled, and 
with no agreed alternative to replace Mbandzeni, what remaining 
opposition there was immediately crumbled.
Despite the way in which he was steam-rollered into office, 
Mbandzeni's personal position remained relatively weak. Installed 
to suit Sisile's convenience, rather than for any obvious claim of 
his own, he was inevitably relegated to a secondary role. 
Re-inforcing this was his own timidity and political inexperience. 
In the last years of Ludvonga's minority Sisile had played an
(11) Below, 273.
(12) S.S. 172, 242, Bell to State Secretary,25 June 1874; Kuper, 
'Primitive Nation', 350.
(13) Sw.A., Honey, 'History',43.
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increasingly important part in national government and ritual. 
Mbandzeni, by contrast, knew nothing of these mysteries, and was 
forced into even greater dependence on the advice and experience 
of his adopted mother. Nor was it only to Sisile that he had 
to defer. Behind her stood the old regency junta of Thandile, 
Sandlane, Malunge and Maloyi - names which recur again and 
again in the surviving records of the period. How ruthlessly 
they would act in defence of their group interests had already 
been demonstrated after the death of Ludvonga, when many younger 
up and coming councillors had been liquidated. Surrounded by 
these, and denied any immediate infusion of new blood into his 
councils, Mbandzeni stood as a lonely and isolated figure in 
the first months of his reign.
Once safely installed in power, the first major hurdle facing 
the king and his regents was the problem of Mabhedla. About the 
time of Mbandzeni's installation Mabhedla had fled north, to 
try and raise the Hhohho districts in his support, and had 
established himself at the hill fortress of Mvubu in the 
chiefdom of Matsafeni Shongwe. Few, however, had rallied to 
his call, and when the royal armies marched out with orders to 
capture him he fled north to find sanctuary with Sekhukhune (14). 
The Swazi armies rashly followed, chasing Mabhedla into the 
heart of Sekhukhune's country, to Mosega Kop. Here they 
suffered their second major defeat at the hands of the Pedi in 
the space of five years. Confronted with Pedi guns, they were
(14) Myburgh, Carolina, 99-100: interview Mhambi Dlamini.
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again picked off like flies, and their bones were left to whiten 
Mosega mountain for years to come (15).
As if this was not bad enough, pressure also continued to 
mount from the Zulu in the south, which partly reflected the 
close connections being forged between them and the Pedi. As 
early as April 1874 Cetshwayo began talking of taking retaliation 
on the Swazi for the death of Ludvonga, and for the killing 
that followed, and a formal approach was made to the British to 
be allowed to do that in October of the same year (16). More 
or less simultaneously new attacks were also undertaken by 
Mbilini on the Swazi borders, so that the two became associated 
in the public mind of both the Swazi and the Transvaal as a 
plot to take over Swaziland and outflank the Republic. Mbilini, 
it was claimed, considered himself king of Swaziland, and New 
Scotland part of his patrimony, and would continue making 
incursions until its occupants either got out or acknowledged 
his rights. Cetshwayo, on the other hand, was supposed to be 
hatching a long-term plot, of which this was but a part, to 
conquer Swaziland and install Mbilini in charge (17). The truth 
of these allegations is not easy to judge. Cetshwayo claimed 
that he merely wanted to avenge an insult, and to "wash his 
spears" on his elevation as king. As for Mbilini, he said, he 
had no control over him, and was even prepared to allow a free
(15) Aylward, Transvaal, 184; Hunt, 'Bapedi1, 296, note 28.
(16) S.S. 176, 234, G.W. Rudolph to State Secretary, 23 April 
1874; C.O. 179/115 Encl. in No. 189, Statement of messenger 
from Cetshwayo, 19 Oct. 1874.
(17) S.S. 176, 235-8, G.W. Rudolph to State Secretary 23 April 
1874; S.S. 170, Bell to President, 23 April 1874.
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hand to the authorities to go into Zululand to prise him out.
Cetshwayo1s disclaimers are, however, singularly unconvincing, 
and it is unlikely that his ambitions were as limited as that. 
Although he no doubt did want to wash his spears in the manner 
customarily prescribed, it is equally possible that he was 
using this as a blind to conceal objectives of a directly 
political kind. The washing of the spears was after all some­
thing expected of a ’savage', and it might hopefully divert 
peoples' attention from probing deeper still. To a large 
extent it did. Some were completely taken in, while with others, 
such as Rudolph, sufficient doubt was implanted in their minds 
to leave them uncertain as to the appropriate thing to do. As 
a result, much of Cetshwayo's policy towards Swaziland, between 
1874 and 1877, was allowed to unfold virtually unchecked.
To understand Cetshwayo's real objectives it is necessary to 
see them in the context of his earlier connections with Swazi­
land. These went back to 1852, when he had played a prominent 
role in the invasion of Swaziland of that year. From that 
point on, Swaziland seems to have exercised a powerful grip on 
his imagination, both as an arena for future military exploits, 
and as the nucleus of a new state in the event of his expulsion 
from Zululand. In the early 1860s the second consideration may 
have lost some of its force, as Mpande reconciled himself to 
his situation, and as the likelihood of white intervention
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recede, but in the late 1860s and early 1870s it surfaced once 
again. The problem now lay not so much in the resurgence of 
internal divisions within Zululand, although these were still 
present in the person of Uhamu, as in the growing assertiveness 
of his white neighbours, and the prospect of an end to the 
competition between them that confederation would being. 
Confederation was doubly dangerous to Cetshwayo because it 
promised to create a united front between his white neighbours, 
and because it was baited with the offer that the S.A.R. be 
allowed to make good its claims against Swaziland and Zululand (18). 
Were it to succeed, Cetshwayo would have his room for political 
manoeuvre drastically curtailed, and all avenues of withdrawal 
to the north finally shut off.
Cetshwayo*s answer to this dilemma seems to have been to try 
and break out of the tightening circle by a pre-emptive thrust 
towards the north. Even before confederation became an issue, 
Cetshwayo had become conscious of the need to do this, simply 
to counter the ambitions of the S.A.R. Immediately after the 
death of Mswati he had sent a Zulu force to confirm Ludvonga's 
accession in Swaziland, and had ordered the expansion of 
Zulu homestead across the Pongola, in an effort to shore up 
Zulu influence in the area (19). This last
(18) C.J. Uys, In the Era of Shepstone, (Lovedale, 1933), 120- 
133; C.F. Goodfellow, Great Britain and South African 
Confederation 1870-1881, (Cape Town 1966), 63, 79-82, 94.
(19) Above, 220; T.S.C. Case 22 (Swazi documents...), State­
ment by Swazi messengers, 19 March 1866.
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move was regarded particularly seriously by the Swazi. Much of 
the reason for the 1855 and 1866 cessions had been to interpose 
a Republican presence between the Swazi and Zulu along the 
Pongola River to insulate them from Zulu pressure, and now the 
Zulu were moving in force into the area vacated for that 
purpose. As time went on the threat that this represented 
became clearer still. First under the leadership of Ntabakayikonjwa 
and then, when he proved insufficiently forceful, under Sithambi, 
Zulu settlement in the area grew at an astonishing rate, until 
by the mid 1870s, when Cetshwayo was having to meet the threat 
of confederation, it comprised some thirteen chiefdoms and 
numbered somewhere in the region of 30 000 souls (20).
Parallel moves were taking place at the headwaters of the Pongola 
River. Between 1870 and 1878 Mbilini made four attacks into 
this region, striking terror into Boer and Swazi communities 
alike (21). Cetshwayo always denied complicity in these attacks 
and even gave a carte blanche to the Boers in 1874 and again 
in 1876 to go and prise him out. Yet some measure of responsibility 
almost certainly attached to him. For one thing it is incon­
ceivable that Mbilini could have squatted on the borders of 
Zululand if Cetshwayo had been seriously opposed, which was 
something Cetshwayo himself more or less admitted a little later 
when he told the British that Mbilini had in fact already
(20) Interview Tigodvo Hlophe; P.P. 1882, C. 3219, 57-61, Barlow’s 
evidence; C.0. 179/94, Encl. in No. 51, Statement of Swazi 
messengers, 17 June 1869; C.0. 291/19, Transvaal Royal 
Commission Report, Appendix 16K, Encl. list of chiefs by 
Roberts, 16 May 1881; S.S. 190, R 1489, 70, Rudolph to S.S.
15 July 1875; G.H.Z., Vol. 781, Minutes and Memo’s 1878-9, 
Vol. II, Min. by Frere, 13 Nov. 1878, paras 71-2.
(21) Above, 258, below, 306, 314, 319.
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tendered allegiance to him (22). For another, it is hard to 
credit that Cetshwayo exercised no control over Mbilini, when 
he was prepared to make reparations for raids undertaken by 
him, and could restore the actual cattle seized by Mbilini, as 
was the case in 1874 (23). In one way or another he was 
Ce t shwayo*s man.
But if Mbilini*s activities were part of a strategy that went 
well beyond some ritual slaughter on the accession of a king, 
the precise role alloted him within it is more difficult to pin 
down. In one breath Cetshwayo seemed content to make capital 
out of his activities; in the next he went out of his way to 
disassociate himself as completely as possible, so that in the 
end nobody in the area had any clear idea of what was really 
going on. Today's historian is in much the same situation, 
although he, at least, has the perspective of Cetshwayo1s 
earlier ambitions in Swaziland to guide his conclusions. Perhaps 
the most informed guess is that Cetshwayo, although using any 
means that came to hand to put pressure on the Swazi and the 
S.A.R., was at the same time, taking care that a range of 
options always remained open. If Mbilini succeeded in inducing 
a failure of nerve in the S.A.R., then his activities could be 
acknowledged and Cetshwayo could assume control. If, on the 
other hand, they seemed to be precipitating a collision between 
Zululand and the Republic, then he could be discarded and his
(22) De Volksstem, 23 Jan. 1875, De Inval van Umbilini.
(23) S.S. 182, 34-5, Rudolph to S.S., 22 Dec, 1874.
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actions disavowed. Either way there was a bonus to be had, to 
the extent that any challenge to the spread of Zulu occupation 
on the north side of the Pongola would be further postponed.
Much the same sort of reasoning seems to have been behind Zulu 
policy towards Swaziland. At best, Cetshwayo could have hoped 
to impose a puppet administration on all or part of Swaziland 
through conquest. At worst, he could use the combined pressures 
of Mbilini, Zulu encroachment across the Pongola, intrigues 
with Ndwandwe or whoever, and even marriage alliances with the 
Swazi king, to make Swaziland more responsive to Zulu demands.
It all depended on the way things seemed to be working out.
The problem for the historian is to decide which option Cetshwayo 
was most seriously pursuing at any one time, and for the most 
part this is impossible. Perhaps the only exception to this 
rule is Cetshwayo's attempted invasion of Swaziland in May 1875. 
What decided him on this course of action is uncertain. It may 
have been talk of impending confederation; it may have been
evidence of Swazi vulnerability, or it may simply have been a
gamble on the strength of the S.A.R.'s resolve. Most likely it 
was a combination of all three. In any case, whatever the
reasons, Cetshwayo's determination to espouse the more radical
option on this occasion is clear. First messengers were sent 
to Natal to ask the authorities there for their permission (24). 
Then Cetshwayo sent to Rudolph to acquaint the S.A.R. of his 
decision, and finally, when the S.A.R. made known its opposition,
(24) C.0. 179/115, Encl. in No. 189, Statement of messenger 
from Cetshwayo, 19 Oct. 1874.
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he told them he would go ahead with his plan whatever they 
said (25). If Cetshwayo had been gambling on Republican 
hesitation he was badly mistaken. Joubert, the Acting 
President, knew as well as Cetshwayo that Swaziland held the 
key to the eastern Transvaal, and the S.A.R. pressed ahead 
immediately with preparations to resist. Commandos were called 
up in Wakkerstroom and Utrecht; artillery was summoned from 
Pretoria, and one of the biggest Republican forces to take the 
field for years began to take shape (26). Cetshwayo seems to 
have been prepared to ignore these warnings and go ahead with 
his plans for invasion, but by now important voices were being 
raised within his own council in opposition to the scheme. Not 
only was the S.A.R. intent on halting the invasion, they insisted, 
but' Natal had also re-iterated its opposition. In the face of 
this growing reaction Cetshwayofs own determination now began 
to wilt, and on the eve of the invasion, with his forces already 
assembled, Cetshwayo was ignominiously forced to climb down (27).
The S.A.R., however, went ahead with its demonstration regard­
less. Only dimly aware of developments in Zululand, they still 
clung to the view that a show of strength was needed to quell
(25) P.A. S.S. 185, 392-4, Rudolph to State Secretary, 17 March 
1875.
(26) De Volksstem, 22 May 1875.
(27) S.S. 188, 284-5, Rudolph to State Secretary, 29 May 1875;
De Volksstem, 11 Sept. 1875, R. Bell to Editor, 20 Aug. 1875. 
According to Rudolph one of Cetshwayo’s leading indunas named 
'Mkokwaan* was subsequently killed for his opposition - S.S. 
213, 193, Rddolph to State Secretary, 24 Aug. 1876.
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Zulu ambitions. However, increasingly significant as time went 
on was the determination of the S.A.R. to make use of this 
opportunity to impose some sort of control over Swaziland (28).
Not since 1871 had conditions been so opportune. Mbandzeni was 
newly installed, and still relatively insecure, while recent 
Zulu movements had driven home the need for Republican support 
as never before. From another angle it was also not an 
opportunity to be missed. Under normal circumstances it was 
next to impossible to raise a burgher force for a demonstration 
like this. The average burgher, as De Kiewiet notes, expected 
his patriotism to be profitable, and a demonstration in 
Swaziland was manifestly not (29). Yet, without a substantial 
show of force, it was unlikely that the Swazi would be cowed to 
the'point of giving way. What Cetshwayo's threats also 
provided, therefore, was an ideal pretext for the unpopular 
duty of imposing the Republic's control over Swaziland, and one 
which the S.A.R. was determined not to let pass.
Not surprisingly the Swazi greeted the expedition with a good 
deal of mistrust. While serving firm notice of the S.A.R.'s 
determination to protect Swaziland, it also heightened 
suspicions about what the S.A.R. wanted to protect Swaziland 
for. Why, for example, had such a large force been sent when 
the threat of invasion had all but vanished? And why, if it 
was meant to ward off Zulu aggression, was it descending on 
Ludzidzini rather than beating the marches between Swaziland
- (28) C.0. 879/9, No. 83A, 99, Incl. I in no. 75, Colley to 
Wolseley, 10 Aug. 1875.
(29) C.W. De Kiewiet, The Imperial factor in South Africa: a 
study in politics and economics, (Cambridge, 1937), 101.
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and Zululand? As it straggled its way towards the Swazi capital, 
two miles in length, and with its complement of 350 men, 4 
mountain guns and 58 waggons, the answers to these questions 
must have started seeming uncomfortably clear (30).
Swazi misgivings about the objects of the expedition were soon 
justified. Virtually its first public act was to organise a 
display of cannon and other fire, which, despite a counter 
demonstration of Swazi military strength, left the Swazi 
dispirited and cowed (31). Then the real business of the 
expedition was begun: the Government of the S.A.R., the regents 
were told, wanted a new treaty to be signed regulating relations 
between the two states. In the negotiations that followed 
Rudolph extracted virtually all the concessions that the S.A.R. 
demanded. The principal one was the acceptance by the Swazi of 
the status of subjects, which was something they had resolutely 
resisted before. But there were, in addition, other restrictions 
as well: the guarantee of military aid to the S.A.R. whenever 
it required it; a prohibition on any war undertaken independently 
by Swaziland without the prior permission of the S.A.R.; a 
promise to promote commerce, to keep trade routes and roads 
open and in good condition; and permission to build a railway 
through Swaziland. Most serious of all perhaps was their
(30) C.0. 879/9, 93-9, No. 83A, Incl. I in No. 75, Colley to
Wolseley, 10 Aug. 1875; De Volksstem, 31 July 1875, Report 
Ludidi, 28 June 1875; W.F. Butler, The Life of Sir George 
Pomperoy-Colley 1835-1881, (London 1899), 127-8, appears 
to be mistaken when he talks of 320 burghers, 4 guns and 
65 waggons.
C31) Ibid; De Volksstem, 24 July 1875, Report from special
correspondent, 1 July 1875; U.W.A., A 85, MSS, A.S. Dawson, 
’Ten Years in the Transvaal 1872-1881: a story of stirring 
times by one who went through them’, n.d., 107.
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agreement that, "in the event of the Government of the South 
African Republic deeming it necessary to appoint in their midst 
a supervising official /they woul(T7 engage themselves to abide 
by his decision." Even the presence of the Republican cannon 
could not quell dissatisfaction with that clause, and it was 
only on the assurance that this meant general supervision to 
guarantee the provisions of the treaty, and not local rule by 
a white official, that the regents were persuaded to sign. In 
return, the Swazi obtained virtually nothing, which again 
serves to underline the threat of coercion present throughout 
the negotiations. The Swazi were granted the promise of 
protection against their enemies; the free and unrestricted 
right of possession and ownership of the lands occupied by them; 
"and the guarantee of self-government, though only as far as 
it was humanly just and defensible". The commissioners were 
hardly open to the charge of being over-generous (32).
On paper the Swazi had been forced to sacrifice a great deal, 
but much of what the S.A.R. had gained was more illusory than 
real. Without military coercion, the settlement could be 
neither policed nor enforced, and the S.A.R.'s shortcomings in 
this area became evident almost from the moment the treaty was 
signed. Indiscipline and discontent seem to ha\ e been rife on 
all the S.A.R.’s military enterprises, and the Swaziland 
commando showed itself in no way exempt. The Utrecht contingent
(32) S.S. 190, 51-63, Minutes of activities of G.M. Rudolph and 
C.W. Joubert at Ludidi, 27 June 1875 to 3 July 1875;
W.J. Leyds, The Transvaal Surrounded, a continuation of 
"The first annexation of the Transvaal , (London 1919), 
Appendix H, 507-8, translation of treaty between the 
representatives of the S.A.R. and Swaziland, 1 July 1875.
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was disaffecfed because of the shortage of provisions, and 
because they felt Utrecht lay open to Zulu attack, and a steady 
stream of deserters made their way home while the commando was 
away. The Pretorians were annoyed at being conscripted for an 
expedition so remote from their local concerns, and vented their 
irritation in allegations of favouritism against their commanders.
And to cap everything, Boer/Uitlander antipathies also made
themselves felt, and eventually flared up in a fist fight between the
two groups, only shortly before the commando left Ludzidzini for home (33).
Hardly the sort of thing, as a correspondent to De Volksstem
later wrote, to inspire the Swazi with any great respect for
Republican strength (34).
The•logistical difficulties of military ventures into Swaziland 
were also underlined by the commando’s experiences, and must 
have come as something of a revelation to Swaziland’s military 
planners. A secondary objective of the commando had been to 
'beat the marches' between Zululand and Swaziland, and to iron 
out some remaining ambiguities of border definition, but such 
was the condition of the expedition's horses and oxen through 
want of adequate grazing, and so rebellious the men through the 
general inadequacy of provisions and ammunition, that the 
entire expedition had to be called off. In the end all that 
was accomplished was a minor border rectification in the south,
(33) De Volksstem, 2 April 1873, Special correspondent, 1 Feb. 
1875; C.0. 879/9, No. 83A, Incl. I in No. 75, Colley to 
Wolseley, 10 Aug. 1875; S.S. 190, 28, Rudolph to S.S.,
4 July 1875; U.W.A., Dawson, 'Ten Years', 110-11; Butler, 
Colley, 132.
(34) De Volksstem, 4 March 1876, Letter 28 Feb. 1876 (prudently) 
unsigned.
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which, although cheating the Swazi out of another sliver of 
territory, left the one remaining bone of territorial contention 
between the S.A.R. and the Swazi - the Koraati winterveld - 
unsettled (35).
This familiar parade of weaknesses allowed Mbandzeni and his 
councillors to take new heart. It might not be possible to 
play on internal divisions within the Republic any more, but it 
could still be hoped that their continuing military shortcomings, 
coupled with diplomatic support from Natal, might be enough to 
keep them temporarily at bay. The first thing to do was to 
convince the British that the 1875 expedition was some sort of 
aberration, and that a binding treaty had never been signed.
This, however, was easier said than done. Neither the treaty 
nor the expedition could easily be explained away, the more so 
since Colonel Colley, the personal representative of Wolseley, 
had been eye-witness to its preliminary dealings at the Swazi 
capital. The Swazi did, however, have two things working in 
their favour. First were prevailing notions of African 
ignorance and gullibility. Second was the willingness of British 
officials at various levels in the colonial hierarchy to be 
convinced of a grand deception in the wider interest of South 
African confederation. Between them, these two factors served 
to persuade the British of the truth of the Swazi allegations,
(35) S.S. 190, 61-2, Minutes, 3 July 1875, Ludidi; S.S. 190,
R 1489, 63-66, Rudolph to State Secretary, 15 July 1875;
De Volksstem, 31 July 1875, Letter from Ludidi, 28 June 
1875; ibid, 24 July 1875, Letter from special correspondent 
30 June 1875; C.0. 879/9, 99, No. 83A, Incl. I in No. 75, 
Colley to Wolseley, 10 Aug. 1875.
286
and of the need to intervene on behalf of Swaziland to save 
them any such encroachment from the S.A.R., and on 21st January 
1876 a warning was duly despatched to Barkly for transmission 
to the Government of the S.A.R., informing it of the British 
Government’s opposition to any extension of Republican territory 
or influence in that direction (36).
For once it seems Swazi success owed more to good luck than good 
diplomacy. The stereotypes of black gullibility could be 
exploited up to a point, and Carnarvon and Herbert do genuinely 
seem to have believed that the Swazi had been duped, but in 
the absence of other reasons to make them turn a blind eye, it 
is unlikely that the likes of Shepstone and Bulwer would have 
been similarly deceived. The strength of these other reasons 
are best gauged by the feebleness of the Swazi case against the 
treaty. They had signed it, they claimed, on the understanding 
that Rudolph was a Natal official, and that all they were doing 
was re-asserting a long-standing tributary relationship to 
that colony. But any detailed examination of this argument would 
have shown that it simply did not stand up. Rudolph, it is 
true, had for some years been an official in the Natal service, 
but it is hardly credible that his presence for three years as 
the Republican magistrate of Utrecht could have passed unnoticed 
in Swaziland (37). Even in that unlikely event, both'the 
character and objectives of the expedition were unmistakable.
(36) P.P. 1877, C. 1748, 15-16, No. 5, Carnarvon to Barkly,
25 Jan. 1876.
(37) P.P. 1877, C. 1748, 55, Incl. No. 3 in No. 38, Minute by 
Shepstone, 3 June 1877.
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Its co-leader (together with Rudolph) was C.J. Joubert, nephew 
to the Acting President; the expedition itself was composed of 
burghers from Utrecht, Wakkerstroom and Pretoria, many of whom 
must have been personally known in Swaziland; and its demands 
were framed unambiguously in the.interests of the S.A.R. (38). 
The form of the protest alone should have sounded a warning. 
Since the Swazi alleged that they were unaware that the 
expedition had been promoted by the Transvaal, it was logically 
impossible for them to send a protest against it. They there­
fore had to resort to the convoluted formula of thanking the 
Natal authorities for sending Rudolph, with whom they had 
concluded a treaty, despite his being at the head of 350 Boers, 
adding almost incidentally that the S.A.R. had subsequently 
attempted to assert sovereignty over them (39).
It is hard to imagine the Colonial Office failing to pick up 
these contradictions, if they had made any serious effort to 
do so, and there seems little doubt that no such attempt was 
ever made. The reason can be traced to the exigencies of 
confederation. The idea of joining together the various states 
of southern African into one confederation under the British 
flag had cropped up intermittently throughout the nineteenth 
century. First Grey, then Buckingham and now finally Kimberley 
and Carnarvon had taken it up as a means of devolving imperial 
responsibilities, without relinquishing imperial control, each
(38) S.S. 190, Minutes of activities of G.M. Rudolph and
C.J. Joubert at Ludidi, 27 June 1875. For the terms of 
the treaty concluded see Leyds, Transvaal, 507-8.
(39) T.S.C., Case 22 (Swazi documents...), Statement of messengers 
from Umbandeni, 16 May 1876.
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to be equally frustrated in turn. It is no part of this dis­
cussion to examine the wider ramifications of Carnarvon’s 
federation policy. As applied to the S.A.R., however, it had 
a vital bearing on Swaziland’s future development. The central 
premise of Carnarvon's policy as it affected the S.A.R. was 
containment, its principal elements being denial of access to 
the sea, either through St. Lucia, Kosi or Delagoa Bay; 
exclusion from new sources of diamonds and other wealth; and a 
prohibition on expansion into neighbouring African territories. 
Its impact, he hoped, would be of two related kinds. Negatively, 
he intended it would exclude the S.A.R. from the enjoyment of 
any real economic and political independence, and so coerce 
them into federation. Positively, he expected the prospect of 
securing otherwise prohibited spoils would prove too strong an 
inducement for the S.A.R. to resist-(40). The Colonial Office 
response to the Swazi appeal was governed by precisely these 
assumptions. As Wolseley wrote in a memorandum to the Colonial 
Office, "If /the authorities of the S.k.Rj think they can 
exercise in the freest and fullest manner all the freedom of an 
independent State in their dealings with the Natives beyond 
their frontiers, and can make war with whoever they please* 
without any reference to us, they will be less likely to accept 
confederation." The S.A.R. should, therefore, be made to stay 
its hand until it agreed to confederation, in which event, it 
should be told, "Her Majesty’s Government would then be able to 
view in a different manner such questions as those involved in 
the action which the South African Republics would now seem
(40) Goodfellow, Great Britain, 63, 79-82, 94.
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inclined to adopt." (41) As long as confederation aborted, it 
seemed, the Swazi were safe.
They were indeed safe from two points of view, for as long as 
the S.A.R remained separate and independent they could also 
count on Boer military weakness, and their continued dependence 
on Swazi help against other African groups. This was borne 
out again by the events of 1876 among the Pedi. For some years 
before, the S.A.R. had been worried by the rapid growth of Pedi 
power on their borders. Throughout the late 1860s and early 
1870s Pedi numbers had continued to expand as neighbouring 
peoples were either coerced into accepting Pedi control, or 
voluntarily placed themselves under Pedi jurisdiction to escape 
the exactions of Republican rule. As Pedi numbers grew, so too 
did Pedi defiance. Encouraged first by the disasters in the 
Zoutpansberg, and then by the example of Cetshwayo, they took 
an increasingly contemptuous view of the Republic's ability to 
retaliate, until in 1876 they openly challenged its authority 
by infiltrating settlers and rustling cattle on the Republican 
side of the Steelport River (42).
The Swazi, who had suffered in the past from these developments, 
benefitted from them now. Republican burghers were notoriously 
unwilling to scale defended strong points of the sort they 
commanded, and African auxiliaries were essential to press the 
battle home. Burgers was therefore obliged to request Swazi
(41) C.0. 179/18 No. 214, 26 Oct., Encl. Memo by Wolseley,
21 Jan. 1876.
(42) Van Rooyen, 'Verhouding', 190, 226-231; Berliner Missions- 
berichte, 1862, 92.
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aid, and the diplomatic balance once again turned. Ironically, 
the British authorities totally misinterpreted the situation. 
Unaware of the previous history of Swazi relations with either 
the Pedi or the Republic, they imagined Swazi assistance to 
mean that their previous conclusions about the 1875 treaty 
were wrong (which they were), and that the Swazi were in fact 
effectively tributary to the S.A.R. (which they were not), and 
this temporarily weakened the support they were prepared to 
offer the Swazi against the Republic (43). Had the Swazi 
realised how this was threatening their principal line of 
defence against the S.A.R., they might have responded differently 
to Burgers's request. As it was they did not, and preparations 
to send the Swazi contingent still vent ahead.
Even so, their decision to assist Burgers was not reached 
without some difficulty. The disasters of 1869 and 1875 had 
been enormously costly in men, and memories were still fresh in 
Swaziland of how Republican commandos had left the Swazi 
unsupported to take the full brunt of the attack on Maleo's 
fortress in 1864 (44). Still more serious was the danger of a 
Zulu attack on Swaziland's undefended rear. This was made all 
the more likely by the close relations established between 
Cetshwayo and Sekhukhune, and the interests on which this 
alliance was based. Since 1873, Swazi leaders had feared a
(43) C.O. 179/121, No. 143, Bulwer to Carnarvon, 20 July 1876,
and Minutes by Fairfield and Carnarvon 6 Nov. and 7 Nov. 1876.
(44) S.S. 209, R 1407, 423, Encl. Buchanan to Purcocks and Bell,
31 May 1876. On this occasion Mtshengu, insila to Mswati 
and a leading councillor, "wanted to know what sort of 
people we whites were, that when we went out to fight none 
of us got killed, nor did we go into danger".
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pincer movement on Swaziland from Cetshwayo and Sekhulchune, 
and this had not been without considerable justification. Only 
two things were drawing Zulu and Pedi together, and these were 
hostility to the S.A.R. and hostility to Swaziland. In both 
cases, moreover, there was every chance of their hostility 
against the Republic being displaced onto the Swazi, so closely 
were they associated in the earlier history of the Transvaal (45). 
In Cetshwayo's case still other reasons applied. Swaziland 
was one of the major sources of dispute between the Zulu and 
the Republic, and one which could leave either of them partially 
encircled, depending on whoever won control. There was thus 
every chance of Cetshwayo attacking the Swazi rear if they 
helped against Sekhukhune. It would relieve pressure on 
Sekhukhune; it would give substance to long-standing claims on 
his neighbour; and it would be a powerful blow against his 
rivals in the Republic.
Nor did the danger stop here. Swazi enemies stretched the 
length and breadth of the eastern Transvaal, and there existed 
a real possibility of their paying off old scores under the 
cover of a Zulu and Pedi diversion. Of no-one was this more 
likely that Mzila. For over ten years his empire had suffered 
from the depredations of the Swazi in support of his brother 
Mawewe, whose son still remained in northern Swaziland hatching 
plans to return to power. A local trader in the area, in
(45) See for instance S.S. 208, R 1009/76, Merensky to President 
and Ex. Co., 2 May 1876; S.S. 17, R 1792/57, 227, Verslag 
der Commissie, Oct. 1857; Van Rooyen, 'Verhouding1, 107.
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fact, claimed there was a formal pact in existence, whereby 
Cetshwayo, Sekhukhune and Mzila had agreed to launch a joint 
attack on the S.A.R. (46). Du Bois1 report of a plot against 
the S.A.R. was perhaps a little far-fetched, but his story 
could have had more substance as far as the Swazi were concerned. 
At the very least, it indicates the rumours that were current 
in the area at the time, and the existence of the idea of 
attacking the S.A.R. through its association with the Swazi.
At most, they lend weight to the talk of black confederation 
that was associated with Cetshwayo in the second half of the 
1870s. In this case not the "unpremeditated community of 
affliction that related the natives to one another in spite 
of traditional tribal feuds", that De Kiewiet speaks of, but 
a confederation operating on a more limited regional level, and 
activated by African animus against a collaborator state (47).
The list of objections to participating in Burgers’s Sekhukhune 
campaign was clearly a formidable one, but against all the 
odds the Swazi were eventually won over. They need only 
summon the northern regiments, they were told, and the southern 
regiments could be left to protect the south. In addition the 
S.A.R. promised that a force of burghers would be posted on 
Swaziland’s south-eastern flank to guard against any action 
Cetshwayo might take (48). Combined with the prospect of 
revenge for the 1870 debacle, it all proved too much for the 
Swazi to resist, and Swazi opinion in the capital slowly swung
(46) G.H.N., Vol.1396 R.J. Du Bois to Shepstone, 3 April 1876.
(47) De Kiewiet, Imperial Factor, 148.
(48) S.S. 209, R 1407, 423, Encl. Buchanan and Purcocks to Bell, 
31 May 1876; F.C., Vol. I, Burgers to Bell, 17 May 1874.
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round in favour of taking part. Or so it seemed, until Burgers*s 
plans were suddenly disrupted by a totally unexpected hitch.
In the middle of June, the Swazi regiments which had been 
assembled to take part in the operation, and had in fact been 
doctored for the purpose, were suddenly dismissed. The 
explanation the regents gave was that this had been necessitated 
by the Umcwasho puberty ceremony, but this was palpably false. 
Bell, who was field-cornet in New Scotland, suspected sabotage 
by one of the border farmers from Lydenburg, which is not all 
that far-fetched when one considers the Republic’s previous 
record in such matters. It is more likely, however, that the 
regents simply got cold feet. Sandlane and Maloyi had never 
been very enthusiastic about the project, and had made a point 
of being absent from the capital when the assistance was being 
negotiated, so as not to be associated with the decision. After 
the Commission's departure they returned, and from this point 
a noticeable cooling of Swazi enthusiasm began to set in. Swazi 
opinion was always fairly ambivalent, and their return seems to 
have strengthened the group that believed the pros and cons of 
the expedition to be too finely balanced to be worth the risk.
As a result, feeling in the capital slowly hardened against 
participation, until, on the eve of their departure, the Swazi 
regiments were withdrawn (49).
What the regents seem to have planned was to try and wriggle 
free of their obligations, by deferring participation in the
(49) S.S. 212, No. 1934, 114-20, Bell to Burgers, 29 June 1876.
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expedition until it was too late; hence the story of Umcwasho. 
But the Republican authorities had no intention of letting the 
Swazi off the hook as easily as that. More to the point, they 
dare not. The Lydenburg contingent had already suffered set­
backs as a result of the Swazi non-appearance, and if the Swazi 
continued to hold back, the whole future of the campaign would 
be put at risk (50). Within a matter of days, therefore, fresh 
Republican emissaries were at the royal capital, demanding to 
know what had happened to the Swazi aid. This time there was 
to be no dodging the Republican requests. By contriving to be 
absent in the initial negotiations, Sandlane and Maloyi had 
avoided being bound by the initial commitment, and had been 
in a position to exert counter-pressure to get the decision 
reversed. But the same tactic could not be used twice. There 
was a limit to how far they could disassociate themselves from 
the regents' collective decisions, particularly over an issue 
of this importance. Consequently, when the regents succumbed 
to Republican pressure a second time, they succumbed as a body, 
leaving Sandlane and Maloyi as committed as the rest, and with 
no leeway to secure a second reversal once the Commission had 
left. Belatedly, therefore, they and the council resigned 
themselves to the despatch of a two thousand strong Swazi 
contingent, which left for the Republic in the first week of 
July (51).
(50) P.P. 1877, C. 1748, No. 51, 70, Barkly to Carnarvon,
2 July 1876.
(51) S.S. 211, No. 1743, 177, Bell to S.S. Swart, 5 July 1876; 
P.P. 1877, C. 1748, No. 61. 84, Barkly to Carnarvon,
4 Aug. 1876.
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According to Burgers's plan of operation, the Swazi were to 
join the Lydenburg commando in its assault on the fortress of 
Johannes Dinkoanyane. While Burgers campaigned against Pedi 
outposts in the west, the Lydenburg commando was to do the same 
in the east, before both joined with a third force in a final 
assault on Sekhukhune himself. As far as their part in this 
operation went, the Swazi acquitted themselves well, seizing 
control of Johannes's fortress and inflicting heavy casualties 
on the enemy. Their Republican allies however showed themselves 
much less committed. Instead of supporting the Swazi contingent 
as they stormed the slopes of Johannes's stronghold, they held 
back, preferring the loss of extra Swazi lives to any risk of 
their own. With casualties of thirty dead and over fifty 
wounded the Swazi were understandably enraged (52). Precisely 
the same thing had happened when Mswati had answered an earlier 
call to help against Mapoch, and now, despite all Republican 
promises to the contrary, it had happened again. This time, 
they vowed, would be the last, and without further ado they 
abandoned the expedition and returned home (53).
As the Swazi tramped belligerently homewards, amidst rumours of 
reprisals and pillaging on their way, discontent began to swell 
through the Republican ranks (54). Morale in any case was low,
(52) De VoIksstem, 29 July 1876, Cooper's report, 18 July 1876;
S.S. 212, No. 2056, 316, Cooper to S.S., Aug. 1876.
(53) Ibid, 309-10. There also seems to have been a dispute about 
cattle - P.P. 1877, C. 1748, 81-2, Encl. 2 in No. 59, Extra 
to Natal Witness, 25 July 1876; ibid, 106, No. 76, Bulwer
to Carnarvon, 22 Aug. 1876.
(54) The postcart driver had an incontrovertible hole in his hat 
to show where a Swazi bullet passed through - S.S. 212, No. 
1936, 123, Bell to State Secretary, 23 July 1876; P.P. 1877, 
C. 1748, 88, No. 62, Barkly to Carnarvon, 11 Aug. 1876.
296
because of more general dissatisfaction with Burgers’s 
Presidency. The extreme fundamentalist Doppers objected to him 
on grounds of his heresy (Burgers was previously a Dutch Reform 
Church predikant in the Cape, but had been suspended for his too 
"advanced" views), and a much broader spectrum of opinion 
opposed him on issues ranging from his Education Act to his 
railway loan (55). It was unfortunate under these circumstances 
that he had been obliged to assume command of the army, as he 
risked having his political unpopularity rub off onto the war 
effort as well. What was needed to overcome this was a 
combination of early military successes and a guarantee of 
black support, but the Dinkoanyane debacle denied him both of 
these. Despite urgent appeals to Mbandzeni, the Swazi refused 
any additional aid, and what little momentum the campaign 
gathered died gradually away. In its place there arose a corrosive 
spirit of mistrust. The Republic’s other black forces now 
anticipated fresh acts of betrayal, while the Republican burghers 
began to suspect them of collusion with Sekhukhune. As each 
glanced nervously over their shoulder at the other, the campaign 
slowly ground to a halt. M.W. Pretorius carefully skirted the 
fortress of Sekhukhune's sister, Legolwana, on receipt of a 
transparently insincere pledge of loyalty, and left her command” 
ing his lines of communication at the rear. Dinkoanyane’s 
followers were allowed briefly to regroup themselves to pose a 
similar threat further east; and by the time it came for the 
attack on Sekhukhune, the army was so thoroughly disaffected
(55) S.P. Englebrecht, Thomas Francois Burgers, n 1 Lewenskets 
(Pretoria, 1933), 137-43, 147-54, 171-4, 189-91.
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that little more was attempted than a perfunctory firing of some 
grass huts on the lower slopes of Sekhukhune's mountain, before 
the cry "huis toe" ("back home") went up, and the army fell 
apart. With his authority shattered Burgers stood helplessly 
by, and was left with no alternative but to abandon that campaign 
and leave a small band of volunteer irregulars to salvage what 
little they could from the collapse (56).
The abandonment of the Pedi campaign came as a serious setback 
to the Burgers administration, but its importance is easily 
exaggerated for the S.A.R. as a whole. The Pedi had, it is 
true, repelled one of the largest military expeditions ever to 
have gathered on Republican soil, and this inevitably had 
repercussions on African attitudes both inside the Republic and 
beyond. However, against this it is worth remembering that 
Sekhukhune’s victory was by no means unprecedented; Sekwati had 
had similar successes after 1852, and even the disunited Venda 
chiefdoms had achieved the same feat the following decade, so 
that its psychological impact was not nearly as great as the 
imperial authorities imagined. Nor was his victory by any 
means total. After the withdrawal of Burgers’s forces, von 
Schlikkeman and his irregulars waged such an effective campaign 
of harrassment that Sekhukhune had been compelled to negotiate 
a truce in which he was alleged to have accepted the status of 
subject, and the obligation to pay reparations. Of course, it 
would be equally wrong to take this submission too seriously.
(56) Van Rooyen, ’Verhouding1, 254-6; Uys,Shepstone, 203-6; 
Englebrecht, Burgers, 199-207.
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All Sekhukhune wanted was a respite from harrassment in which 
to plant his crops, and if he were ever acquainted with the 
terms demanded, which Hunt for one doubts, it is unlikely that 
he intended abiding by them (57). Rather what had happened 
was a reversion to the status quo ante. Both sides had shorn 
their power to resist conquest, but neither had had the capacity 
to impose their control over the other. The balance of advantage, 
therefore, was struck by the sum of their respective weaknesses 
rather than by the sum of their respective strengths. What 
this meant in the context of the 1870s was that whoever vzas 
most vulnerable to guerrilla skirmishing was most likely to 
lose out. In the first years of the decade that advantage was 
clearly with the Pedi, and in the later 1870s it might have 
swung in that direction more strongly still. But in 1876, 
when Britain annexed the S.A.R., the situation was one of 
stalemate, with neither side holding any real advantage.
Unfamiliar with Republican history, and obsessed with notions 
of 'white prestige1 the British understood little of this. They 
exaggerated the significance of Sekhukhune's victory, and 
overreacted to the news of the truce (58). No doubt this was 
partly because Sekhukhune had thrown out a life line to 
confederation when it appeared to be all but sunk, but there 
was more to it than that. Shepstone for one was genuinely 
puzzled by Sekhukhune's inaction after Burgers's retreat, and
(57) Hunt, 'Bapedi1, 298-9.
(58) P.P. 1877, C. 1776, 126-7, Incl. in No. 90, Shepstone to 
Barkly, 12 March 1877.
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had to resort to racial stereotypes to escape his confusion.
Pedi passivity now became rationalised in terms of their 
unwarlike tribal character, while the inevitable nemesis of 
Burgers’s defeat was reserved for the hands of the more martial 
Nguni. ’’The Swazi,” he explained, ”[arej defiant and agressive 
and they show signs of intending to occupy by force the lands 
which they consider to have been wrongly taken and alienated 
by the Republic." As for Cetshwayo, his "hatred of the Boers 
/wa§7 notorious £a.nd7 since the Sikukuni fiasco he had assumed 
the exercise of sovereignty over a portion of Transvaal territory. 
The Government of Natal," he concluded, "has been the only 
obstacle to attacks on the Republic being made by those tribes, 
which....would....most assuredly have annihilated the State." (59).
As far as the Swazi were concerned, nothing could have been 
further from the truth. Although they stubbornly witheld any 
further help from the S.A.R., it was not out of sense of outrage 
or contempt, but because their earlier reasons for helping them 
had fallen away. Despite the risks involved, Burgers’s initial 
plan had offered at least a chance of revenge against the Pedi 
at not too great a cost of men. The Dinkoanyane episode had 
however put paid to all that. More importantly, it had also 
put an end to fears of Republican retaliation should the Swazi 
opt out. Mbandzeni had sent military assistance and had been 
badly let down. Now he had an unassailable moral case for 
staying out. As the regents watched their soldiers trickle back
(59) Ibid.
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to their homesteads, relief rather than outrage must have been 
their dominant response.
The Swazi pushed home this advantage in two broad directions. 
Psychologically, they exploited it to take the offensive on a 
variety of outstanding border problems (60). Morally, they 
sheltered behind it to avoid any further military requisitions. 
That this created difficulties for the S.A.R. cannot 
be doubted, but it was a far cry from the sort of upheavel in 
relationships suggested by Shepstone. The border was only 
mildly disrupted, with the principal focus of activity again 
confined to the Komati, and so far were the Swazi from scorning 
Burgers's new appeals that they went to elaborate lengths to 
disguise their refusal and avoid giving offence. "Mataffin 
/Matsafen{7,M explained Mbandzeni, "had acted wrongly. Finding 
the Lydenburg men did not treat him fairly he should have moved 
his men forward tq join His Honour's /i.e. Burgers'sj command 
so that His Honour could personally have seen he had kept faith 
with the Republic." For the moment, however, his hands were 
tied. Matsafeni had as yet not returned, and he would have to 
await his report before making any decision. A month later 
Mbandzeni's attitude was much the same. "The Swazi were friendly 
enough and treated us obligingly," reported the Republic's 
emissaries, "but the behaviour of Commandant Coetzer had produced 
a mistrust in them that was insurmountable in spite of all our
(60) S.S. 213, 200-1, No. 2188, Bell to State Secretary, 14 Aug. 
1876; S.S. 222, 325-6, No. 3637, Bell to State Secretary,
11 Dec. 1876; De Volksstem, 3 March 1877; T.S.C., Case 7, 
Letter Book, 1876-8, Shepstone to Frere, 12 Sept. 1877.
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efforts." (61).
Up to a point, Mbandzeni’s caution was a tribute to the Republic*s 
well-attested powers of recuperation, but beyond that it was 
still another indication of the shadow that Zululand continued 
to cast over Swaziland's affairs. The S.A.R. might be ailing, 
but Zululand remained strong, and so long as that situation 
persisted the Swazi had to avail themselves of whatever allies 
they had. The dilemma this implied for Swaziland's leaders 
was a serious one. Swaziland needed Republican protection 
against the Zulu, and was obliged to supply military aid in 
return. At the same time the power of the S.A.R. was suspect, 
and the very act of giving it assistance exposed the Swazi even 
more. Uys even supposes it was rumours of Zulu invasion which 
sent Swazi regiments scuttling home in August 1876, and while 
this is in itself incorrect, it does point to a more general 
truth (62). As Bell reported even before the Dinkoanyane 
encounter, the Swazi dared not stay out for long for fear of 
Zulu reprisals, and there is little doubt that this lay at the 
back of Matsafeni's mind throughout his absence in Lydenburg (63).
(61) S.S. 212, 349-50, No. 2079, Bell to State' Secretary, 7 Aug. 
1876; S.S. 212, 309-10, No. 2056, H.W.A. Cooper, Landdrost 
Lydenburg, to State Secretary, August 1876.
(62) Uys, Shepstone, 205-6. Reports coming from the Zulu border 
at about this time in no way support Uys’s claim, see for 
example S.S. 210, No. 1951, J.F(?). Joubert to Pretorius,
22 June 1876; S.S. 210, Rudolph to State Secretary, No. 
1739, 6 July 1876, 170-1; S.S. 211, No. 1805, Rudolph to 
St. Secretary, 13 July 1876,308-9. Indeed as far as one 
can tell a piece of deliberate distortion is involved 
here, Uys being concerned to minimise the Republic's own 
responsibility for the Swazi withdrawal.
(63) P.P. 1877, C. 1748, 75, Incl. 2 in No. 53 extract of letter 
from Hamilton, 11 July 1876; see also S.S. 208, R 1009/76, 
Merensky to St. Secretary, 2 May 1876.
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With the return of his army, rumours of this sort intensified 
and strengthened Mbandzeni’s determination to lie low. Early 
in August Rudolph got wind of preparations for a new Zulu attack, 
and this story was apparently confirmed by Cetshwayo1s request 
to Natal a little later in the month to be allowed to "wash 
his spears.11 (64) Cetshwayofs target, according to later 
reports, was Mtyelegwane, a semi-independent Swazi chief, living 
at the point where the Lusutfu River passes through the Lebombo (65). 
Mtyelegwane commanded fortresses which Cetshwayo was especially 
anxious to control, and which he had already assaulted in the 
middle of 1875 (66). Cetshwayo’s motive in this instance was 
only partly defensive (i.e. the desire to control defensive 
fortresses as an insurance against military defeat), for what 
he also seems to have had in mind was to secure a strong point 
from which he could seize control of Swaziland south of the 
Lusutfu/Ngwerapisi line (67). It was, in effect, Dingane’s plan 
resurrected.
A combination of factors frustrated Cetshwayo’s plans. Most 
visible were the combined protests of the S.A.R. and Natal, but
(64) S.S.212, Rudolph to St. Secretary, 10 Aug. 1876; P.P.
1877, C. 1748, 129, Incl. I in No. 106, Statement by 
messengers sent to Cetshwayo by Natal government, 28 Aug.
1876; see also S.S. 213, 89, No. 2139, P.J. Henderson 
(Commandant) to J.C.L. Moll, Landdrost Wakkerstroom,
16 Aug. 1876.
(65) S.S. 213, 192-6, No. 2187, Rudolph to St. Secretary,
24 Aug. 1876.
(66) Ibid; S.S. 190, 25, No. 1488, Rudolph to St. Secretary,
4 July 1875; S.S. 190, 67, R 1489, Rudolph to State Secretary, 
15 July 1875.
(67) S.S. 242, 362, No. 2961, Bell to Osborne, 24 July 1877.
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these would not have had the influence they did were it not for 
cleavages within the Zulu political system which external 
pressures could lever apart. What made these all the more 
serious from Cetshwayofs point of view, and from the point of 
view of his Swaziland policy as a whole, was the broad north/ 
south configuration of the rift. For years now Cetshwayo had 
had to count on the enmity of his half brother Hamu,living in 
the north-west of Zululand, beyond the Inkonjeni hills. By 
the time of Cetshwayo*s coronation he was already identifiable 
as a leader of an opposition group, and was negotiating with 
the Swazi to flee out of Zululand and join them (68). Nor was 
Hamu's the only hostile grouping at Cetshwayo*s coronation. 
Besides him, there was also the faction from the north-east led 
by Sibhephu, with whom there was nearly a headlong collision at 
Cetshwayo*s installation (69). Over the years these two 
remained a perpetual thorn in Cetshwayo*s flesh, particularly 
over the question of Swaziland. In May 1875, for example, an 
attack on Swaziland had to be called off because of a conjunction 
of outside protests and internal opposition, led in this case 
by a certain Mkokwane (70). Mkokwane was killed for his part 
in the affair, but opposition to Cetshwayo*s Swazi policies 
carried on. In April 1877 Mnyamana (who also had a chiefdom in 
the north-west of Zululand, and who Dunn associated with Hamu’s
(68) S.S. 157, 42-3, R 718/73, Bell to Burgers, 29 March 1873.
(69) Moodie, John Dunn, 26-7, 39-42. For an earlier reference 
to these rifts see S.N.A., 1/1/21, D. Leslie to S.N.A.,
28 July 1871.
(70) S.S. 188, 284-5, No. 1166, Rudolph to State Secretary,
29 May 1875; De Volksstem, 11 Sept. 1875, R. Bell to Editor, 
20 Aug. 1875; S.S. 213, 193, No. 2187, Rudolph to State 
Secretary, 24 Aug. 1876.
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faction at Cetshwayo's coronation in 1873), Gaozi, Hamu and 
Ziwedu (the latter being a chief in the north-east of Zululand) 
were supposed to have been responsible for Cetshwayo's calling 
off yet another raid into Swaziland (71) , and three months 
later when Cetshwayo made still one more request to the Transvaal 
and Natal to be allowed to "wash his spears" - "I am no king", 
he said on this occasion, "but sit in a heap. I cannot be a 
king until I have washed my assegais." - Fynney reported that 
virtually all of the headmen were opposed to the plan, and 
specifically that he could not rely on either Hamu or Sibhephu (72).
The question that automatically springs to mind when surveying 
this succession of alarms and near excursions is why Cetshwayo 
persisted in his efforts when the opposition was evidently so 
powerful. Was it not perhaps some sort of extended hoax mounted 
by Cetshwayo for entirely different reasons, or even the 
figment of fevered outsiders' imaginations? The second part 
of the question is answered more easily than the first. If 
Mkokwane was executed for his opposition to Cetshwayo's 
Swaziland expedition, then it presumably follows that Cetshwayo 
was set on the idea, at least on this occasion, and that he was 
only deflected by fairly determined opposition. However, this 
still does not explain why he persisted in these efforts when 
they seemed to be perpetually blocked. A partial explanation
(71) S.N.A.,Vol.1/7/13, Statement of 2 native residents of 
Eshowe Mission, 26 April 1877.
(72) P.P. 1878, C. 1961, 46-9, Encl. I in No. 12, Report by
F.B. Fynney, 4 July, 1877; G.H.N., Vol. 1397, F.B. Fynney to 
Acting S.N.A., 13 July 1877.
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may perhaps be found in the type of opposition which raised 
itself to Cetshwayo's plans. The main focus of this, as we have 
seen, was concentrated in the north, but that should not be 
taken to mean that it constituted a monolithic or cohesive 
geographical bloc. Hamu and Sibhephu could be counted unreliable 
in most situations, but this was by no means true of the other 
personalities involved (73). Mnyamana, for instance, was 
Cetshwayo's leading minister, and can by no stretch of the 
imagination be described as hostile to his regime. Nor for 
that matter can Ziwedu, who was Cetshwayo's half-brother and a 
close confident of the King. Both, on the other hand, seem to 
have had particular interests in Swaziland - Ziwedu because of 
his geographical location, Mnyamana both because of this, and 
because of his marriage ties with the Swazi royal house (74).
As far as Swaziland was concerned their allegiances must always 
have been torn. While Cetshwayo seemed set on invasion they 
must necessarily have muted their criticism, but the moment 
any extraneous obstacle appeared, such as the commandeering 
of burghers in the S.A.R., or the protests of the government of 
Natal, they could seize on them to bring their opposition out 
into the open. It is possible that it was the fluctuating 
responses of men like these which gave Cetshwayo's Swaziland
(73) This does not necessarily mean that they would have been, 
as Sibhephu's behaviour in the Anglo-Zulu War showed.
(74) S.P.,File 17, Notebook 2, 8, interview Xaba with Socwatsha 
present, 3 May 1910; G.H.N., Vol. 1398, Report by F.B. Fynney 
to Acting S.N.A. (? 1878).
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policy its extraordinary volatility (75). With Hamu and 
Sibhephu automatically suspect, it required only their opposition, 
linked as it invariably was with outside protests, to tip the 
balance decisively against intervention. Conversely, because 
the issue was so finely balanced, it always held hope for 
Cetshwayo that he would be successful if he tried just one 
more time.
These broad contours of Zulu foreign policy only stand out when 
one steps back from the problem and views it over a period of 
years, and for this reason it has been necessary to look 
forward to 1878. Returning for a moment to the particular 
events of 1876 the same features stand out but in much less 
sharp relief. Cetshwayo continued to talk about invading 
Swaziland, but without ever doing anything about it, and one 
can only assume that his failure to act was because of the 
combination of pressures described above (76). The only exceptions 
to this inactivity were two attacks made by Mbilini into the 
disputed territory and into the S.A.R. at the turn of the New 
Year (77). Even here it is uncertain whether these were specifically 
authorised by Cetshwayo. Bell maintained that they were, and that 
they were designed to provoke reprisals from the Trans-vaal,
(75) Which may account for the fact that Cetshwayo was supposedly 
contemplating ousting Mnyamana in favour of Mabemba, C.O.
879/42, Appendix I, 386, No. 9, Wood to Kimberley, 24 Sept.
1881. For subsequent rumours about Mnyamana’s alleged 
unreliability see De Volksstem, 3 May 1877; Mac.P., Box 45A, 
Diary Feb. 1879.
(76) Above, 280, note 25; P.P., 1877, C. 1748, 216,
Incl. in No. 165, reply of Cet. to messenger sent by Govern­
ment of Natal, 21 Nov. 1876; ibid, 229, No. 177, Bulwer to 
Carnarvon, 13 Nov. 1875.
(77) The two attacks seem to have been on Dec. 30th and Jan. 2nd,
P.P. 1877, C. 1776, 52, No. 42, Bulwer to Carnarvon, 12 Jan. 
1877; De Volksstem, 13 Jan. 1877, Supplement.
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and thus precipitate war, but Cetshwayo!s subsequent behaviour 
in inviting Rudolph to come and seize Mbilini suggests that this 
was not so (78). An alternative argument would be that 
Cetshwayo was using Mbilini to intimidate the inhabitants of 
these areas into evacuating their land# More likely still, 
however, is that Mbilini was acting independently, at least in 
the detailed planning of the raid, in the expectation that it 
would gain Cetshwayo’s approval (79). Cetshwayo certainly seems 
to have been embarrassed by Mbilini!s deeds. In reply to 
Rudolph’s protest about the raid he said that Mbilini deceived 
him by telling lies, and that he was just "a Schelmhond like 
all Swazis", and assured Rudolph that he could enter unhindered 
into Zululand to attack Mbilini. Rudolph understandably felt 
less sure. Mbilini lived in the midst of other Zulu villages, 
and he preferred the less risky course of getting Cetshwayo to 
deliver Mbilini himself (80). Cetshwayo, however, was able to 
evade that responsibility after an unauthorised attack made by 
Field-Cornet Kohrs and a number of other Wakkerstroomers on 
Mbilini's village on 24th February (81). Although this was 
unsuccessful and Mbilini managed to escape deeper into Zululand, 
Cetshwayo henceforth disclaimed all responsibility for his
(78) S.S. 228, 137, No. 367, Bell to St. Secretary, 13 Jan. 1877.
(79) U.R.5, U.R.B., N o .203 , 17 Jan. 1877, and S.S. 228, 157-8,
No. 377, Rudolph to State Secretary, 24 Jan. 1877. If this 
is to be believed Cetshwayo's target was Wakkerstroom’s ward 
3, and if this was the object it was partly achieved with the 
evacuation of a number of families from the area, P.P. 1877,
C 1776, 53, Incl. in No. 42, Report by J.W. Shepstone,
10 Jan. 1877.
(80) S.S. 228, 155-8, No. 377, Rudolph to State Secretary,
24 Jan. 1877.
(81) S.S. 230, 345-6, No. 862, Rudolph to S.S., 26 Feb. 1877.
Seven or eight whites and an unknown number of blacks were 
involved.
behaviour. Mbilini, he asserted, was no longer in his charge.
He had given him over to Rudolph, and Kohrs had attacked him 
and forced him to flee. That had interposed Kohrs between 
Rudolph and himself, and if Rudolph still wanted Mbilini he 
would have to go to Kohrs. Rudolph fumed, "From this you can 
see how arbitrarily Cetshwayo acts, and that nothing is to be 
got from him by friendship." (82)
Cetshwayo had obviously been loathe to take action against 
Mbilini, and the chief reason for his repudiating him at all 
was probably information about Shepstone’s impending visit to 
the Republic. Already by mid-December, Cetshwayo had some idea 
of what this was about, and this may have persuaded him to mark 
time over Swaziland and the disputed boundary, until he could 
see more clearly what it implied (83). It is, in fact, just 
possible that he may have had hopes of Shepstone in this respect, 
but if that was the case they were quickly dashed, when Shepstone, 
chameleon-like, took on all the policies and attitudes of his 
predecessors once he had annexed the Transvaal. As a result, 
within a few months, the situation on the boundary was just as 
tense as before. Confrontation returned to the disputed fron­
tier; Zulu settlers continued to colonise along the Pongola; 
and the same threats and requests to invade were uttered against 
the Swazi. There was nevertheless one important difference.
(82) S.S. 232, 341-2, No. 1196, Rudolph to State Secretary,
29 March 1877.
(83) T.S.C., Case 7, Letter Book 1876-8, 2, Shepstone to Barkly, 
23 Feb. 1876.
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Faced with a much more united front of whites on his western 
and southern borders, Cetshwayo was prepared to take a more 
flexible line with his Swazi neighbours. Thus, sprinkled among 
threats of invasion and encroachment one also finds overtures 
for alliances between the two Royal Houses, which allowed the 
Swazi to breathe a little more easily in the months before the 
war (84).
While Zulu attitudes froze back into positions of suspicion and 
hostility, Swazi reactions to the new administration remained 
much more ambiguous and supple. Annexation was welcomed for 
the greater protection it promised against the Zulu, but was 
distrusted for the greater rigidity it brought to Transvaal/
Swazi affairs. The underlying ambivalence of Swazi policy is 
nowhere clearer than at the first Queen’s Birthday celebrations 
to be held in the annexed Transvaal. In common with the other 
chiefdoms in the area, the Swazi had been invited to this to 
pledge their fealty to the Crown. Not withstanding their earlier 
protestations of loyalty, however, they had no intention of 
being lumped together with other chiefdoms, as simple subjects 
of the Crown. Led by Sandlane Zwane and Mbovane Fakudze, the 
nation’s two leading councillors, they insisted on a separate 
audience with Shepstone once the other representatives had
(84) P.P. 1877, C. 1883, 19, Encl. 2 in No , 18, C. Boast, Acting 
Resident Magistrate Newcastle to M. Osborne, 15 May 1877;
S.S. 259, No. 243, J. Dunn to Shepstone, 8 May 1877; S .S. 
242, No. 2957, 346-7, Bell to Osborne, 8 July 1877; G.H.N., 
Vol. 1397, F.B. Fynney to Acting S.N.A., 13 July 1877 ; S.S. 
242, No. 2960, 354-6, Bell to Osborne, 24 July 1877; T.S.C., 
Case 7, Letter Book 1876-8, 262, Shepstone to Frere,
12 Sept. 1877; ibid, 289, Shepstone to Frere, 16 Nov. 1877;
G.H.N., Vol. 791, G. 400A/77, Shepstone to Bulwer, 6 Dec. 
1877 .
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dispersed. At this "they stated the difficulty of their 
position and their attachment to Her Majesty's Government", as 
well as, "their satisfaction at the Transvaal having become 
British territory and their anxiety to be what they had always 
considered themselves to be under the British Government",
The unspoken implication of all this was that they did not 
want to be what they had never been, that is, the direct 
subjects of the Crown, and Shepstone picked it up immediately.
"I explained," he went on, "that hitherto the relations of the 
Amaswazi with H.M.G. had been from circumstances those of distant
(
neighbours, but that by the recent change they had become either
adjoining neighbours or subjects; which of these positions
/
they wish to occupy they must themselves, as a people, 
determine... but... a clear and definite declaration they must 
soon make, because both the obligations and privileges of 
living inside the enclosure differed from and were greater 
than residence without" (85).
To their relief the Swazi were never called upon to take this 
delicate decision. Shepstone’s first task on taking charge of 
the Transvaal was to repair the damage he felt had been done
to white prestige within its borders, and the status of
Swaziland was held over for future consideration (86). Because 
of this, and because a succession of political crises soon came 
thronging in on the administration, it was nearly three years
(85) P.P. 1877, C. 1883, 13-14, No. 13, Sir T. Shepstone to 
Carnarvon, 27 May 1877.
(86) P.P. 1878, C. 1961, 63, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 31 July
1877.
before the British could again devote their undivided attention 
to Swaziland. Just thirteen months after Shepstone assumed 
control, fresh troubles flared up with Sekhukhune, and these 
in turn were overtaken nine months later by the most serious 
crisis Britain had yet had to confront in south-eastern Africa 
the Anglo-Zulu War. As a result, for virtually the entire 
period of annexation, Swaziland was left in the same political 
limbo as it had held for the previous decade viz-a-viz the 
S.A.R.
This did not mean that they were left entirely to their own 
devices. As the Sekhukhune campaign unfolded, the British 
soon blundered into exactly the same morass of difficulties as 
their predecessors had done. Sekhukhune was strongly fortified 
on his mountain, and could not be physically dislodged without 
a frontal assault and a heavy loss of men. The alternative of 
a guerilla campaign was not much better. In that sort of 
warfare, mobility was essential, and this was effectively denied 
the British by the horse sickness which raged around Sekhukhune 
stronghold for much of the year (87). To escape their predica­
ment the British were eventually forced back on precisely the 
same expedient as the Republic had used. African auxiliaries 
were sought as a solution to the problem, and Captain George 
Eckersley was sent to Swaziland to solicit help. The reply 
Eckersley brought back with him was discouragingly negative.
(87) T.S.C., Case 14, M. Clarke to Shepstone, 7 June 1878; 
ibid, M. Clarke to Shepstone, 21 Aug. 1878.
312
It was hardly reasonable, the Swazi pointed out, for the British 
to expect any help from them when the Zulu were busy occupying 
a great swathe of Swazi territory in the south (88). Equally 
unreasonable, they no doubt added to themselves, was to ask them to 
place everything at risk when the British could not even 
subdue Sekhukhune. Until the Zulu question was settled, they 
were keeping their options open.
The Zulu question was in fact rapidly coming to a head. Both 
Shepstone and Frere, for their various reasons, had decided 
that an independent Zululand could not be permitted to exist, 
and they were only waiting for a suitable pretext by which to 
destroy its independence. For a rather different set of reasons, 
the Swazi were also facing crisis in a similar direction.
Between January and April 1878, there had been a brief lull in 
Zulu pressure on Swaziland, following the clash between 
Cetshwayo’s Ngobamakosi and Hamu’s Tolwana regiments at the 
annual First Fruits ceremony, but as the spectre of civil 
disturbances faded, encroachments and provocations across the 
Pongola River were again actively resumed (89). In the middle 
of May notice was served on farmers living in the Pongola ward, 
along the lower Mkhondvo River, to move, and towards the end
(88) S.S. 305, R 3301, Captain Clarke to S.N.A., 9 Sept. 1878, 
Encl. Eckersley to Clarke, 5 Sept. 1878, (this is also 
reproduced in C.2220, 309-310).
(89) S.N.A., Vol. 1/4/2, No. 5, H.F. Fynn, Resident Magistrate 
Msinga Division, to S.N.A., 3 Jan. 1878; ibid, No. 20, 
Fynn to S.N.A., 9 Jan. 1878; De Volksstem, 22 Jan. 1878,
Own Correspondent ; S.P., 'Miscellaneous1 , 29393, 145-6, 
Ndukwana, 29 Sept. 1900.
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of the month building was resumed on the royal village at 
Luneberg, which had been abandoned, half constructed, the 
previous December (90). When Cetshwayo had begun building 
this in November 1877 it had come close to precipitating a 
crisis with the Transvaal. Shepstone had written to Frere 
that it jeopardised the whole of Utrecht and the greater part 
of Wakkerstroom, as well as giving Cetshwayo control of natural 
fortresses in the area, and would, for that reason, have to 
be stopped (91). When building restarted six months later, 
Rudolph put a less alarmist construction on the act, pointing 
out it was not a military village as such, and emphasising the 
peaceable demeanour of its induna, Faku, but it is more likely 
in this case that Shepstone's judgement was more sound (92). 
What mattered was not so much its alleged function, which 
was to provide an administrative centre for the remnants of 
Nyamainja's people in the area (93), nor its diminutive size, 
but the fact that by doing this Cetshwayo had stated a formal 
claim over an area he had already informally infiltrated. 
Bulwer, who was normally one of Cetshwayo’s protagonists,
(90) S.S. 281, R 1594, Rudolph to Secretary Government, 14 May 
1878, encl. J.D. Engelbrecht to Rudolph, 11 May 1878; 
ibid, R 1593, Rudolph to Secretary Govt., 15 May 1878; 
ibid, R 1761, Rudolph to Secretary Govt., 25 May 1878.
(91) T.S.C., Case 7, Letter Book 1876-8, 289, Shepstone to 
Frere, 16 Nov. 1877.
(92) S.S. 281, R 1999, Rudolph to Secretary Govt., 1 June 1878.
(93) S.P., File 17, Notebook 3, 25, Lazarus Xaba, 7 May 1910.
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understood this, and any doubt on the question was dispelled 
by Cetshwayo’s actions over the next six months (94). After 
backtracking briefly in early June, Cetshwayo began July by 
occupying Mtyelegwanefs territory in the east, and by building 
right up to Swaziland's royal graves and strongholds in the 
Mahamba, Mozaza River and Ngwavuma River region (95) (Map 3).
In September a new attack was launched by Mbilini into 
Swaziland, again possibly without Cetshwayo's direct consent (96), 
and by November, if a surveyor's comment is to be believed,
Zulu occupation stretched right up to the Mhlangavula (97).
These events have never been accorded the significance they 
deserve. Partly because they were used as a pretext for a war, 
which was so obviously undertaken for other reasons, partly
(94) "This of course is an act of assertion of authority and 
it is evidently the thin end of the wedge, inserted with 
/[the probable7... object of placing the king in a position 
to raise, future questions should the opportunity favour" -
G.H.Z., Vol. 780, No. 123, Bulwer to Frere, 3 Aug. 1878.
(95) S.S. 322, 16, Rudolph to S.N.A., 18 June 1878, Encl. 
Statement by Swazi messengers, 18 June 1878; The Net, 
October 1878, Letter from Jackson, 28 June 1878; De 
Volksstem, 2 July 1878, letter 21 June 1878; ibid, 9 July 
1878; ibid, 30 July 1878, Own Correspondent, 15 July 1878;
S.S. 306, R 3466, Rudolph to Secretary Govt., 27 Sept.1878.
(96) S.N.I., No. 6/78, Rudolph to S.N.A., 12 Oct. 1878 (This 
is reproduced in C. 2260, 52-3): ibid, No. 24/78, Rudolph 
to S.N.A., 27 Oct. 1878 (reproduced in C. 2222, 105);
Dunn claimed that Cetshwayo was furious over this last 
attack, but that Umnyamana had given him warning so that 
he could escape, C. Vijn, Cetshwayo's Dutchman, translated 
by J.W. Colenso (London, 1880), 106, Note 13.
(97) S.S. 316, R 4297, G.E. Fawcus to Govt. Secretary, 18 Nov.
1878.
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because of ignorance about Cetshwayo’s earlier ambitions, 
historians have tended to draw the opposite conclusion that 
they had little or no aggressive intent. Instead, the explanation 
generally preferred has been that Zulu villages spilled over 
the Pongola because of the protracted drought which gripped 
south-eastern Africa in 1877-1878 (98). This may indeed have 
played a part in the movement, but a more thorough ecological 
analysis would be necessary to show why this drought should 
have had precisely these effects. Besides that, the drought 
thesis only holds for 1878. Zululand, according to Coupland, 
was spared the drought that affected most of the rest of 
southern Africa in 1877, which means that other explanations 
have to be found for Zulu encroachments before 1878 (99).
These, as we have shown, are largely strategic and political, 
and that being the case, it seems fair to presume that political 
motives played a significant part in the movement of 1878 as 
well.
It is against this background of encroachment that Swazi 
reactions to the Zulu war must be judged. Swaziland was, in 
Swazi eyes, in the front line of conflict, and nothing would 
induce them to lend help to Britain for anything other than 
their own self defence. Indeed, to begin with, they seemed
(98) De Kiewiet, Imperial Factor, 206-8; D.R. Morris, The 
Washing of the Spears, (London, 1966) 267; R. Coupland, 
Zulu battle piece, Isandhlwana, (London, 1948), 30-31. 
There is an element of contradiction in De Kiewiet who 
implies that pressure on fertile border lands was for 
pasturage for cattle, but who also notes Zulu herds had 
become decimated by lung sickness and red-water disease.
(99) Coupland, Isandhlawana, 30-31.
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unwilling to do even that. Despite English promises of support,
the Swazi refused to take any action that might in any way
antagonise Cetshwayo. As Mbandzeni sarcastically observed to
the Swazi Border Commissioner, MacLeod in November 1878, he was
sure that the British would help the Swazi push back the Zulu
across the Pongola, the only problem was "which year" that
would take place. Sandlane elaborated on this theme the
following day. "I told him of the power of the English,"
MacLeod notes,
/an47 they /jjandlane and two other indvuna7 
said that might be true. They hoped so, but 
they had never seen the English fight. They 
were always saying they would but never did.
They thought they never would. If we did 
we should be beaten. They had seen the 
Zulus fight. Until they saw the English 
fight the Zulus and beat them they could 
not believe it possible. They would not 
fight the Zulus until they ssw them 
running away to their caves, then they 
would come and help the English burn 
them out. When the English were ready to 
go into Zululand they might tell the 
Swazis so that the Swazis might be ready 
in case the English proved the stronger, 
which would make them very glad. (100)
While this remained the basic Swazi attitude, it did soften a
little as hostilities approached. Towards the end of December,
MacLeod returned to Nkanini to inform Mbandzeni of the British
ultimatum, and to make another plea for Swazi assistance in
the event of war. MacLeod had been authorised to offer a bribe
of horses and cattle, but he decided, probably correctly, that
blackmail would get better results. Thus, when Mbandzeni
stonewalled on the question of military assistance, MacLeod
(100) Mac. P., Box 62C, Official Communications, 1878-80, 
MacLeod to ?, n.d.
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threatened him with unfavourable border delimitations once the 
war had been won (101). Had his superiors got to hear of this 
MacLeod would almost certainly have been disciplined, as Frere 
had specifically vetoed the idea only three weeks before (102) . 
But as it was, it was enough to make Mbandzeni sit up and take 
notice, and he promised to help, provided he was supported by 
British troops (103).
MacLeod returned from Nkanini in high spirits, little understand­
ing how elastic Mbandzeni's proviso might be. White support, 
after all, could be variously interpreted and it could easily 
be argued that it was insufficient or wrongly placed. MacLeod’s 
threats had nonetheless been a source of dismay, and their 
effects can be seen in messages that passed back and forth 
between Pretoria and Nkanini over the next two weeks. Shortly 
after MacLeod had left Nkanini, messengers had arrived from 
Shepstone's Commissioner in Pretoria informing Mbandzeni of 
the suspension of hostilities against Sekhukhune, and the 
movement of troops to Derby in New Scotland. They returned 
with the message that Swazi headmen were on their way to 
Pretoria to ask for immediate definition of the boundary so 
that the Swazi "could die with the white men in holding it".
(101) Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Communications, E. Wood to MacLeod, 
17 Dec. 1878; ibid, MacLeod to his brother Johnny,
26 Dec. 1878.
(102) N.A., E. Wood Collection, File II/2/2, Chelmsford to Wood,
3 and A Dec. 1878.
(103) Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Communications, Wood to MacLeod,
17 Dec. 1878, note by MacLeod, 25 Dec. 1878.
318
Bound by instructions to avoid all discussion of the border, 
Clarke could do nothing to oblige, and despite repeated requests 
by the Swazi delegation for information about the British policy 
on the Swazi/Zulu border, they went home with the question 
unclarified (104).
Whether these fears would have been enough to bring the Swazi 
into the war is difficult to say, but the probability is that 
they would not. The test should have come late in January 1879, 
when Mbandzeni was instructed to send an army to expel the Zulu 
living on the north bank of the Pongola. After giving his 
assent to MacLeod's messengers, Mbandzeni retreated from this 
position when visited by MacLeod himself, telling him that he 
had already sent an army to Mtylegwane's, but would summon his 
council about this latest request. On the face of it this looks 
like evasion, but MacLeod was never given the chance to find 
out, as on his way back from delivering these instructions 
he heard of the defeat at Isandhlwana, and further action had 
to be postponed (105) .
Britain's defeat at Isandhlwana should have shaken Swazi 
confidence, but its effects turned out to be oddly mixed. To 
the surprise of Shepstone, who expected demoralisation to set
(104) P.P. 1878-9, C. 2252, 67-8, Encl. in No. 20, His Excellen­
cies Commissioner to S.N.A., Pretoria, 13 Jan. 1879.
(105) P.P. 1878-9 C. 2260, 65, sub. encl. in No. 10, MacLeod 
to Col. Wood, 25 Jan. 1879; T.S.C., Case 18, File "M",
No. 24, MacLeod to ?»28 Jan. 1879; Mac. P., Box 45A,
Diary, Jan. 1879.
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in once the news became known, the Swazi seem; to have drawn 
a quiet satisfaction from the defeat. For once they felt 
Britain was fully committed, and could not back out. For once 
too, according to MacLeod, they had gained some idea of the 
full destructiveness of British arms. The army third column 
may have been annihilated and the.British advance checked, 
but in this and the following engagement at Rorke's Drift 
something like two and a half thousand Zulu had been killed, 
leaving Zulu morale seriously undermined. Not that this meant 
the Swazi were any more likely to help; indeed, quite the reverse 
was the case. Although Mbandzeni reiterated his willingness 
to supply troops on more or less the same conditions as before, 
those conditions were now virtually impossible to satisfy (106) .
No British commander dared denude the south eastern Transvaal 
to protect Swaziland, and the Swazi could rest assured that 
their offer would not be taken up.
Much as Chelmsford and Wood would have liked to secure Swazi 
participation on the northern front they were prepared to 
accept Mbandzeni’s case (107). Swaziland was obviously vulnerable 
in the south, as an attack by Mbilini showed the following 
month, and it was as unreasonable to expect them to protect
(106) Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Communications , MacLeod to 
father, 2 Feb. 1879; ibid, Box 45A, Diary, Jan. 1879 and 
Miscellaneous loose leaf, draft letter, n.d.; For Zulu 
casualties at Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift see Morris, 
Washing, 387, 417.
(107) E. Wood Collection, File II/2/2, Chelmsford to Wood,
27 Jan. 1879; T.S.C., Case 19, File "RM, Rowlands to 
Shepstone, No. 25, 31 Jan. 1879.
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Utrecht and Wakkerstroom, as it was for Wood to shield southern 
Swaziland and so expose Utrecht (108). What Wood and Chelmsford 
failed to realise however was the improbability of the Swazi 
helping in any event. Although Mbandzeni might have been 
prepared, with the appropriate backing, to clear the northern 
Pongola strip, there were no circumstances whatsoever in which 
he would have participated in a full scale invasion of 
Zululand (109).
This became apparent in the final phases of the war. In the 
middle of June, MacLeod rode to Nkanini to ask Mbandzeni to 
move against Cetshwayo's followers north of the Pongola, but 
Mbandzeni again declined on the grounds that he would not be 
getting white support (110). On his return to Utrecht, however, 
he found a telegram waiting from Wolselcy, who had just arrived 
in Cape Town to take command of the Zulu campaign. Wolseley 
wanted to know how MacLeod could activate the Swazi front, and 
MacLeod replied that the Swazi would only fight if supported 
by British troops. Ignoring MacLeod’s qualification, Wolseley 
ordered him to mass Mbandzeni's forces along the Pongola River
(108) P.P. 1878-9, C. 2308, 65, Encl. 5 in No. 14, Col. 
Schembrucker to E. Wood, 11 Feb. 1879; T.S.C., Case 29,
H.C. Shepstone to H. Commissioner, 13 Feb. 1879, Encl. 
Rudolph to H.C. Shepstone.
(109) At the end of April 1879 for example, the Swazi repeated 
their offer to help, provided the British operated from 
Mahamba due south, S.N.I, N 63/79, Rudolph to S.N.A.,
29 April 1879, Encl. Statement by Makwazidile, 29 April 
1879. The Swazi objective in this case appears to have 
been to regain the north bank of the Pongola.
(110) Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Communications, MacLeod to ?, 
13 June 1879, Lotiti; P.P. 1880, C. 2482, 109, Encl. 2 
in No. 48, MacLeod to Rudolph, 16 June 1879.
321
and create a diversion in the north (111) . MacLeod was 
privately sceptical about his chances of success, but rode back 
to Nkanini to present Wolseley's request (112). By this stage 
MacLeod's own position was becoming increasingly delicate. 
Although he had a shrewd idea that the Swazi would never take 
part in any invasion of Zululand, he could not express this 
directly to his superiors for fear that this was seen as a 
reflection on himself. British commanders expected their 
officers in the field to be resourceful, and Swazi reluctance 
was something he would have been expected to overcome. As a 
result MacLeod engaged in what was almost a three-way deception. 
When the Swazi expressed their familiar reservations to Wolseley, 
he misrepresented Wolseley's plans; and assured them they would 
not have to do anything which would involve them in any serious 
danger (113). And when Mbandzeni was eventually cajoled into 
agreeing, on the basis of those conditions, he merely told his 
superiors that eight thousand Swazi were gathering, giving no 
indication of how little they were likely to help (114) .
Even with these qualifications, the Swazi had left themselves 
a way out. Although MacLeod gives little sign of realising 
it, the British forces had already advanced well into Zululand,
(111) Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Communications , G.M. Sive- 
wright, Telegraph G.M., Pmb., to Rudolph, 25 June 1879; 
ibid, Wolseley to MacLeod, 29 June 1879 (also reproduced 
in C. 2454, 150); ibid, Box 45A, Diary, June 1879.
(112) Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Communications, Mac. to his 
mother, 29 June 1879.
(113) Ibid, MacLeod to Aunt Emily, 5 July 1879.
(114) Ibid, Box 45A, Diary, June 1879; C.O. 179/132, W.O. to 
C.O. 3 Sept. 1879, Encl. Wolseley to S.S. War, 10 July
1879.
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and a decisive battle with Cetshwayo could not be far off. 
Certainly not as far off as July 15th when the Swazi agreed to 
have their forces ready, as was confirmed when the decisive 
battle took place at Ulundi on July 4th. With that the Swazi 
breathed a sigh of relief, and positively demanded to be set 
loose on the Zulu; and it was here that they made their first 
serious mistake. What Mbandzeni wanted to do was to loot 
Zulu property along the Pongola, but with Cetshwayo still free 
the British had other plans. On his own initiative, to begin 
with, and then at the request of Wolseley, MacLeod asked 
Mbandzeni to supply forces to track down Cetshwayo, who had 
taken refuge in the Ngome forest after the battle of Ulundi. 
MacLeod's initial request caught Mbandzeni completely off his 
guard. His army was assembled and going through the final 
stages of doctoring, and he himself had just asked to attack 
the Zulu living along the Pongola. Deprived of all his usual 
excuses, therefore, he was forced to come clean and admit he 
was still too afraid of Zulu strength to risk his army that 
far into Zululand (115) .
Instead of exposing Mbandzenifs refusal, MacLeod again chose 
to hide it, and simply told Wolsely that there were five 
thousand Swazi gathered at Mbandzeni's capital awaiting 
orders (116). This in turn allowed the Swazi to turn the 
tables on MacLeod. Conscious of the potential damage they had 
done themselves by refusing MacLeod's request, they sent
(115) Mac. P., Box 45A, Diary, July 1879.
(116) P.P. 1880, C. 2482, 226, Encl. in No. 75, Wolseley to
S.S. War, 2 Aug. 1879.
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messengers to Rudolph, Landdrost of Utrecht, to say that they 
were afraid of compromising themselves by not sending an army 
after Cetshwayo, but that when their army was collected some 
days before, MacLeod had instructed Mbandzeni not to send it 
out until he received instructions from the government (117) .
Having received one fright over MacLeod's request, Wolseley's 
subsequent appeal for help found them better prepared. 
Wolseley's hope was that Cetshwayo would be "disposed of as 
Dingane was, or killed in some Swazie skirmishes.... his 
death Zbeing7 a much better solution to.... our difficulties 
than his capture", but with the Swazi armies now dispersed 
Mbandzeni had more solid grounds for refusing (118). It was 
contrary to Swazi custom, he explained, to send out an army on 
the waning moon, and it would be impossible to provide a force 
within the next two weeks (119). By that time of course 
Cetshwayo was on the point of being captured, and Wolseley had 
already sent to Mbandzeni to say that his help was no longer 
required (120). For the Swazi the war was now over.
The Swazi performance during the war had been a truly masterly 
display of fence-sitting. Without actually doing anything they 
had managed to project an image of loyalty, which won them 
tributes from all sides once the fighting ceased. Whether this
(117) Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Communications, Statement of 
Swazi messengers, 6 Aug. 1879, Utrecht.
(118) Ibid, Wolseley to MacLeod, 31 July 1879.
(119) Ibid, Box 45A, Diary, 7 Aug. 1879.
(120) C.O. 179/132, W.O. to C.O., 3.9.1879, e n d ,  telegram 
Wolseley to S .S. War, 3 Sept. 1879.
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would have stood up to closer scrutiny is perhaps open to 
doubt. MacLeod, for one,was drafting letters, now that he was 
freed from the need of producing results, which presented the 
Swazi in a much less glowing light. But in the end it did not 
matter. Before their image could become even the least bit 
tarnished, the Swazi were given the opportunity to prove their 
loyalty in an operation far more to their liking - that is, in 
a new campaign against the Pedi.
Since October 1878, operations against Sekhukhune had dragged 
on in desultory fashion, with an almost total lack of success. 
Clarke explained his failure in terms of the ravages of horse 
disease and the absence of African support. With horses, he 
felt, his forces would have achieved relatively easy success, 
but without them his white troops were next to useless unless 
supported by African - which in practice meant Swazi - 
auxiliaries (121) . Wolseley echoed this view when he took 
charge of operations in October 1879. Instructing MacLeod 
to assemble two thousand, and if possible five thousand, Swazi 
soldiers he wrote, "I place so much importance to having the 
Swazis that I will wait for your arrival with them." (122)
Anxious to make amends for their earlier shortcomings, the Swazi 
were only too eager to oblige (123). To the amazement of MacLeod,
(121) T.S.C., Case 14. M. Clarke to Shepstone, 7 June 1878.
(122) Mac. P., Box 62E Official Communications (Wolseley). 
Wolseley to MacLeod, 3 Nov. 1879.
(123) Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Comms., W.F. Fairlie, Command­
ing Officer Swazi Police, to Rowlands, 22 Feb. 1879;
P.P. 1878-9, C. 2318, 77, Encl. in No. 17. M. Clarke, 
Commander Lydenburg to Secretary to Government, 3 March 
187 9; Myburgh, Carolina, 101-3. And also to take revenge 
for a Pedi attack on Feb. 8 of the same year on outlying 
Swazi villages on the Komati. This had however been 
largely unsuccessful, and the Pedi lost most of their 
force - see Mac. P.. Box 62E* Official Communications.
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who assured Wolseley this would take at least three weeks to 
do, they managed to muster three thousand men within the week, 
and in the middle of the planting season at that. En route 
from Nkanini to Lydenburg this doubled, and then nearly 
trebled in size as new units joined the force, and by the 
18th November when they arrived in Lydenburg they numbered 
between eight thousand and eight thousand five hundred - five 
hundred bearing guns (124) .
The place allotted the Swazi in Wolseley's strategy was an 
important one. In his diary entry for the 10th October he had 
noted Clarke's gloomy forebodings that, "every time he looked 
at the mountain the less he liked it, as he knew that taking 
it meant many lives lost," and two weeks later he was remarking 
how, "even brave men like Clarke and Carrington view the 
mountain and its defenders with superstitious awe." (125) The 
Swazi presence was designed to help banish those fears. Where 
his British officers might flinch, the Swazi were to be thrown 
in as shock troops to storm the rear of Sekhukhune's mountain 
and take its defenders from behind (126). The Swazi lived up
(124) This is MacLeod's figure of Swazi numbers, and probably 
the most reliable one - Mac. P., Box 45A, Diary: October/
November 1879; ibid, MacLeod to father 17 Nov. 1879; C.O.
291/9, Chief of Staff's Journal of Military Operations in 
the Transvaal. 23. Other estimates range from 6 000 (P.P. 
1880, C. 2505, 103, Encl. 2 in No. 32, Major Creagh to
Chief of Staff 11 Dec. 1879) to 10 000 (C.R. Low, General
Lord Wolseley - A Memoir, (London, 1883) 376).
(125) A. Preston (ed.), The South African Journal of Sir Garnet 
Wolseley 1879-1880, (Cape Town, 1973), 13, 15; see also 
Wolseley's entry for Nov. 20 on pages 170-1, "all my scheme 
hangs upon them Zjthe Swazi7 as the centre....".
(126) C.O. 291/9, Chief of Staff's Journal of Military Operations 
in the Transvaal, 1879, 16.
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to expectations in every way. Contrary to Wolseley's subsequent 
assertions that they hung back until white soldiers moved first, 
and that it was the wing under Ferreira which had cornered 
Sekhukhune, the Swazi delayed only until it was light enough 
to receive covering fire, and had hunted down Sekhukhune one 
and a half hours before Ferreira's arrival (127). "No white 
men could have swept over that hill as the Swazi did," MacLeod 
subsequently wrote, and their casualty figures of five to six 
hundred dead and a similar number wounded bear witness to his 
claims (128). So too, more volubly, did Wolseley's Chief of 
Staff. Echoing earlier Republican views on the subject he 
wrote in his journal of the campaign, "It is difficult to 
overrate the political value of the Swazi factor in our future 
relations with the Northern native tribes." (129) And in 
these sentiments Wolseley heartily concurred (130). Despite 
the change in government, Swaziland's position as the principal 
collaborater state in south eastern Africa seemed to be 
assured.
Swaziland's aid against Sekhukhune created a debt of gratitude
(127) Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Communications, MacLeod to 
Editor of Natal Witness, 9 Jan. 1880; MacLeod to Aunt 
Emily, 10 Jan. 1880; ibid, Box 45A, Letters from Africa, 
MacLeod to Mother, 20 Dec. 1879.
(128) Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Communications, MacLeod to 
Father, 8 Dec. 1879; ibid, Box 45A, Diary, November/
December 1879; ibid, Box 45A, MacLeod to Mother, 20 Dec.1879; 
S.P.G., Series "E" 1880, Vol. 35, J. Thorne to S.P.G.
31 Dec. 1879, 1525.
(129) C.O. 291/9, 49, Chief of Staff's Journal of Military 
Operations in the Transvaal, 1879.
(130) P.P. 1880, C. 2584, 39, Encl. in No. 30, Wolseley, to
S.S. War, 2 Jan. 1880.
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which, try as they could, British politicians cound never feel 
they had discharged, and established a fund of public good will 
in England that the Swazi were to draw on for another two and 
a half decades. As MacLeod remarked drily to his mother,
"To the British mind in general. Russians and Zulus are fiends, 
Turks and Swazis angels", only spoiling the illusion of 
impartiality by adding that he personally, "place/dj the Boers 
decidedly below the lot" (131) . Surprisingly the Swazi never 
really grasped the strength of their posfi'ion. Well versed 
in the intricacies of South African diplomacy, they were novices 
when it came to dealing with Whitehall, and only extracted a 
fraction of the concessions they might have obtained. The most 
striking illustration of this can be seen in the Transvaal/
Swazi Boundary Commission of January 1880. The instructions 
given to the Boundary Commission were ambiguous to the point 
of self contradiction. In one breath its president (Alleyne) 
was told to secure Swaziland’s assent to the existing beacons, 
and to tell them that through want of sufficient evidence the 
British government could not recognise Swazi claims on the 
Komati Valley (132). In the next he was instructed that,
"While it is desirable to re-establish the old Boer boundary 
in the Komati Valley, it is still more desirable that the 
Swazis should look upon us as firm and honest friends 
incapable of spoiling them of their just possessions." (133)
(131) Mac. P., Box 45A, Letters from Africa, MacLeod to Mother, 
27 Sept. 1879.
(132) P.P. 1880, C. 2505, 126, Encl. 2 in No. 50, Wolseley to 
Alleyne n.d.
(133) P.P. 1880, C. 2695, 19, Encl. 2 in No. 17, Herbert to 
Alleyne, 3 Jan. 1880.
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'Clarifying1 the position three days later, Wolseley's private 
secretary, Herbert, clouded it still further. Alleyne was now 
told that although the Swazi might complain about a restriction 
of their territory to the north, they should recognise that _ 
they had profited from the extension of their territory down 
to the Pongola in the south, secured them by the Zulu boundary 
settlement (134). In some agitation Alleyne telegraphed 
back asking whether the Swazi were in fact to be given any 
territory south of the southern boundary line, in response to 
which Herbert executed a further somersault by ruling that the 
existing line of beacons should be adhered to as the boundary (135) .
Apart from confusion, what emerges from these exchanges is that 
the Swazi could have obtained a great deal more from the boundary 
settlement than they ultimately did. All that was restraining 
the British government was fear of a backlash from the Boers, 
but as Herbert had made clear to Alleyne, if it came to the 
choice, the Swazi were the more important. This was especially 
true in the Pongola River region where there was virtually no 
Boer settlement to speak of. What possessed Herbert to 'concede' 
this in his earlier instruction is hard to imagine, but it was 
a revealing slip. When congratulating the Swazi some months 
earlier on their loyalty during the Zulu War, Wolseley had 
told MacLeod to inform them their loyalty would prove to their
(134) Ibid, 19, Encl. 3 in No*. 17, Telegraph Herbert to Alleyne,
6 Jan. 1880.
(135) Ibid, 19-20, Encl. 4 in No. 17, Telegraph Alleyne to 
Wolseley; Encl. 5 in No . 17, Telegraph Herbert to Alleyne,
8 Jan. 1880.
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advantage in the final settlement of the country, and that 
Wolseley hoped to give them "a considerable extension of 
territory beyond what they now occupy.1 (136) This offer was 
subsequently retracted, but it remained at the back of British 
minds until the retrocession of the Transvaal. Provision was 
even made for it in the recast instructions sent by Wolseley 
to the Boundary Commission to clarify earlier communications, 
and it is hard to escape the impression that had the Swazi 
really pressed for it the British would have caved in (137) .
The same is true for Swaziland’s northern boundary. The 
Komati boundary has already been mentioned, but an even more 
likely candidate for compromise was the Hhohho border further 
north. When Alleyne reached this point at the close of his 
investigations he found the beacons disputed and the earlier 
treaties unclear. Three different interpretations seemed 
possible (Map 10). Firstly, a line along the Komati River to 
the Lebombo’s Mananga Point, which was in practice unacceptable 
since it would have excised the homesteads of the most recent 
generation of royal princes in Hhohho. Secondly, a line along 
the edge of the mountains to Kamhlubana peak, and then on to 
the junction of the Crocodile and Komati Rivers, which would 
have included a substantial slice of the modern Transvaal in
(136) P.P. 1880, C. 2482, 258, No. 87, Wolseley to Hicks Beach; 
Mac. P., Box 62E, Official Communications, Chief of Staff 
to MacLeod, 15 Sept. 1879. Even this last offer was 
qualified however by reference to Boer farmers who had 
fulfilled the conditions of the 1855 cession and had 
actually occupied the land.
(137) P.P. 1880, C. 2695, Encl. 6 in No. 17 Herbert to Alleyne, 
10 Jan. 1880.
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Swazi territory. And thirdly a line to Kamhlubana Peak, and 
then to Mananga Point in the Lebombo (the present boundary). 
Undecided Alleyne telegraphed Wolseley for further instructions, 
to be told that he should plump for the second line unless the 
Swazi were firmly opposed (my emphasis) in which case he should 
award the third (138) . In effect the extra territory was there 
for the taking.
The Swazi however made no such protest and the opportunity 
slipped away (139). Whether one should take this to mean they 
acquiesced willingly in the decision is difficult to say. To 
argue from silence in this case would be dangerous, as there 
is evidence that the Swazi may have tried to register a complaint 
shortly afterwards, when they asked to send an embassy to 
Natal (140). Once this was refused, however, they seem to 
have realised the futility of trying to drive a wedge between 
the Transvaal and Natal now that they were both under British 
control, and for the final months of British rule in the 
Transvaal they appear to have been relatively content with a 
status which guaranteed independence and freedom from taxation, 
provided they supply military aid whenever requested to do so (141) .
(138) F.C., Vol. 2, M. Barlow Special Commissioner Swazi Border 
to D. Forbes, 18 Aug. 1880.
(139) P.P. 1880, C. 2695, 28, Encl. 9 in No. 17, Alleyne to 
Herbert, 7 April 1880.
(140) F.C., Vol. 2, M. Barlow', Special Commissioner Swazi 
Border to D. Forbes, 18 Aug. 1880.
(141) S.N. 102, S.N.A. to MacLeod, 17 Jan. 1880.
/
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Swazi reaction during the Anglo-Boer war of 1881 can be read 
as at least a partial confirmation of this view. On the basis 
of earlier experience, one would have expected them to wait on 
the sidelines and see who would come out on top, but instead 
they committed themselves wholeheartedly to the British, and 
categorically rejected Boer overtures of alliance (142).
Whether this can be taken as evidence of any more than a greater 
hostility towards the S.A.R. is debatable. Not wanting to 
involve ’native races' in a confrontation between whites, the 
British authorities never put Swazi promises to the test, and 
one wonder whether they would have proved more substantial 
than those offered during the Zulu War. Even if they had - 
and it seems that they might have, as they were less hedged 
round with qualifications than before - one is no closer to 
proving the point, for what must have weighed most heavily 
with the Swazi was their calculation as to who would win. At 
the outset of hostilities there appeared to be only one answer 
to that question, and the Swazi acted accordingly. Like many 
others who made the same calculation they were to be rudely 
awakened. Following Colley's defeat at Majuba Hill the 
British apetite for the fight vanished, and within two months 
the two sides were negotiating the Transvaal's return to self 
rule.
(142) P.P. 1882, C. 3098, 2, No. 2, Wood to Kimberley, 30 May
1881; P.P. 1881, C. 286£, 25, Encl. in No. 12, C.F.Spring 
to P.S. Colley, 28 Dec. 1881, encl. Barlow to H.C. Shepstone, 
10 June 1881.
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The chief significance of these negotiations for the Swazi was 
the proposal put forward by Carnarvon to cut off a slice of 
Transvaal territory somewhere east of the 30th parallel, to 
protect the Zulu and Swazi from the Transvaalers, and prevent 
incidents between the two sides. Despite reservations on the 
part of the Boer leaders, this had been inserted into the 
instructions of the Royal Commission appointed to oversee 
retrocession (143), but was thereafter gradually whittled down 
during the Commission's proceedings, by the combined represen­
tations of the Boer delegation and those British officials who 
felt that the more completely Britain washed her hands of the 
Transvaal the better . "The sooner we get rid of contingent 
responsibilities," minuted Lanyon, "the better for Imperial 
interests", to which Bellairs added the specious argument 
that these kingdoms could hold their own against the Transvaal 
anyway (144) . But it was the leaders of the Boer deputation 
who presented the heart of the case. The eastern Transvaalers, 
they argued, could not possibly accept this limitation. These 
were the oldest settled parts of the Republic, as well as the 
most wealthy, and neither "national feeling" nor "sound 
political economy" would tolerate their exclusion. Should the 
British press ahead with the plan they would run the twin risk
(143) C.O. 291/18, Transvaal Royal Commission Report, Appendix 
No. 3, Agreement between Wood and Boer Commanders on
21 March 1881; P.P. 1881 C. 2892, 4-5, No. 1 Kimberley 
to Robinson, 31 March 18B1.
(144) C.O. 291/19,Transvaal Royal Commission Report, Appendix 
16h, encl. Minute by Lanyon, 10 May 1881; C.0.;29l/10, 
No. 31, Bellairs to Secretary State, 2 May 1881, Encl. 
Bellairs to Wood, 1 May 1881.
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of armed resistance in the short run, and a festering sense of 
bitterness in the years to come (145). Robinson and Villiers 
(two of the Royal Commissioners) were inclined to agree. It 
would be better, they felt, for Britain to secure concessions 
for the other half million blacks within and to the west of the 
Transvaal who were, "weak... split up and without unity or 
strength", and on other outstanding issues between the two 
parties: the Zulu and the Swazi were strong enough to look 
after themselves (146). Wood, the third Royal Commissioner, 
dissented vigorously from this view. In a separate telegram 
to Kimberley, the new Colonial Secretary, he urged that at the 
very least the land north of the Drakensburg and south of the 
Komati should be retained. On the basis of the Secretary of 
State's earlier communications, he claimed, he had already 
informed the Swazi that a buffer would be created between them 
and the Transvaal, and if the same was not done for the Zulu, 
the consequences would be fatal (147). Kimberley, however, 
was unimpressed by Wood's argument, and adopted the majority 
recommendation almost clause for clause. The Transvaal became 
independent w__thin its former bounds, and with no loss of 
territory to the east, and the only protection Swaziland 
secured was a formal recognition by both parties of her 
independence, and the ultimately unenforceable oversight of
(145) C.O. 291/18, Transvaal Royal Commission Report, Appendix 
No. 7, B. Leaders to Commission, 17 May 1881.
(146) C.O. 291/18, Transvaal Royal Commission Report, Appendix 
7(a), telegram Robinson to Kimberley, 22 May 1881.
(147) Ibid, Appendix 7(b), telegram Wood to Kimberley, 22 May 
1881.
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border relations by a British Resident (148). With only minor 
modifications in 1884, this was to provide the framework for 
Transvaal/Swazi relations for the next eight years - eight 
years in which the independence of the Swazi was finally 
undermined.
(148) C.O. 291/10, telegram Robinson to Kimberley, encl. Draft 
reply, 30 May 1881.
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CHAPTER VIII 
REPUBLICAN PRESSURE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF 
CONCESSIONS 1881-1886 
Two themes dominate the 1880s in Swaziland, and one ceases to 
have the same central importance. With Cetshwayo1s defeat by 
the British in 1879, the Swazi were able, for probably the 
first time in living memory, to enjoy the luxury of disengage­
ment from Zulu affairs. Although rumours circulated in the 
first half of the 1880s about Swazi support for one or other 
of the contending factions in Zululand, and although the civil 
war there occasionally spilled over into the Pongola valley or 
the southern Lebombo, the Swazi kept themselves largely aloof 
from the conflict, and Zululand faded from the forefront of 
Swazi leaders1 minds (1). However, if Zululand lost its 
central significance, two other problems came much more to 
fore. The first was Mbandzenifs quest for personal authority; 
the second, the * paper conquest* of his country through 
concessions, and the diplomatic complications to which this 
gave rise. It is with these that this chapter will be concerned.
For much of this period the two questions are closely inter­
woven, but as the Transvaalers wrested their independence from 
the British in the summer of 1881, it was the first which took 
the lead. . Mbandzeni, it will be recalled, began his reign 
from a position of exceptional weakness. He had been chosen
(1) G.H.Z., Vols. 677-709 (1879-1888); C.O. 179/142-8
(1882-3); C.O. 427/1-3 (1888).
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as king less for his exceptional qualities Lthan for his exceptional 
lack of them, his lack of mother included, and the best that 
could be said of him was that he was "a quiet puff-adder", 
itself a notably ambiguous metaphor (2). With the passage of 
time, the very exercise of kingship drew out unexpected 
qualities. Almost imperceptibly Mbandzeni became more kingly; 
his decisions more crisp, and by the early 1880s observers were 
unanimous on the transformation that had taken place (3).
Besides Mbandzeni*s own ability to rise to the part, two other 
factors aided in his transformation. In 1874-5 both Thandile 
and Malunge died, having dominated Swazi politics for the last 
two and a half decades, and, with their passing, an important 
thread of continuity in Swazi life was snapped (4). The 
added fluidity this lent to Swazi politics, and the extra 
freedom it gave Mbandzeni himself can be seen in the reactions 
of white observers to the news. From Utrecht, Rudolph openly 
exulted at the passing of "that old Jezebel", while to Jackson, 
on his return to Enhlozana nearly a year later, it held out 
fresh hope that the missionary logjam in Swaziland might at
(2) Interview Maboya Fakudze.
(3) See for example C.O. 879/42, Appendix I, 387, No. 9, Wood 
to Kimberley, 24 Sept. 1881, in which Wood relates 
Rudolph*s opinion; P.P. 1884, C. 4037, 112, Report of 
Rutherford’s Secretary to British Resident on mission to 
Swaziland, 25 March 1884.
(4) S.S. 177, 160, Bell to State President, No. 1681, 1 Nov. 
1874; S.S. 178, 171, Rudolph to State Secretary, No. 1850, 
3 Dec. 1874. The exact date of Malunge*s death is not 
known. A prominent signatory of official documents in 
Ludvonga's reign, his last public act was to preside over 
Mbandzeni*s nomination (Honey, ’History1, 42), after which 
he fades from view completely.
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last be breaking up (5). For the moment, however, these hopes 
were some what premature. Mbandzeni was still officially a 
novitiate, and it was not until he donned the headring in the 
middle of 1876 that this formally came to an end. Only now, 
as Mbandzeni proudly proclaimed to the S.A.R., was he fully 
in charge of the nation's affairs (6).
That at least was the formal position; the reality was rather 
different. Despite the departure of such formidable upholders 
of the conciliar tradition as Thandile and Malunge, there were 
still others of the calibre of Sandlane, Maloyi and Sobandla, 
not to mention Sisile herself, to take up their mantle, and 
it needed more than the amiable self-indulgence of Mbandzeni 
to loosen their grip. And yet things could not be quite the 
same as they were. For all his limitations Mbandzeni was king, 
and he did periodically assert himself, so that it was 
necessary to find some area in which he could be given his 
head. In foreign affairs the field that was ultimately settled 
upon was the allocation of grazing, hunting and wood cutting 
concessions. The poor relation of foreign policy, this could 
be more confidently entrusted to Mbandzeni, because of the 
lower order of decision making it involved. At the same time
(5) S.S. 178, 48, Rudolph to State Secretary, No. 1775,
18 Nov. 1874; S.P.G., Series "E", Vol. 31, 1876, 1229, 
Jackson to S.P.G., 31 Oct. 1876; ibid, Jackson to S.P.G., 
31 March 1876. Earlier Jackson had described Thandile as 
the most difficult person he had to deal with and the 
"most bigoted, superstitious, tenacious of old 'customs'", 
S.P.G. Series "E", Vol. 27, 1871-2, 1552, Jackson to 
S.P.G., 30 June 1872.
(6) S.S. 212, 350, Bell to State Secretary, No. 2079, 7 Aug. 
1876.
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it was an area in which Mbandzeni himself had shown a special 
interest and would perhaps not have brooked opposition. He 
evidently liked whites better than most Swazi (7), and the 
power to dispense concessions, together with the gifts he 
received in return, seem to have flattered his vanity and 
conferred the illusion of power (8).
It is from this point on that the concession era may be said 
to have got truly underway. Grazing concessions were dispensed 
with increasing regularity; an Anglican mission was allowed to 
gain a toehold on the southern border; and the first tentative 
steps were taken towards the parcelling out of Swaziland’s 
mineral wealth (9). For the most part Mbandzeni's councillors 
watched these developments unmoved. Most benefitted in some 
measure from the traffic, and in the late 1870s there were more 
pressing matters to claim their attention. Nevertheless, even 
at this early stage, there were times when Mbandzeni*s 
behaviour created friction. Occasionally he made grants which 
were wildly excessive, and these were invariably a source of 
conflict within his councils. The first such incident took 
place almost the moment he came of age, when he granted a graz­
ing concession of thirty-six thousand acres in southern
(7) S.P.G., Series "E", Vol. 31, 1876, 1226, Jackson to 
S.P.G., 31 March 1876.
(8) The Wesleyan missionary, Underwood, hints at something 
like this in 1886 - see W.M.M.S. Records, Transvaal, Box 
1886-1891, File Underwood to Kilner, 15 May 1886.
(9) Miller, Swaziland, 20; S.P.G., Records, Series "E", Vol. 
31, 1876, Jackson to S.P.G., 31 Oct. 1875. According to 
Miller (Swaziland, 17), T. MacLachlan moved permanently 
into Swaziland to prospect in 1878.
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Swaziland to Joachim Ferreira and Ignatious Maritz (10). 
Mbandzeni’s councillors unanimously opposed the grant, but 
having made it Mbandzeni stubbornly refused to back down. As 
tempers rose, Sandlane seems to have signified his displeasure 
by refusing to visit the king, after his meeting with Shepstone 
in Pretoria, and tensions only eased after fighting broke out 
between soldiers from Sandlane!s and Mbandzeni’s residences, 
in which a number of Sandlane’s men were killed (11).
Mbandzenifs behaviour in 1876 set the pattern for the 1880s. 
Periods of dull passivity would be accompanied by mounting 
resentment at being excluded from the exercise of effective 
power, and would finally be broken by a brief bout of self- 
assertion, after which the whole cycle would resume. The 
early 1880s saw the climax of just such a sequence. Shortly 
before Ludvonga’s death the young king had been betrothed to 
a daughter of Langalibalele called Undumo or Somdlalose (12). 
Because of Ludvonga's death the marriage was never formalised, 
but Somdlalose stayed in Swaziland where she eventually caught 
the fancy of Mbandzeni, and a liason was struck up. Sisile is 
supposed to have warned against the relationship because of 
Somdlalose’s close association with Ludvonga, but Mbandzeni
(10) S.S. 212, 121-2, No. 1936, Bell to State Secretary, 23 July 
1876; ibid, 349, No. 2079, Bell to St. Secretary, 7 Aug. 
1876; Watson, ’Little Free State’, 5-6.
(11) S.S. 242, No. 2958, Bell to Osborne, 16 July 1877.
(12) The first is the name given by Rudolph (P.R.O., C.0. 879/42, 
38, Appendix 1 & 2, Encl. in No . I, Rudolph to Wood, 4 May 
1881); the second that given by Maboya Fakudze, (interview 
Maboya Fakudze). Matsebula (History) gives no name at all.
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went ahead regardless. The extreme foolhardiness of his 
behaviour was brought home when in about 1879 a son was born 
of the union, and it became whispered that Mbandzeni had 
raised up seed to Ludvonga, and that the baby, Mdzabuko, was 
now the real king (13). If this were not serious enough, the 
child also became a pawn in a broader struggle for power between 
Mbandzeni and his mother. Since Mbandzeni's installation*
Sisile had been the effective head of state. Her voice 
predominated in council, while communications with the outside 
world were sent out in her name (14). Mbandzeni's resentment 
at this state of affairs was not long in developing, as is 
most obviously seen in his refusal to heed Sisile's warnings 
about Somdlalose, and similar antipathies also began to build 
up among his councillors (15). Here, however, the reasons 
were of a slightly different kind. In the structure of Swazi 
politics the position of the queen mother is significant, not 
only because of the enormous power she wields, but also because 
she was so often imported from the outside. This often meant
(13) Matsebula, History, 29-30; S.P., Large notebook of Articles 
30091, 91, Zibokwana, 4 Jan. 1899.
(14) The Swazi deputation that visited Shepstone in Pretoria 
(above,309-10) placed particular emphasis on this point - 
S.P., File 17, Notebook 3, 3-4, Lazarus Xaba, 6 May 1910 
(Lazarus Xaba was a messenger of Shepstone.)
(15) Towards the end of 1878, for example, Sisile tried to 
stop Mbandzeni building his own hornstead (Mbekelweni 
presumably) and, according to popular rumour, witheld 
her co-operation in rain-making when he refused, S.P.G.,
Box C/AFS/7, S. Africa, Wigram Letters, No. 29, Mrs E. 
Carlsen to ?, 30 Oct. 1878. When MacLeod visited Swazi­
land all business was still being done at Sisile's village, 
MacLeod Papers, Box 45A, Diary, 21 Dec. 1878.
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that that the queen mother would act as an innovative force in 
Swazi politics, injecting new ideas and new practices into 
Swazi life. Thandile provides a classic example of this ten­
dency, but in her own way, Sisile also carried on the tradition(16). 
The main difference with her was in the sorts of goals she 
espoused, for whereas Thandile attempted to alter the 
distribution of power between the centre and the periphery,
Sisile sought to reallocate it at the centre itself. She 
expanded her own power in a disproportionate fashion, and what 
was worse in Swaziland's male dominated society, sought to 
involve women far more in the decision making processes (17) .
The type of opposition that raised itself to the two women 
reflected these different approaches. Thandile's took the 
form of a provincial revolt; Sisile's that of a growing dis­
enchantment among the councillors of state, paralleling that 
against Mbandzeni himself.
The birth of Mdzabuko brought these tensions to a head. Sensing 
Mbandzeni's growing hostility, Sisile is supposed to have 
looked to Mdzabuko as the means of perpetuating her power.
The young child was doctored in the rites of kingship, and his 
claims to succeed Mbandzeni were discreetly noised about. Only 
now was Mbandzeni jerked out of his customary lethargy. A 
young indvuna named Magungubeyane was sent to Mdzabuko's nurse 
with poison milk, and within hours the young child was dead.
(16) For Sisile's history, Above, 215, note 11.
(17) S.P., 30091, 120, Large note-book of articles, Gama,
18 Dec. 1898; ibid, 91, Zibokwana, 4 Jan. 1899.
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With that the struggle came out in the open. Accusations and 
counter-accusations flew, and eight days later Mbandzeni 
removed all his relatives, except for Sisile and Somdlalose, 
from Nkanini. The likely fate of the two women was now plain, 
and together with some members of the Ndlavele and Lochegu 
regiments, who were stationed at Nkanini, they fled towards
the Transvaal. That night they reached a cave near the Gobholo
stream, where they were overtaken by Mbandzeni's pursuing 
forces. A battle ensued in which SisileTs army inflicted 
heavy losses on her opponents at little cost to themselves, 
the exploits of Mancibane Dlamini being remembered to this 
day. Nevertheless, Sisile was trapped, and, realising this, 
the company fled on under cover of night. It was a head start,
but it was one that proved to be too short. Sisile was
corpulent and slow, and when the pursuing soldiers caught up 
with her at Mpholonjeni (18), her own forces left her behind to 
be strangled, while they made their escape into the Transvaal (19). 
Once this became known, other figures who had been associated 
with Sisile also took flight, the most important being Mtyce, 
who fled from Hhohho with two thousand followers and a Swazi
(18) The Dube chiefdom a few miles west of modern Mbabane.
(19) The above account has been pieced together from the 
following sources, Matsebula, History, 30-31; Kuper, 
Aristocracy, 100-101; P.R.O., C.O. 879/42, 381, Appendix 
I, Encl. in No. I, Rudolph to Wood, 4 May 1881; S.P. 
30091, 91, Large Notebook, Cloepas Kunene, 21 Dec. 1898; 
interview Maboya Fakudze; interview Mandanda Mtetwa (who 
between them supply the names of persons and regiments);
interview Makhoti Mkhatshwa.
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army in pursuit (20). At this point, however, Mbandzeni 
showed the restraint that earned him his subsequent reputation 
for kind-heartedness and tolerance. Mancibane was allowed to 
return in honour, and the young soldiers accompanying Mtyce 
were soon trickling back. Within a month things were virtually 
back to normal, and with the installation of Tibati Nkambule 
as Queen Mother, constitutional equilibrium was once again 
restored (21).
The struggle between Mbandzeni and Sisile climaxed in February 
1881, when the attention of the rest of South Africa was 
distracted by the first Anglo-Boer War - a coincidence which 
set the few remaining Swazi-watchers speculating that it 
reflected disagreements among the Swazi over whom to support 
in the war (22). While there is no evidence of this sort of 
split, Mbandzeni was still fortunate in having suppressed 
these divisions before a reconstructed Republic could take 
advantage of them in the way it later did in Zululand. As it 
was, the penalties of Mbandzeni’s earlier indiscretions were
(20) C.O., 879/42, Appendix I, 380, Encl. in No. I, H. Fletcher 
to Lanyon, Feb. 1881. In addition Mgomi and Mtatusa both 
relatives of Sisile also fled out (ibid, B. Hamilton 
(Secretary to Wood) to Rudolph, 4 May 1881), as did Seshela, 
a half brother of Mbandzeni, some 5 months later (ibid,
Encl. in No. 2, teleg. Acting Quartermaster, Fort Amiel to 
Fraser, 1 July 1881; P.P. 1882, C. 3098, 80, No. 25, Wood
to Kimberley, 17 Aug. 1881; P.P. 1882, C. 3182, 62, Encl. 
in No. 35, Roberts to Rudolph, 3 June 1881).
(21) Matsebula, History, 31; according to Honey, (Sw.A., 'History*, 
47) Mbandzeni himself favoured Makubati, younger sister to 
Sisile, but he was over-ruled by the council who nominated 
Tibati.
(22) S.P.G. Box C/AFS/7, South Africa, Wigram Letters, No. 29,
Rev. G.F. Carlsen to Bishop Mackenzie, 24 May 1881;
E.P. Mathers, Golden, 57.
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already making themselves felt. Scarcely had the two sides 
downed arms in the Transvaal, than a flood of winter graziers 
swept over Swaziland, innundating its winter pastures and 
leaving the Swazi to wonder how best to stem the flow.
That at any rate was the impression given to the British 
authorities in May and June 1881, and considerable embarrassment 
it caused them too (23) . At the time the Royal Commission had 
only just discarded Kimberley’s earlier proposal to annex part 
of the eastern Transvaal, and now the very situation this was 
designed to avert was already beginning to develop. As usual, 
the Royal Commissioners disagreed on what to do. Wood argued 
for expulsion of the graziers but Be Villiers and Robinson 
were less sure, and in the end it was decided to see what the 
Boer Triumverate could do. Charged with laying this request 
before Kruger, Wood found him surprisingly eager to assist.
An undertaking was given to expel all graziers who had entered 
Swaziland since the ending of the war, and J.S. Joubert was 
given instructions to see the order carried out (24). Joubert, 
however, interpreted his instructions in an exceedingly liberal
(23) C.O. 291/19, Transvaal Royal Commission Report-, Appendix 
16 h, Mins, proceedings, 14 May 1881, encl. in encl.
Roberts to Rudolph, 4 May 1881; S.N, 103, Letter Book,
118-9, S.N.A. to Roberts, 30 June 1881; P.P. 1882, C. 3182, 
62, encl. in No. 35, Statement by U ’bulana and 5 others, 
messengers from Umbandine; ibid, encl. in No. 35, Roberts
to Rudolph, 3 June 1881; S.N..4 A, Ongeregisteerde inkomende 
stukke, Memo by E. Wood, 13 July 1881.
(24) Ibid; C.O. 291/20, Transvaal Royal Commission Report, 
Appendix 16x, Mins, of Proceedings, 24 June 1881; ibid, 
Appendix 16y, Minutes of Proceedings, 27 June 1881; P.P. 
1882, C. 3090, 55, Encl. 2 in No. 17, Kruger to J.C.
Joubert, n.d.
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way, and it is doubtful whether Kruger anticipated anything 
else. Instead of expelling recent graziers from Swaziland, he 
simply investigated specific complaints, and the basic questions 
agitating Wood remained untouched (25) . Already a pattern was 
emerging of half-hearted Boer investigations following half­
hearted British complaints, and this was confirmed a short 
while later when fresh allegations from the Swazi were simply 
referred to the new Republic to take what action it saw fit (26) .
The flood of complaints accompanying retrocession give the 
impression of a grazier invasion set free by the lifting of 
British control, but a close look at Mbandzeni's allegations, 
and the investigation that was subsequently made into them, 
leave one wondering whether there was a decisive break (27). 
Examined critically, the Swazi complaints certainly do not 
suggest a dramatic change in the situation. Admittedly the 
grazier influx may have been larger, and it may have included 
some who entered without permission, but this does not seem 
to add up to the talk of war and occupation to which the Swazi 
messages gave expression. What was different, however, were 
the circumstances in which the influx was taking place. During 
annexation, grazing licences had been given out with a mis-
(25) S.N. 4A, Ongeregisteerde inkomende stukke, Memo by Wodd,
13 July 1881, encl. account of interview between Umbandine 
and J.S. Joubert, 9 July 1881; C.O. 291/20, Transvaal 
Royal Commission Report, Appendix 16 ww, Encl. J.S. Joubert 
to S.J.P. Kruger, 15 July 1881.
(26) G.H.Z., 1881, Jan-Sept, Drafts and Copies of Correspondence, 
No. Transvaal 5, Wood to Secretary of State, 17 Aug. 1881.
(27) Above, 345.
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placed sense of security, the government having shown its 
opposition to the acquisition of permanent rights by graziers 
in Swaziland in the case of Ferreira and Maritz (28) . With 
the return of the Transvaal to independence, however, the 
premises on which these grants had been given were suddenly 
changed. Ferreira, Maritz and their associates became a 
potential fifth column, and a rapidly growing one at that, 
while the annual grazier influx in itself held the prospect 
of future grazier occupation. Even this probably exaggerates 
the sense of urgency the Swazi felt. It is easy enough from 
here to see that the Swazi were facing a transformed situation, 
but there was little to show at the time that the new S.A.R. 
would prove that much more powerful than the old. Instead, 
the Swazi seem to have anticipated a return to the situation 
of pre-annexation days - a situation in which there were more 
overt dangers, but in which there were more potential rewards 
as well, and it is in this spirit that their messages should 
be read; partly apprehensive because of the uncertainties 
involved, but part hopeful and speculative in anticipation of 
a return to more fluid political relationships.
This idea of a tentative probing of the new order - of an 
attempt to come to terms with both its weaknesses and its 
strengths - finds support in later events. Barely a month
(28) Ferreira and Maritz had acquired a massive cession in the 
south of Swaziland in June 1876 (above, 340), but the 
British Government had always refused to recognise it, 
and had consistently encouraged Mbandzeni to evict them. 
For a brief account of this see S.N.A.,4A, Ongeregisteerde 
inkomende stukke, Memo by Wood, 13 July 1881, and Watson, 
'Little Free State', 5-7.
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after Joubert’s mission, the Swazi themselves took the'initiative 
by approaching Wood with the proposal that the Pongola strip 
should be returned (29) . Wood predictably declined to consider 
this, and the issue seemed closed until Mbandzeni surreptitiously 
re-opened it in the winter of 1882. The occasion was a border 
incident in May, in which a Swazi border indvuna named Mbenge 
(Mabele?) seized cattle from a Swazi refugee in the S.A.R. 
Ferreira, the Republican Border Commissioner, retaliated by 
entering Swaziland and seizing the same cattle and more, 
whereupon Mbandzeni protested to Pietermaritzburg. On one level 
he was well justified: Ferreira’s men had entered Swaziland 
illegally, and had exacted an arbitary fine. Mbandzeni, 
however, went further and accused Ferreira of absorbing Swazi 
territory into the S.A.R. (30). While the claim was not 
impossible, it is difficult to believe* Besides Mbandzeni’s 
subsequent denials to Ferreira (31), which must obviously be 
taken with a pinch of salt, the beacons in the area had been 
carefully surveyed and changes would have been subsequently 
found out. Of course, it is possible that these beacons
(29) P.P. 1882, C. 3098, 80, No. 25, Wood to S.S., 17 Aug. 1881. 
Mbandzeni had in fact raised this issue in a tentative 
manner with Rudolph in May, C.O. 291/19, Transvaal Royal 
Commission Report, Appendix 16h, Mins, of Proceedings,
12 May 1881, encl. in encl. Umbandine to Rudolph,12 May 
1881.
(30) P.P. 1882, C. 3419, 32, Encl. 2 in No. 14, Statement of 
messengers from Umbandeen, 21 June 1882; P.P. 1883, C.
3486, 32, Annexure C in Encl. I in No. 26, J.J. Ferreira, 
Native Commissioner, to P.J. Joubert, 19 Sept. 1882;
S.N. 124, J.J. Ferreira to P.J. Joubert, "Staat van 
naturelle Zaken", May 1882, No. 37.
(31) P.P. 1883, C. 3486, 33, Annexure D in Encl. I in N o . 26, 
Statement of messenger from Umbandeen at Derby to
J.J. Ferreira, 19 Sept. 1882.
349
were later shifted back, but on balance it is more likely that 
they were never moved at all. That being so, the same pattern 
emerges as before, but the accent in this case was much more 
firmly on attack, and on a systematic effort to blur border 
jurisdiction in the south.
A still clearer example of this latter trend in Swazi diplomacy 
can be found on Swaziland's north-western border the following 
year. The Swazi had never been fully reconciled to the loss 
of the Emjindini (Komati Winterveld) region, and in the middle 
of 1883 they demonstrated the versatility of the concession in 
an effort to get it back. In May, permission was given to 
J.H. Wyld and C.B. Kestall to prospect for gold in a huge 
tract of land north-west of Hhohho, which embraced the entire 
Emjindini district down to the Crocodile river. The language 
of the concession leaves little doubt as to the objective.
"In making /"itj", it ran, "I do not alienate from my kingdom 
this or any other portion of it, but reserve intact the sover­
eignty of my dominion. Mr. Wyld and Mr. Kestall engage not to 
make any claim contrary or injurious to my right as Sovereign 
of the country, but to recognise my authority as King, and to 
apply to me for such protection as they might require, and I 
engage to grant such protection to them." (32) And to underline 
his determination further, Mbandzeni also sent representatives 
into Kaap Valley to visit gold diggers in the area, and
(32) P.P. 1884, C. 3841, 29, Encl. in encl. in No. 19. 
Ratification of grant by Umbandine to J.H. Wyld and
C.B. Kestall, 24 May 1883.
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demanded licences for the right to prospect (33).
The news created a ripple of consternation in the S.A.R.
State Secretary Bok wrote to the British Agent that he intended 
investigating immediately, and was despatching instructions to 
J.J. Ferreira on the following day. In some haste the British 
Agent, Hudson, drafted a letter to Mbandzeni - to be delivered 
at the same time - in which he outlined the government's charges, 
and counselled against precipitate action until he could investi­
gate himself (34) . The government courier reached Mbandzeni 
on July 26, but Mbandzeni was understandably suspicious of a 
letter which arrived in this way. In an effort to verify its 
authority, the missionary Jackson was called in, but the move 
backfired on Mbandzeni in an unexpected way. Jackson not only 
vouched for the letter's authority, but was also present during 
the subsequent discussion, and it is possible that his presence 
made Mbandzeni admit what he might not otherwise have done.
He told J.J. Burgers, the government courier, to inform Hudson 
that he acknowledged doing everything complained of in the 
letter; that he had done so in full awareness of where the 
official boundary line lay; but that since no-one had collected 
taxes in the area since its demarcation, he had assumed the 
boundary no longer held. And with that he had Jackson draw 
up a new document annulling the Wyld Concession (35) . Small
(33) Ibid, 29, Encl. in encl. in No. 19, Vernon Webb and 2 
others (to Bok?), n.d.
(34) Ibid, 30, encl. in No. 19, Hudson to Umbandine, 13 July 
1883 .
(35) Ibid, 42, Encl. in Encl. in No . 29, J.J. Burgers to 
Hudson, 28 July 1883.
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wonder that Mbandzeni never allowed Jackson or any other third 
party to be present in his subsequent dealings with Republican 
officials, or that he steadfastly refused, from this point, to 
direct any of his protests against the S.A.R. through the 
British Resident in Pretoria.
The Swazi continued in their efforts to blur border jurisdictions 
right through until 1887, but by the middle of 1883 a marked 
change of attitude can be detected. Prior to this, a degree 
of confidence can be sensed in their actions, a feeling that 
the new S.A.R. might not prove that much more formidable than 
the old, but within a month of Burgersfs departure this optimism 
was already beginning to wane. The reason was the success of 
Republican forces in the so-called Mapoch War. Facing opponents 
and a terrain which had so often proved their undoing, the 
Republic had crushed the insurrection in a nine month campaign.
To Mbandzeni and his councillors this event had a significance 
comparable to retrocession itself. Without visible strain, the 
new Republic had shouldered a £40 000 war bill, and had main­
tained a commando of between fifteen hundred and two thousand 
for nine months in the field. Suddenly the Republic appeared 
vastly more powerful than before. It only added to Swazi 
discomfiture that they had refused military assistance when 
Joubert had asked them to help in the campaign, and the symbolic 
significance this came to hold for the Swazi is captured in 
their messages to the Republic over the next four years, asking 
whether their attitude during the conflict was responsible for
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the S.A.R.'s hostility since (36).
The first signs of Swazi anxiety at the Republic's newly 
disclosed strength became apparent to observers shortly after 
the war. Early in September, De Volksstem's correspondent in 
Komati spoke of a much more accommodating attitude among the 
Swazi ever since "Nyabel's" defeat, and a few weeks later 
Joel Jackson reported a sudden upsurge of anxiety about a 
possible grazier attack (37). Jackson himself discounted 
the rumours as the idle talk of frontier Boers, but this was 
not a view that found much sympathy among the Swazi. When he 
put it to a neighbouring chief, he was told that he was simply 
ignorant of outside developments, and the Swazi remained on 
tenterhooks until early the following year (38) .
Other observers took a more serious view of the Swazi fears. 
Wilkinson for example, who was Jackson's superior in Zululand, 
wrote personally to Robinson to advise him of the danger the 
Swazi were in, while Robinson, on what were ultimately rather 
flimsy grounds, came to the conclusion that the Swazi were in
(36) P.P. 1882, C. 4037, 114, Encl. in encl. in No. 107 Report 
by Rutherford, Secretary to the British Resident, on a 
mission to Swaziland, 25 Mar. 1884; G.H.Z.. May-Sept, 1885, 
Vol. 694, Cardew to Bulwer 4 Aug. 1885, encl. I, Ingram, 
special correspondent to Natal Mercury to Cardew 16 June 
1885; P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 24, Encl. in encl. 2 in No. 14 
letter from Jacob Steyn signed by Umbandine and 14 captains, 
26 Feb. 1886; ibid, 25, encl. in encl. 2 in N o . 14, mins.
of conversation between Kruger and 9 Swazi representatives, 
20 March 1886.
(37) De Volksstem, 18 Sept. 1883, Correspondent Dalumanutha,
Komati, 7 Sept. 1883.
(38) S.P.G. Records, Series "E", Vol. 38, 1883, 1455, Letter
from Jackson 30 Sept, 1883; P.P. 1884, C. 4037, 114, Encl.
in encl. in No. 107, Report by Rutherford, 25 March 1884.
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urgent need of protection (39). Robinson's decision was probably 
also influenced by the presence at this time of a Republican 
deputation in London, which was seeking revision of the terms 
of the Pretoria Convention, and in particular a relaxation of 
controls over its relations with African people. The principal 
object of this exercise was to open the way for westward 
expansion, but Robinson realised that the east's fate would 
also ultimately be involved. It was this which seems to have 
led Robinson to exaggerate Swaziland's danger, and to recommend 
a border resident and police force on the eastern border, as well 
as in the west (40).
Robinson's request fell on the deaf ears of the liberal 
establishment, but he had pinpointed embarrassing obligations, 
and required a careful reply. "For Parliamentary purposes", the 
one that was drafted was that his recommendation "appear/ed7 to 
involve the permanent presence of Imperial officers and men on 
the frontier of the Transvaal State, and the assumption of 
responsibility for the conduct of the Transvaal citizens and 
of native tribes which neither this country nor the Transvaal 
could consent to ", and that Derby did not think, "at present" 
that they "could enforce on the Eastern boundary Transvaal's 
undertakings in the Pretoria Convention" (41). Derby's reply 
indicated the matter was now closed, but Robinson was unwilling
(39) P.P. 1884, C. 3841, 105, No. 87, Robinson to C.O. 23 Nov. 
1883, London.
(40) Ibid.
(41) C.O. 179/148, Conf. Culwer to Derby, 1 Nov. 1883, minute 
by Herbert, 7 Dec. 1883, encl. reply to Robinson, letter 
of 23 November by Derby, 11 Dec. 1883.
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to let the matter rest. If the government would not take any 
active measures to enforce observation of the part of the Pretoria 
Convention, he said, there seemed to be no point in putting 
them into the new Convention at all, as there was "very little 
prospect that /they would7 spontaneously observed." Nor 
could he understand why the government should feel any greater 
sense of obligation in the south-west than they did with the 
Swazi. "The assumption on this subject which underlay all 
negotiations with reference to retrocession," he emphasised,
"was that H.M.G. had, whilst in possession of the Transvaal 
Government, conquered and disarmed the Zulus and employed the 
Swazis as allies in the field, and were accordingly under a 
peculiar obligation to take care that in restoring the Transvaal 
to the Boers, the Zulus and the Swazis were for the future 
protected from Boer depredations." Ultimately, he claimed, the 
British authorities would still be obliged to act, and would 
then have to provide, "an expensive and only partial remedy 
for an evil which might have been prevented altogether by timely 
and comparatively inexpensive precautions." At the very least, 
he urged, the Government should secure in the new Convention 
the right of appointing border agents and police on the eastern 
frontier. Hopefully, the very knowledge of that would then 
deter Boer trespasses, which would otherwise never be prevented 
by the existing "paper promises". Robinson had spoken strongly, 
and Herbert, in particular, was annoyed. He misrepresented 
Robinson's argument by claiming that Robinson wanted to commit 
the British Government, "to the expensive undertaking of keeping
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the Transvaal people within their borders and of protecting 
all adjacent natives from them," and then concluded with a 
passage of extraordinary sophistry, "... are we bound for ever," 
he asked, "to repair the damage caused by the internal 
dissensions of the Zulus who could keep out the Boers in 
conjunction with the Swazis. And may not the Zulus prefer 
Transvaal rule to the present anarchy?" Derby preferred not 
to comment, and Robinson’s proposed amendment to the constitution 
went through without further discussion (42).
Robinson's campaign on Clause 2 of the London Convention was 
not his only response to the Swazi complaints that reached 
him in the last few months of 1883. Besides this, he also 
passed the allegations through the normal channels to Pretoria, 
and by early the next year the normal assurances were coming 
back (43). Ironically, at the very moment the Vice President 
was assuring Hudson that he himself had just returned from the 
Swazi border and had found it, "all quiet and no complaints", 
a fresh batch of allegations was being levelled about Joubert's 
own behaviour there. According to a letter form David Forbes, 
written at Mbandzeni's request, Joubert had given a speech to 
local burghers hinting at action in Swaziland in the not'too
(42) C.O. 179/150, Robinson to C.O., 14 Dec. 1883, minute by 
Herbert, 15 Dec. 1883; see also H. Robinson, 'The Swazi­
land Question,' Fortnightly Review, Vol. XLVII (New Series), 
(Jan.-June 1890), 284-6.
(43) P.P. 1884, C. 4037, 2, Encl. in N o . 4, British Resident, 
Pretoria, to Acting High Commissioner Smythe, 7 Jan. 1884.
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distant future. According to Forbes, this was only the latest 
of a series of similar threats from border burghers, and the 
Swazi were now anxious for the British Resident to come and 
investigate (44).
Joubert predictably, denied the charges, but there was obviously 
something there (45) . Mbandzeni was convinced that a speech 
of this sort had been made, as were many border burghers.
Indeed, Landdrost Krogh of Wakkerstroom was sufficiently unsure 
of Joubert*s position to write informing him of the intention 
of certain burghers to take possession of part of Swaziland, 
and asking him whether it was, in fact, government policy to 
seize part of Swazi territory, "voor boete of anderzins."
The unspoken question behind Krogh*s report was whether the 
government or Joubert was implicated, and whether he should 
discourage the movement or stand aside, and although Joubert 
firmly denied any such government intention, this did not fully 
settle the matter (46). It was obviously inconceivable for the 
government to have openly encouraged a move of this sort at 
the very moment they were attempting to renegotiate the Pretoria 
Convention, but this need not necessarily have deterred Joubert 
from publicly speculating, in his private capacity, on the 
future status of Swaziland. This, after all, was Joubert’s
(44) Sw.A, Folder No. 6, Hudson to High Commissioner, 26 Jan. 
1884, Encl. Forbes to Hudson, 14 Jan. 1884.
(45) P.P. 1884, C. 4037, 60, Encl. in encl. in No. 57, Memo of 
instructions to Rutherford, 18 Feb. 1884.
(46) S.N. 10, S.R. 43/84, J.C. Krogh to S.N.,21 Jan. 1884, 
minute Joubert to Krogh, 25 Jan. 1884.
own political constituency, and collective responsibility 
within the government was not nearly so strong as to prevent 
him playing up to one of the favourite projects of the area, 
to boost his personal support. No doubt he only did this in 
the very vaguest of terms. According to Forbes’s letter, the 
precise words were that, " ’he hoped they would be able to remain 
at their ploughs, but he expected they would soon have to take 
up their rifles again’, and plainly pointed to the Swazie 
country as the place to be attacked" (47). Harmless enough 
really, apart from the construction that Forbes himself placed 
on them, but then that was precisely the understanding of the 
rest of the gathering, and that, in turn, was enough to set 
in motion an agitation, which only Joubert's subsequent rebuttal 
to Krogh ultimately curbed.
The British authorities in Pretoria and Cape Town seem, on the 
whole, to have taken a less serious view of these developments 
than anyone else. Nevertheless, perhaps with a view to disarm­
ing criticism of the ineffectual provisions for preserving 
Swaziland's independence in the London Convention, they 
authorised an investigation of the complaints to be made by 
the secretary to the British Resident in Pretoria, R. Rutherford 
Rutherford's report of his mission, which he undertook late 
in March 1884, is not a particularly helpful document. He was
(47) Sw.A., Folder No. 6, G. Hudson to High Commissioner, 26 Jan 
1884, Encl. David Forbes to Hudson, 14 Jan. 1884. Part of 
this letter is reproduced in C. 4037, 35, Encl. in encl.
3 in No. 32, but without the quotation cited above.
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able to confirm that rumours were circulating about the eventual 
annexation of Swaziland, but was able to furnish only his own 
rather vague impressions that he had no indication of Republican 
officials being involved. For the rest his report merely 
comprises some disparaging remarks about Mbandzeni, more 
complimentary ones about James Forbes, and a few comments 
about the changed attitude of Republican burghers towards 
Swaziland since the Mapoch war (48).
Ultimately, the most significant thing about Rutherford’s 
report was the use to which it was put. In a covering letter 
to the High Commissioner, Hudson wrote of the gold and mineral 
wealth of Swaziland, of the steady influx of grazing and 
mineral concessionaires, and of the likelihood of these making 
common cause with the turbulent element on Swaziland’s borders, 
whose activities Rutherford had just investigated, and ended 
with the recommendation that the British Government, "should 
begin to exercise a practical restraining, advising and to 
some extent directing influence and supervision by means of 
some British representative or agency." (49) On receipt of the 
two documents, Robinson took up the refrain and used them as 
a means of reopening the question in London (50;. Derby however
(48) P.P. 1884, C. 4037, 110-116, Encl. in encl. in No. 107, 
Report by R. Rutherford, 25 March 1884.
(49) P.P. 1884, C. 4037, 110, Encl. in No. 107, Hudson to High 
Commission, 29 March 1884.
(50) Ibid, 109, No. 107, Robinson to Derby, 22 April 1884. 
Robinson also used the same argument when the Zulu Reserve, 
shortly afterwards,seemed similarly threatened - C.O. 471/1, 
Robinson to S.S., 14 May 1884, telegram.
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refused to be drawn. He concurred with Robinson and Hudson on 
the advantages of a British agency on the Swazi border, but 
then slammed the door on the proposal by saying that the 
Government had no intention for the moment of appointing one.
He did, however, leave room for. a glimmer of hope. Although 
the Government had decided not to take the step at present, he 
told Robinson, it would be as well for him to find out whether 
Mbandzeni would be prepared to defray the cost of a Resident, 
and small frontier police force. That, at least, he seems to 
have reasoned, would help deflect any humanitarian criticism 
of his otherwise stony refusal to act (51).
Derby's reply, although discouraging, did at least keep hope 
alive. The Assistant and Under Secretaries at the Colonial 
Office had been broadly favourable to Robinson's proposal, 
and Robinson could now use Derby's final suggestion to bring 
pressure to bear again (52). That, of course, assumed that 
Mbandzeni would be agreeable to the idea, but then Robinson 
had little doubt on that score. Had he not proclaimed his 
devotion to the British Crown often enough, and had he not even 
agreed to pay taxes if necessary when Rutherford visited him? 
Unfortunately for Robinson, Mbandzeni's attitude was not as 
straightforward as that. If he had looked a little more closely
(51) Ibid, 119-20, No. 116, Derby to Robinson, 21 May 1884.
(52) C .0.417/1.High Commissioner to S.S., No. 16, 22 April 
1884, Minutes by Hemmings, Bramston, Herbert and E.A., 
15 and 16 May 1884.
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into the past history of the Swazi case, he would have found 
that when Wood had visited Mbandzeni in September 1881, to 
inform him of the terms of retrocession, he had asked Mbandzeni 
whether he would be prepared to pay taxes to support a British 
Resident, and Mbandzeni had refused. The way in which Wood put 
the question, and the reasons Mbandzeni gave for refusing, 
were particularly instructive, for they explain much of 
Mbandzeni's later reluctance to accept a British presence on 
Swazi soil. Wood had asked whether the Swazi would be prepared 
to pay taxes for a British Resident like the Zulu, to which 
Mbandzeni had replied that the Zulu were different since they 
had no king, and that his people would not understand if they 
paid money for a Resident, and would go directly to him over 
the head of the king (53). Mbandzeni's fears in this case 
were clearly related to the insecurity of his own position in 
Swaziland, and these seem to have grown rather than diminished 
with the passage of time. Immediately after retrocession 
Mbandzeni had been keen to retain the services of the Border 
Commissioner, Roberts, as a British Resident in Swaziland, 
even though he was unwilling to pay taxes to support him (54) . 
The reason was at least partly because of the personal rapport 
which had developed between the two men, and which offset the 
sense of insecurity with which Mbandzeni was generally beset 
when thrust into contact with the representatives of an outside
(53) C.O. 879/42, Appendix I, 389, Encl. in N o . 9, Minutes of 
Conference between Sir E. Wood and 'Umbandeen' 5 Sept. 1881.
(54) Ibid, 388; P.P. 1882, C.3098, 80, Wood to S.S., 17 Aug. 1881; 
ibid, 82, Encl. 4 in No. 25, J. Jackson to E. Wood, 9 Aug. 
1881, and 82-3, encl. in encl. in No. 25, Message from 
Umbandeen to Wood.
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authority. When Roberts departed, so did Mbandzeni's confidence 
that a British Resident would not enter in collaboration with 
his councillors and undercut his position, as in fact would 
almost certainly have happened if the views of the British 
visitors who met Mbandzeni during this period are anything to 
go by. Rutherford himself almost certainly helped resurrect 
these fears. When he visited him he found Mbandzeni with, "very 
little influence... upon the counsels and conduct of the country's
affairs.... Listless in manner and trifling in business ;
not seeming even to affect any great interest in what was going 
on; almost childish often in demeanour," and it is unlikely, 
despite Mbandzeni's seeming vacuity, that Rutherford's 
contempt was entirely lost on him (55).
Thus, by the time Robinson instructed Rutherford to find out 
whether, in the probable event of a British agency being 
established in Swaziland, Mbandzeni would be prepared to defray 
the costs, Mbandzeni was already set against the idea (56).
As he told Forbes, who was commissioned to convey this request 
to Mbandzeni, he was unwilling to have anyone he did not know, 
and would prefer to stay as he was rather than have someone he 
did not like. His councillors, for similar, though not
(55) P.P. 1884, C. 4037, 112, Encl. in encl. in No. 107, Report 
by Rutherford, 25 March 1884. Wood had also probably
had the same effect with his, "Usanhlana will see", when 
the King obviously did not, ibid, 389-90.
(56) I have not come across the original instruction of 
Robinson to Rutherford, but its substance is contained
in Rutherford's letter to Forbes, transmitting Robinson's 
request - see F.C., Vol. I, R. Rutherford to D. Forbes,
10 July 1884, Confidential.
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identical, reasons, agreed. Sandlane commented that there had 
been a British Resident in Zululand ever since the war, and 
this had not prevented the Boers occupying it, and both he 
and Mbovane seem to have felt that any agent would have to be 
somebody in whom they personally had confidence, and who would 
(by implication) be responsive to Swazi interests rather than 
those of the protecting power (57). The reply stopped the 
unsuspecting Robinson in his tracts, and Herbert voiced what 
was probably their common irritation by commenting, with a 
certain malicious satisfaction, that since Mbandzeni did not 
think British Residents did much good to the natives elsewhere, 
"He will no doubt soon be under a Republic." (58)
At the very same time that Robinson's initiative was bogging 
down, a totally independent, and to some extent rival attempt, 
was being made to foist a white adviser on Mbandzeni. Just 
before Rutherford had arrived at Mbandzeni's capital at the end 
of March 1884, an African messenger had arrived at Nkanini 
claiming he had been sent to announce the arrival of Shepstone, 
and to say that the Swazi should have nothing to do with 
Rutherford on his forthcoming visit to Swaziland. The messenger 
in question was Mhlopekazi, and the visitor he announced was 
Arthur Shepstone, and while he may have exceeded his instructions 
in what he said about Rutherford, the conflict this anticipated
(57) P.P., 1884-5, C. 4214, 95, Encl. in encl. in No. 65,
D. Forbes to Rutherford, 12 Aug. 1884.
(58) C.O. 417/2, High Commissioner to S.S., No. 206, Minutes 
by Herbert, 8 Oct. 1884.
between the Shepstones and the British Resident, and between 
Arthur Shepstone and David Forbes, were soon to become all 
too real (59).
Arthur Shepstonefs visit to Swaziland brings together two 
important strands of Swazi history in this period - the 
gathering momentum of Swaziland’s conquest by concessions, and 
the ambition of the Shepstone family to cash in on its 
influence to take a share in an increasingly lucrative sphere 
of operations. To understand exactly what the Shepstones 
hoped to gain by this mission,it will help to fill in some of 
the background of mining and mineral concessions in Swaziland 
up to this point. From the moment gold had been discovered in 
the eastern Transvaal in 1873, Swaziland had excited the 
interest of prospectors by the highly auriferous appearance of 
its northern sector. Early in 1875, a party of Australian 
prospectors from Pilgrim’s Rest prospected for gold on the 
north-western borders of Swaziland, but without success, and 
three or four years later Tom MacLachlan moved permanently into 
the area to continue the search (60). MacLachlan, in common 
with other prospectors who tried their luck in this area, was 
greeted with suspicion by the Swazi authorities. He was
(59) P.P. 1884, C. 4037, 113, Encl. in encl. in No. 107, Report 
by Rutherford, 25 March 1884; for Mhlopekazi see above 
Mbandzeni’s reaction to Rutherford is partly confirmed by 
J. Forbes later - see F.C., Vol. 2, J. Forbes to Robinson, 
6 May 1885.
(60) W.C. Scully, Further reminiscences of a South African 
pioneer, (London, 1913), 247 , 261; T. Baines, The Gold 
Regions of South Eastern Africa (London, 1877) 74-5, 
128-142.
refused a written concession, and seems to have been confined 
primarily to territory falling outside the Swazi boundary. In 
addition, the Swazi leaders anticipated Lobengula's later action 
by restricting the number of white gold diggers who could work 
MacLachlan’s finds to five, and even then remained suspicious 
that he might be intriguing with the border chief Hvovu, of 
whose loyalty they were uncertain (61). MacLachlan nevertheless 
prospered, and in the course of the next two years the political 
climate also began to change. Once Mbandzeni had rid himself 
of Sisile, a far more accommodating attitude began to prevail 
towards concessionaires, and MacLachlan was able to worm his 
way into Mbandzeni's confidence and gain exclusive rights to 
the land north of the Komati River. Where MacLachlan led others 
soon followed: David Forbes acquired rights to prospect on the 
Ngwenya mountain and also rather vaguely throughout Swaziland 
as a whole; Thomas Wyld was accorded the same privileges in 
the far northern tip of Swaziland and over the border to the 
Crocodile River; and a host of others flocked in to try their 
luck (62) (Map 11).
As the pace of concessionaire activity quickened, Mbandzeni’s 
councillors seem to have become increasingly worried that the
(61) G.H.N., Vol. 791, encl. in encl. in G. 435a/80, W.Barter 
Chief Constable, Pilgrims Rest, to Colonial Secretary,
15 Aug. 1880; De Volksstem, 4 Sept. 1880; De Volksstem,
11 Sept. 1880, Extract from Natal Mercury.
(62) T.S.C., Case 20, File Arthur Shepstone, Arthur to Sir
Theophilus Shepstone, 21 May 1884, 24 June 1884; 23 July 
1884., above, 349.
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situation might get entirely out of hand. What they needed 
now, they seem to have reasoned, was a single trustworthy white 
who could regulate this potential anarchy, and ensure that 
Swaziland would extract at least a share of the new wealth that 
was being created. That of course was a very tall order, for 
disinterested whites were few and far between, but with the 
possible prompting of Mhlopekazi, they eventually plumped for 
the house of Shepstone, to which distance had hitherto lent a 
degree of credibility. Mhlopekazi and Mnikina, who were already 
in Swaziland, were accordingly sent back to Shepstone’s house­
hold to ask for one of his sons to take charge of matters in 
Swaziland, and this was confirmed by Mbandzeni1s official 
messengers to Natal shortly after (63).
It was in response to these requests that Arthur Shepstone 
arrived in the Swazi capital in mid-May 1884, in high hopes of 
making his fortune. To begin with, events seemed to justify 
his optimism. Within two weeks a meeting of the libandla had 
been called, and despite reservations expressed by some that 
Shepstone might become another Allison, the substance of the 
powers previously offered to Shepstone were formally conferred, 
together with the individual right to prospect for gold in 
Forbe’s Ngwenya concession (64). From the moment the libandla
(63) Ibid, 24 June 1884, Minutes of meetings between 
Arthur Shepstone, Umnikina and Mhlopekazi with Mbandzeni 
and the Libandla of Ngwane, 26 May 1884, and 28 May 1884 
(in Zulu) .
(64) Ibid.
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dispersed, however, things began to go sour. After a conversa­
tion with David Forbes, Mbandzeni revoked the promise to allow 
Shepstone to prospect in the Ngwenya, as well as his general 
oversight of mineral affairs, and would only grant him the 
informal right to prospect on MacLachlan1s concession to the 
north of the Komati. There for a month matters stood, until 
by the middle of June, with matters no further advanced, 
Shepstone had had enough. As he was about to leave, however, 
Sandlane and Mhlaba intervened, and persuaded Mbandzeni to offer 
the land granted MacLachlan in May 1882, which they claimed had 
been cancelled by a subsequent concession of November the 
following year. Shepstone was dubious because the 1883 con­
cession seemed to include everything granted in 1882, but, with 
the prospective rewards so glittering, he agreed to see what 
he could work out with MacLachlan. Even there he had not 
reckoned with the continuing obstinacy of Mbandzeni, for what­
ever the liqoqo or libandla said, Mbandzeni was convinced 
Shepstone would become a rival focus of authority. Shepstone 
was too powerful to have near him, he confided on one occasion. 
It was bad enough with Forbes and MacLachlan, "Even CVaey] he 
now Zsaw7 had the advantage of him, and how much more power [he] 
would have than those people." Mbandzeni consequently continued 
to stall, until Shepstone eventually gave up in disgust some 
four months after he had arrived (65).
(65) T.S.C., Case 20, File, Arthur Shepstone, Arthur to Sir 
T. Shepstone, 24 June 1884, 23 July 1884, 4 Sept. 1884. 
The same point was made in a message to the S.A.R. in 
which Mbandzeni complained of Shepstone suborning his 
principal men, see P.P. 1886, C. 4645, 12, Encl. in No. 
10, Bok to Robinson, 14 July 1885.
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Mbandzenifs refusal to accept either a mineral commissioner or 
a British Resident illuminates an important aspect of Swaziland's 
conquest by concessions, as well as an important facet of the 
practice of Swazi politics as opposed to the political theory 
by which they were supposed to run. However theoretically 
unconstitutional it may have been, Mbandzeni could grant 
concessions in defiance of his councillors' wishes, and what­
ever the consensus arrived at in the libandla, Mbandzeni could 
override it by refusing to implement its decisions. Ultimately 
the only sanction they had was his assassination, but since they 
were reluctant to employ that, the centre of decision making 
in Swaziland was largely paralysed, and the concession invasion 
proceeded unchecked.
The other critical element in determining Swaziland's 
failure to withstand concessionaire pressures is the extra­
ordinary hybrid form those pressures took. As Jackson later 
remarked, in a memorandum to de Winton, "Every Boer in the 
eyes of the Swazies has at least a semi-official character, 
because if he be not an official himself, some one of his 
relations probably is, and he himself may be one tomorrow, 
or he may come down in company with an official, which makes 
the Swazies afraid to deny any request lest they should offend 
someone in power." Many border graziers did all they could to 
blur those distinctions further and to foster the impression 
that the Swazi could buy off official intervention by the grant 
of private concessions (66). This was so even when the practice
(66) P.P. 1890, C. 6201, 21, Annexure "A", Memo by Reverend 
Mr.Jackson, n.d.
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was frowned on by the government. In January 1885, the Republican 
authorities are supposed to have sent out a circular to all land- 
drosts, instructing them to do what they could to prevent the 
annual movement of graziers into Swaziland, and at other times 
it positively prohibited any meddling by graziers in political 
activities (67). But group discipline was not strong enough 
within the central government, let alone its local branches, 
to prevent breaches in these regulations being committed whole­
sale, as an episode involving Vice-President Joubert and 
Landdrost Krogh of Wakkerstroom in April 1885, clearly illustrates.
Between April and October 1885 a string of messages reached 
Bulwer and Robinson, speaking of an attempt by Vice-President 
Joubert and Landdrost Krogh to secure a Republican Protectorate 
over Swaziland. With minor variations these all told the same 
tale. Joubert had sent a message from the eastern Transvaal in 
the middle of April, instructing Mbandzeni to have his councillors 
gathered together the following week. On the 27th April Joubert 
and Krogh arrived, accompanied by a large retinue, and had pro­
ceeded to demand that Mbandzeni recognise a Boer protectorate 
over Swaziland. Taken aback, Mbandzeni had stalled, claiming 
that some of his councillors were unwell, and that a decision 
of such magnitude could not be taken without their presence.
For two days Joubert had argued and threatened, claiming the 
British would never help Mbandzeni because they always acted 
too late, and only left after giving instructions that he should 
be called for once the councillors regained their health. That, 
however, was not the end of the story. While Mbandzeni was
(67) Leyds, Transvaal, 239; S.N. 104, 59, M. Stiemens to
C.J. Tosen and P.J. van Schalkwyk, March or April 1884.
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still rushing off appeals to Natal requesting protection against 
the S.A.R., Krogh returned to Mbekelweni, ostensibly on the same 
mission, but in practice to acquire a concession. Wearily, 
Mbandzeni agreed, and conceded a huge tract in the south of
Swaziland on a ninety year lease (68).
A variety of interpretations have been made of this episode.
At the time many were convinced that the attempt had been made, 
and that it was an extension of Joubert and Krogh’s land-grabbing 
activities in the New Republic, but since then historians have
tended to take a more cautious view (69). Mouton, Joubert's
biographer, suggests that a move of this sort was highly 
improbable given Joubert's fear of a British annexation of 
Swaziland, while Garson cites correspondence between Leyds and 
Beelaerts van Blokland as evidence that there was no official 
intention to annex (70). The problem with both these views 
is that they tend to focus on Joubert the Vice-President as 
opposed to Joubert the politician, or Joubert the land baron, 
and largely ignore the question of why the Swazi should have 
bothered to make these allegations at all. The moment one 
turns the question round, however, and looks at the Swazi rather 
than the S.A.R., or at Joubert's private rather than his public 
concerns, a different set of possibilities begin to emerge.
(68) P.P. 1886 C. 4645, 3, Encl. 2 in No. 3, James Forbes to 
Robinson, 6 May 1885; ibid, 5-6, Encl. in Encl. 8 in N o . 3,
J.B. Rathbone, J.H. Wyld, T. Corry to Bulwer, 4 May 1885;
G.H.Z., May-September 1885, Vol.694, S.C.38, Encl. in Cardew 
to Bulwer 9 June 1885, extract of a letter from Jackson to 
Cardew, 19 May 1885; ibid, Encl.I in Cardew to Bulwer, 4 Aug. 
1885, Ingram (special correspondent, Natal Mercury) to 
Cardew, 16 June 1885; C. 4645, 64-5, Encl. 1 in N o . 4,
Statement by messengers from Mbandine, 7 Oct. 1885.
(69) See for example C.O. 179/157, Conf. Bulwer to Derby, 10 July 1885.
(70) J.A. Mouton, 'Genl. Piet Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis1 
A.Y.B., I (1957) (Parow, 1957), 180; Garson, 'Swaziland*, 286-7.
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As far as the Swazi were concerned, there seems to have been 
as little reason for them to have fabricated these complaints 
as there was for the S.A.R. to attempt to get a protectorate 
over Swaziland, and the tone, reiteration and detail of the 
messages all suggest that the Swazi believed a demand for a 
protectorate had been made. However, even accepting this to 
be true, it does not necessarily mean that a protectorate was 
Joubert's real aim. Garson points out the improbability of 
Britain's ever recognising a Republican protectorate, and 
Joubert must presumably have been conscious of this (71). 
Equally improbable as he must also have known, was the idea of 
the Swazi voluntarily accepting his proposal. To persuade them 
would require force, and as State Secretary Bok remarked at 
the time, the use of force on the pattern of the New Republic 
was impossible, as there were no civil disturbances on which 
to base any similar move (72).
The probability is then that Joubert was acting neither 
officially nor unofficially in the interest of the Republic, 
but was pursuing private or, at best, sectional ends. The 
nature of these ends is revealed in Krogh's return shortly 
after Joubert's departure to obtain a massive grazing lease at 
nominal rent, for what Joubert had done, and probably intended 
to do, was to soften up the Swazi in preparation for this 
request. In addition, the entire exercise can also be seen
(71) Ibid, 286.
(72) P.P. 1886, C. 4645, 12, Encl. in No. 10, Bok to Robinson, 
14 July 1885.
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as serving Joubert's broader political interests. The core of 
Joubert's political support was concentrated in Wakkerstroom, 
and the news of his attempt to acquire a protectorate could not 
fail to consolidate that. It would be politically popular in 
its own right, and even if formally unsuccessful, would soften 
up the Swazi for other concessionaire demands'. Even the 
Swaziland concession itself had its political uses. Sub­
divided and leased at low rents it would create clients for 
Joubert and reinforce the patriarchal structure of his 
political support, which was characteristic of Republican 
politics at that time (73). Indeed, in the end what one can 
perhaps see in this is the land baron and the politician join­
ing hands to solve the problems of white landlessness, which 
might otherwise have eroded his political support.
The main point of the foregoing analysis is that Joubert's 
visit to Swaziland in 1885, and other similar visits at other 
times, weakened Swazi resistance to concessionaire demands, 
and it is not necessary to accept the argument about Joubert's 
objectives on this occasion for that to stand. This certainly 
is how the Swazi seem to have seen it. As one councillor 
helplessly confessed to Jackson when the latter remonstrated 
with him about Krogh's grant, "we see we are ruining our
(73) See for example R. Cornwell, 'Land and Politics in the 
Transvaal in the 1880s,' S .S .A ., Vol. 4 (London, 1974), 
29-40; Trapido, 'Class Formation', 53-65.
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country.by such concessions but what can we do." (74) 
Mbandzeni's only answer was to appeal for British intervention, 
but in this case, as in others, it was a forlorn hope. Unless 
Mbandzeni would accept a British Commissioner they could only 
forward complaints for investigation, to which the reply 
inevitably came back that there was no substance to the 
complaints.
Up to a point Mbandzeni may even have been satisfied with 
this procedure. As yet he showed little sign of having grasped 
the full gravity of the situation, and this at least gave 
reassurance that Republican officials knew they were being 
observed (75). Some awareness of Swaziland's true position 
began to sink in in 1887, as the S.A.R. began to make a more 
determined bid to entrench its influence in the area, but up 
until then Mbandzeni seems even to have entertained hopes that 
he might escape some of the territorial restrictions imposed 
in recent years, by judicious appeals to the British. This 
happened both in Hhohho and in the south, but the former
(74) G.H.Z., May-September 1885, Vol. 694, S.C. 38, Encl. in 
Cardew to Bulwer, 9 June 1885, extract of a letter from 
Jackson to Cardew, 19 May 1885.
(75) Mbandzeni's comment somewhat later suggests precisely this. 
In a conversation with two Natal messengers who had just 
witnessed Joubert and Krogh make another attempt to secure
a protectorate over Swaziland (unbeknown to them of course) , 
Mbandzeni thanked the messengers for the message they 
brought from the British Government and added, "...he 
trusted that now the Boers saw that the Government listened 
to and enquired into their causes of trouble, they would 
cease to trouble them further by stealing their cattle."
It was almost as if he could visualise his words on the 
pages of a Blue Book. P.P. 1887, C. 4890, 147-8, Encl. 1 
in No. 71, Statement by messengers to Swaziland, 27 Nov. 
1886.
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provides the clearest example of the process (76). The 
unwillingness of the Swazi to relinquish territory in that 
area had been demonstrated repeatedly over the years, the most 
recent being with the Wyld concession in 1883, and the same 
issue was raised on a number of other occasions prior to 1887. 
In 1884, the first attempt to levy taxation in the area brought 
a howl of protest from the Swazi, in which they accused the 
Border Commissioner, Erasmus, of illegally trespassing on their 
land. At the time the Republican Government was still anxious 
to avoid incidents with the Swazi, which might be used as a 
pretext for British intervention, and a mollifying reply was 
sent back that an investigation would be mounted and compen­
sation would be paid for any illegal action(77). Whatever the 
findings of the investigation, the Swazi did not find them 
satisfactory, and within a few months they were asking for 
Pretoria to beacon the disputed border in the north (78).
(76) For examples on the southern border see above, 348-9. 
and also P.P. 1886, C. 4645, 64, Encl. I in No. 41, 
Statement by messengers from Mbandine, 7 Oct. 1885;
G.H.Z., Oct.-Dec. 1885, Vol. 695, Acting Sub-Commissioner 
Cardew to Mitchell, 27 Oct. 1885, transmitting information 
from Jackson; ibid, Cardew to Bulwer, 15 Oct. 1885, encl. 
Ingram to Cardew, n.d. Both of the above despatches are 
reprinted with names ommitted in C, 4645, 65-66, 66-68; 
P.P. 1887, C. 4980, 145, Encl. in encl. I in No. 70,
J. Gama to Havelock, 17 Oct. 1886.
(77) S.N. 104, 120, Joubert to J.J, Ferreira, 31 July 1884.
(78) P.P. 1884-5, C. 4213, 137, Encl. in No. 84, Rutherford to 
Secretary to High Commissioner, 20 Sept. 1884,
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This was, on the face of it, a perfectly reasonable request.
When the British Boundary Commission, under Alleyne, had sur­
veyed the Swazi border, they had failed to beacon any further 
north than the Komati Gorge, and this left the whole of the 
Hhohho district in urgent need of definition (79). Swazi 
motives for all that may well have been more devious. Accord­
ing to David Forbes, the Swazi were hoping that this would 
place the matter sub-judice, and that Erasmus would thereby be 
precluded from raising taxes in the area (80). This in itself 
was a relatively short-term expedient, but it was a potentially 
elastic one.. If later Swazi behaviour is anything to go by, 
there was every chance that they would have refused to co-operate 
with the beaconing, by demanding the presence of Alleyne, or 
some other such condition, and so try to defer the matter 
indefinitely into the future. The S.A.R. however refused to 
be drawn, and continued to collect taxes in the area in the 
following years (81).
A further factor which may have stiffened Swazi resistence to 
border delimitation, was a serious clash which took place between 
the Swazi and the Republican Border Commissioner in August 1885. 
Tempers were already strained from the previous year when
(79) C.O. 291/6, Encl. in No. 18, Diary of the Swaziland 
Boundary Commission, Jan.-Feb., 1880.
(80) G.H.Z., Oct.-Dec. 1884, Vol. 692, Sec. State,Conf., Derby 
to Bulwer, 9 Dec. 1884, Encl. in Encl., D. Forbes to 
Rutherford, 8 Oct. 1884.
(81) P.P. 1886, C. 4645, 70, D. Forbes to Sir R. Herbert, C.O., 
22 Dec. 1885; P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 28, Encl. in encl. 2 in 
No. 14, Report of P.J. Joubert, N.J. Smit, G.R. von 
Wielligh, 11 Nov. 1886.
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Matsafeni Mdluli, Mbandzeni's Hhohho indvuna, had advised 
people to resist paying taxes, and at least one person had been 
killed in the ensuing affray (82). In August 1885, matters 
took a further turn for the worse when Erasmus, the Border 
Commissioner, seized Swazi cattle along the entire northern 
boundary. This time the resistance was fiercer again, as 
Hanyane Mkhatshwa (the successor Mawewe (83)) battled it out 
with Erasmus's police (84). In messages to Pietermaritzburg, 
Swazi messengers laid the blame for this incident squarely on 
the shoulders of Erasmus, who, they claimed, was seizing cattle 
along the entire length of the Komati. If true, this would have 
placed Erasmus clearly in the wrong, as it would have meant that 
he was trying to absorb the whole of Hhohho into the S.A.R..
The question, however, was by no means as clear-cut as the 
Swazi tried to make out. When a Republican Boundary Commission 
visited Swaziland in November 1886, in answer to Swazi complaints 
of September 1885 and March 1886, the Swazi are supposed to 
have claimed a line from Kamhlubana to the Crocodile River, 
and to have refused to accept the beaconing of Alleyne's 
border because it was the area to the north that was the basis 
of their complaints.
(82) P.P. 1886, C. 4645, 65, Encl. I in No. 41, Statement by 
messengers from Umbandine, 7 Oct. 1885; S.S. 969, R 3884/84, 
156-171, J.A. Erasmus to P.J. Joubert, 18 Aug. 1884; ibid,
R 3885/84, 178-80, Complaint of Erasmus against Mataffin,
18 Aug. 1884.
(83) For Mawewe see above, Chap. V. - •
(84) S.S. 1105, R. 4752/85, 87-93 , J.A. Erasmus Report 15 Sept. 
1885; G.H.Z., Oct.-Dec. 1885, Vol. 695, Cardew to Bulwer,
15 Oct. 1885, encl. in encl. T. MacLoughlin (i.e. MacLachlan) 
to Ingram n.d.; ibid, Vol. 697, S.N.A. to Mitchell, 29 April 
1886, encl. message from Umbandeen, 16 April 1886; P.P. 1887, 
C. 4913, 105-6, Encl. in Encl. I in No. 63, Havelock to
H. Commissioner, 23 April 1886; Von Wielligh, Lebombo,
238-9; Myburgh, Barberton, 79-80.
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Once again one faces the problem of flatly contradictory 
accounts, but what little independent evidence there is tends 
to support the Republican case. In April 1886, Swazi messengers 
arriving at Pietermaritzburg complained of Erasmus’s taxation 
in an area bounded by the Dlomodlomo mountains, the Crocodile 
River, the Lebombo mountains and the Komati, which would have 
meant that the Swazi were complaining primarily about the area 
outside Alleyne’s boundary line (85) (Map 10). A protest from 
MacLachlan, the gold-prospector, further reinforces that 
impression. MacLachlan's complaint was that the S.A.R. had 
seized a portion of Swazi territory, sixteen by forty-five 
miles in size, which though not explicitly identified seems 
to indicate an area between Alleyne’s boundary line and the 
Crocodile River, which has roughly the same dimensions (86).
One last fragment of evidence which also seems to point in 
the same direction, is that it was Hanyane rather than anyone 
else who offered resistance to Erasmus, for while part of 
Hanyane’s chiefdom included the far northerly part of Swaziland, 
the vast bulk of it fell outside the 1880 boundary line (87).
To sum up then, it would appear that while Erasmus may have 
encroached over the boundary in some areas, the real basis of 
the dispute was land further north - land which the Swazi had 
lost through the 1880 boundary delimitation, and which they 
were now desperately trying to win back.
(85) P.P. 1887, C. 4913, 47, Encl. in encl. I in No. 47, 
Statement by ’Umkonkoni’, messenger from the Swazi,
30 April 1886.
(86) G.H.Z., Oct.-Dec. 1885, Vol. 695, Cardew to Bulwer,
15 Oct. 1885, encl. in encl., T. MacLoughlin (sic) to 
Ingram n.d.
(87) Myburgh, Barberton, 76-7.
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There are a variety of reasons why Mbandzeni should have been 
so preoccupied with this problem at the very moment he was 
signing away much of the remainder of his country in concessions. 
In his conversations with the Republican Boundary Commission 
•of November 1886, he had pointed out that many of the cattle 
seized belonged to himself, and while the commissioners seem 
to have scoffed at the idea, there was probably some justice 
to his claim (88). Hanyane's father, for example, had arrived 
in Swaziland virtually destitute of cattle, and Mswati had 
provided the stock which helped him rebuild his herds. Hence 
Mbandzeni had a genuine claim to all of his stock, and probably 
similar rights over the cattle of the other chiefdoms over the 
border (89). Nor was that all, besides meaning wealth, cattle 
also under-pinned political authority, and this again was 
being cut away by taxation and so on. In October 1883, Ingram 
remarked how Mbandzeni1s control was visibly slipping in these 
outlying areas, and the cases of Hvovu and Ndlaluhlaza Mkhatshwa 
seem to offer additional evidence of how Mbandzeni's authority 
was being eaten away (90).
Perhaps the most striking example of the subversive influence 
of these developments however is offered by Hanyane himself.
(88) P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 28, Encl. in encl. 2 in No . 14, Report 
of P.J. Joubert, N.J. Smit, G.R. von Wielligh, 11 Nov. 1886.
(89) Certainly when refugees fled from Swaziland into the S.A.R. 
Mbandzeni always demanded the release of their cattle.
(90) G.H.Z.,Vol. 695, Oct.-Dec. 1885, Cardew to Eulwer, 15 Oct.1885, 
encl. Ingram (Special Correspondent, Natal Mercury) to Cardew
n.d. (largely reproduced in C. 4645, 66-7); for Hvovu see 
above, 364, note 61. Ndlaluhlaza Mkhatshwa is
also supposed to have contemplated leaving Swaziland at 
about this time, Interview Mahloba Gumede.
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In May 1881 Ndlemane, the regent to Hanyane, had already asked 
the British Government to be allowed to leave Swaziland and 
take up an independent position between the Shangane and the 
Swazi, and the activities of Erasmus in mid-1885 seem to have 
reawakened that desire (91). It was at this point that Charlie 
Du Pont entered the picture, to suggest the means by which this 
could be’accomplished. Du Pont was one of that notorious band 
of’border ruffians’who had lived a semi-bandit existence in 
Swaziland since the late 1860s, and of whom much has been 
written else where (92). At this point Du Pont had just - 
returned from a trading trip to the Shangane, where he found 
Mzila recently dead, and his councillors still worried about 
a possible move by Mawewe's successor to recover the throne.
They had therefore suggested to Du Pont - or Du Pont had 
suggested to them - that Du Pont should lure Hanyane back from 
Swaziland to Gaza with the promise of white support to restore 
him to power, and that he should be quietly disposed of along 
the way. Du Pont would then get Hanyane’s cattle, as well as 
a handsome reward from themselves, and they would be freed of 
a fear that had haunted them for years. On his return, Du Pont 
set the plan in motion, though whether he was intending to 
back Hanyane or to murder him is difficult to say (93) . Hanyane
(91) S.N. 7, S.R. 51/81, British Resident to Joubert 6 Sept. 
1881. No action seems to have been taken on this. For 
Ndlemane see also Myburgh, Barberton,78, whose dates are a 
little astray.
(92) For example, Forbes, Life, 109-14; D. Barker, Swaziland, 
(London, 1965), 24-6.
(93) According to ’Mantayi’ Bennett, Du Pont was a frequent 
exponent of this type of hijacking, waylaying Shangane 
labourers on their way back from the mines, and shooting 
them for their pay packets. His father is supposed to have 
seen the donga where their corpses were left - interview 
’Mantayi' Bennett, 14 June 1970, Manzini, Swaziland.
380
was contacted and found agreeable; white mercenaries were 
raised on the goldfields, and the plan was about to move into 
action when Mbandzeni learnt of it, and had Hanyane detained.
Du Pont was incensed and stormed up the Swazi border demanding 
seven hundred and fifty cattle as compensation for Hanyanefs 
arrest. These were naturally refused, but Mbandzeni did not 
come off unscathed (94). First, Erasmus seems to have taken 
action against Mbandzeni or Hanyane and extorted a considerable 
fine (95). Then, on top of that Hanyane fled, and took refuge 
for the rest of his life in southern Mozambique (96) . The 
moral of the story was clear, and explains Mbandzeni’s dogged 
resistance to the S.A.R.'s claims: unless he could prevent the 
policing of these areas by the officials of the Republic, his 
authority over his subjects that lived there was virtually at 
an end.
As in his earlier brushes with Piet Joubert and Abel Erasmus, 
Mbandzeni appealed about Du Pont’s behaviour to the British in 
Natal, although exactly what he expected to achieve by this
(94) On the 23 July 1886 Cardew received information from Central 
Zululand about a conflict between Sandlane and Mbandzeni,
in which both were appealing to White volunteers (P.P. 1887,
C. 4980, 16, Encl. in N o . 7, Cardew to Havelock, 31 July 
1886). Cardew’s correspondent was evidently confusing the 
names Sandlane and Hanyane, but his report- helps fix the 
date for these disturbances in early to mid-July 1886. For 
the details of Du Pont’s attempt see P.P. 1887, C. 4980,
18, encl. in No. 11, extract of letter from a resident of 
Swaziland to Cardew, 28 July 1886; P.P. 1887, C. 4980, 20-21 
Encl. I in No. 13, message from Umbandine, 19 Aug. 1886;
S.N. 12, S.R. 512/86, interview between Kruger and 3 Swazi 
reps, 2 Aug. 1886. THis is also reproduced in English in 
C. 5089, 26-8, encl. in encl. 2 in N o . 14.
(95) P.P. 1887, C. 4980, 145, Encl. in encl. I in N o . 70, J. Gama 
to S.N.A. Natal, 17 Oct. 1886 (Gama was a Shepstone retainer); 
F.C., Vol. 7, Sarah (Forbe’s sister) to Kate, 1 Aug. 1886.
(96) Myburgh, Barberton, 79-81.
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manoeuvre is not very clear (97). The customary ’motions’ of 
the High Commissioner forwarding Swazi complaints to the State 
Secretary for investigation were plainly inadequate, as the 
State Secretary invariably denied the allegations, and the 
British authorities had no machinery for making an independent 
check. Moreover, while these had had some influence to begin 
with, they were becoming increasingly ineffectual the more 
often they were used. The only effective alternative would 
have been the establishment of a British protectorate or a 
British Commissioner on the Swazi border, but that neither 
party was particularly eager to accept. True, Mbandzeni had 
made a formal request for a British Resident in October 1884, 
and supposedly reiterated it to one of the Forbes’s in May 1885, 
but these seem to have been made under the pressure of 
impatient advisors or events, and when it came to a decision 
Mbandzeni invariably drew back (98). Thus, successive attempts 
by Robinson in October 1884 and May 1885 to find out whether 
Mbandzeni would pay for a British Resident were politely ignored, 
and it was not until David Forbes paid a visit to Britain in 
December 1885 that any response was elicted at all (99) . Even 
then the reply that Forbes brought was probably as much his 
doing as Mbandzeni’s. Some five months later, when the trader, 
Rathbone, asked Mbandzeni what he thought about Robinson's
(97) Above, 355-6, 369-70, 376-8.
(98) G.H.Z., Oct.-Dec. 1884, Vol. 692, Secretary State Conf. 
Derby to Bulwer, 9 Dec. 1884, Encl. in Encl. I, Forbes to
Rutherford, 8 Oct. 1884; P.P. 1886, C. 4645, 3, Encl. 2 in
No. 3, James Forbes to Robinson, 6 May 1885.
(99) G.H.Z., Oct.-Dec. 1884, Vol. 692, Secretary State conf. 
Derby to Bulwer, 9 Dec. 1884, Encl. in Encl. I,G. Bower
(Imperial Secretary) to Rutherford, 28 Oct. 1884; P.P.
1886, C. 4645, 4, Encl. 4 in N o . 3, G. Bower to James
Forbes, 30 May 1885.
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message, he answered that, "he had not thought much about it, 
and could not see his way clear to pay the Resident," (100) 
and it was probably only Forbes’s prodding that got him to 
reply at all. Nevertheless, the reply that Forbes did extract 
probably comes closer than anything else to revealing 
Mbandzeni's true position. Since the Swazi people had, "not 
been in the habit of going out to work," this went, "they 
/were7 very poor in cattle and money." Consequently Mbandzeni 
asked whether it would not be possible for the British just,
"to proclaim a Protectorate for the present to prevent any 
other power establishing a claim there, until they saw their 
way to paying for the expense of a Resident" (101). In effect, 
what this meant, was that Mbandzeni, as well as his councillors 
in various degrees, feared the power a Resident Commissioner 
might wield, but wanted more protection than protests alone 
could confer. As a compromise it would have been masterly, 
had it not been for one vital flaw in their reasoning - Article 
XII in the London Convention guaranteeing Swazi independence, 
guaranteed it against the British as well as the S.A.R, and it 
would therefore require the S.A.R.’s consent before it could 
be breached.
British thinking on the subject was, if anything, more woolly 
still, and there was a tendency throughout just to let matters 
drift. Indeed, it is Garson's contention that their only 
concern was to keep up appearances, which could usually be
(100) P.P. 1887, C. 4913, 110, encl. in encl. in No. 65,
Rathbone to Savage, encl. Hill, 9 May 1886.
(101) P.P. 1886, C. 4645, 70, No. 46, D. Forbes to S.S. R. Herbert, 
22 Dec. 1885, Edinburgh.
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satisfied by the token investigation of complaints (102).
While this is true up to a point, it oversimplifies Britain's 
position, which was influenced more than Garson realises by the 
attitude Mbandzeni took up. The minimum effective protection 
that Britain could have offered was the appointment of a 
Border Commissioner to investigate Swazi complaints, but this 
was hamstrung from the beginning by Treasury intransigence, 
and by Mbandzeni's own reluctance to help defray any costs. 
Admittedly, Derby and his cabinet colleagues were in principle 
unwilling to do anything that might involve future complications 
and expense, but with the Colonial Office and Robinson strongly 
supporting intervention, a positive response from Mbandzeni 
would have greatly strengthened their hand. As it was, Derby 
and his successors could simply cry "Treasury", and the case 
for intervention fell at the first fence (103). This point 
becomes clearer from the subsequent development of the argument 
as the situation grew more acute in 1886 and 1887 . Another 
obstacle Derby had raised to any action in Swaziland was the 
need to link it to some decision about the region as a whole, 
and for a time this had proved fertile ground for evasion and 
debate. By 1886 a decision on Zululand had become urgent, 
however, as fears of German intervention began to gain ground, 
and with that the question of Swaziland was scrutinised anew.
To many, the logical answer seemed to be a protectorate over 
Swaziland, but at this point it was discovered that this would
(102) Garson, 'Swaziland', 285.
(103) See for example C.O. 417/2, High Commissioner to Secretary 
State, 29 Oct. 1884, Conf. Minutes by J.A., Fairfield, 
Herbert.
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require the assent of the S.A.R. to abrogate Articles II and 
XII of the London Convention (104). Since this was clearly 
not forthcoming, attention focussed again on the idea of a 
Border Commissioner, only to run up against the problem of 
finance once more. As the new Secretary of State minuted on 
the opinion of the Law Officers, "to this step we should 
immediately address ourselves, but the difficulty in our way is 
to provide for the expense as I fear the Treasury and House of 
Commons will not allow the English tax payers to be taxed for 
these Commissioners" (105).
As 1886 closed, therefore, Swaziland was entering a new phase 
in its internal and external relations. The British Government 
became increasingly inclined to follow Robinson in washing its 
hands of Swaziland, while the S.A.R., deprived of St. Lucia 
Bay, began to see it as its only road to the sea. As a result, 
Republican pressure became that much more overt and intense, 
and the extent to which the Swazi had mortgaged their indepen­
dence to concessions became that much more clear Mbandzeni’s 
response was to appoint Theophilus Shepstone as his resident 
advisor, in an attempt to regulate and escape the new pressure 
being applied. It is with the consequences of this, and the 
final conquest by concession, that the next chapter will be 
concerned.
(104) C.O. 179/166, Bulwer to C.O., 14 Jan. 1886, Draft Stanley 
(Secretary State) to Havelock, Jan. 1886; Sw. A., Folder 
No. 5, Conf. Knutsford to Acting High Commissioner 2 Aug. 
1889, Encl. Law Officers to C.O., 8 Feb.1887; C.O.,417/12, 
High Comm, to S.S., No. 346, 15 Dec. 1886, Min. by R.G.U.H.,
7 Jan. 1887.
(105) C.O., 417/18, Law Officers to S.S., 8 Feb. 1887, Minute 
by Holland, 10 Feb. 1887.
CHAPTER IX 
THE CONQUEST BY CONCESSIONS 
1886-1889
By the end of 1886 pressures were building up on Mbandzeni from 
all sides. In Hhohho and Mahamba the S.A.R. was levying taxation 
on Swazi subjects in complete disregard of any protests the Swazi 
might make, while along Swaziland’s eastern boundary the Portugues 
were preparing the way for the occupation of the fertile and 
reputedly mineral-rich Lebombo (1). Again, in roughly the same 
twelve months, the Swazi were subjected to a concessionaire 
influx which dwarfed previous proportions, as the Komati and De 
Kaap goldfields were opened up. New towns mushroomed on Swazi­
land’s western borders, and this in turn spilled over into 
Swaziland proper as supplicants streamed into Swaziland for 
mineral concessions on an unprecedented scale (2). To add to 
his troubles Mbandzeni was also confronted at about this time 
with the consequences of an earlier act of folly, when the sixty 
or so Boer families on the Ferreira and Maritz concession began 
agitating to be allowed to administer themselves and to be 
absorbed into the S.A.R. In March 1886 they took the first 
preliminary steps in that direction,by establishing a skeleton 
administration for what was now called the Little Free State, and 
two months later a delegation waited on Mbandzeni to acquaint
(1) S.S. 1270, 39-43, R 4219/86, J.A. Erasmus to P.J. Joubert,
19 Aug. 1886, encl. J.A. Erasmus report; P.P. 1887, C. 4890, 
145, encl. in Encl. I in N o . 70, Gama to S.N.A., 17 Oct.
1886; P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 4, Encl. I in N o . 2, message from 
Umbandine to Gov. Natal, Jan. 1887.
(2) Mathers, South Africa, 106-198, 208.
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him of their decision. The reception they received was evidently 
frosty, but they were only briefly deterred, and seven months 
later a new deputation was visiting Mbandzeni to tell him that 
the concession had been lawfully purchased by Ferreira and Maritz, 
and that the king could lay no further claim (3).
By themselves this array of problems would probably have been 
enough to make Mbandzeni revise his earlier refusal to call in 
outside assistance, but the final straw which tipped him in this 
direction seems to have been another visit from Joubert and Krogh 
in October 1886. As with their earlier visit they wanted 
Mbandzeni to sign a document placing Swaziland under the wing 
of the S.A.R. Again Mbandzeni refused, and again Joubert rode 
away in a huff, leaving Krogh behind as before to submit a 
mineral concession. Here, however, the pattern begins to change. 
Mbandzeni would have nothing to do with Krogh1s request for a 
concession, and Krogh went off in a rage (4). Mbandzeni may at 
last have realised the connection between official demands for 
a protectorate, and the private requests for concessions by S.A.R. 
officials. If so, he must also have begun to appreciate the 
need for outside support, and in November 1886 he decided to ask 
a representative of the Shepstones to take on that role (5).
(3) Watson, 'Little Free State , 13-14.
(4) P.P. 1887, C. 4890, 147-8, encl. in Encl. in No. 71, state­
ment by Ungahbonkulu and Mancinzane to Gov. Natal on return
from Swaziland, 27 Nov. 1886; ibid, C. 5089, 14, encl. in
Encl. I in N o . 8, Savage and Hill to G. Brown, 25 Jan. 1887.
(5) Mathers, South Africa, 225-6.
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The decision to call in the Shepstones was logical and obvious.
Not only was Mbandzeni being subjected to unprecedented pressures 
which demanded specialised support, but he was also unwilling to 
use a British Commissioner who would act in British interests and 
not his own. In the Shepstones he could hope to reconcile these 
demands by securing an advisor who would be responsible to him­
self, and who would also, by virtue of his family connections, 
carry weight in Natal. Yet even this may not fully explain his 
decision. Some time before Mbandzeni ever requested the Shepstone.1 s 
help, two of Sir Theophilus!s Edenvale retainers (John Gama and 
Stephen Mini) were already in Swaziland, and it is possible that 
they had been briefed by their patron to suggest the idea (6). 
Certainly the Shepstones had good reasons for wanting this done.
Offy was on the brink of bankruptcy in Natal, which would have 
been a terrible blow to his father Sir Theophilus, while Sir 
Theophilus's own financial position does not seem to have been 
particularly strong, after the refusal of the Imperial Government 
to grant him an adequate pension when he retired. What could . 
have been more natural, therefore, than for Sir Theophilus to 
look to Swaziland to restore the family fortunes, and to intimate to 
the Swazi that this might be one way of acquiring the political
(6) P.P. 1887, C. 4890, 145, encl. in Encl. I in N o . 70, J. Gama 
to S.N.A. Natal, 17 Oct. 1886, H.C. Shepstone to Havelock,
25 Nov. 1886; see also Forbes Life, 118. Forbes however is 
perhaps not the most reliable source in this instance, as 
he claims that the White Governing Committee was in existence 
before Shepstone arrived in February 1887, ibid, 115-8. For 
the White Governing Committee see below, 391-2,
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leverage they had been lacking before (7).
Whether this was so, or whether Offy visited Swaziland, as he 
and Sir Theophilus later maintained, with no other intention than 
the acquisition of a gold concession from the King, Offy was 
offered the post after he arrived in the country late in November 
1886 (8). Offy was not formally appointed to the position until 
February the following year, and in the interval both parties 
sought to underwrite the advantages they hoped to gain from the 
arrangement. Offy had the Libandla convened, and secured its 
sanction to his control of concessions (including their revenues) 
and white affairs as a whole, while the Council sent messages to 
the Natal Government (or more precisely to H.C. Shepstone, the 
Secretary for Native Affairs), and to Sir Theophilus, to secure 
British approval for the move. The idea was obviously to get a 
British commitment of support for Offy’s assumption of the office, 
but that attempt fared not nearly so well. Although Sir Theophilus 
gave his assent and whatever authority this had, and although
(7) That Sir Theophilus was not above this sort of behaviour is 
indicated in a letter he sent to Offy in September 1890.
At this stage Offy was still in a desperate financial 
position, and his wife was having the greatest difficulty 
in preventing his estates being sequestered. "That" wrote 
Sir Theophilus, "would be a calamity that I cannot contem­
plate without horror at the humiliation it would bring upon 
us all," and he explicitly used all the influence he could 
bring to bear to persuade a Swazi delegation then in 
Pietermaritzburg to pay £10 000, or face having Offy leave 
them, T.S.C., Case 31, File "S" Sir Theophilus to Offy,
28 Sept. 1890.
(8) T.S.C., Case 14, Draft Conf., Sir T. Shepstone to Sir D. 
Currie, 20 Jan. 1887; Mathers, South Africa, 225-6; P.P. 
1887, C. 5089, 68, Encl. 3 in N o . 39, Natal Mercury,
25 May 1887.
H.C. Shepstone made a strong plea on MbandzeniTs behalf, the High 
Commissioner would have no truck with what was going on. Offy, 
Mbandzeni was told, was acting in his own private capacity and 
was in no way accredited to either Britain or Natal (9).
Offy's appointment was greeted by a storm of protest from the 
grazier community in Swaziland, and was the cause of a minor 
crisis which blew up the following year. Since retrocession 
many grazing concessionaires had held hopes of quietly converting 
their grazing leases into freehold tenure, but Shepstone's 
appointment as government secretary immediately snuffed them out. 
Up until now Mbandzeni's defence against grazier ambitions had 
been to grant out separate mineral concessions over the winter 
pastures the graziers leased. In so doing he was continuing a 
time-honoured Swazi tradition of setting his enemies at loggerhead 
over the same resource, for while it was the Boers who for the 
most part became the grazing concessionaires, he permitted 
prospecting rights for minerals almost exclusively to the British 
Shepstone's appointment seemed to set the seal on this division, 
as it left little prospect of the graziers achieving change by 
means of subterfuge or of fait accompli. At one further remove, 
seemed also to smack of British or Natal intervention, and to 
represent a check to Republican interests in Swaziland as a whole.
(9) P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 8, encl. in Encl. in No. 3, Gama to 
S.N.A., 23 Dec. 1886; ibid, 9, Encl. 2 in N o . 3, telegram 
Havelock to High Commissioner, 17 Jan. 1887; ibid, Encl.
3 in N o . 3, High Commissioner to Havelock, 19 Jan. 1887, 
telegram; ibid, 4-5, Encl. in Encl. I in No.2, message from 
Umbandine to Governor Natal, Jan. 1887; ibid, 9, Encl. in 
No. 7, Havelock to Robinson, 25 Jan. 1887.
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Consequently the news of Shepstone's appointment set in motion 
a campaign of agitation, laced with talk of a filibustering 
invasion of Swaziland the following spring (10).
The first threats of this kind were uttered while Shepstone 
was away in Pietermaritzburg setting his affairs in order before 
coming to reside permanently in Swaziland, and these took on a 
more ominous note when he returned to have his appointment con­
firmed the following February (11). Twice in February and again 
in March, a party of graziers, under the leadership of Stoffel 
Tosen, descended on Mbekelweni issuing threats about Shepstone 
and demanding the extension of their concessions to include 
mineral rights as well (12) . It was widely rumoured at the time 
that the graziers were angry because Shepstonefs arrival had 
obstructed plans for a filibustering invasion of Swaziland the 
following April, but eye-witness accounts of the March meeting 
between the graziers and Mbandzeni make it clear that they had 
more limited aims. What they wanted above all was to expand 
their grazing rights to include minerals as well. They had the 
money they claimed, and they would pay, but they would never 
tolerate anyone else digging on their land. The Swazi countered 
with expressions of injured innocence. Mbandzeni asked whether 
the country was no longer his, adding that he would have to ask the
(10) P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 15-17, encl. in Encl. I in No. 9,
T. Shepstone to S.N.A. Natal, 29 Jan. 1887; ibid, 49, encl. 
in Encl. in N o . 34, J. Gama to S.N.A. Natal, 16 Jan. 1887.
(11) Ibid; ibid, 15-17, encl. in Encl. I in N o . 9, Shepstone to 
S.N.A. Natal, 29 Jan. 1887; ibid, 32, encl. in Encl. in No. 
18, Capt. A. Hulley to Havelock, 21 Feb. 1887.
(12) Ibid, 37, Offy Shepstone to State Secretary, 20 Feb. 1887; 
Mathers, South Africa, 226-7.
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two governments whether this was so, and when Tosen began 
fulminating about Shepstone's appointment Sandlane took up the 
refrain. Had the Boers accepted grazing concessions on condition 
that one of Shepstonefs sons should not come into the country, he 
asked? To this, of course, the graziers had no adequate reply, and 
the meeting broke up in mutual recriminations about Mbandzeni's 
request for British protection,and the grazier's rumoured inten­
tion to invade on April 5th. Tosen's parting shot was that,
"If you call in a Government your time is up", and with that he 
stalked off (13).
The Republican government, at Britain's insistence, put a stop 
to the grazier threats, and by the end of the year the agitation 
had died down (14). However, a further, and in the long run a 
far more damaging,source of opposition to Shepstone were sections 
of the English-speaking concessionaires themselves. Until 
Shepstone's arrival several of these had enjoyed the confidence 
of the King, and they inevitably resented being relegated to a 
secondary role. Shepstone tried to neutralise their hostility, 
and to legitimise his power,by setting up a White Government 
Committee shortly after he arrived. While Shepstone retained 
control over the revenues arising from concessions, as well as 
all business transacted between whites and the King, this was to
(13) Mathers, South Africa, 227-30. An almost identical report 
is also reproduced in P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 58-61, Encl. 2 in 
No. 39, Natal Witness, 11 May 1887; P.P. 1890, C. 6200, 
encl. in Encl. 2, Report of C.J., F.Y. and J.F. Joubert,
May 1887.
(14) Below, 421.
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take charge of the organisation of a police force and the courts 
and the collection of non-concession revenues like licences and 
dues (15). For a brief while Shepstone's plan seemed to be work­
ing. Concessionaires like Rathbone, who had previously had the 
ear of the King, judged it wiser to hitch themselves to Shepstone’s 
obviously rising star, while for the bulk of the English community 
the memory of the recent filibustering scare was still too fresh 
to permit in-fighting among., t hems elves . This honeymoon period 
was nevertheless soon passed. Other concessionaires like Thorburn 
never reconciled themselves to Shepstone’s rise, and they held 
a major asset in Thorburn’s Mbekelweni liquor canteen. Miller 
points rather flippantly to the significance of his, when he 
notes that the prime determinant of his initial allegiances was 
the availability of ice-cold lager at Thorburn’s rather than 
Shepstone’s after a hot day’s trudge to Mbekelweni, but this 
devalues what is in fact a more significant point (16). Thorburn’s 
canteen offered a natural meeting place for malcontents, and 
could be used to corrupt and suborn Mbandzeni’s leading men (17). 
Soon it was the nucleus of steadily growing opposition to Shepstone. 
Even then Shepstone might have been able to isolate it had he not 
been so obviously corrupt himself. "We all knew Shepstone was 
an adventurer," Forbes writes, "to a greater extent I mean, than 
we were", and Shepstone became an obvious target for resentment 
when he refused concessions to others at the same time as he
(15) Mathers, South Africa, 245; P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 68-71, Encl.
3 in N o . 39, Natal Mercury, 25 May 1887.
(16) M.P. 1.08.1, MS 602, 'Incidents in the early history of
Swazieland’, by A.M. Miller, 5.
(17) See for example, The Net, 11 Sept. 1887, Letter from
Bishop Mackenzie, May 1887.
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acquired many for himself, and in the name of his friends (18).
Allister Miller, who was subsequently secretary to the White
Committee, conveys the growing fractiousness of the times in an
unpublished manuscript on the early history of Swaziland;
There was something very exhilarating in
the atmosphere at the Embekelweni in those days.
Native and European alike were divided into 
three camps - Shepstonites, Thorburnites and 
spies... Suppose you were visiting the Embekel- 
weni and you wrote first to Mr. Shepstone, then 
you were a Shepstonite, but if you went to 
Mr. Thorburn's you were a Thorburnite. If on the 
other hand you went to Mr. Thorburns and after 
staying there [a] \ hour or so went down to say 
good-bye to Mr. Shepstone....you were a spy. (19)
As Miller points out, it was not just the concessionaires who 
polarised into factions on this issue, but Swazi notables as 
well. In part this was because individual councillors became 
agents for individual concessionaires in the scramble for con­
cessions, but other factors entered into it as well (20). It 
did not take long, for instance, for Mbandzeni to realise that 
his revenues were being systematically milked by Shepstone for 
his own private use. Up to a point this was permissible, as 
specific provision had been made in a separate agreement for Offy 
to receive one half of the concession revenues in payment for 
his services, but the indications are that Offy did not stop
(18) Forbes, Life, 119; T.S.C., Case 30, File "G", Declaration 
Charles Garden, 2 Feb. 1887; ibid, Case .20, File "Offy SM,
Offy to Helen, 13 Jan. 1889; Sw.A., Folder No. 5 (from Lesotho), 
No. 100, Knutsford to Robinson, 31 July 1888, encl. Adcock 
to C.O., 19 May 1888; T.S.C., Case 31, File "Offy S", Offy to 
A. Henderson, 29 June 1890.
(19) M.P. 1.08.1, MS 602, Miller, ’Incidents', 5.
(20) Forbes, Life, 106-7; A. Davis, Umbandine. A Romance in 
Swaziland, (London 1898), 131-2, 138-142, 147-9, 154-6.
394
there (21). According to David Forbes, Mbandzeni's annual revenue 
from concession rentals and transfers should have been something 
like £15 000, and it is clear that Mbandzeni saw only a tiny 
fraction of that (22) . Forbes was of course a hostile witness, 
because of the way his uncle had been ousted from the confidence 
of the King, and it can be argued in Shepstone's defence that the 
revenues for mineral and monopoly concessions could not have 
reached anywhere near that inflated figure in the first months 
that he held in office, and that he was probably not receiving 
all the rentals from winter graziers, who did not recognise his 
position until the middle of 1888 (23). Nevertheless it is 
hardly credible that the £150 Mbandzeni is supposed to have 
received from Shepstone in the first six months of 1888 represen­
ted a half of the revenue collected, or that the sum which he 
claimed to have set aside for himself during the same period 
was as little as £420 (24). Again, Shepstone's own financial 
circumstances in this period make his enemies1 accusations ring 
all the more true. In November 1887 Offy's creditors were 
virtually hammering on his wife's door in Pietermaritzburg, and 
she was writing frantic letters to Offy's associates to lend her 
£500 to stop her furniture being sequestered (25) . Small wonder 
then that Mbandzeni saw so little of his revenues being transmitted 
into his hands.
(21) G.H.N., Vol. 688, 132-3, Conf. Robinson to Havelock, 29 June
1888, Encl. Capt. Ewing to Capt. Bower, 19 June 1888.
(22) Forbes, Life, 118.
(23) G.H.N., Vol. 857, No. G. 239, Umbandine to Havelock, 6 July 
1888, encl. Komatie Observer, 11 July 1888,5.
(24) G.H.N., Vol. 688, 132-3, Conf. Robinson to Havelock, 29 June
1888, Encl. Ewing to Bower, 19 June 1888; Sw.A., Folder No.
I (from Lesotho), R.C. Williams to Robinson, 23 Oct. 1888, 
Encl. Ewing to Williams (extract n.d.).
(25) T.S.C., Case 31, File "S", Helen Shepstone to Alfred 
Henderson, 7 Nov. 1887.
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With ammunition of this sort, it was not difficult for Shepstone's 
enemies to discredit him with the King, and this was further 
facilitated by suspicions that came to be felt about Offy's 
relations with the S.A.R. The first hint of anything improper 
came to light in July 1887, when Offy secured a railway concession 
over Swaziland for agents acting on behalf of the S.A.R. (26).
Once this became public knowledge it gave rise to widespread 
speculation that Offy was acting in collusion with the S.A.R.-, 
and this was further fuelled by a visit Shepstone made to Pretoria 
in November 1887 (27). Shepstone had in fact been commissioned 
by Mbandzeni to lay before Kruger a series of complaints about 
the flight of Matsafeni Mdluli from Hhohho with the king's cattle; 
Portuguese encroachments on the Lebombo; grazier threats of 
invasion; and the Republic's taxing of Swazi subjects on the 
northern and southern borders, and this he did with a considerable 
degree of success. Kruger was conciliatory on all points, and 
promised that the ring-leaders of the grazier agitation would 
be summoned to Pretoria for a warning, and would be punished if 
they continued upsetting the peace (28). In a sense, however, 
Shepstone had been almost too successful. There must be some 
secret agreement with the S.A.R., his detractors urged, for him
(26) G.H.N., Vol. 615, No. 8, Encl. Railway Concession granted 
by Umbandine, 20 July 1887, transferred 23 Aug. 1887.
(27) Barberton Herald, 7 Feb. 1888; Sw.A., Folder 5 (from Lesotho),
F. Adcock to Robinson, 14 Feb. 1887; G.H.N., Vol. 688,
136-7, Robinson to Havelock,. 29 June 1888, Encl. Ewing to 
Bower, 19 June 1888.
(28) C.O. 417/17, No. 472, High Comm, to Sec. State, 19 Dec. 1887, 
encl. extract Cape Argus, 14 Dec. 1887; S.S. 1953, R 5358/87, 
118-213, minutes of meeting Exec. Co. with Shepstone, 18 Nov. 
1887; ibid, 216-250, minutes of meeting between State 
President and Shepstone, 18 Nov. 1887.
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to secure concessions of this kind, and speculation continued 
unabated throughout the following months.
What was the truth behind all these allegations? In one sense 
at least they seem to have had some substance. A railway con­
cession was largely worthless unless the owner could exercise 
some physical control over the area traversed, and Offy must 
have realised this before he secured it from Mbandzeni for the 
S.A.R. (29). But this is not in itself to say that Offy had 
become a tool of the S.A.R. The S.A.R. did, it is true, make 
overtures for his services, but it was by no means clear at that 
stage what Swaziland’s ultimate fate would be (30). Offy’s 
policy, therefore, seems to have been one of keeping a foot in 
both camps. He would store up credit with the S.A.R. through such 
things as the railway and similar concessions, but he would not 
compromise himself by becoming entirely their creature. Indeed 
it might be argued in some respects it benefitted Swaziland, since 
he could use this limited credit to secure concessions on other 
issues. Speculating still more rashly, it is possible the Swazi 
saw this as well. Certainly, they do not seem to have been very 
responsive to attempts to blacken Shepstone’s name on that count.
(29) See for example S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the 
Western Sudan: A Study in French Military Imperialism,
(Cambridge 1969), 61-72.
(30) Miller, for example,found documents in Shepstone's safe after 
he took control of the official papers, which showed that 
approaches had been made to him in September 1887 by the 
Landdrost of Barberton, and by J.A. Keiser, who, interest­
ingly enough, was one of the purchasers of the railway 
concession - G.H.N., Vol. 616, 21, No. 19, Encl. J.A. Keiser 
to Shepstone, 10 Sept. 1887, 22, Encl. J.Z. de Villiers to 
Shepstone, 6 Sept. 1887.
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Rather, what they were concerned with was Shepstone’s misappropria­
tion of revenue, and it was this, together with his failure over 
the Portuguese boundary delimitation, which finally precipitated 
his fall.
Concern had been growing about the Portuguese since the end of 
1885. Towards the end of the year rumours had been rife that the 
Portuguese had granted land to about two hundred Boers, just to 
the east of the Lebombo, and this was raised at an interview with 
Kruger in March of the next year (31). That particular project 
fell away, but on April 14th a deputation from Louren9o Marques 
arrived at the Swazi capital on a not unrelated quest. The rival 
accounts of this visit are completely at odds. In the Portuguese 
version their delegation asked for a concession of coal rights 
on the west of the Lebombo, and explained that there was never 
an intention to sell any territory to the Boers. The territory
east of the Lebombo was, however, a Portuguese possession with 
which they would do whatever they liked. To all this Mbandzeni 
allegedly acceded, even though he refused the presents proffered 
by the Portuguese, and he concluded by asking them to drive 
away the white community living on the Lebombo who had been 
molesting his subjects. The following month, still according 
to the Portuguese account,a Swazi delegation visited Lourenjo
(31) G.H.Z., Vol. 695, Cardew (Acting sub-Commissioner, Nqutu)
to Gov. Natal, 10 Nov. 1888, encl. Jackson to Cardew 29 Oct. 
1885, 69-70; ibid, 697, No. ZA, 130, C. Evans to Gov. Natal, 
26 April 1888; P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 25, Encl. in encl. 2 in 
No. 14, minutes of meeting between Swazi messengers and 
Kruger, 20 March 1888.
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Marques,confirming to the Governor that this was what had . 
transpired, and accepting various gifts for the King (32). The 
Swazi account tallies with the Portuguese only in regard to the 
concessions and the gifts, and thereafter tells a quite 
different tale. The Swazi had not recognised or been asked about 
any border on the Lebombo, and had merely protested about the 
sale of land to the Boers,with whose proceeds they alleged the . 
gifts had been bought. Thereafter, in a visit of Swazi represen­
tatives to the fort at Louren^o Marques, the Portuguese had 
recognised Swazi suzerainty as far as the Tembe, in accordance 
with their normal practice in the past (33).
It appears from all this that both sides were blurring the issue 
in anticipation of pursuing their claims at some future date, and 
nothing more happened after that, until May the next year, when the 
Portuguese evidently advertised farms on the top of the Lebombo.
The Swazi protested about this to the Governor of Lourenjo Marques 
and to Natal, and when a new Portuguese delegation was on the 
point of arriving they appealed for a Joint Commission on the
(32) C.O. 879/29, Africa 359, Evidence to the Portuguese Swazi 
Boundary Commission, Minutes of 2nd meeting, 4 June 1888, 
evidence of J.J. Monteiro Liborio; Minutes of 11th meeting,
21 June 1888, evidence of J. Appolonio Carvalho; ibid, 
document No. Ill, extract despatch No. 64, 1886, Gov. L.M. 
to Secretary Gen. Mozambique.
(33) Ibid, 5th meeting, 8 June 1888, evidence of E.C. du Pont, 
Ugwababa, Uhofusa; 9th meeting, 18 June 1888, John Gama; 
document No. XII, statement of Umbandeni, 18 June 1888; U.W.A. 
A 74, Machado Papers, Transcript of interview between Swazi 
king and Col. Machado, attributed to c.1880, but in fact 
September 1887; P.P. 1887, C. 4913, 70, encl. in encl. in
No. 44, message of Umbandine to Gov. Natal, 29 April 1886.
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boundary, including representatives from Britain and the S.A.R. (34). 
The Swazi evidently felt they had a fairly strong case, as 
indeed they had when one looks at the evidence they led (35).
However, in the subsequent Boundary Commission which convened in 
the middle of the next year, it was decided that the ’raids' of 
1860 did not amount to a conquest, and that their settlement was 
too recent for the Swazi to have a claim. What was more, the 
Commissioners concluded, with Shepstone dissenting, the treaties 
of 1846 and 1875 between the S.A.R. and the Swazi, together with 
the treaties between the Portuguese and the Republic in 1869 and 
1875 (in neither of which were the Swazi represented), defined 
the eastern border of Swaziland as the summit of the Lebombo, 
and that was to be the basis of their award (36).
The decision of the Boundary Commission put an end to Shepstone's 
first period of personal ascendancy in Swaziland. Although the 
Commissioners' decision was not communicated to Mbandzeni until 
October of that year, he sensed at its sittings that it would go 
Portugual's way, and this proved utterly fatal to Shepstone's
(34) CO.O 879/29, Africa No. 354, Evidence to Portuguese Swazi 
Boundary Commission, Document No. V, T. Shepstone to Lieut­
enant Gov. Lourenpo Marques, 25 May 1887, and encl. L. de 
Bois, Offy Shepstone, 22 May 1887; Sw.A., Folder No. 5 (from 
Lesotho), No. 175, Holland to Robinson, 11 Oct. 1887, encl. 
in encl. translation Diary do Governo, 20 Sept. 1887, Royal 
decree; G.H.N., Vol. 688, 33~4, Robinson to Havelock, 19 Aug. 
1887, Offy to S.N.A., 30 Sept. 1887; ibid, 829, Desp. No. 40, 
Drummond V/C Lourenpo Marques to Havelock, 26 Oct. 1887.
(35) C.O. 879/29, Boundary Commission. The Portuguese delegate to 
the Commission also thought so when he initially rested his 
case on the treaties with the Republic, and Britain's sub­
sequent ratification in 1882, rather than on the evidence of 
occupation - ibid, Minutes of 12th meeting, 23 June 1888. 
Finally, Offy also thought he would get the S.A.R.'s support - 
T.S.C., Case 20, "Offy S", Offy to Sir Theophilus, 10 Oct. 1887.
(36) C.O. 879/29, Africa No. 359, Minutes of 13th and 14th meetings, 
27-28 June 1888.
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political credibility (37) . Not only had he failed to keep 
control of Swaziland’s turbulent white population and pocketed 
most of the King’s revenues, but now he and his family had 
proved incapable of combating the feeblest imperialism of them 
all. Shepstone’s detractors were not slow in seizing on these 
shortcomings and demanding a redistribution of political power, 
but even then it was not easy to prod Mbandzeni into action. In 
the short space that Shepstone had held office in Swaziland his 
influence on royal authority had come close to realising 
Mbandzeni’s worst fears. Already a faction had emerged which 
grouped itself around his leadership, and this may have even 
included members of the regiments who despised Mbandzeni's rule (38). 
Much as Mbandzeni might have wanted to rid himself of Shepstone, 
therefore, he was even more afraid cf the internal repercussions 
that this might provoke. Externally, too, he was in a sense the 
prisoner of his advisors. The Shepstone family might have proved 
incapable of resisting Portuguese expansion, but it was still a 
force to be reckoned with in the politics of Natal. However 
inadequate they might have proved diplomatically, therefore, 
their enmity might leave Swaziland in a position which was even 
more exposed.
Plagued by these worries, Mbandzeni moved against Shepstone only 
slowly and reluctantly, and it was not until Shepstone had 
refused repeated requests to explain his financial management,
(37) Sw.A., Folder No. 5 (from Lesotho), No. 100, Knutsford to 
Robinson, Encl. Adcock to C.O., 16 June 1888. Mbandzeni 
was apparently also angered at Shepstone’s resistance to 
Thorburn’s banking concession. P.P. 1890, C. 6200, 148-9, 
encl. in Encl. in No. 90, Memo, by Sir T. Shepstone, 1889; 
U.W.A., A. 82, B. Nicholson’s Papers, W.C. Penfold, 'The 
Romance of Swaziland’, Mss of Article for the Star, 4-5.
(38) G.H.N., Vol.688, 134,Robinson to Havelock, 29 June 1888, encl. 
Ewing to Bower, 19 June 1888; above,note 37; below, 414.
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and to allow Mbandzeni and the White Committee to examine the 
concession records, that Mbandzeni despatched a document which 
formally restricted Shepstone's powers (39). Even then it was 
a question of them being restricted rather than annulled. 
Shepstone retained his position as Resident Advisor, as well as 
many of his political powers, and he was even able to renegotiate 
the terms of his remuneration. In this he showed his customary 
guile and finesse. Not only was he provided with an annual 
salary of £600, but he was also able to persuade the King to 
grant him transfer dues payable to the Crown. "Of course they are 
muffs," Shepstone noted, after this had been agreed, "as the 
revenue from duties will be very considerable shortly as several 
large companies will soon be out ... By this too I get £3 000 
Cobolondo money... " (40).
The Portuguese Boundary Commission and the ensuing palace 
revolution ushered in the final phase of the concession conquest 
of Swaziland. According to Miller, the ease with which Swaziland 
had been divested of its eastern borderlands left Mbandzeni 
mentally and spiritually crushed, and this in turn seems to have 
reacted adversely on his already precarious health (41) . It is 
from this point on that one can date Swaziland's final descent 
into anarchy, with the political health of the nation closely 
mirroring the physical health of the King. Feeling his own life
(39) G.H.N., Vol. 857, No. G, 239, Umbandine to Havelock, 6 July 
1888, encl. Komatie Observer, 11 July 1888, 5. The concession 
documents etc. were not m  fact handed over until February 
the next year - M.P. Diary of A.M. Miller, Dec. 1887-April 
1894, T/S, 11-14, 13-15 February 1888.
(40) T.S.C., Case 23, Swaziland Diary, 7-8 August 1888.
(41) Miller, Swaziland, 30; T.S.C., Case 23, Swaziland Diary,
11-12 Jan. 1889.
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ebbing away from him, and his country slipping out of control, 
Mbandzeni seems quite simply to have given up. "Why should I not . 
eat before I die", became his motto, and with that the con­
cessionaire conquest slid completely out of control (42).
By weakly surrendering the initiative in this way, Mbandzeni must
bear some of the responsibility for his country's subsequent fate,
but as much, if not more, rests with the squalid intrigues of
those whites who posed as the King's advisors and friends. In
this respect the transition from the personal rule of Shepstone
to the collective rule of the Committee assumes critical
importance, for the effect of this as Ralph Williams, the British
Resident in Pretoria, noted was that, "Instead of being plundered
by one ^Swaziland was7 now the prey of many." (43) With no
single person in authority to regulate the rush, concessionaires
literally scrambled over one another to grab whatever they could.
There were dozens of men walking about the 
king's kraal, with concession papers .... in 
their pocket ready to be put before the king 
to be signed... We all walked round the kraal, 
or sat in the shade of a tree, to all outward 
appearance for no other reason than for the 
sake of our health. Only with our friends did 
we discuss concession Zsic7 in case other people 
might be after the same piece of land. We were 
keeping our eyes open for our respective agent, 
or special chief. He would at long last show 
himself and make a sign, as obscure as possible 
from the vision of the other white men. We 
strolled around as unconcerned as possible in 
the direction he had indicated, and there meet 
your chief ZsicJ, who would tell you he had 
spoken to the king... (44)
Mbandzeni's deteriorating health merely accelerated these
(42) Miller, Swaziland, 20.
(43) Sw.A., Folder No. I, R.C. Williams to Robinson, 4 Oct. 
1888 (Confidential).
(44) Forbes, Life, 106-7.
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developments. By early 1889 it was clear that Mbandzeni had not 
much longer to live, and the concessionaires entered into a final 
frantic scramble to secure what resources were left (45) . At 
the head of the pack was the White Governing Committee. Sensing 
a growing reaction against them among the ordinary Swazi, they 
realised that their authority could not possibly survive the 
King's death, and with their help concessions of every conceivable 
description were wheedled out of the King, and the economic 
assets of the kingdom progressively stripped.
This rapid descent into anarchy is most graphically represented 
by an analysis of the volume and type of concessions granted . 
during this period, and by the way in which they were secured 
from the king (see Appendix). Already by 1886 most of the 
available winter pasturage in Swaziland had been parcelled out, 
and by the end of 1887 the same had happened to Swaziland's 
imagined mineral wealth as well (46). While alienating much of 
Swaziland's economic wealth, however, these did not necessarily 
in themselves jeopardise Swaziland's political independence. The 
grazing leases were for limited periods of time, and like the 
mineral concessions had saving clauses about rights of Swazi 
occupation being preserved. The same is not true of the monopoly 
concessions which make their appearance in significant numbers 
in the middle of 1888, after the sitting of the Portuguese .
(45) T.S.C., Case 23, Swaziland Diary, 11-13 Jan. 1888.
(46) P.P. 1889, C. 6201, 59-65, Appendix K, Registration of 
Concessions, 71-73, Appendix K2, Concessions. The first of 
these tables is reproduced in the Appendix.
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Boundary Commission and the elevation of the White Committee to 
its new powers. Ranging from exclusive control over pawn-broking 
and patent medicines, to sole rights over the King’s revenue, 
these made effective government of Swaziland progressively less 
possible, and reduced Swazi independence to a hollow, empty shell. 
The most pernicious of all these from the Swazi point of view 
were the revenue concessions,which granted away the King’s 
revenue; the customs concession, which did the same for customs 
dues; and the unalloted lands concession, which ceded ownership 
over all unalloted lands south of the Komati River, and those that 
fell vacant once earlier leases had lapsed. These were doubly 
subversive of Swazi independence because they had been secured 
on behalf of the S.A.R. (47). Backed by loans from Eckstein and 
Porges, the Kimberley and Rand mining capitalists, the S.A.R. 
ploughed upwards of £50 000 into the acquisition of these rights 
in the hope of presenting the British Government with a fait 
accompli, and so gaining a vital link in their road to the sea (48). 
What Eckstein and Porges hoped to gain out of this is unclear.
In Swaziland the rumour was that they meant to emulate Rudd’s 
and Rhodes’s activities in the north, but it is just as likely 
that they were seeking to ingratiate themselves with the S.A.R. 
for more limited ends (49). The objectives of the third party
(47) P.P. 1890, C. 6201, 14, Report on Swazieland, by Sir F. de 
Winton, Feb. 1890.
(48) P.R. Botha, Die Staatskundige Ontwikkeling van die Suid- 
Afrikaanse Republiek onder Kruger en Leyds, Transvaal 1844- 
1889, (Amsterdam 1926), 344; J.B. Taylor, A Pioneer Looks 
Back, (London 1939), 67, 143.
(49) M.P. 1.08.1, MS 577a, ’Swazieland in the 80s', by A. Miller,
6-7. Like the governmant’s support in their mining ventures
in the Republic. This would presumably include labour supplies, 
although it is unlikely that it was specifically Swaziland 
labour that they were concerned with in this transaction.
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to these transactions are considerably more clear. Endowed with 
few scruples at the best of times, the White Committee found 
the sort of money on offer from the S.A.R. too much to resist. 
Ewing for instance, who was for a time the chairman of the 
Committee, is alleged to have got some thousands of pounds for his 
part in securing the revenue concession, while Thorburn and 
others obtained similar sums for acquiring customs and other 
concessions on behalf of the S.A.R. (50). The White Committee 
officially deprecated these moves. In June 1889, for instance, 
the Committee condemed the "unofficial advisors" who had induced 
Mbandzeni to sign a customs and revenue concession, but this, 
in fact, seems to have been as much out of pique at being left 
out of a deal, which was both lucrative and cut away the basis 
of the Committee’s own financial position, as out of any 
principled stand (51). Miller and Thorburn for instance had 
already been to Pretoria in 1889 with the object of selling 
similar concessions to the S.A.R., and a few months later Miller 
himself was instrumental in obtaining the unalloted lands 
concession for the same power (52). According to Miller’s 
subsequent testimony to the Swaziland Concessions Commission, he 
was not acting consciously on this occasion as an agent for the 
S.A.R., but on his own evidence to the same tribunal he stands 
condemned when he admits having received a third share of its
(50) M.P. 6942, Letter Book ’B' of Forbes Reef Gold Mining Co., 
179, F.B. Doering to F.N. Faviell, 24 June 1889.
(51) Sw.A., Folder No. 2 (from Lesotho), Mitchell to Smyth,
27 July 1889, Encl. Swaziland Government Committee, copy of 
resolution n.d.
(52) Sw.A., Folder No. 2 (from Lesotho), Conf. R.W. Williams to 
Robinson, 8 Feb. 1889; M.P., Diary of A. Miller, 10-11,
12-13 Feb. 1889.
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proceeds a mere two months later for the services he had 
rendered (53).
The plundering of Swaziland's economic resources had a more 
generally subversive effect on Swazi society than a narrow 
economic analysis suggests. Just as the penetration of mercantile 
capital not only bled but disrupted other parts of the continent, 
so too in Swaziland it had a politically corrosive effect (54) .
In the late 1850s and 1860s, the Swazi had partly evaded these 
pressures by redirecting them outside, and had spread impoverish­
ment and destruction into the lowveld and to the north. The 
changing pattern of the 1880s foreclosed on this option. The 
S.A.R., after retrocession, was a far more formidable force, 
now that its administration had been restructured by a major 
imperial power, and its economy was revolutionised by the discovery 
of gold, and it was able to impose itself more effectively on 
the region as a whole (55) .
As a result, rather than mediating mercantile and colonial 
pressures, Swaziland found itself more and more the object of 
their attentions, with all the disruption that entailed for its 
society as a whole. As the rush for concessions accelerated, in
(53) M.P. 1.08.23, MS 549(b), 'Report of the Swazieland Concessions 
Commission', 22 May 1908, para. 37.
(54) S. Amin, 'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa - 
Origins and Contemporary Forms', Journal of Modern African 
Studies, X, No.4, (1972), 511-16; W.G. Clarence-Smith and 
R. Moorsom, 'Underdevelopment and Class Formation in 
Ovamboland, 1845-1915', Journal of African History, 16, (1975), 
365-381; C. Meillassaux (ed), The Development of Indigenous 
Trade and Markets in West Africa, (Oxford, 1971) , 50-59; For a 
more general discussion see G. Kay, Development and Under­
development: A Marxist Analysis (London, 1975), 96-124.
(55) Arndt, Banking, 100-119; M.H. De Kock, Selected Subjects in 
the Economic History of South Africa, (Cape Town/Johannesburg, 
1924), 113-116.
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step with the quickening economic tempo of the Rand, leading 
aristocrats were sucked into an endless round of competition for 
the emphemeral resources offered in return. As part of this 
process, individual aristocrats became associated increasingly 
with individual concessionaires, and less wittingly with the 
governments and syndicates for whom they often held briefs, until 
it became an index of power who could secure what concession for 
whom. While this became one basis for division, the aristocracy 
also fractured along entirely different lines, as a reaction set 
in, among those who were rooted in an earlier economic order, 
against dealing ,in concessions at all.
The tensions associated with these divisions coalesced in a spate 
of political killings in late 1888 and 1889. Carried out under 
the guise of rooting out those responsible for Mbandzenifs 
deteriorating health, they reached such proportions by August 
1889, that Shepstone was able to assert, no doubt with considerable 
exaggeration, that the whole of Hhohho was depopulated through 
people fleeing from the raids (56). The most significant episode 
took place in November 1888, when Sandlane Zwane and a number of 
other leading councillors were executed for conspiring to over­
throw the King. The plot, according to Sandlane’s accusers, was 
that, together with Nkopolo, a senior son of Mswati, he intended 
to assassinate Mbandzeni and seize control of his heir, after 
which they would establish a regency under their joint personal
(56) G.H.Z., Vol. 725, No. 2, 835, Bower to Herbert, 3 Oct. 1889, 
Encl. Shepstone, 16 Aug. 1889, in encl. memo by Offy.
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control (57). The truth of these allegations is, as usual, 
impossible to judge. According to Miller, who had an interest 
in blackening Sandlane's name, because of his own close associa­
tion with his chief rival Tikhuba, Sandlane had approached the 
senior councillors Mvelaphasi and Logcogco to broach an iNcwala- 
time coup d'etat (58) . Now the notion of an assassination attempt 
during the iNcwala celebrations is inherently implausible. For 
one thing, it is the most sacred event in the Swazi political 
calendar, during which the nation is explicitly equated with the 
king, and most Swazi would surely have recoiled from such a grossly 
sacrilegious act* For another, it attracted a huge concourse 
of people, which would have been thrown into turmoil of, quite 
possibly, bloody proportions. Against this it might be argued 
that the iNcwala was the only occasion when enough warriors 
were assembled to offset the preponderance of the royal regiments 
at the capital. But, in the end, it is more likely that the 
idea of an iNcwala -time plot got around because at the iNcwala 
ceremonies the previous year Nkopolo had been involved in a 
disturbance, from which he had had to be rescued by Sandlanefs 
men, and which he was allegedly still burning to avenge (59).
There was no necessary connection between this and a plot against 
the King, yet it may provide a clue to the subsequent killings,
(57) S.N. 15, S R 22/89, Interview Umjobela, Umbozia, 7 Jan. 1889; 
P.P. 1890, C. 6200, 104-5, encl. in encl. in Encl. in No. 64, 
Umbandine to Havelock, 11 Dec. 1888. A further reason for 
the execution, according to Mbandzeni, was because of Sand­
lane’s adultery with one of Mswati's wives - P.P. 1890,
C. 6201, 9, encl. in No. 3, Report on Swazieland by F . de 
Winton,Feb. 1890.
(58) M.P. 1.08.1., MS 602, Miller, 'Incidents', 12-13.
(59) M.P. 1.05, MS 154, Miller's Diary for part of 1888, Dec. 10, 
cutting from Gold Fields Times, 14 Dec. 1888.
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since it pinpoints an aspect of Nkopolo’s character which was a 
source of concern to black and white concession hunter alike.
By common consent Nkopolo was the most turbulent of Mbandzeni's 
brothers. In part this persona was structurally pre-determined, 
insofar as his status as the first son of Mswati’s sisulamisiti 
wife gave him an inviolability not accorded to any of the other 
King’s sons. Even so, Nkopolo seems to have had a character to 
match; he was openly impatient with Mbandzeni’s flabby political 
leadership, and condemned the influx of whites that this had 
allowed. Of course, the more these views were aired, the more 
he became an object of suspicion to all those involved in the 
acquisition of concessions, and was gradually elevated in their 
minds to the leadership of a party of reaction, comprising the 
younger ’hotheads' in the regiments who resented the way their 
country was being overrun by whites (60). It would be interesting 
to know how much substance there was to these accusations, for 
if there was any at all, there might be evidence here of a non- 
aristocratic reaction being articulated through the regiments, 
which had previously been one of the main instruments for 
legitimising Dlamini rule, and which may now have been becoming 
increasingly restless through the cessation of raiding and the 
loss of spoils to offset surplus extracted by the dominant class. 
In any case, from the point of view of Nkopolo's ultimate fate, 
all this was probably immaterial, since both parties to the 
concessions seem to have felt a sufficient sense of guilt to
(60) Ibid; ibid, 1.08.1., MS 602, Miller, 'Incidents’, 12-13;
Sw.A., J 50/03, D. Forbes to Res. Commissioner, 21 Jan. 1901;
Davis, Umbandine, 156-9.
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assume a reaction of this kind. Mbandzeni's poor state of health, 
and the attendant political uncertainty, merely heightened these 
anxieties, and it only needed the circumstantial detail of the 
iNcwala episode to transform it into a fully fledged plot.
Once Nkopolo had been branded in this way, Sandlane could not 
escape being tainted by association. Sandlane's daughter was 
Nkopolofs chief wife, and Nkopolo was permanently domiciled at 
Sandlane’s village Ludzidzini (61). Like Nkopolo moreover, he 
was credited with being more hostile to the flood of concessionaires 
than any other leading councillor. Although he continued to sign 
the concession documents as the chief councillor of the realm, 
he invariably did so after they had been granted at Mbekelweni, 
and so remained uninvolved in the squalid scramble for preferment 
round the King (62) . By the very fact of remaining aloof, 
however, Sandlane became an object of resentment. To councillors 
like Tikhuba, who were fighting for precedence at Mbekelweni, 
he represented an obstacle to their ambitions, as well as a 
living rebuke. While to Mbandzeni, who was constantly having to 
defer to his superior judgement, he was the embodiment of all the 
slights he had suffered in his reign. The Nkopolo plot, there­
fore, offered the perfect pretext for his removal: to Tikhuba 
and his associates, one that was perhaps cynically constructed 
in anticipation of Mbandzeni’s early demise; to Mbandzeni, one that 
enabled him to reconcile his basically amiable and tolerant
(61) Forbes, Life, 91; M.P. 1.08.1, MS 602, 'Incidents', 12-13.
(62) Davis, Umbandine, 148.
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nature with a sense of grievance that had developed over the 
years. Thus, while Nkopolo escaped on horseback to the S.A.R., 
Sandlane was taken out from his homestead on 10th October and 
clubbed to death (63).
The other group of councillors who lost their lives at this time 
did so for separate, although not entirely unrelated, reasons.
In contrast with Sandlane, Kwababa, Bulana and Juako •were in 
the thick of the concession hunt at Mbekelweni, and it was the 
heightened factionalism which this bred that helped hasten their 
deaths. According to David Forbes, Kwababa and Bulana were 
Tikhuba’s chief rivals, and he took the opportunity of the Nkopolo 
’conspiracy' to despatch them as well (64). Such rivalries were 
closely tied up with their alignments with concessionaires. After 
the death of Sandlane, Tikhuba threw in his lot unreservedly 
with the group of Miller and Thornburn, and Miller was appointed 
as the King’s secretary early the following year. Shepstone, by 
contrast, found himself further out in the cold. He was relieved 
of his duties as secretary to the King, and was complaining soon 
after that no headmen were left at the capital with whom one 
could deal (65). What he meant, of course, was that there were 
no headmen at the capital with whom he could speak, the most 
prominent members of his faction being either silenced or dead.
(63).Others executed because of their connection with Sandlane 
were his brothers Makabene and Mtambo, together with Mzwele 
and Nomadabo - P.P. 1889, C. 6200, 230, Encl. in encl. in 
No. 151, Annexure X, extract Smit’s Report; G.H.Z., Vol. 725, 
No. 2, 835, Bower to Herbert, 3 Oct. 1889, encl. in encl.
Memo by Offy Shepstone, 16 Aug. 1889.
(64) Forbes, Life, 93.
(65) P.P. 1890, C. 6200, 143-4, encl. in Encl. I in No . 86, 
interview Umbandeni and J. Gama, n.d.; T.S.C. Case 23, 
Swaziland Diary, 10 Jan. 1889.
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As the flood of concessionaires grew to still more outrageous 
proportions under the stewardship of Miller and Thornbum, with 
rights to lobola and hut tax even being granted away, Shepstone 
was able to stage a partial recovery by posing as the champion 
of Swazi liberties and rights. Assisting him now was Mbandzeni's 
deteriorating health. As the year wore on, few believed that 
Mbandzeni could have much longer to live, and many officials at 
the capital started hedging their bets in anticipation of a 
back-lash against the excesses of the Miller/Thomburn regime, 
which might sweep a rehabilitated Shepstone back into power (66).
As early as mid-January 1889, Shepstone was reporting that 
revulsion was setting in over the death of Sandlane, and shortly 
afterwards Mjubeka, who was a councillor hostile to Shepstone 
and who was apparently tied up in Sandlanefs death, was somehow 
’accidently1 killed (67).
Nevertheless, for the time being, such opposition as there was 
could not come out in the open, and either stayed passively on 
the sidelines, or removed itself entirely from the scene. Faced 
with the self-serving servants of the calibre of Miller and 
Tikhuba, and sullen non-cooperation of those outside of that 
group, Mbandzeni began to doubt the good faith of everyone he 
met (68). In the middle of February Miller returned to Swaziland
(66) Thus Miller was writing to Rathbone in April expressing his 
unease about Offy, but saying they were safe as long as the 
king stayed alive - Sw.A., Folder No. 2 (from Lesotho), 
Havelock to High Commissioner, 14 May 1889, encl. in encl.
I, Miller to Rathbone, 29 April 1889.
(67) T.S.C., Case 23, Swaziland Diary, 11, 13 January 1889. Mjubeka 
was also a close associate of David Forbes, although Forbes 
attributes his death to Mjubeka's misappropriation of cattle - 
Forbes, Life, 120-123.
(68) F.C., Vol. 8 (1889-1895 Letters), D. Forbes Jnr. to D. Forbes 
Snr., 3 March 1889.
413
from Pretoria, where he and Thornburn had been peddling a variety 
of concessions, to learn that "Kannemeyer had turned traitor and 
broached the Dutch proposals to the King", and whatever these 
were, they cannot have been anything other than sinister (69).
With confidents and supporters like these, Mbandzeni had little 
need of enemies. Yet there were plenty who were sufficiently 
luke-warm in their support to qualify as such, as can be seen 
two months later when Mbandzeni berated even his councillors for 
being too afraid of Shepstone to open their mouths in his 
presence (70).
As diplomatic pressures built up in May and June of that year, 
these tendencies became all the more pronounced. Factionalism 
intensified, killings grew worse, and Mbekelweni became a place 
that many regional chiefs shunned (71). Increasingly a new party 
began to crystallise around Shepstone. As early as April 1889 
the tindvuna, Kwahlakwahla and Mhlonitwa, had returned from Natal 
with a report that when they arrived in Pietermaritzburg Sir 
Theophilus had sent for the Governor of Natal, and that they had 
both ordered that Offy be re-instated, saying that an English army 
was on its way to take control of the country. This was, as 
Miller noted, "a cock and bull story", but it shows how these two 
figures were slowly gravitating into the pro-Shepstone camp (72) . 
It may also tell us something of the composition of the group.
(69) M.P., Diary A. Miller, 10-11, 12-13 February 1889.
(70) Ibid, 19, 1 April 1889.
(71) G.H.Z., Vol. 725, No. 2, 835, Bower to Herbert, 3 Oct. 1889, 
encl. in encl., 16 Aug. 1889.
(72) Sw.A., Folder No. 2 (from Lesotho), Havelock to High Commiss­
ioner, 14 May 1889, Encl. in Encl. I, Miller to Rathbone,
29 April 1889.
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Kwahlakwahla had for years been Mswati’s representative to Natal, 
and can probably be counted among the elder indvuna of the land, 
and it was among these possibly erstwhile supporters of Sandlane 
that opposition was coalescing to the actions of the King (73).
Other members were Maloyi and Mancibane Dlamini, but most 
important of all was the Queen Mother, Tibati, who began lending 
her support in the middle of the year (74). Early in August 
there were meetings between Shepstone and her council, at which they 
reputedly refused to admit his dismissal from office, and by 
September he was sufficiently buoyed up by these contacts to be 
expecting a ’’hatful of money" relatively soon (75). Offy may 
lastly have been able to count on some regimental support. Ralph 
Williams, the British Agent in Pretoria, reported that several 
of th° regiments were under the influence of Shepstone, and it 
is likely that he enjoyed in particular the Indlavela’s support (76). 
By the time Mbandzeni died at the beginning of October, it all 
added up to an almost impregnable position. It is not surprising 
to find, therefore, that Miller and his companions indulged in 
a last feverish scramble for concessions, only transferring the
(73) T.S.C., Case 23, Swaziland Diary, 21 Oct. 1889.
(74) Ibid, 10 Jan 1889, 21 Oct. 1889. In July Offy told the 
British Commissioner, Martin, that there were /"two or three 
chiefs who would do anything for him but are not now in the 
King’s favour, and that these chiefs are powerful enough to 
take the country any day". Sw.A., Folder No. 2 (from 
Lesotho), Mitchell to Smythe, 27 July 1889, Encl. Martin to 
Smythe, 21 July 1889.
(75) P.P. 1890, C. 6200, 193, Encl. in encl. in No. 132, Martin 
to Smythe, 11 Aug. 1889; T.S.C., Case 31, File "Offy S",
Offy to Barnes, 9 Sept. 1889.
(76) Sw.A., Folder No. 2 (from Lesotho), R.C. Williams to Smythe, 
20 June 1889; T.S.C., Case 23, Swaziland Diary, various dates 
Oct.-Nov. 1889.
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notorius public revenue concession thirty-six hours before his 
death, or that Tikhuba and his followers became increasingly 
regular habitue's of Thornburn's liquor canteen (77).
Offy’s own reactions to the situation were contradictory and
confused. In a letter to his wife in January 1889, he wrote,
I expect a row tomorrow with the Committee 
and am prepared for them to take a very
strong position as I am now /established
in the country, and besides have the S.A.R.
Govt, to fall back upon (failing the British 
Government) in case of necessity.
After complaining about the non-payment of £7 000, and his
determination to get it off the governments if Mbandzeni died,
Offy went on to mention,
Another /Dutchman whc/7 is here in my house 
begging me to side with the S.A.R. Govt, 
and use my influence. I shall be President 
and be paid in cash what the king owes me.
What a fix to be in. For 3 hours we have 
been discussing the thing. As I feel the 
British Govt, will not do anything I am 
tempted to agree to it. But I must see 
tomorrow what line the king adopts and if 
he tries to sell me I'll sell him straight 
out.
The final paragraph indicts him still further. "Cohen has left
here", he wrote,
with the dynamite concession for Pretoria.
He will I fancy get some thousands for it.
I am in several things indirectly with him 
in which I do not appear of course, but
he'll send me a cheque when he succeeds, as
he will do in some of them. Electric and
Telegraphs has gone through /i.e. to the
S.A.R. Government/, and I'll have some money 
on that in a few days and also on the dynamite 
concession. (78)
(77) P.P. 1890, C. 6201, 68-70, Encl. in Encl. in N o . 3, Shepstone 
to de Winton, 3 Dec. 1889; T.S.C., Case 23, Swaziland Diary,
11 Nov. 1889.
(78) T.S.C., Case 20, File "Offy S", Offy to Helen, 13 Jan. 1889.
416
Eight months later, when his position was immeasurably stronger,
Offy was writing in similar vein to his solicitor Barnes,
I ’ll be able to wire you the money in a few 
days so I hope you'll be able to stave it off 
for a bit. As you know from my wife I suppose 
the S.A.R. will pay me the whole amount the 
king owes me (say £ 15,000) [\] and they want 
me to remain. I would not take it yet but 
in a very few days I fancy I shall hear the
B.G. /T.e. the British Government/ mean the 
S.A.R. to have it and I'll accept the money.
I could have got £ 2,000 or £ 3,000 /immediately/ 
but I would not take it then as things stood, 
although God knows I needed it badly enough. (79)
It is clear from all this that Offy was not exactly scrupulous
in his dealings with the Swazi, yet there is another side of
his character which is perhaps hinted at in these passages, and
which emerges more clearly after Mbandzeni's death. Mbandzeni
died on October 6th, and almost immediately Offy was elevated to
a position of astonishing power (80). He imposed calm on the
regiments at the funeral of the King, preventing a collision of
possibly bloody proportions (81); he ordered the promotion of
the Indlavela regiment to the councils of the realm (82); and he
was given sole authority and control over European and concessionaire
affairs. It was after the meeting that ratified that decision that
Offy reveals an unimagined side to his personality. "I shall never
forget the scene”, he wrote in his diary,
Alone with the whole nation represented. All 
looking to me, treating me as their king for 
Father's sake, and clinging to me because 
Father was owner of the Nation...Never in a 
savage country has the whole nation done as 
they did and sign such a document...I am in a 
fix with a tremendous burden on my shoulders
(79) T.S.C., Case 31, File "Offy S” , Offy to Barnes, 15 Sept. 1889.
(80) M.P. Diary of A. Miller, 6 Oct. 1889.
(81) T.S.C., Case 23, Swaziland Diary, 17, 18, 20 Oct. 1889.
(82) Ibid. 3 Nov. 1889.
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to carry now. I only hope I shall carry 
it right and save the Nation. (83).
Offy was an unsuspected sentimentalist, and was showing signs of
even developing a mission!
While this internal wrangling worked its way through to a 
conclusion, two Anglo/Boer Commissions had visited Swaziland, 
which between them put the seal on Swaziland's loss of independence, 
although not the precise form that the subordination would take.
It remains in this chapter to outline the steps which led to 
this result.
Sometime towards the end of 1886 the High Commissioner, Robinson, 
had lost patience with the equivocations of the British Govern­
ment or Mbandzeni, and came down firmly against the idea of the 
British assuming control. In a memorandum written to the 
Secretary of State, Stanhope, in October of that year, he argued 
that the British were under no treaty obligation to maintain the 
independence of the Swazi, and would find it extremely difficult 
for themselves to take control. Swaziland was difficult of 
access, being surrounded on three sides by Republican territory, 
and all that was permitted to the British in terms of the London 
Convention was to appoint a Border Commissioner, who would then 
be saddled with great responsibility but not the slightest 
control. The British Government should therefore reconsider its 
attitudes to the likely alternatives, which were an independent 
digger or grazier Republic, or eventual annexation to the Trans-
(83) Ibid, 20-21 Oct. 1889.
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vaal (84). Robinson never thereafter strayed from this view, 
pushing it forward time and time again when Swaziland was 
discussed, and was a major influence on Britain’s failure to 
assume any responsibility in the area.
The permanent officials at the Colonial Office took the 
diametrically opposite view, and it is a measure of his influence 
that their voice was never adequately heard. While they . 
recommended the establishment of a British Resident or a British 
Protectorate with every new incident in Swaziland, Robinson 
inveighed repeatedly against the assumption of "responsibility 
without jurisdiction", and undercut much of the ground on which 
they might otherwise have stood (85). Robinson was also power­
fully supported by imperial inertia and by the Law Officers of 
the Crown. In an opinion handed down in February 1887, the Law 
Officers concluded that Britain was precluded by Article XII of 
the Convention of London from declaring a Protectorate over 
Swaziland, and this guided British thinking until 1889 (86).
Other intervention was ruled out by a seeming incapacity to act. 
Holland,who succeeded Stanley as the new Secretary of State, was
(84) C.O. 879/25, Africa No. 33, 1-2, Robinson to Stanhope, 12 Dec.
1886, encl. memo by Robinson on Swaziland, 9 Oct. 1886;
Robinson, ’Swaziland’, 286-7.
(85) P.P. 1887, C.5089, 3, No. 2, Robinson to Stanhope, 26 Jan. 1887;ibid, 
31, No. 18, Robinson to Holland, 2 Feb. 1887; ibid, 10, No.
5, Robinson to Holland, telegram, 19 Feb. 1887; ibid, 18, No.
11, Robinson to Holland, 7 March 1887; C.O. 417/13, High 
Commissioner to S.St.,No. 24, 26 Jan. 1887, minutes by Hemming^: 
and Herbert, 16 Feb. 1887; ibid, No. 44, minutes by Hemming,
Bramston and Herbert, 3 March 1887; ibid, telegram 19 Feb.
1887, minutes by Herbert, Holland, 21-22 Feb. 1887; C.O. 417/
14, H.C. to S.St.,telegram., 7 March 1887, minutes by Hemming, 
Herbert, Holland, 8-9 March 1887; below, 420.
(86) Sw.A., Folder No. 5 (from Lesotho), Conf. Knutsford to Acting 
High Commissioner, 2 Aug. 1889, encl. Law Officers to C.O.,
8 Feb. 1887; C.O. 417/13, No. 84, H.C. to S.St.,9 Feb. 1887, 
minute by Holland, 1 April 1887.
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in theory predisposed to help the Swazi against the Republic, 
if only to escape the philanthropic and capitalist pressures which a 
Republican takeover would bring, yet he postponed decisive action 
in the matter on an endless succession of trivial or spurious 
grounds. At the beginning of 1887 it was the misplaced hope that 
Shepstone would be able to regulate the anarchy which had arisen 
from concessions, and the wish to discover whether the mining 
capitalists in the country would foot the bill for a British 
Resident (87); in March/April it was the need to consult the 
South African representatives to the Colonial Conference being 
held in London (88); in April/May the more substantial argument 
that the Cabinet could never act without a crisis (89); and in 
September the hope, carefully cultivated by Robinson, that the 
White Committee might be establishing a viable administration in 
the country (90). Nevertheless, Holland was conscious, in a 
way that Robinson never needed to be, of the pressures that could 
be brought to bear by philanthropic and speculative interests if 
Swaziland were to be thrown to the wolves. As Herbert minuted 
on Robinson’s first reiteration of his memorandum to Stanhope,
Sir Hercules "strangely misapprehends ’public opinion'", and in 
this view Holland evidently concurred, as can be seen from his 
subsequent efforts to stall a decision either one way or the
(87) Ibid, No. 24, H.C. to S.St.,26 Jan. 1887, minute by Holland,
22 Feb. 1887; ibid, H.C. to S.S. telegram, 19 Feb. 1887, 
minute by Holland, 22 Feb. 1887.
(88) C.O. 417/14, H.C. to S. St., telegram, 29 March 1887 , minute 
by Holland, 31 March 1887.
(89) Ibid, No. 161, H.C. to S. St.,20 April 1887, minute by Herbert, 
12 May 1887.
(90) C.O. 417/15, No. 319, H.C. to S.St.,18 Aug. 1887, minutes 
by Fairfield, Herbert, Holland, 7, 10, 13 Sept. 1887.
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other (91).
The policy that Holland therefore adopted was one of procrastina- 
tion on the issue of British involvement on the ground, combined 
with a firm discouragement of Republican efforts to extend their 
control, and while in the long run these two objectives were 
clearly incompatible, it was enough to put the brake on Republican 
pressure, at least for a time. The last of P.J. Joubert’s 
personal visits to Swaziland took place in October 1886, and 
during 1887 it was a quasi-autonomous grazier agitation which 
made the running for the Transvaal. In January, J.C. Krogh, a 
Republican official of New Republic fame, was issuing threats 
about the super-imposition of mineral on grazing concessions, 
and spreading panic about a grazier invasion in April; and in 
March, as we have seen, Stoffel Tosen and his party descended 
on Mbekelweni with a similar object in mind (92). When Mbandzeni 
reported these attempts at intimidation to Natal, Robinson was 
all in favour of replying that Britain had not undertaken the 
policing of his country, and he himself would have to repel any 
invasion that occurred, but the Colonial Office and Knutsford 
took a more belligerent view, and telegraphed the Republic to 
keep its subjects under control (93). The S.A.R. replied 
sanctimoniously that it had always respected the Convention, and 
sent affidavits 'proving1 the falsity of the charge, even though
(91) C.O. 417/13, No. 24, H.C. to S.St.,26 Jan. 1887, minute by 
Herbert, 16 Feb. 1887.
(92) Above, 390.
(93) P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 30, No. 16, Robinson to Holland, 29 March 
1887, telegram; C.O. 417/14, H.C. to S.St.,telegram, 29 March 
1887, minutes by Hemming, Bramston, Holland, 30-31 March 1887. 
Holland had also in fact ordered similar action in relation
to a previous complaint about Krogh in January - P.P. 1887,
C. 5089, 18, No. 10, Holland to Robinson, 5 March 1887, telegram.
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these, if anything, left the opposite impression, but the protests 
nevertheless had had their effect (94). On 13th April, State 
Secretary Stiemens instructed J.J. Ferreira, the Border Commissioner 
at Piet Retief, to make sure that Republican subjects did not 
involve themselves illegally in Swazi affairs, and the agitation 
against Mbandzeni and Shepstone immediately died down (95).
Final proof of the collapse of the agitation came when Tosen was 
assaulted by two of his followers, and the party that had grouped 
itself around him comprehensively collapsed.
The agitation did, nevertheless, have a longer term result, 
since it led Holland to broach the question of a Joint Commission 
of investigation together with the Republic (96). Robinson’s 
familiar objections, together with the equally familiar problem 
of cost, meant that the proposal was speedily dropped, but, 
having seen this as a means of re-opening the question, the 
S.A.R. refused to let the matter rest (97). Towards the end of 
1887, moreover, it added a new string to its bow, when with 
Shepstone’s assistance it acquired a railway concession over 
Swaziland, and added quickly those for electricity and telegraphs 
as well (98). The ’Swaziland question' was now assuming its full 
intractable form. On the one hand Britain would not assume 
control for reasons of economy and fear of alienating the Republic,
(94) Ibid, 33, No. 21, Robinson to Holland, 11 April 1887; ibid,
47-8, Encl. in Encl. I in No. 34, Krogh to State Secretary,
6 April 1887; G.H.Z., Vol. 704, ZA 158, Robinson to Havelock,
21 April 1887, encl. memo by H.C. Shepstone, 3 May 1887.
(95) S.N. 105, Letter Book, M. Stiemens to J.J. Ferreira, 18 April 
1887.
(96) P.P. 1887, C. 5089, 50, No. 35, Holland to Robinson, 19 May 1887.
(97) P.P. 1890, C. 6200, 9, No. 3, Robinson to Holland, 6 July 1887;
C.O. 417/15, No. 267, H.C. to S.St.,6 July 1887, minutes by 
Hemming, Herber, Holland, 28-29 July, 2 Aug. 1887.
(98) Above, 394, 415.
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as well as because of the various monopolies the Republic now 
controlled. On the other, the Republic was- prevented from 
realising its ambitions because of the need under the London 
Convention to secure the consent of both Britain and the Swazi 
before it took control, of which the latter in particular was 
impossible to gain. And all the while, of course, Swaziland was 
becoming progressively less governable, as white and black 
became locked in factional strife.
1888 opened with a fresh attempt by the Republic to secure a 
Joint Commission of investigation. As early as September the 
previous year the grazier party had made clear its refusal to 
accept the credentials of the White Committee, and the Committee 
had responded at the beginning of 1888 by proposing that such 
persons should be stripped of their rights (99) . The Republic 
used this evidence of discord to revive the idea of a Joint 
Commission of investigation,and requested that the resolution 
should not be implemented by the Swazi until an investigation 
was made. Somewhat bewildered Mbandzeni agreed, and the Republic 
then coupled this with the threat of new grazier agitation, and 
Mbandzeni's appeal the previous year, together with Holland's 
earlier idea of a Joint Commission, to insist that an investigation 
must be launched (100). It was pretty flimsy stuff, as the
(99) P.P. 1890, C. 6200, 27-30, Encl. in No. 11, extract, Barberton
Herald, 18 Oct. 1887, encl. in Encl. in No. 12, Offy Shepstone
to S.N.A., 10 Oct. 1887; C.O. 417/17, No. 472, H.C. to S.St.,
19 Dec. 1887, encl. extract Cape Argus, 14 Dec. 1887.
(LOO) Sw.A., Folder No. I (from Lesotho), Bok to Robinson, 16 March
1888, encl. Bok to Umbandine, 20 Jan. 1888, encl. Shepstone 
to Bok, 31 Jan. 1888; P.P. C. 6200, 56, Encl. 1 in No. 26,
Bok to Robinson, 20 Jan. 1888; ibid, 64, Encl. 1 in No. 32,
R. Williams to Robinson, 1 March 1888; ibid, 71, Encl. 1 in 
No. 41, telegram Kruger to Robinson, 6 April 1888, 75, No. 43, 
Robinson to Knutsford, 14 April 1888 and subsequent enclosures.
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Colonial Office soon saw, and they refused to take any action 
until they had received confirmation from Mbandzeni. Seeing 
what lay behind the Republic's proposals, Mbandzeni now refused 
to accept an investigation, and the Joint Commission and grazier 
agitation withered a second time (101).
There was now a lull in activity until the turn of the year, 
apart from Mbandzeni's renunciation of his rights over the old 
Little Free State concession, which had been the seat of the 
grazier agitation, and his agreement to its incorporation into 
the Republic should the appropriate authorities agree (102).
Then, in the latter part of December, the State President Kruger 
visited the border, and told a group of Swazi representatives 
that the document had become "old and faded" that had been signed 
at the crowning of Mbandzeni, and that he wanted him to sign 
another in its place (103). The approach Kruger used was not 
exactly subtle, and little progress was made on that particular 
tack. Indeed, in the following months, the Republic's initiative 
became,if anything, even further becalmed as Offy Shepstone 
refused various lucrative offers for his services, and Mbandzeni
,(101) Ibid, 57, Encl. 3 in No. 27, Robinson to Kruger, 21 Jan. 
1887; ibid, 60, Encl. I in No. 29, Havelock to Robinson,
8 Feb. 1888; Encl. 2 in No. 29, Robinson to Havelock, 13 
Feb. 1888, 63, encl. in Encl. in No. 31, S.N.A. Natal to 
Offy Shepstone, 16 Feb. 1888; ibid, 78, encl. in Encl. in 
No. 45, Offy Shepstone to S.N.A., 16 April 1888.
(102) Watson, 'Little Free State', 112-121.
(103) P.P. C. 6200, 100, Encl. I in No. 60, telegram, Havelock
to Robinson, 22 Dec. 1888; ibid, 107, encl. in Encl. in 65, 
Umbandine to Havelock, 5 Jan. 1889; M.P. Diary of A. Miller, 
3, 6 Jan. 1888. (This should in fact be 6 Jan. 1889, as 
the reference to Mjubeka's death on 12 Jan. 1889 makes 
clear).
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sent off an appeal for protection to Natal (104). It was with 
a view to restoring some movement to the situation that the 
Republic made its famous offer in May to renounce its ambitions 
to the north and west of the Republic, in return for a free hand 
between the Swazi border and the coast (105). The Colonial 
Office typically sat on the proposals, pending Robinson's arrival 
in London, and were not shifted until Offy Shepstone made a 
somewhat exaggerated appeal for the intervention of the govern­
ments, in view of the generally unsettled state of the country, 
and disturbances that might arise at the White Committee elections 
in July (106). The Republic seized on Shepstone's message with 
great joy and jubiliation, while the Colonial Office as usual 
tried to weather the storm. This time, however, the Republic 
was not to be baulked, and sent their own Commissioner, Smit, in 
spite of the Colonial Office's request to confer. The Colonial 
Office's hand was finally forced, and it sent its own Commissioner, 
Martin, hot on Smit's heels (107).
The results of the Commission have been documented fully else­
where, and only need the barest summary here (108). The White
(104) T.S.C., Case 23, Swaziland Diary, 11 Jan. 1889; ibid, Case 
20, File "Offy S", Offy to Helen, 13 Jan. 1889; G.H.N.,857,No. 
G. 71a/89, Miller to Havelock, 28 Feb. 1889, encl. Petition
to Robinson from Umbandine, 28 Feb. 1889.
(105) P.P. 1890, C. 6200, 53, Encl. in No. 93, Bok to Smythe, 
telegram, 3 May 1889.
(106) S.N.A. Vol. 1/1/300, No. 1147/1903, Encl. Offy Shepstone 
to Mitchell, 25 May 1890.
(107) P.P. 1890, C. 6200, 161-2, No. 99, Smythe to Knutsford,
5 June 1889, telegram; No. 100, Smythe to Knutsford, 6 June 
1889; 163, Knutsford to Smythe, 12 June 1889, telegram.
(108) Garson, 'Swaziland', 292-6, 302-6, 312-415.
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Committee elections were postponed sine die, although the meeting 
itself took place on July 29th, and Mbandzeni was persuaded to 
extend the existing Committee's term of office for another 
three months. With the situation stabilised to some extent, the 
Commissioners left, and three months later a Joint Commission, 
comprising Sir F. de Winton and P.J. Joubert, arrived in Swazi­
land. Sir Francis had been given instructions only to investigate 
and report, but while in Pretoria he had reached a provisional 
agreement with the Republic, whereby the Commissioners would 
establish a provisional administration for whites in the country, 
and would leave over concessionaire claims to a special concessions 
tribunal. When the Commissioners finally set foot in Swaziland 
they found the situation already changed. Mbandzeni was dead; 
Shepstone had been re-instated; and the White Committee was 
defunct. Consequently, in accordance with the desires of the 
Queen Regent and her council, they co-opted Shepstone onto a 
provisional Government Committee, in which Martin of Britain and 
Esselen of the S.A.R. were the other two representatives. This 
remained essentially the situation for the next five years, even 
though it had been intended to be a purely 'stop-gap' arrangement, 
until a final decision was reached. Nevertheless, the change in 
Swaziland's status that this implied was in another sense 
decisive and final. All that remained was the diplomatic horse- 
trading over the terms under which the Republic would take 
control. The political and economic subversion of the country 
by concessionaires had ensured that it could never revert to its 
previous independent status.
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CONCLUSION
The Swazi kingdom grew out of the pressures associated with 
competition for trade, particularly with the Tembe, and com­
petition for the rich resources of Shiselweni. While centred 
on this area from c. 1760-1820, it acquired some of its 
characteristic features, notably the dominance of a Dlamini 
based aristocracy; a dual monarchy sharing power between the 
king and his mother; and a partially developed regimental 
system. Towards the end of that period the Swazi came under 
growing pressure from the south, and were forced to colonise 
the land lying north of the Lusutfu River. Here they remained 
for some while a nation under arms, as they plundered the other 
peoples living in the area and were themselves swept about by 
the currents of the Mfecane.
In time, a more settled administration developed as the 
aristocracy spread out from the royal capitals at Ezulwini, 
to assume physical control over the land that it ruled, and 
the process gathered speed in the reign of Sobhuza's successor, 
Mswati, as he attempted a fuller integration of the country 
through the regimental system, and reduced the autonomy of 
regional chiefs. It is in this period that one can talk of 
Dlamini power being entrenched, and of the Swazi developing an 
apparatus of state. On the one hand one sees the appropriation 
of surplus on an institutionalised basis, as opposed to the 
predatory looting that had previously been the case, and the 
emergence of a single stratified society, as against a number
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of societies living in proximity, of which the strongest raided 
from the rest. On the other, one perceives the developing 
institutions of state as the means of representing the interests 
of various classes in society, and of legitimising the existing 
distribution of power (1). In this context the role of the 
regiments was particularly critical, since they were in them­
selves a means of labour appropriation, yet also operated to 
redistribute the surplus appropriated through raiding, and 
provided an avenue of upward mobility to the dominated class (2). 
As a result, by the time of Mswati's death in 1865, Dlamini 
power was sufficiently entrenched for there to be no serious 
convulsions with the transfer of power, and for a regency to 
function effectively and stably for the following decade.
Political developments were also moulded by pressures from 
outside. Zulu invasions continually threatened the political 
and economic order, and it is no accident that a full consoli­
dation of state had to await the end of the Zulu raids. The 
Swazi were also forced by these attacks to look for allies in 
the Boers, and to grant a number of territorial concessions 
between 1846 and 1875. Nevertheless, the relations that were 
established were not markedly unequal, since the Republic was
(1) Hindess and Hirst, Pre-capitalist, 21-41, 198-200, 225.
(2) Two of the most famous warriors rewarded in this way 
were Ndlaludzaka Dlamini and Gija Mabuza, Nxumalo, 'Oral 
Tradition', 20-21, Ngobozane Dlamini 13 Oct. 1973, 35, 
Joseph Dlamini, Jan. 1974, 37-41, Mfolweni Dlamini,
10 Feb. 1974; interview Mpholweni Dlamini (who is the 
same person as the above).
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equally dependent on the Swazi in various ways. As a result 
the Swazi were able to take control of the lowveld, as far north 
as the Limpopo, and in the 1860s reached the pinnacle of their 
power.
The consolidation of the Republic following the discovery of 
gold, and its annexation by Britain, meant that this freedom 
was gradually lost, and in the 1880s pressure began mounting on 
Swaziland itself. The clearest index can be seen in the country’s 
conquest by concessions, which may in turn have been helped by 
its highly stratified society, and these were eventually so 
subversive of political order that they provided the pretext on 
which the Republic and Britain could intervene.
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APPENDIX
REGISTRATION OF CONCESSIONS
. Registered 
by
Name of 
Concessionaire
Description 
of Concession
Date of 
Grant
Lessack, Ephraim Sole right of auctioneering 22 Feb. ’89
Lessack, Ephraim M " photography t i
Eckersley, Fred Farm and right to sulpur
springs, Inkanini Valley n
King Jackson, Rev.Joel Mineral rights 12 Oct. ’86
Rudolph, G.J. Farm 27 Feb. ’89
Pigg’s Peak Co. Renewal of mineral lease 28 Feb. ’89
Gordon, Charles Electro-chemical gold
and silver process i t
McNab, Robert Renewal of old right to
Lebombo farm 6 M a r . ’89
McNab, Robert Monopoly for tanning and
tanneries i i
Mr. Shepstone Murray, Alexander Mineral 26 Feb. f87
McNab, Robert Monopoly for sale of
patent medicines 6 Mar. ’89
Wells, Michael Insranee and Assurance 12 M ar. ’89
Mr. Shepstone Bothma, C.J.,
Steyn, H. and
J. Grazing right 29 Jan. ’84
Mr. Shepstone McCrudy Mineral right •  •
Mr Shepstone Davis, Alexander,
Morris, James Mineral 30 April ’87
Wilson, W.G.D. Monopoly for lotteries 28 Mar. ’89
Mr. Shepstone Bird, William Mineral 30 M ar. ’87
M r .'Shepstone Forbes Reef G.M.
Co. Mineral •  •
M r ._ Shepstone Maber, G.L.D. Printing 20 Jan. ’89
14 Feb.’89
Simpkins, S.H. Rights to deal in spirits
on How and Wyldesdale
Mineral Concessions 3 April ’89
Harington, J.R. To manufacture and import
diamond drills 20 April ’89
Harington J.R. To build townships i i
Cohen, N.H. Customs (to collect and
receive) i t
Cohen N.H. Tobacco (manufacture and
import) i t
Wdlls, N. Wood and farming, Mananga 23 April ’89
Meikle, Alexander Farming right over mineral
concession 29 Oct. ’89
Campbell, R.M. Steam power 26 April ’89
Mr. Shepstone Stone, Max Horo townships (erection
of) 30 Oct. ’89
Porges, Jules, Agreement re protection
Eckstein, H. of properties 1 May ’89
Mr. Shepstone Renny Tailycur,
E.R. Manufacture cement 7 May ’89
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REGISTRATION OF CONCESSIONS
Registered Name of Description Date <of
by Concessionaire of Concession Grant
Ewing, Andrew Milling 8 Sept. '89
Mr..Shepstone Orton, J.H. Mineral 8 June '87
Thorburn, M.F. Gas Manufacture 10 May '89
Thorburn, M.F. Advertising, and Gov. 
Gazette TI
Mr. Shepstone Maber, G.L.D. Mineral 22 June '87
13 May.-'89 Miller Allister,
M. Farm Lebombo 8 Dec. '88
Mr Shepstone Forbes and
Henderson Mineral 28 May '88
Gordon, Charles Oil extraction 18 May '89
Scott, W.
(Havelock) Agreement re taxation t i
Verrall, C.H. Pawnbroking and Orphan
Chambers 28 May '89
Mr. Shepstone Freeman, C.V. ) Trading and store rights
Maber, G.L.D. ) on Mdimba 17 Oct '89
Henwood, J.C. Farm 3 June '89
Henwood, James C. Store right i t
McNab, Robert Right of wood on western 
slopes of Lebombo from 
Umbelosi South. The 
wood around caves not
to be cut. 21 June '89
Fraser, James Trading right south of
Usuto 21 June '89
Botha, T.J. Grazing 5 Jan. '80
Steyn, H.J. Grazing i t
Mr. Shepstone Tosen, C.J. 
Hutchinson, Geo.
Grazing
Farm over Kobolondo
10 Sept .  '8*
Concession 20 June '89
Leadley, Fred Farm Pigg's Peak 26 June '89
Pigg, William Farm Black Diamond Creek 18 June '89
27th June *89 Towson, William 
Forbes, David
Grazing rights
Wood right over Acton's
15 June '80
and Lebombo Concession 18 June '89
Forbes, David Wood right over Forbes' 
Coal Concession i t
Forbes, David Wood right over Necoman's
Concession 26 June '89
Trent, S ., Maber,
G.L.D. Farm (renewal of old grant) 27 June '89
Rathbone, Thos. Wood right over Seaforth •
B. Concession 27 June '89
Cohen, N.H. Importation of machinery 6 July '89
Cohen, N.H. Importation of cement i i
Harington, J.R. Central reduction Mills i i
Mr. Shepstone Botha, J.P. and
M. Grazing 4 July '81
Vandermerwe, J.P.
and G. Grazing 7 July '80
Middleton, Henry Farm 6 July '89
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Registered Name of Description Date of
by Concessionaire of Concession Grant
Lessack, R. Right to apply for 
concessions 9 July '89
Harington, J.R. Power of Attorney to 
collect King's private
revenue 6 July ’89
Parkinson, J. Farm and store 7 July ’89
Ewing, Andrew Farm it
Major, J.A. Farm and store rights 19 July ’89
Pincocks and Extension for 50 years of
Bogie mineral right 18 June ’89
Vandermerwe,
P.J.J., Van
Rensburg, H.W.J .
Van Rensburg,
F.J.J. Grazing rights 2 July '89
Delange, H.D.
Labuschagnie Grazing right 27 July '88
Mr. Shepstone Van Rensburg Grazing right 7 July '80
M r . Shepstone Grobelaar, S,F. Grazing 4 July '88
Mr. Shepstone Joubert, D.,
Joubert, P. Grazing right 22 June ’82
M r . Shepstone Veldtmann, F.J.
Botha, J. Grazing right 22 June '82
M r . Shepstone Klupper, C.C. Farm 3 March '88
3 March ’88
Maritz, T.J. Grazing 15 June '88
M r . Shepstone Camming, George Farm, also trading right 8 Sept. '89
M r . Shepstone Kemp, J.J. Grazing right 20 Oct. ’85
Mr. Shepstone Groening, C. Farm Usutu 6 July ’88
M r . Shepstone Nel, S., Nel, 
J.P.
Grazing right 7 June '87
M r . Shepstone Maritz, F. 
Joubert, D.S.
Grazing right 22 June ’87
Joubert, G. Grazing right 25 April ’88
M r . Shepstone D.J. Joubert,
G. Joubert,
S. Bothma,
M.J.J. Grobelaar,
J.N. Grobelaar,
Jacob Steyn 
W.F. Joubert 
C.G. Steenkamp 
J.H. Bothma
J.S. Joubert Grazing right 11 May ’88
Mr. Shepstone McNab, Robert Farm, Jobbe’s 5 July ’88
Faddy William Wood right 21 June ’89
Grazing
Mr. Shepstone Joubert, C.
Gerhardus,
Joubert, P.C.,
Bekker, J.C. 19 May ’88
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Registered Name of Description Date of
by Concessionaire of Concession Grant
Mr. Shepstone Bester, H. Grazing 6 Aug. ’80
Mr. Shepstone J. Englebucht,
C. Englebucht, 
G. Englebucht, 
G.P. Englebucht 
and D. Engle­
»
21 June ’87
bucht Grazing 6 Aug. ’80
Mr. Shepstone Hatting, C.J.J. 6 July '87
20 July ’89 K1aas Gnamel,
Mabilica Farm 26 July ’80
Purcocks, V.,
Purcocks, B.,
Bogie, A. Mineral 15 Oct. '86
Dupont, E.C. Farm July '88
Mr. Shepstone Schruer, John Mineral 20 Feb. ’87
Mayoss, W.F. Farm 6 Oct. ’89
Ewing, Andrew Wood right, Nomahashes 2 Oct. '89
Cruering, C . Farm, Shlangwana 22 Aug. '80
Wyld, Joseph
Herbert;
Kidson, John
Carlton;
Simpkins,
Samuel Hy. Mineral 15 Sept . '86
Great Ophir Kannemeyer1s Mineral 
Concession n
Gowrie Concession Mineral i i
Horo Farms i i i i
Mr. Shepstone Meyer, T.; 
Lammerding,
F.A. Grazing 20 April *88
31 July '89 Arnoldi, Bernard Grazing right 10 July '89
31 July '89 
5 Aug. '89
Joubert, J.F. Grazing right 7 July '87
Breed, J.H.P. Grazing right 4 Aug. '80
Wyld, J.H. Farm over Wyldesdale 7 Aug. '89
3 Aug. ’89 Mini, Stephen Planting farm 27 Aug. '89
Halle, Gustave Mineral, Mdimba 17 Sept . '88
Craufert, F.M.H.,
and Grobelaar S.Grazing 30 July '83
5 Aug. ’89 Middleton, H.R. Farm Lebombo 25 Aug. '89
Mr. Shepstone Amoretti, Alex. 
Joubert, M.,
Farm Lebombo 1 Dec. '89
Joubert, J. Grazing 12 July '86
National Manu­ Manufacture of Cotton,
facturing Co. Linen, &c. 5 July '88
R. McNab and Alex,
Meikle
Rathbone, T.B.,
Shepstone, W.S. Dynamite and gunpowder 31 March f87
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Mr. Shepstone
25 July '89 
25 July '89
De Klercq, H. 
Klaas Suamels 
Rathbone, T.B.
Van Rooyen, 
R.T.J., Junr. 
Pienaar, N.
(Piet Retief) 
Rathbone, T.B.
Darke, G. 
Rivers, E. 
Krutzinger, J.J. 
Steenkamp, T.C. 
and T.J. and 
G.J. Rudolph 
Krutzinger, P.H. 
Badehhorst, F.L.L 
and W.J.J. 
Watkins, Frank 
Thorburn, John
Town, Henry, 
Thorburn, John
Mr. Shepstone Krogh, J.C.
Davel, J.A.H.
26 July *89
Grazing
Building licence 
Store and farm
Grazing right
Grazing right 
Wool washing and 
pressing 
Farm
Grazing
Grazing
Grazing
Concession for all vacant 
lands south of Komati for 
farming purposes 
Right to bill batteries, 
to trent bailings and 
concentrates 
Grazing 
Grazing
11 July '89
5 April '87
6 July '87
24 July '89
18 July '89 
31 July '88
25 July '89 
25 July '89
18 April '88
26 July '89
9 June '84 
5 May '88
Part of a table in P.P. 1890, C. 6201, Appendix K, Regis­
tration of Concessions.
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